self concept and culture essay

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Culture and the Self

July 26, 2016

Social scientists have long understood that people in different parts of the world see themselves in different ways, but research has often been driven by a rather black-and-white — and some would say stereotypical — view of what the differences are.

In an article just published in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General , Vignoles and colleagues (2016) (PDF, 209KB) introduce a new perspective on cultural differences in self-construal. Funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (UK), and conducted by members of the Culture and Identity Research Network among more than 10,000 members of diverse cultural groups spanning all inhabited continents, their research explodes the common myth of a "West-versus-the-Rest" divide in self-perceptions.

For several decades, psychological scientists have commonly assumed that Western cultures foster seeing oneself as independent from others, whereas the rest of the world's cultures foster seeing oneself as interdependent with others. Critics have argued that this view of cultural diversity is too simplistic, but it has remained a dominant assumption in the field — and researchers often explain unsupportive findings away as methodological failures rather than question it.

The new research paints a much richer picture of diversity in cultural models of selfhood. It shows that Western cultures tend to emphasize certain ways of being independent (e.g., being different from others, self-directed, and self-expressive), but not others (e.g., being self-interested, self-reliant, and consistent across contexts).

Viewed in global context, Western cultures are not "exceptional" but they form part of the broad kaleidoscope of global variation. Nor is cultural individualism linked straightforwardly to independent self-perceptions, as has been commonly presumed. Different ways of seeing oneself as both independent and interdependent were emphasized in different parts of the world, and this was partly explained by socioeconomic development and religious heritage of the cultural groups studied.

The findings will be important to practitioners and researchers interested in cultural diversity. They open up new research possibilities that will help researchers better understand how psychological processes vary across the world.

A richer understanding of cultural variation, based firmly on empirical research rather than stereotypes, could help practitioners intervene more effectively with members of diverse cultural communities.

Vignoles, V. L., Owe, E., Becker, M., Smith, P. B., Easterbrook, M. J., Brown, R.,…Bond, M. H. (2016). Beyond the 'east–west' dichotomy: Global variation in cultural models of selfhood. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 145 (8), 966–1000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000175

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How Does Culture Affect the Self Identity Personal Essay

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Introduction

Culture influence on personality identity, chinese – indonesians’ culture in relation to personal identity, how am i shaped and influenced by culture.

Culture or the way of life is attributed to the personality of an individual and makes them who they really are. Self awareness emphasizes the significance of an individual to exist and is attributed to social views and practices. It defines individual characteristics and contributes to the diversity of people in the world and this makes life interesting.

Culture and personal identity relate closely and are dependent on each other. Construction of identities is within individual in relation to a particular historical background and organization. This paper shall explore the personality trait explained above and explain the contribution that culture has made.

The vibrant Indonesian culture is ethnic and is also being influenced by countries such as China and India which neighbor it. Cultural identity is marked by the influence from the family, regional, and religious aspects. For instance, am a mixture of Chinese and Indonesian, born in Indonesia and have lived there my entire life.

My family background is relatively humble although my parents provide for my basic needs. However, Luxuries are not always present when needed. With hard work, the family is better than before since the parents have worked extra hard to make ends meet. Nevertheless, the initial financial constrains that my family experienced contributed to my personality.

I have come to be known as a girl of low profile since my cultural background has dictated so. I have learnt to save money and use it on important things only. In addition, I’ve learnt to share with others and not to become self-engrossed, an image that I always portray not only to my parents and friends but also to the society at large. This has made me and the whole family relate well with others.

Chinese- Indonesians are an ethnic minority whose culture is heterogeneous. They have been categorized into totok and peranakan. Since peranakan have their birthplace as Indonesia, they are identified with the ethnic regions of Indonesia and they disregard their Chinese origin.

In contrast, the totok has a lesser Indonesian orientation instead, are more of Chinese since them or their parents have been born in china (Aimee 77).

Another distinction is in the commercial activities undertaken by the groups. Totok group are geared on achieving business success and accumulate wealth. Thus, this is reflected in their self-reliance, investment approach, and prowess which are aspects that have greatly influenced my identity.

As a totok I practice a significant cultural value known as the guanxi . It is a concept which points out that for one to succeed, he or she should relate with people who matter and one must harmonize with the environment instead of altering it.

“For instance, through his personal and financial connections with government officials, particularly Suharto, whom he befriended long before he became Indonesia’s president, Liem Sioe Liong amassed a multibillion dollar importer that encompassed the manufacturing of cement and steel, automobile distribution …” (Aimee 78).

The example emphasizes the aggressiveness of the totok which in turn has taught me to avoid being self-centered but instead count on others in every activity I undertake in life.

On the other hand, the peranakan base their engagements on merit hence are not very successful in the Indonesian commercialism. Therefore, being a totok means that the culture has dictated my hardworking nature and most significantly, my networking and social nature. This has in turn affected my personality of being considerate of others and avoiding being self-centered.

Religious aspects, social environment, and distinct originality have had a strong effect on my identity. Being a Chinese- Indonesian I have learnt proper use of money and resources in order to become successful in life contribute to my identity of being low profile.

The family is a very important institution based on the cultural values if Chinese-Indonesians. Family ties are maintained and preserved by practice of norms such as marriage which ensures solidarity among members (Aimee 74).

It is the role of the parents to teach their children proper manners in life and this has been properly implemented by both of my parents in a strict way which has enabled me to follow the rules and regulations set in various areas quite easily. The family union is relevant to set a good example to the children and ensure happiness in marriage. Marriage is one cultural value that is highly regarded by Chinese-Indonesians.

Indonesian culture is very categorical on religious morals which are elements that are reflected in the entire society and more specifically by my trait of putting others ahead of me and sharing my resources with them. I believe that Sex before marriage is a vice that is forbidden by my culture which helps maintain an environment where children can grow well, become educated, and attain a high degree of moral standards.

Being a Muslim country it is also under the influence of other religions such as Buddhism as well as Hinduism which may as well have played a part on my personal identity. Its cultural, richness is depicted in the country’s art and theatre work such as dances and music.

The economic background, family relations and ethnic distinctions have contributed significantly to the personality trait of being a low profile person who is considerate of others. Moreover, belonging to a Chinese-Indonesian ethnicity means that I have interacted with several cultures.

A multicultural interaction may have similar or contradicting effects on personal identity which is reflected in my personality making it hard to evaluate specifically whether I am of totok o r peranakan origin.

Nevertheless the role played by my immediate family has guided me as I interact with the social environment around me. The culture has enabled me be identified in the society as a low profile woman. This does not only help to deliberately avoid undue prominence but also to exercise personal freedom and acceptance.

Aimee, Dawis. The Chinese of Indonesia and their Search For Identity: The Relationship Between Collective Memory and the Media . New York: Cambria Press. 2009. Print.

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Exploring The Impact of Culture on The Self

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What Is Self-Concept?

Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

Rachel Goldman, PhD FTOS, is a licensed psychologist, clinical assistant professor, speaker, wellness expert specializing in eating behaviors, stress management, and health behavior change.

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Development
Can It Be Changed?
Self-Concept Theories

Frequently Asked Questions

Self-concept is the image we have of ourselves. It is influenced by many forces, including our interaction with important people in our lives. It is how we perceive our behaviors, abilities, and unique characteristics. For example, beliefs such as "I am a good friend" or "I am a kind person" are part of an overall self-concept.

Other examples of self-concept include:

How you view your personality traits, such as whether you are an extrovert or introvert
How you see your roles in life, such as whether you feel that being a parent, sibling, friend, and partner are important parts of your identity
The hobbies or passions that are important to your sense of identity, such as being a sports enthusiast or belonging to a certain political party
How you feel about your interactions with the world, such as whether you feel that you are contributing to society

Our self-perception is important because it affects our motivations , attitudes, and behaviors . It also affects how we feel about the person we think we are, including whether we are competent or have self-worth.

Self-concept tends to be more malleable when we're younger and still going through self-discovery and identity formation . As we age and learn who we are and what's important to us, these self-perceptions become much more detailed and organized.

At its most basic, self-concept is a collection of beliefs one holds about oneself and the responses of others. It embodies the answer to the question: " Who am I? " If you want to find your self-concept, list things that describe you as an individual. What are your traits? What do you like? How do you feel about yourself?

Rogers' Three Parts of Self-Concept

Humanist psychologist Carl Rogers believed that self-concept is made up of three different parts:

Ideal self : The ideal self is the person you want to be. This person has the attributes or qualities you are either working toward or want to possess. It's who you envision yourself to be if you were exactly as you wanted.
Self-image : Self-image refers to how you see yourself at this moment in time. Attributes like physical characteristics, personality traits , and social roles all play a role in your self-image.
Self-esteem : How much you like, accept, and value yourself all contribute to your self-concept. Self-esteem can be affected by a number of factors—including how others see you, how you think you compare to others, and your role in society.

Incongruence and Congruence

Self-concept is not always aligned with reality. When it is aligned, your self-concept is said to be congruent . If there is a mismatch between how you see yourself (your self-image) and who you wish you were (your ideal self), your self-concept is incongruent . This incongruence can negatively affect self-esteem .

Rogers believed that incongruence has its earliest roots in childhood. When parents place conditions on their affection for their children (only expressing love if children "earn it" through certain behaviors and living up to the parents' expectations), children begin to distort the memories of experiences that leave them feeling unworthy of their parents' love.

Unconditional love, on the other hand, helps to foster congruence. Children who experience such love—also referred to as family love —feel no need to continually distort their memories in order to believe that other people will love and accept them as they are.

How Self-Concept Develops

Self-concept develops, in part, through our interaction with others. In addition to family members and close friends, other people in our lives can contribute to our self-identity.

For instance, one study found that the more a teacher believes in a high-performing student's abilities, the higher that student's self-concept. (Interestingly, no such association was found with lower-performing students.)

Self-concept can also be developed through the stories we hear. As an example, one study found that female readers who were "deeply transported" into a story about a leading character with a traditional gender role had a more feminist self-concept than those who weren't as moved by the story.

The media plays a role in self-concept development as well—both mass media and social media . When these media promote certain ideals, we're more likely to make those ideals our own. And the more often these ideals are presented, the more they affect our self-identity and self-perception.

Can Self-Concept Be Changed?

Self-concept is not static, meaning that it can change. Our environment plays a role in this process. Places that hold a lot of meaning to us actively contribute to our future self-concept through both the way we relate these environments to ourselves and how society relates to them.

Self-concept can also change based on the people with whom we interact. This is particularly true with regard to individuals in our lives who are in leadership roles. They can impact the collective self (the self in social groups) and the relational self (the self in relationships).

In some cases, a medical diagnosis can change self-concept by helping people understand why they feel the way they do—such as someone receiving an autism diagnosis later in life, finally providing clarity as to why they feel different.

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Other Self-Concept Theories

As with many topics within psychology , a number of other theorists have proposed different ways of thinking about self-concept.

Social Identity

Social psychologist Henri Tajfel developed social identity theory, which states that self-concept is composed of two key parts:

Personal identity : The traits and other characteristics that make you unique
Social identity : Who you are based on your membership in social groups, such as sports teams, religions, political parties, or social class

This theory states that our social identity influences our self-concept, thus affecting our emotions and behaviors. If we're playing sports, for instance, and our team loses a game, we might feel sad for the team (emotion) or act out against the winning team (behavior).

Multiple Dimensions

Psychologist Bruce A. Bracken had a slightly different theory and believed that self-concept was multidimensional, consisting of six independent traits:

Academic : Success or failure in school
Affect : Awareness of emotional states
Competence : Ability to meet basic needs
Family : How well you work in your family unit
Physical : How you feel about your looks, health, physical condition, and overall appearance
Social : Ability to interact with others

In 1992, Bracken developed the Multidimensional Self-Concept Scale, a comprehensive assessment that evaluates each of these six elements of self-concept in children and adolescents.

Self-concept development is never finished. Though one's self-identity is thought to be primarily formed in childhood, your experiences as an adult can also change how you feel about yourself. If your self-esteem increases later in life, for instance, it can improve your self-concept.

Our self-concept can affect the method by which we communicate. If you feel you are a good writer, for instance, you may prefer to communicate in writing versus speaking with others.

It can also affect the way we communicate. If your social group communicates a certain way, you would likely choose to communicate that way as well. Studies on teens have connected high self-concept clarity with more open communication with parents.

Self-concept refers to a broad description of ourselves ("I am a good writer") while self-esteem includes any judgments or opinions we have of ourselves ("I feel proud to be a good writer"). Put another way, self-concept answers the question: Who am I? Self-esteem answers the question: How do I feel about who I am?

Our self-concept impacts how we respond to life, so a well-developed self-concept helps us respond in ways that are more positive and beneficial for us. One of the ways it does this is by enabling us to recognize our worth. A well-developed self-concept also helps keep us from internalizing negative feedback from others.

Different cultures have different beliefs. They have different ideas of how dependent or independent one should be, different religious beliefs, and differing views of socioeconomic development.

All of these cultural norms influence self-concept by providing the structure of what is expected within that society and how one sees oneself in relation to others.

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Richter T, Appel M, Calio F. Stories can influence the self-concept . Social Influence . 2014;9(3):172-88. doi:10.1080/15534510.2013.799099

Vandenbosch L, Eggermont S. The interrelated roles of mass media and social media in adolescents' development of an objectified self-concept: A longitudinal study . Communc Res . 2015. doi:10.1177/0093650215600488

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Stagg SD, Belcher H. Living with autism without knowing: receiving a diagnosis in later life . Health Psychol Behav Med . 2019;7(1):348-361. doi:10.1080/21642850.2019.1684920

Tajfel H, Turner J. An integrative theory of intergroup conflict . In: Hogg MA, Abrams D, eds. Intergroup Relations: Essential Readings. Psychology Press:94–109.

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By Kendra Cherry, MSEd Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

What is Self-Concept Theory? A Psychologist Explains

What is Self-Concept Theory in Psychology? Definition + Examples (PDF)

You might answer with “ I’m a mother ,” or, “ I’m a therapist, ” or maybe, “ I’m a believer, ” “ I’m a good friend, ” “ I’m a brother. ”

Maybe you answer with, “ I am excellent at my job, ” “ I’m an accomplished musician, ” or “ I’m a successful athlete. ”

Other responses might fall into the category of traits: “ I’m a kind-hearted person, ” “ I’m intelligent and hard-working, ” or “ I’m laid-back and easy-going. ”

These responses come from your internal sense of who you are. This sense is developed early in life, but it goes through constant evaluation and adjustment throughout the lifespan.

In psychology, this sense of self has a specific term: self-concept.

Before you read on, we thought you might like to download our three Self-Compassion Exercises for free . These detailed, science-based exercises will not only help you understand and show more compassion and kindness to yourself but will also give you the tools to help your clients, students or employees improve their self-compassion.

This Article Contains:

What is self-concept a definition, self-concept theory, the components and elements of the self-concept model, the development stages of self-concept, 10 examples of self-concept, research on self-concept, measuring self-concept with scales, tests, and inventories, self-concept activities and lesson plans for preschoolers and older students (pdf), self-concept worksheets (pdf), 8 quotes on self-concept, a take-home message.

Self-concept is an overarching idea we have about who we are—physically, emotionally, socially, spiritually, and in terms of any other aspects that make up who we are (Neill, 2005). We form and regulate our self-concept as we grow, based on the knowledge we have about ourselves. It is multidimensional, and can be broken down into these individual aspects.

For example, you may have a very different idea of who you are in terms of your physical body, and who you are in terms of your spirit or soul.

The influential self-efficacy researcher Roy Baumeister (1999) defines self-concept as follows:

“The individual’s belief about himself or herself, including the person’s attributes and who and what the self is.”

A similar definition comes from Rosenberg’s 1979 book on the topic; he says self-concept is:

“…the totality of an individual’s thoughts and feelings having reference to himself as an object.”

Self-concept is related to several other “self” constructs, such as self-esteem, self-image, self-efficacy, and self-awareness. In the following section, we will explain these slight—yet important—differences.

Self-Concept vs. Self-Esteem

Self-concept is not self-esteem, although self-esteem may be a part of self-concept. Self-concept is the perception that we have of ourselves, our answer when we ask ourselves the question “Who am I?”

It is knowing about one’s own tendencies, thoughts, preferences and habits, hobbies, skills, and areas of weakness. According to Carl Rogers, founder of client-centered therapy , self-concept is an overarching construct that self-esteem is one of the components of it (McLeod, 2008).

Self-Concept vs. Self-Image

Self-image is related to self-concept but is less broad. Self-image is how an individual sees themselves, and it does not have to align with reality.

A person’s self-image is based on how they see themselves, while self-concept is a more comprehensive evaluation of the self, largely based on how a person sees themselves, values themselves, thinks about themselves, and feels about themselves.

Carl Rogers posited that self-image is a component of self-concept, along with self-esteem or self-worth and one’s “ideal self” (McLeod, 2008).

Self-Concept vs. Self-Efficacy

Self-concept is a more complex construct than self-efficacy. While self-efficacy refers to an individual’s judgments of their own abilities, self-concept is more general and includes both cognitive (thoughts about) and affective (feelings about) judgments about oneself (Bong & Clark, 1999).

Self-Concept vs. Self-Awareness

Self-awareness also influences self-concept. It is the quality or trait that involves conscious awareness of one’s own thoughts, feelings, behaviors, and traits (Cherry, 2018A). To have a fully developed self-concept (and one that is based in reality), a person must have at least some level of self-awareness .

We explore this further in The Science of Self-Acceptance Masterclass© .

Generally, theorists agree on the following points:

On the broadest level, self-concept is the overall idea we have about who we are and includes cognitive and affective judgments about ourselves;
Self-concept is multi-dimensional, incorporating our views of ourselves in terms of several different aspects (e.g., social, religious, spiritual, physical, emotional);
It is learned, not inherent;
It is influenced by biological and environmental factors, but social interaction plays a big role as well;
Self-concept develops through childhood and early adulthood when it is more easily changed or updated;
It can be changed in later years, but it is more of an uphill battle since people have established ideas about who they are;
Self-concept does not always align with reality. When it does, our self-concept is “congruent.” When it doesn’t, our self-concept is “incongruent.”

Identity and Self-Concept Theory in Psychology vs. Self-Concept in Sociology

Both psychology and sociology share an interest in self-concept, but they use slightly different ways to explore it. Individual researchers vary, of course, but generally, the divide can be thought of in these terms:

Sociology/social psychology focuses on how self-concept develops, specifically within the context of the individual’s social environment.
Psychology focuses on how self-concept impacts people (Gecas, 1982).

There are other differences between the two, including psychology’s general focus on the individual versus sociology’s focus on the group, community, or society; however, this difference in focus has led to two diverse research streams. Both have resulted in great insights and interesting findings, and they sometimes overlap, but this divide can still be seen in the literature today.

Carl Rogers and the Self-Concept Theory of Personality

Famed psychologist, theorist, and clinician Carl Rogers posited a theory of how self-concept influences and, indeed, acts as the framework for, one’s personality.

The image we have of who we are contributes to our personality, and our actions—combined with our personality —create a feedback loop into our image of ourselves. Rogers believed that our personality is driven by our desire for self-actualization . This is the condition that emerges when we reach our full potential and our self-concept, self-worth, and ideal self all overlap (Journal Psyche, n.d.).

How we develop our personalities and self-concepts varies, thus creating the unique individuals we are. According to Rogers, we always strive for self-actualization, some with more success than others.

How do people go about striving for self-actualization and congruence? This relates to the idea of how anyone “maintains” their idea of themselves. We explore that next.

Self-Concept Maintenance Theory

Self-Concept and Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs

Self-concept maintenance refers to how people maintain or enhance their sense of self. It is relatively fixed after a person reaches adulthood, but it can—and does—change based on the person’s experiences.

The theory of self-concept maintenance states that we do not simply sit and wait for our self-concept to develop: we take an active role in shaping our self-concept at all ages (whether we are aware of this or not).

Although there are different theories about the processes of self-concept maintenance, it generally concerns:

Our evaluations of ourselves
Our comparison of our actual selves with our ideal selves
Our actions taken to move closer to our ideal selves (Munoz, 2012).

This may seem like a pretty logical and straightforward process, but we tend to give ourselves room for moral ambiguity. For example, a study by Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2007) showed that people will generally engage in beneficial dishonesty when given the opportunity. However, these same people might not revise their self-concept to incorporate this dishonesty.

When participants in the study were prompted to be more aware of their internal standards for honesty , they were less likely to engage in beneficial dishonesty; on the other hand, when given a “degrees of freedom” (greater separation between their actions and the rewards they would receive for dishonesty), they were more likely to engage in dishonesty—with no impact to their self-concept.

This is one example of the work on self-concept maintenance, as humans constantly assess themselves and their moral code since it influences their identity and actions.

Self-Concept Clarity and Self-Concept Differentiation

Self-concept clarity is different from self-concept.

Self-concept clarity (SCC) refers to how clear, confident, and consistent an individual’s definitions of themselves are (Diehl & Hay, 2011). Self-concept differentiation (SCD) refers to how an individual’s self-representation may vary across contexts or social roles (e.g., self as a spouse, self as a parent, self as a student).

SCC and SCD are hot topics in psychology since they influence thought patterns and behavior.

Higher SCC indicates a firmer and more stable self-concept, while low SCC indicates that an individual is unclear or vague about who they really are. Those with low SCC may struggle with low self-esteem, self-consciousness, and neuroticism.

SCD is not as clear-cut. Having a high SCD may be viewed as a bad thing, but it can also be an effective coping mechanism for succeeding in the modern world where individuals have many different roles. If SCD is very high, it might mean that the individual does not have a stable self-concept and “wears a different mask” for each of their roles.

A very low level of SCD may indicate that the individual is authentically “them” across all of their roles—although it may also indicate that he cannot effectively switch from one role to another (Diehl & Hay, 2011).

Essentially, people who differentiate their roles slightly, yet maintain a clear image of themselves, may succeed most at finding balance in their identity and image.

The Components and Elements of the Self-Concept Model

There are different ideas about what self-concept consists of, and how it should be defined; however, there are some characteristics and dimensions that apply to the basic, agreed-upon conceptualization of self-concept.

Characteristics of Self-Concept

As a brief review, self-concept is the perspective we have on who we are. Each of us has a unique self-concept, different from the self-concept of others and from their concept of us.

However, there are some characteristics that all of our self-concepts have in common.

Self-concept:

Displays uniquely with each person.
Vary from very positive to very negative.
Carries emotional, intellectual, and functional dimensions.
Changes with the context.
Changes over time.
Influence the individual’s life (Delmar Learning, n.d.)

Dimensions of Self-Concept

Different dimensions may constitute different kinds of self-concept; for example, the dimensions that create “academic self-efficacy” will not have as much overlap with “social self-efficacy.”

There are some overarching dimensions that researchers understand with the self-concept puzzle. These dimensions include:

Self-esteem
Self-image (physical)
Identities or roles (social)
Personal traits and qualities (Elliot, 1984; Gecas, 1982)

Early childhood is a ripe time for young humans to perceive themselves in the world.

The Formation of Self-Concept During Early Childhood

There are three general stages of self-concept development during early childhood:

Stage 1 : 0 to 2 years-old a. Babies need consistent, loving relationships to develop a positive sense of self. b. Babies form preferences that align with their innate sense of self. c. Toddlers feel secure with gentle but firm limits d. At age two, language skill develops and toddlers have a sense of “me.”
Stage 2 : 3 to 4 years-old a. Three and four-year-olds begin to see themselves as separate and unique individuals. b. Their self-images tend to be descriptive rather than prescriptive or judgmental. c. Preschoolers are increasingly independent and curious about what they can do.
Stage 3 : 5 to 6 years-old a. They are transitioning from the “me” stage to the “us” stage, where they are more aware of the needs and interests of the larger group. b. Kindergarteners can use their words to communicate their wants, needs, and feelings. c. Five and six-year-olds can use even more advanced language to help define themselves within the context of the group (Miller, Church, & Poole, n.d.).

Self-Concept in Middle Childhood

During middle childhood (about 7 to 11 years old), children are beginning to develop a sense of their social selves and figuring out how they fit in with everyone else. They reference social groups and make social comparisons more often, and begin to think about how others see them.

Other characteristics of their self-concept at this stage include:

More balanced, less all-or-none descriptions
Development of the ideal and real self
Descriptions of the self by competencies instead of specific behaviors
Development of a personal sense of self (Berk, 2004)

Culture begins to play a big role at this stage, but we’ll talk more about that later.

The Development of Self-Concept in Adolescence

Adolescence is where the development of one’s self-concept really explodes.

This is the stage in which individuals (about age 12-18) play with their sense of self, including a time when they experiment with their identity, compare themselves with others, and develop the basis of a self-concept that may stay with them the rest of their life.

During this period, adolescents are prone to greater self-consciousness and susceptibility to the influence of their peers and chemical changes happening in the brain (Sebastian, Burnett, & Blakemore, 2008).

They enjoy greater freedom and independence, engage in increasingly competitive activities, compare themselves with their peers, and can value (even over-value) the perspective of others (Manning, 2007).

In adolescence, there are two important factors that influence self-concept and self-worth:

Success in areas in which the adolescent desires success
Approval from significant people in the adolescent’s life (Manning, 2007).

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You may have a good handle on what self-concept is but these examples can help explain it more.

Self-concepts are rarely all positive or all negative; someone may have both positive and some negative self-concepts in different domains (e.g., a husband who thinks of himself as a good father but sees his physical self as out-of-shape and unhealthy or a student who think so themselves as a great athlete who struggles academically).

Some examples of positive self-concepts include:

A person sees herself as an intelligent person;
A man perceives himself as an important member of his community;
A woman sees herself as an excellent spouse and friend;
A person thinks of himself as a nurturing and caring person;
A person views herself as a hard-working and competent employee.

On the flip side, these people could have negative self-concepts like:

A person sees herself as stupid and slow;
A man perceives himself as expendable and a burden on his community;
A woman sees herself as a terrible spouse and friend;
A person thinks of himself as a cold and unapproachable person;
A person views herself as a lazy and incompetent employee.

We all have many of these mini or domain-specific self-concepts that encompass our self-concept. Some may be more positive or negative than others, and each is an important piece of what makes us who we are.

Self concept, self identity and social identity – Khan Academy

Given the marked interest in this topic within sociology and psychology, there is quite a bit of research out there on the subject. Here are a few of the most interesting and impactful findings on self-concept.

Self-Concept in Marketing and How it Influences Consumer Behavior

It probably won’t shock you that the idea of self-concept has made its way into marketing—after all, brands and companies can profit from targeting certain desirable identities. In fact, it is the basis of fashion and consumerism.

Our self-concept influences our wants and needs, and can also shape our behavior. Whether it is true or not, we tend to believe that our purchases will help establish our identity. There is a reason why people buy certain clothing, cars, etc.

And this idea has a name: self-concept attachment.

Self-Concept Attachment

Self-concept attachment refers to the attachment we form to a product as it influences identity. For example, someone who loves their Patagonia jacket may also consider it as a status symbol that also represents their “outdoorsy” side.

Thus, this jacket has a strong self-concept attachment, in addition to its purpose of providing warmth.

Surprisingly, consumers become more attached to a brand when the brands match their “actual selves” rather than their ideal selves (Malär, Krohmer, Hoyer, & Nyffenegger, 2011). We tend to identify more with brands that “meet us where we are” rather than trying to connect with our higher, ideal selves.

Companies understand this and work to (1) get to know their target consumers better, and (2) mold their brand identity to match the self-concept of their consumers. The more they can get consumers to identify with their brand, the more they will buy that brand.

How Does Self-Concept Affect Interpersonal Communication?

Think about a cycle in which we develop, maintain, and revise our self-concept: we have an idea of who we are, and we act in accordance with that self-concept. Consequently, others form an idea about who we are, and they react in accordance with their idea of who we are, thus impacting our idea of who we are.

This feedback loop continues to shape us, and interpersonal communication plays a big role here.

Our self-concept drives our motivations, methods, and experiences with communicating with others. For example, if you see yourself as someone who is always right (or who must always be right), you may struggle in communicating with others when disagreements arise.

If that need is accompanied by an acceptance of aggression, you may use hostility, assertiveness , and argumentativeness to attack the self-concepts of the people you are debating instead of discussing their positions (Infante & Wigley, 1986).

Communication on social media is also a determinant and an outcome of an individual’s self-concept.

Sponcil and Gitimu (2012) suggested that, in general, the more friends an individual has on social networking sites, the more positively they feel about themselves as a whole. Conversely, the anxiety of social media and maintaining one’s image poses separate issues.

Self-Concept and Academic Achievement

Self-concept and academic achievement is also a positive feedback loop, as actions beget similar actions and identity to match.

In a longitudinal study, Marsh (1990) found that students with more positive academic self-concept achieved greater academic success the following year. Later studies confirmed the relationship between the two but indicated that achievement affects self-concept more than self-concept inherently influences achievement success (Muijs, 2011).

Research by Byrne (1986) offered instead that self-concept and academic self-concept can be considered two separate constructs; academic achievement may impact one’s overall self-concept, but it is most directly related to academic self-concept.

Self-Concept and Career Development

Self-concept develops throughout the lifespan and during any career.

According to researcher Donald Super, there are five life and career development stages:

Growth (Ages 0 to 14)
Exploration (Ages 15 to 24)
Establishment (Age 25 to 44)
Maintenance (Age 45 to 64)
Decline (Age 65+)

The first stage is marked by the development of one’s basic self-concept. In the second stage, able individuals experiment and try out new classes, experiences, and jobs. Stage 3 sees individuals establishing their career and building their skills, likely starting in an entry-level position.

In the fourth stage, individuals engage in a continuous management and adjustment process to both their self-concept and their career. Finally, the fifth stage is characterized by reduced output and preparations for retirement, activities which can have a huge impact on one’s self-concept (Super, Starishevsky, Matlin, & Jordaan, 1963).

Of course, this model assumes equal access and privilege upon entering the workforce, which is not truthful to reality. Not all humans, for example, have the opportunity to explore and establish themselves as easily as others.

Nevertheless, Super posited that self-concept drives career development and can act as a general framework and inspiration for future research in this area, including a social and racial unearthing of Rogers’ theory on self-actualization.

The research could also be conducted on Bandura’s work on self-efficacy, on role salience, and on the idea of multiple identities in career development (Betz, 1994).

Culture and Self-Concept

Unsurprisingly, culture can have a big impact on self-concept. For example, how children are treated in early childhood influences how their sense of self develops.

Many parents might be more concerned with emotions and satisfying the wants of their children, while others may be more firm and controlling of their child’s behavior, worrying about their needs rather than fulfilling their desires. This is a generalization, but one that holds under scrutiny: culture influence self-concept.

Research suggests that those from more collectivist cultures produced more group self-descriptions and fewer idiocentric self-descriptions than those from individualistic cultures (Bochner, 1994).

Further research also indicated that East Asian cultures are more accepting of contradictory beliefs about the self; this indicates that one’s self-concept in these cultures may be more flexible than, say, American culture (Choi & Choi, 2002).

Findings like these are fascinating, but they also reveal how and why it is difficult to measure self-concept. The next section summarizes those attempts.

One’s self-concept does not always align with “reality” or with how others view a person. However, there are still some tools that can measure self-concept.

If you are interested in using a self-concept measure for research purposes, look first at the development of the instrument, the definition it is based on, and the dimensions or components it measures. It’s important that you choose a tool that aligns with the idea of self-concept that your research uses.

Some of the most prominent tools to measure self-concept include:

The Robson Self-Concept Questionnaire (SCQ; Robson, 1989)
The Social Self-Concept Questionnaire (SSC; Fernández-Zabala, Rodríguez-Fernández, & Goñi, 2016)
The Academic Self-Concept Questionnaire (ASCQ; Liu & Wang, 2005)

Self-Concept Questionnaire by Dr. Saraswat

The Self-Concept Questionnaire from Dr. Saraswat (1984) has become a popular choice for measuring self-concept. It consists of 48 items measuring self-concept across six dimensions:

Temperamental;
Educational;
Intellectual.

For each item, the respondent rates how well each item describes their ideas about themselves on a 5-point scale. Higher scores indicate high self-concept, while low scores indicate low self-concept.

This self-concept questionnaire is generally thought of as reliable by researchers, but it is dated.

If you’re looking for a great resource with 10 simple but effective activities for cultivating self-concept in young children, Glori Chaika’s article “Ten Activities to Improve Students’ Self-Concepts” can be adapted to fit the context for several age ranges.

We summarize the 10 activities she suggests here:

1 – The Interview

This activity is great for the beginning of the year as students to get to know their peers.

Break the group into pairs, and make sure each student is paired with someone they don’t very well. Give them 10 minutes to interview each other (5 minutes per interview) with fun questions like “would you rather live on a boat or on an island?” or “what is your favorite subject at this school?”.

When all of the interviews have been completed, have each pair come to the front of the class and introduce their partner to the other children.

2 – The Journal

Journals can be beneficial in many ways, as keeping a journal allows you to self-examine. Help your students develop their sense of self by assigning journal entries that they keep in one notebook all year.

Tell your students that they can put whatever they want in their journal—they can write a poem, describe a dream they had, write about what they hope for, something they are happy about, something they are sad about, etc.—and that they must make at least three entries (or however many you decide is appropriate) per week.

Make sure to tell them that you will only read the entry if they give you permission, but that you will check to ensure they have at least three dated entries per week.

3 – Designing Self-Collages

Self-collages are a great activity from young children to high-schoolers. Tell the students they need to create a collage that represents who they are by using pictures, words, and/or symbols. They can cut things from magazines, print them out from the internet, or draw pictures themselves.

You may want to guide them by suggesting to focus on things they enjoy or are good at, places they’ve been or would like to go, and people they admire.

When everyone’s collage is complete, you can do an extra activity where students present their collage to the classroom, or maybe everyone tries to guess which collage belongs to which student.

4 – Ranking Traits

This activity is best for older students with writing skills. Have the students rip a piece of paper into ten strips and write a word or phrase on each strip that they feel describes them. Tell them that no one will see the things they write down, so they can be completely honest.

Once the students have written down their ten traits, have them arrange them in order from those they most like about themselves to those they least like about themselves.

Encourage them to reflect on their traits by asking questions like:

Do you like what you see?
Do you want to keep it?
Now give up one trait. How does the lack of that affect you?
Now give up another. Give up three. Now what kind of person are you?

After the students have reduced their traits to six, have them add the traits back, one by one. For an extra boost to this activity, you can have the students journal about their experience at the end, and how they want to use their strengths.

5 – Accentuate the Positive

Accentuating the positive is all about noticing and sharing the positive things about others (and themselves).

To try this activity, break the students up into groups of four to six. Instruct the groups to pick one person (to start with) and tell that person all the positive things about them. Encourage the students to focus on traits and skills that can be altered (e.g., work ethic, skill in soccer), rather than permanent features (e.g., eyes, skin).

One student in each group will act as a recorder, writing down all the positive things that are said about someone. Each member of the group takes a turn, and the recorder gives the individual the list of all the positive things said about them at the end of the activity.

This exercise can also make a great focus for a journal entry.

6 – Thumbprints

This activity requires an ink pad and the willingness to get a bit messy!

Have each of your students place his or her thumb on the inkpad and then on a piece of paper to get a thumbprint. Show them the five major fingerprint patterns and have them identify their print type. Explain how fingerprints are unique—both across their own fingers and from person to person.

Next, have each student create an animal out of their thumbprint. Bonus points if the animal is one the student feels represents him or her! Encourage them to write about this in their journal, or to add the thumbprint drawing to their journal.

7 – Create a “Me” Commercial

This activity can be especially fun for the drama-loving students. Tell them that they are each going to make a two or three-minute commercial on why you should hire them.

The commercial should focus on their special skills, talents, and positive qualities. It should highlight what is great about them and what they would bring to the fictional position they are auditioning for.

Give the students some time to write their commercial, then have them present their commercials to the class. An alternative method for this activity is to have small groups create commercials for each group member.

8 – Shared Learning

This is a simple activity if you’ve been having your students write in their journal for the whole term.

Tell the students to look through their journal entries and reflect. Have them choose one thing they have learned about themselves during this term.

When each student has chosen something they would like to share, sit in a circle and have each student share out on what they learned over the past three months (or four months, or six months, etc.).

9 – Write Yourself a Letter

This is another activity that is appropriate for older children since it requires somewhat advanced writing skills.

Tell the students that they will be writing a letter to themselves, and to be totally honest since no one else will be able to read it. They can write whatever they’d like in this letter to their future selves, but they may want to add in things that describe them today (e.g., height and weight, current friends, favorite music and movies, special things that happened to them this year).

On another piece of paper or on the back of this letter, tell students to write down ten goals they would like to accomplish by this time next year. Have your students seal the letter and their goals in an envelope, address the envelope to themselves, and give it to you. In one year, mail the letters out to the students.

This is a far-reaching activity that will encourage your students to think about how they change over time, and how they stay the same.

10 – Drawing Self Portraits

Make sure that each student has access to a mirror for this activity. If there isn’t one handy in your classroom, bring some small mirrors in for the students to use.

Tell your students to use the mirror to draw a picture of themselves. It doesn’t have to look exactly like them, but it should be a good representation of them. This simple activity can promote self-reflection in students (beyond the kind that involves a mirror).

To take this activity a bit further, have them divide the drawing in half—on the left side, each student should draw herself as she sees herself, and on the right side, she should draw herself as she thinks others see her. Along with this drawing, the students can make an entry in their journal on the differences between how they see themselves and how they think others see them.

Self-Concept Activities for Preschoolers

For example, a few of the activities that can help preschoolers develop a self-concept include:

Record each child’s voice during an activity period. Have the children listen to the voices and guess which voice goes with each child.
Have several children stand in a line in front of the class. Name the child who is first, second, third and so on. Ask the children to change positions. Then have each child in line name his or her new position. To vary the activity, have the children at their seats name each child in line and describe his or her position.
Make a friendship quilt. Cut several squares of brightly colored construction paper. Give each child one of the squares. Have them decorate the square or even glue a picture of himself, glitter, beads, sequins, or yarn to the square. Staple the squares, side by side, to the bulletin board. If extra squares are needed to fill in empty spaces, print the school’s name or teacher’s name on additional squares and intermingle them with the student’s squares.
Have the children think of some things they can’t do now, but can do when they grow older. What are some things they can do now that they couldn’t do when they were younger?
Role-play the growth process from baby to father or mother to grandparent. The child can interpret the process as he or she goes along. Children can also develop a short play about the family.

Any of these activities can be adapted to fit your children’s context, whether that is a classroom, at home, in a playgroup, in a therapy session, etc.

Lesson Plan on Self-Concept

If you’re looking for a good lesson plan on teaching self-concept, this plan from the Utah Education Network is a great choice.

It starts with a description of self-concept as “the person I think I am” and contrasts it with “the person others think I am” and “the person others think I think I am.”

A diagram on the first page shows a cycle with four “stops:”

As I see myself
As others see me
Other’s reactions to me

This diagram shows how each stop on the cycle feeds into the next, influencing each aspect and eventually coming back to the original stop. For example, how we see ourselves influences our actions. Our actions drive how others see us, and their image of us drives their reactions or behavior toward us.

Feedback on ourselves contributes to our overall image of ourselves, and the cycle continues.

Next, it describes several case studies to help drive the point home. There is the case of a 45-year old father who looks in the mirror and thinks about the wrinkle he just found, the weight he would like to lose, his desire to be a stay-at-home dad, his messy and unorganized house, and a commitment he made that has overextended him.

There is also a case of a middle-aged mother thinking about her miserable day at work, the last decade or so of overtime, her struggles to pay the bills and have a little money left for herself, and all the things she has on her to-do list.

A third case focuses on a teenage girl who is concerned about her skin, her haircut, whether her friends truly care about her, and an upcoming chemistry test that she has not studied for.

The final case concerns a teenage guy who was struggling to understand calculus and thinking back to the counselor that encouraged him to take it. He is also comparing himself to his straight-A brother and thinking about how he wished he could be the athlete his father wanted him to be. He is worrying about tryouts and doubting his ability to even make the team.

For each of these cases, the questions are:

How will the individual see himself or herself?
How will the individual act toward others?
How will the individual think others see him or her?
How will others act toward the individual?
What effect does this have on how the individual sees him- or herself?
Where is the spiral headed and how can its motion be reversed?

This is a great lesson for children to learn, whether you introduce it in elementary school (with some extra time and patience set aside!) or in high school.

Follow this link and click on “Self Concept Transparency” to see the example lesson plan for yourself, and feel free to invent examples most relevant to your class or client.

self-concept worksheets strengths self-esteem

Three of the most useful worksheets on self-concept are described below.

All About Me

This worksheet from the Utah Education Network is a good option for children of all ages.

It is only one page with 15 prompts to complete. These prompts are:

I feel good about…
I feel successful when…
My favorite person is…
My favorite activity is…
I wish I could…
If I could have three wishes, they would be: a. b. c.
I feel depressed when…
A character trait I need to improve is…
I am good at…
I wish I did not…
My family is…
I would like to be…
The most important thing to me is…
The thing I like best about myself…

You can find this worksheet and other worksheets and lesson plans on the Utah Education Network’s website here .

17 Exercises To Foster Self-Acceptance and Compassion

Help your clients develop a kinder, more accepting relationship with themselves using these 17 Self-Compassion Exercises [PDF] that promote self-care and self-compassion.

Created by Experts. 100% Science-based.

Learning about how others perceive a construct can be helpful in furthering our own understanding of that construct.

Use the quotes below to see how your idea of self-concept compares to the ideas of others.

What others think of us would of little moment did it not, when known, so deeply tinge what we think of ourselves.

Paul Valéry

Know, first, who you are; and then adorn yourself accordingly.

Seek out that particular mental attribute which makes you feel most deeply and vitally alive, along with which comes the inner voice which says, ‘This is the real me’, and when you have found that attitude, follow it.

William James

Today you are You, that is truer than true. There is no one alive who is Youer than You.

Act as if you are the person you want to be.

Bernie Siegel

The self is not something that one finds. It is something that one creates.

Thomas Szasz

There is but one cause of human failure. And that is man’s lack of faith in his true Self.

An individual’s self-concept is the core of his personality. It affects every aspect of human behavior: the ability to learn, the capacity to grow and change. A strong, positive self-image is the best possible preparation for success in life.

Joyce Brothers

In this piece, we learned about what self-concept is (an overarching idea about who we are), how it comes about (it develops throughout the lifespan, and is most flexible in the early years), what it is related to and affected by (just about everything, but namely consumer behavior, academic achievement, career development, and culture), and whether you can do anything to change it—you can.

Our self-concept is affected by how we feel about ourselves and how we judge our abilities, competencies, and worth as a person. When we put some effort into boosting these self-evaluations, our self-concept will adjust to accommodate these changes.

We have the ability to change how we think about ourselves by working to become more like our ideal selves.

It might seem daunting to put in the effort required to revise your self-esteem and self-image, but like most tasks, getting started is the hardest part. Refer to some of the quotes above to get a dose of inspiration, or find some quotes on the subject that inspire you and keep them nearby whenever you’re in need of some motivation.

What do you think about self-concept? Do you have any other good quotes about self-concept? Do you have a developed self-concept or is it vaguer? Do you think it’s good or bad to have self-concept differentiation?

Let us know in the comments, and thanks for reading.

We hope you enjoyed reading this article. Don’t forget to download our three Self Compassion Exercises for free .

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Here is an idea: – Brief Introduction: Explain self-concept in simple terms—how we see ourselves, including our abilities, personality, and place in the world. Activities: – Positive Affirmation Cards: Students create and decorate cards with positive statements about themselves. Self-Portrait: Draw or paint self-portraits that express individual personalities and strengths. – Growth Mindset Chat: Discuss how effort and perseverance can improve abilities, showing that self-concept can grow and change. – Role-Playing: Practice scenarios that involve giving compliments, asking for help, and overcoming obstacles to understand how actions affect self-concept. – Reflection: Encourage journaling about personal growth, challenges, and successes to help students see their progress. – Parent Guide: Send home tips on reinforcing positive self-concept, including praise, open discussions, and setting a positive example.

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Self and Culture

Although we all define ourselves in relation to these three broad categories of characteristics—physical, personality, and social – some interesting cultural differences in the relative importance of these categories have been shown in people’s responses to the TST. For example, Ip and Bond (1995) found that the responses from Asian participants included significantly more references to themselves as occupants of social roles (e.g., “I am Joyce’s friend”) or social groups (e.g., “I am a member of the Cheng family”) than those of American participants. Similarly, Markus and Kitayama (1991) reported that Asian participants were more than twice as likely to include references about other people in their self-concept as did their Western counterparts. This greater emphasis on either external or social aspects of the self-concept reflects the relative importance that collectivistic and individualistic cultures place on an interdependence versus independence (Nisbett, 2003).

Interestingly, bicultural individuals who report acculturation to both collectivist and individualist cultures show shifts in their self-concept depending on which culture they are primed to think about when completing the TST. For example, Ross, Xun, and Wilson (2002) found that students born in China but living in Canada reported more interdependent aspects of themselves on the TST when asked to write their responses in Chinese, as opposed to English. These culturally different responses to the TST are also related to a broader distinction in self-concept, with people from individualistic cultures often describing themselves using internal characteristics that emphasize their uniqueness, compared with those from collectivistic backgrounds who tend to stress shared social group memberships and roles. In turn, this distinction can lead to important differences in social behavior.

One simple yet powerful demonstration of cultural differences in self-concept affecting social behavior is shown in a study that was conducted by Kim and Markus (1999). In this study, participants were contacted in the waiting area of the San Francisco airport and asked to fill out a short questionnaire for the researcher. The participants were selected according to their cultural background: about one-half of them indicated they were European Americans whose parents were born in the United States, and the other half indicated they were Asian Americans whose parents were born in China and who spoke Chinese at home.

After completing the questionnaires (which were not used in the data analysis except to determine the cultural backgrounds), participants were asked if they would like to take a pen with them as a token of appreciation. The experimenter extended his or her hand, which contained five pens. The pens offered to the participants were either three or four of one color and one or two of another color (the ink in the pens was always black). As shown in Figure 1 and consistent with the hypothesized preference for uniqueness in Western, but not Eastern cultures, the European Americans preferred to take a pen with the more unusual color, whereas the Asian American participants preferred one with the more common color.

Through these and other experiments two dimensions of self-concept emerged, the independent construal (concept) and the interdependent concept. Western, or more individualist cultures, view the self as separate and focus on self, independence, autonomy and self-expression are reinforced through social and cultural norms. This is the independent self-concept. Non-western or collectivistic cultures view the self as interdependent and inseparable from social context and individuals socialized to value interconnectedness consider the thoughts and behaviors of others. Fitting in is valued over standing out.

Intra-cultural Differences in Self-Concept

Cultural differences in self-concept have even been found in people’s self-descriptions on social networking sites. DeAndrea, Shaw, and Levine (2010) examined individuals’ free-text self-descriptions in the About Me section in their Facebook profiles. Consistent with the researchers’ hypothesis, and with previous research using the TST, African American participants had the most the most independently (internally) described self-concepts, and Asian Americans had the most interdependent (external) self-descriptions, with European Americans in the middle.

Image of the earth is encircled by icons of social media and technology.

As well as indications of cultural diversity in the content of the self-concept, there is also evidence of parallel gender diversity between males and females from various cultures, with females, on average, giving more external and social responses to the TST than males (Kashima et al., 1995). Interestingly, these gender differences have been found to be more apparent in individualistic nations than in collectivistic nations (Watkins et al., 1998).

Culture and Psychology Copyright © 2020 by L D Worthy; T Lavigne; and F Romero is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

Self, Identity and Culture

First Online: 19 October 2013

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Shridhar Sharma 4

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“Identity” is an umbrella term used throughout the social sciences to describe a person’s conception and expression of individuality. Identity is also a source of meaning for people. It is a developmental process occurring within the personality and has a powerful socio-cultural context within which it is formed. It refers to the capacity for self-reflection and awareness of self. Identity is, thus, the entire personality of a human being in his uniqueness, with psychological, biological and societal nature. Identity formation is a universal feature of human experience. In this respect, the cultural domain of identity is known as “ethnic identity”. Till recently the cultural identity was something people had as an undisturbed existential possession, in which there exists an inheritance of continuity with the past. It is also important to state that “self” is distinct from identity. From the vantage point of self-psychology, there are two areas of interest: the process by which a self is formed (the “I”) and the cultural context of the schematic which composes the self-concept (the “me”). It is the process which defines individuals to others and themselves. Pieces of the entity’s actual identity include a sense of continuity and a sense of uniqueness from others and a sense affiliation. This chapter will address the concept of identity and identity formation in cultural context.

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Sharma, S. (2014). Self, Identity and Culture. In: Menon, S., Sinha, A., Sreekantan, B. (eds) Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Consciousness and the Self. Springer, New Delhi. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-1587-5_10

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Culture theory : essays on mind, self, and emotion

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Preview: a colloquy of culture theorists Richard A. Shweder
Part I. Culture Theory: An Introduction
1. Anthropology's romantic rebellion against the enlightenment, or there's more to thinking than reason and evidence Richard A. Shweder
2. Properties of culture: an ethnographic view Robert A. LeVine
3. Cultural meaning systems Roy G. D'Andrade
Part II. Culture, Self, and Emotion: 4. 'From the native's point of view: on the nature of anthropological understanding Clifford Geertz
5. Toward an anthropology of self and feeling Michelle Z. Rosaldo
6. Does the concept of the person vary cross-culturally? Richard A. Shweder and Edmund J. Bourne
7. Understanding people Zeno Vendler
8. Emotion, knowing and culture Robert I. Levy
9. Getting angry: the Jamesian theory of emotion in anthropology Robert C. Solomon
Part III. Culture, Language, and Thought: 10. The development of competence in culturally defined domains: a preliminary framework Howard Gardner
11. Language acquisition and socialization: three developmental stories and their implications Elinor Ochs and Bambi B. Schieffelin
Part IV. Commentary: 12. Some reflections on cultural determinism and relativism with special reference to emotion and reason Melford E. Spiro
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4.1 The Cognitive Self: The Self-Concept

Learning objectives.

Define and describe the self-concept and its influence on information processing.
Describe the concept of self-complexity, and explain how it influences social cognition and behavior.
Review the measures that are used to assess the self-concept.
Differentiate the different types of self-awareness and self-consciousness.

Some nonhuman animals, including chimpanzees, orangutans, and perhaps dolphins, have at least a primitive sense of self (Boysen & Himes, 1999). We know this because of some interesting experiments that have been done with animals. In one study (Gallup, 1970), researchers painted a red dot on the forehead of anesthetized chimpanzees and then placed the animals in a cage with a mirror. When the chimps woke up and looked in the mirror, they touched the dot on their faces, not the dot on the faces in the mirror. This action suggests that the chimps understood that they were looking at themselves and not at other animals, and thus we can assume that they are able to realize that they exist as individuals. Most other animals, including dogs, cats, and monkeys, never realize that it is themselves they see in a mirror.

Self awareness collage: a woman looking in the mirror, a dog looking in the mirror, and a monkey looking in the mirror

A simple test of self-awareness is the ability to recognize oneself in a mirror. Humans and chimpanzees can pass the test; dogs never do.

Allen Skyy – Mirror – CC BY 2.0; 6SN7 – Reflecting Bullmatian – CC BY 2.0; Mor – There’s a monkey in my mirror – CC BY-NC 2.0.

Infants who have similar red dots painted on their foreheads recognize themselves in a mirror in the same way that the chimps do, and they do this by about 18 months of age (Asendorpf, Warkentin, & Baudonnière, 1996; Povinelli, Landau, & Perilloux, 1996). The child’s knowledge about the self continues to develop as the child grows. By age 2, the infant becomes aware of his or her gender as a boy or a girl. At age 4, self-descriptions are likely to be based on physical features, such as one’s hair color, and by about age 6, the child is able to understand basic emotions and the concepts of traits, being able to make statements such as “I am a nice person” (Harter, 1998).

By the time they are in grade school, children have learned that they are unique individuals, and they can think about and analyze their own behavior. They also begin to show awareness of the social situation—they understand that other people are looking at and judging them the same way that they are looking at and judging others (Doherty, 2009).

Development and Characteristics of the Self-Concept

Part of what is developing in children as they grow is the fundamental cognitive part of the self, known as the self-concept . The self-concept is a knowledge representation that contains knowledge about us, including our beliefs about our personality traits, physical characteristics, abilities, values, goals, and roles, as well as the knowledge that we exist as individuals . Throughout childhood and adolescence, the self-concept becomes more abstract and complex and is organized into a variety of different cognitive aspects , known as self-schemas . Children have self-schemas about their progress in school, their appearance, their skills at sports and other activities, and many other aspects, and these self-schemas direct and inform their processing of self-relevant information (Harter, 1999).

By the time we are adults, our sense of self has grown dramatically. In addition to possessing a wide variety of self-schemas, we can analyze our thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, and we can see that other people may have different thoughts than we do. We become aware of our own mortality. We plan for the future and consider the potential outcomes of our actions. At times, having a sense of self may seem unpleasant—when we are not proud of our appearance, actions, or relationships with others, or when we think about and become afraid of the possibility of our own death. On the other hand, the ability to think about the self is very useful. Being aware of our past and able to speculate about the future is adaptive—it allows us to modify our behavior on the basis of our mistakes and to plan for future activities. When we do poorly on an exam, for instance, we may study harder for the next one or even consider changing our major if we continue to have problems in the major we have chosen.

One way to learn about a person’s self-concept and the many self-schemas that it contains is by using self-report measures. One of these is a deceptively simple fill-in-the-blank measure that has been used by many scientists to get a picture of the self-concept (Rees & Nicholson, 1994). All of the 20 items in the measure are exactly the same, but the person is asked to fill in a different response for each statement. This self-report measure, known as the Twenty Statements Test, can reveal a lot about a person because it is designed to measure the most accessible—and thus the most important—parts of one’s self-concept. Try it for yourself, at least five times:

I am (please fill in the blank) __________________________________

Although each person has a unique self-concept, we can identify some characteristics that are common across the responses given by different people on the measure. Physical characteristics are an important component of the self-concept, and they are mentioned by many people when they describe themselves. If you’ve been concerned lately that you’ve been gaining weight, you might write, “I am overweight. ” If you think you’re particularly good looking (“I am attractive ”), or if you think you’re too short (“I am too short ”), those things might have been reflected in your responses. Our physical characteristics are important to our self-concept because we realize that other people use them to judge us. People often list the physical characteristics that make them different from others in either positive or negative ways (“I am blond ,” “I am short ”), in part because they understand that these characteristics are salient and thus likely to be used by others when judging them (McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978).

A second characteristic of the self-concept reflects our memberships in the social groups that we belong to and care about. Common responses in this regard include such ones as “I am an artist ,” “I am Jewish ,” and “I am a student at Augsburg College. ” As we will see later in this chapter, our group memberships form an important part of the self-concept because they provide us with our social identity —the sense of our self that involves our memberships in social groups.

The remainder of the self-concept is normally made up of personality traits —the specific and stable personality characteristics that describe an individual (“I am friendly, ” “I am shy, ” “I am persistent ”). These individual differences (the person part of the person-situation interaction) are important determinants of our behavior, and this aspect of the self-concept reflects this variation across people.

Self-Complexity Provides a Buffer Against Negative Emotions

The self-concept is a rich and complex social representation. In addition to our thoughts about who we are right now, the self-concept includes thoughts about our past self—our experiences, accomplishments, and failures—and about our future self—our hopes, plans, goals, and possibilities (Oyserman, Bybee, Terry, & Hart-Johnson, 2004). The self-concept also includes thoughts about our relationships with others. You no doubt have thoughts about your family and close friends that have become part of yourself. Indeed, if you don’t see the people you really care about for a while, or if you should lose them in one way or another, you will naturally feel sad because you are in essence missing part of yourself.

Although every human being has a complex self-concept, there are nevertheless individual differences in self-complexity , the extent to which individuals have many different and relatively independent ways of thinking about themselves (Linville, 1987; Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Some selves are more complex than others, and these individual differences can be important in determining psychological outcomes. Having a complex self means that we have a lot of different ways of thinking about ourselves. For example, imagine a woman whose self-concept contains the social identities of student, girlfriend, daughter, psychology major , and tennis player and who has encountered a wide variety of life experiences. Social psychologists would say that she has high self-complexity. On the other hand, a man who perceives himself solely as a student or solely as a member of the hockey team and who has had a relatively narrow range of life experiences would be said to have low self-complexity. For those with high self-complexity, the various self-aspects of the self are separate, such that the positive and negative thoughts about a particular self-aspect do not spill over into thoughts about other aspects.

Research has found that compared with people low in self-complexity, those higher in self-complexity experience more positive outcomes. People with more complex self-concepts have been found to have lower levels of stress and illness (Kalthoff & Neimeyer, 1993), a greater tolerance for frustration (Gramzow, Sedikides, Panter, & Insko, 2000), and more positive and less negative reactions to events that they experience (Niedenthal, Setterlund, & Wherry, 1992).

The benefits of self-complexity occur because the various domains of the self help to buffer us against negative events and help us to enjoy the positive events that we experience. For people low in self-complexity, negative outcomes on one aspect of the self tend to have a big impact on their self-esteem. If the only thing that Maria cares about is getting into medical school, she may be devastated if she fails to make it. On the other hand, Marty, who is also passionate about medical school but who has a more complex self-concept, may be better able to adjust to such a blow by turning to other interests. People with high self-complexity can also take advantage of the positive outcomes that occur on any of the dimensions that are important to them.

Although having high self-complexity seems useful overall, it does not seem to help everyone equally and also does not seem to help us respond to all events equally (Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002). The benefits of self-complexity seem to be particularly strong on reactions to positive events. People with high self-complexity seem to react more positively to the good things that happen to them but not necessarily less negatively to the bad things. And the positive effects of self-complexity are stronger for people who have other positive aspects of the self as well. This buffering effect is stronger for people with high self-esteem, whose self-complexity involves positive rather than negative characteristics (Koch & Shepperd, 2004), and for people who feel that they have control over their outcomes (McConnell et al., 2005).

Studying the Self-Concept

Because the self-concept is a schema, it can be studied using the methods that we would use to study any other schema. As we have seen, one approach is to use self-report—for instance, by asking people to list the things that come to mind when they think about themselves. Another approach is to use neuroimaging to directly study the self in the brain. As you can see in Figure 4.1 , neuroimaging studies have shown that information about the self is stored in the prefrontal cortex, the same place that other information about people is stored (Barrios et al., 2008). This finding suggests that we store information about ourselves as people the same way we store information about others.

This figure shows the areas of the human brain that are known to be important in processing information about the self. They include primarily areas of the prefrontal cortex (areas 1, 2, 4, and 5). Data are from Lieberman (2010).

Still another approach to studying the self is to investigate how we attend to and remember things that relate to the self. Indeed, because the self-concept is the most important of all our schemas, it has extraordinary influence on our thoughts, feelings, and behavior. Have you ever been at a party where there was a lot of noise and bustle, and yet you were surprised to discover that you could easily hear your own name being mentioned in the background? Because our own name is such an important part of our self-concept, and because we value it highly, it is highly accessible. We are very alert for, and react quickly to, the mention of our own name.

Other research has found that information that is related to the self-schema is better remembered than information that is unrelated to it, and that information related to the self can also be processed very quickly (Lieberman, Jarcho, & Satpute, 2004). In one classic study that demonstrated the importance of the self-schema, Rogers, Kuiper, and Kirker (1977) conducted an experiment to assess how college students recalled information that they had learned under different processing conditions. All the participants were presented with the same list of 40 adjectives to process, but through the use of random assignment, the participants were given one of four different sets of instructions about how to process the adjectives.

Participants assigned to the structural task condition were asked to judge whether the word was printed in uppercase or lowercase letters. Participants in the phonemic task condition were asked whether or not the word rhymed with another given word. In the semantic task condition , the participants were asked if the word was a synonym of another word. And in the self-reference task condition , participants indicated whether or not the given adjective was or was not true of themselves. After completing the specified task, each participant was asked to recall as many adjectives as he or she could remember.

Figure 4.2 The Self-Reference Effect

The chart shows the proportion of adjectives that students were able to recall under each of four learning conditions. The same words were recalled significantly better when they were processed in relation to the self than when they were processed in other ways. Data from Rogers et al. (1977).

Rogers and his colleagues hypothesized that different types of processing would have different effects on memory. As you can see in Figure 4.2 “The Self-Reference Effect” , the students in the self-reference task condition recalled significantly more adjectives than did students in any other condition. The finding that information that is processed in relationship to the self is particularly well remembered , known as the self-reference effect , is powerful evidence that the self-concept helps us organize and remember information. The next time you are studying for an exam, you might try relating the material to your own experiences—the self-reference effect suggests that doing so will help you better remember the information.

Self-Awareness

Like any other schema, the self-concept can vary in its current cognitive accessibility. Self-awareness refers to the extent to which we are currently fixing our attention on our own self-concept . When the self-concept becomes highly accessible because of our concerns about being observed and potentially judged by others, we experience the publicly induced self-awareness known as self-consciousness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Rochat, 2009).

I am sure that you can remember times when your self-awareness was increased and you became self-conscious—for instance, when you were giving a class presentation and you were perhaps painfully aware that everyone was looking at you, or when you did something in public that embarrassed you. Emotions such as anxiety and embarrassment occur in large part because the self-concept becomes highly accessible, and they serve as a signal to monitor and perhaps change our behavior.

Not all aspects of our self-concepts are equally accessible at all times, and these long-term differences in the accessibility of the different self-schemas help create individual differences, for instance, in terms of our current concerns and interests. You may know some people for whom the physical appearance component of the self-concept is highly accessible. They check their hair every time they see a mirror, worry whether their clothes are making them look good, and do a lot of shopping—for themselves, of course. Other people are more focused on their social group memberships—they tend to think about things in terms of their role as Christians or as members of the tennis team. Think back for a moment to the opener of this chapter and consider Dancing Matt Harding. What do you think are his most highly accessible self-schemas?

In addition to variation in long-term accessibility, the self and its various components may also be made temporarily more accessible through priming. We become more self-aware when we are in front of a mirror, when a TV camera is focused on us, when we are speaking in front of an audience, or when we are listening to our own tape-recorded voice (Kernis & Grannemann, 1988). When the knowledge contained in the self-schema becomes more accessible, it also becomes more likely to be used in information processing and more likely to influence our behavior.

Beaman, Klentz, Diener, and Svanum (1979) conducted a field experiment to see if self-awareness would influence children’s honesty. The researchers expected that most children viewed stealing as wrong but that they would be more likely to act on this belief when they were more self-aware. They conducted this experiment on Halloween evening in homes within the city of Seattle. When children who were trick-or-treating came to particular houses, they were greeted by one of the experimenters, shown a large bowl of candy, and were told to take only one piece each. The researchers unobtrusively watched each child to see how many pieces he or she actually took.

Behind the candy bowl in some of the houses was a large mirror. In the other houses, there was no mirror. Out of the 363 children who were observed in the study, 19% disobeyed instructions and took more than one piece of candy. However, the children who were in front of a mirror were significantly less likely to steal (14.4%) than were those who did not see a mirror (28.5%). These results suggest that the mirror activated the children’s self-awareness, which reminded them of their belief about the importance of being honest. Other research has shown that being self-aware has a powerful influence on other behaviors as well. For instance, people are more likely to stay on their diets, eat better foods, and act more morally overall when they are self-aware (Baumeister, Zell, & Tice, 2007; Heatherton, Polivy, Herman, & Baumeister, 1993). What this means is that when you are trying to stick to a diet, study harder, or engage in other difficult behaviors, you should try to focus on yourself and the importance of the goals you have set.

Social psychologists are interested in studying self-awareness because it has such an important influence on behavior. People lose their self-awareness and become more likely to violate acceptable social norms when, for example, they put on a Halloween mask or engage in other behaviors that hide their identities. The members of the militant White supremacist organization the Ku Klux Klan wear white robes and hats when they meet and when they engage in their racist behavior. And when people are in large crowds, such as in a mass demonstration or a riot, they may become so much a part of the group that they lose their individual self-awareness and experience deindividuation — the loss of self-awareness and individual accountability in groups (Festinger, Pepitone, & Newcomb, 1952; Zimbardo, 1969).

Collage: A Klu Klux Klan propaganda meeting, a group of four Nazis smiling, and three college friends helping another do a keg stand

Examples of situations that may create deindividuation include wearing uniforms that hide the self and alcohol intoxication.

Craig ONeal – KKK Rally in Georgia – CC BY-NC-ND 2.0; Bart Everson – Nazis – CC BY 2.0; John Penny – Snuggie Keg Stand – CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

Two particular types of individual differences in self-awareness have been found to be important, and they relate to self-concern and other-concern, respectively (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; Lalwani, Shrum, & Chiu, 2009). Private self-consciousness refers to the tendency to introspect about our inner thoughts and feelings . People who are high in private self-consciousness tend to think about themselves a lot and agree with statements such as “I’m always trying to figure myself out” and “I am generally attentive to my inner feelings.” People who are high on private self-consciousness are likely to base their behavior on their own inner beliefs and values—they let their inner thoughts and feelings guide their actions—and they may be particularly likely to strive to succeed on dimensions that allow them to demonstrate their own personal accomplishments (Lalwani, Shrum & Chiu, 2009).

Public self-consciousness , in contrast, refers to the tendency to focus on our outer public image and to be particularly aware of the extent to which we are meeting the standards set by others . Those high in public self-consciousness agree with statements such as “I’m concerned about what other people think of me,” “Before I leave my house, I check how I look,” and “I care a lot about how I present myself to others.” These are the people who check their hair in a mirror they pass and spend a lot of time getting ready in the morning; they are more likely to let the opinions of others (rather than their own opinions) guide their behaviors and are particularly concerned with making good impressions on others.

Research has found cultural differences in public self-consciousness, such that people from East Asian collectivistic cultures have higher public self-consciousness than do people from Western individualistic cultures. Steve Heine and his colleagues (Heine, Takemoto, Moskalenko, Lasaleta, & Henrich, 2008) found that when college students from Canada (a Western culture) completed questionnaires in front of a large mirror, they subsequently became more self-critical and were less likely to cheat (much like the trick-or-treaters we discussed earlier) than were Canadian students who were not in front of a mirror. However, the presence of the mirror had no effect on college students from Japan. This person-situation interaction is consistent with the idea that people from East Asian cultures are normally already high in public self-consciousness, in comparison with people from Western cultures, and thus manipulations designed to increase public self-consciousness are less influential for them.

Overestimating How Others View Us

Although the self-concept is the most important of all our schemas, and although people (particularly those high in self-consciousness) are aware of their self and how they are seen by others, this does not mean that people are always thinking about themselves. In fact, people do not generally focus on their self-concept any more than they focus on the other things and other people in their environments (Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski, 1982).

On the other hand, self-awareness is more powerful for the person experiencing it than it is for others who are looking on, and the fact that self-concept is so highly accessible frequently leads people to overestimate the extent to which other people are focusing on them (Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999). Although you may be highly self-conscious about of something you’ve done in a particular situation, that does not mean that others are necessarily paying all that much attention to you. Research by Thomas Gilovich and his colleagues (Gilovich, Medvec, & Savitsky, 2000) found that people who were interacting with others thought that other people were paying much more attention to them than those other people reported actually doing.

Teenagers are particularly likely to be highly self-conscious, often believing that others are constantly watching them (Goossens, Beyers, Emmen, & van Aken, 2002). Because teens think so much about themselves, they are particularly likely to believe that others must be thinking about them, too (Rycek, Stuhr, McDermott, Benker, & Swartz, 1998). It is no wonder that everything a teen’s parents do suddenly feels embarrassing to them when they are in public.

People also often mistakenly believe that their internal states show to others more than they really do. Gilovich, Savitsky, and Medvec (1998) asked groups of five students to work together on a “lie detection” task. One at a time, each student stood up in front of the others and answered a question that the researcher had written on a card (e.g., “I have met David Letterman”). On each round, one person’s card indicated that they were to give a false answer, whereas the other four were told to tell the truth.

Figure 4.3 The Illusion of Transparency

After each round, the students who had not been asked to lie indicated which of the students they thought had actually lied in that round, and the liar was asked to estimate the number of other students who would correctly guess who had been the liar. As you can see in Figure 4.3 “The Illusion of Transparency” , the liars overestimated the detectability of their lies: On average, they predicted that over 44% of their fellow players had known that they were the liar, but in fact only about 25% were able to accurately identify them. Gilovitch and his colleagues called this effect the “illusion of transparency.”

Key Takeaways

The self-concept is a schema that contains knowledge about us. It is primarily made up of physical characteristics, group memberships, and traits.
Because the self-concept is so complex, it has extraordinary influence on our thoughts, feelings, and behavior, and we can remember information that is related to it well.
Self-complexity, the extent to which individuals have many different and relatively independent ways of thinking about themselves, helps people respond more positively to events that they experience.
Self-awareness refers to the extent to which we are currently fixing our attention on our own self-concept. Differences in the accessibility of different self-schemas help create individual differences, for instance, in terms of our current concerns and interests.
When people lose their self-awareness, they experience deindividuation, and this may lead them to act in violation of their personal norms.
Private self-consciousness refers to the tendency to introspect about our inner thoughts and feelings; public self-consciousness refers to the tendency to focus on our outer public image and the standards set by others.
There are cultural differences in self-consciousness, such that public self-consciousness may normally be higher in Eastern than in Western cultures.
People frequently overestimate the extent to which others are paying attention to them and accurately understand their true intentions in public situations.

Exercises and Critical Thinking

What are the most important aspects of your self-concept, and how do they influence your behavior?
Consider people you know in terms of their self-complexity. What effects do these differences seem to have on their feelings and behavior?
Can you think of ways that you have been influenced by your private and public self-consciousness?
Do you think you have ever overestimated the extent to which people are paying attention to you in public?

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Principles of Social Psychology Copyright © 2015 by University of Minnesota is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

Description

Major figures in American anthropology, psychology, linguistics, and philosophy have contributed to this study of the relationship between everyday experience and culture. The volume focuses on the role of symbols and meaning in the development of mind, self, and emotion, examining such questions as how culture interacts with cognition and social and emotional growth, and how concepts and meanings are historically transmitted. It also tackles the methodological and conceptual problems involved in the study of meaning and reexamines the problem of �relativism�.

What Is Self-Concept and Why Does It Matter?

Learn about your self-concept and how it affects well-being..

Posted September 1, 2021 | Reviewed by Gary Drevitch

Our self-concept is the image we have of our bodies, capabilities, impressions, etc. (Bailey, 2003). It includes:

The material self. Our body, possessions, and other things in our lives.
The interpersonal self. The views others hold about us.
The intrapersonal self. Our emotions, desires, needs, values, etc. (Epstein, 1973)

Research psychologists noticed that the way we see ourselves is often similar to the way others see us. This finding is referred to as the looking-glass self (Epstein, 1973). This research taught us that much of our self-concept emerges from the social interactions we have with others. Our 'self' emerges based on the information others tell us about who we are.

Our self-concept also includes the self-awareness that we are part of categories based on our age, gender , race, etc. Some people theorize that self-concept is like the glue that holds all the pieces of our personality together. And, at its most basic, self-concept is the answer we give when asked the question "Who am I?"

Why Does the Self-Concept Matter?

Each of us has parts of ourselves that we believe are the most important (Epstein, 1973). For example, an athlete might view their athleticism to be of central importance to their self-concept, even though they also enjoy cooking and are part of a big family. Some have even suggested that the self is arranged hierarchically, with relatively important parts above less important parts. But each of us decides which parts are important to us.

As we experience new things and gain additional information from others, the self-concept may determine which new aspects of personality are acceptable. If new parts don't jibe with the old parts, they may not be allowed, thus ensuring that our sense of self remains reliable and intact (Epstein, 1973). As we grow older, contradictory evidence may have less impact on our self-concept. So it can become harder to integrate external information, particularly if it disrupts important aspects of the self-concept.

How Does Self-Concept Relate to Well-Being?

Several aspects of the self-concept also play a role in well-being . These include:

Self-image: The way you see yourself.
Self-esteem (or self-worth): The extent to which you value yourself or believe you have worth.
Ideal self: The vision you have of your best self.

Self-image

The terms self-image and self-concept are sometimes used interchangeably, but more often, self-image is defined as how you see yourself. This may be literal, like when looking in the mirror. But it can also involve mental representations of yourself. These may or may not be consistent with what one actually sees in the mirror.

Self-esteem (or self-worth)

Self-esteem is broadly defined as the extent to which we like or value ourselves. This generally includes evaluating two parts of ourselves (Tafarodi & Swann Jr, 2001):

Intrinsic value. This refers to our belief that we are a good (or not-so-good) person. If we have intrinsic value, then we value ourselves just for being who we are. This is also sometimes thought of as the extent to which we like ourselves.
Instrumental value. This refers to our belief that we can do good things. If we have instrumental value, then we value ourselves because of the things we do. This is also sometimes thought of as the extent to which we respect ourselves.

The ideal self is defined as the self we would like to be—our best self. It appears to originate from the ideal selves that our parents hold for us and communicate to us through childhood (Zentner & Renaud, 2007).

In positive psychology, the ideal self is thought to include three parts (Boyatzis, & Akrivou, 2006):

The image of our desired future. This may include dreams , aspirations, and goals .
Hope. This includes self-efficacy and optimism (beliefs that we can indeed achieve our goals).
A clear self-concept. This includes an understanding of our core identity and enduring traits. Our ideal self needs to fit with our values, beliefs, and who we are.

Our ideal self is a vision of what we could be or do. That's why the ideal self is thought to be a helpful motivator—it inspires us to progress toward goals and improve our lives in beneficial ways. It may also include aspirations, passions, dreams, and purpose—all things that tend to be good for our well-being.

Our self-concept is an important guiding principle that helps us navigate the world and understand our role in it. Parts of our self-concept may be good or not-so-good for our well-being. That's why learning more about our own self-concept can be beneficial.

Adapted from an article published by The Berkeley Well-Being Institute .

Bailey 2nd, J. A. (2003). Self-image, self-concept, and self-identity revisited. Journal of the National Medical Association, 95(5), 383.

Boyatzis, R. E., & Akrivou, K. (2006). The ideal self as the driver of intentional change. Journal of management development.

Epstein, S. (1973). The self-concept revisited: Or a theory of a theory. American psychologist, 28(5), 404.

Tafarodi, R. W., & Swann Jr, W. B. (2001). Two-dimensional self-esteem: Theory and measurement. Personality and individual Differences, 31(5), 653-673.

Zentner, M., & Renaud, O. (2007). Origins of adolescents' ideal self: An intergenerational perspective. Journal of personality and social psychology, 92(3), 557

Tchiki Davis, Ph.D. , is a consultant, writer, and expert on well-being technology.

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Module 3: The Self

Module Overview

Human beings, by their very nature, are prone to focus on the self and to engage in behavior to protect it. Module 3 will cover some of the ways this occurs. We will start by focusing on the self-concept or who we are and self-schemas. We will also discuss self-perception theory, possible selves, the self-reference effect, self-discrepancies, how others affect our sense of self, and cultural differences of the self. Then we will tackle the issue of self-esteem and its two forms – global and domain specific. Self-esteem across the life span and gender and cross-cultural differences will be examined. We will discuss how self-esteem is affected, and protected, when mortality is made salient, self-efficacy and locus of control, self-regulation, self-awareness, and self-enhancement. Our third section will cover self-presentation and specific strategies we use such as self-promotion, ingratiation, false modesty, self-verification, and self-monitoring. Finally, we will discuss cognitive biases and heuristics used to defend the self, such as the self-serving bias, false consensus effect, false uniqueness effect, and unrealistic optimism and defensive pessimism.

Module Outline

3.1. The Self-Concept

3.2. self-esteem, 3.3. self-presentation, 3.4. cognitive biases and heuristics used to bolster the self.

Module Learning Outcomes

Define the self-concept and clarify how we learn about the self.
Define self-esteem and describe efforts we engage in to protect or improve it.
Describe ways we make ourselves appear in a more positive light to others.
Outline cognitive biases and heuristics used to defend the self.

Section Learning Objectives

Define self-concept and clarify whether it is stable or malleable.
Define and exemplify self-schemas.
Describe self-perception theory and how it helps us learn about the self.
Clarify the importance of possible selves.
Describe the self-reference effect.
Define self-discrepancy theory.
Describe Cooley’s concept of the looking-glass self.
Define reflected appraisal.
Describe the social comparison theory and how it helps us to learn about the self.
Clarify the importance of the two-factor-theory of emotion for the self.
Describe cultural differences in the conception of the self.

3.1.1. The Age-Old Question – Who Are You?

Quite possibly the fundamental question of human existence is who we are. If asked who you are by another person, how would you describe yourself? Are you smart, resourceful, compassionate, petty, empathetic, self-serving, or optimistic? Are you good at sports or do you write poetry well? Should any singing you do be reserved for the shower? These descriptors are what make up our self-concept or the way we see ourselves. This view is probably clear most of the time. If you are not talented at writing, you will likely avoid writing intensive classes as a student. Some classes you cannot avoid, and so in these instances you will seek out extra help so that you are successful with the class. If you are incredibly talented at football, you may go out for the team but will not likely try out for the baseball team. But are there times when you are not so sure about who you are? The answer is likely yes. Maybe you and your spouse are considering adopting. Though you consider yourself a compassionate person, you are not sure you can open your heart up to another child the same way you would to a biological child. In this case, you have no prior experience to reference to determine who you are in this situation.

3.1.1.1. Is self-concept stable or malleable? There are two contradictory views of the self. Though our self-concept is relatively stable and people resist any information that contradicts their view of themselves (Greenwald, 1980), specific social environments can cause different selves to appear (Martindale, 1980). Markus and Kunda (1986) explored this dual nature of the self-concept in a study of 40 female students at the University of Michigan who participated to earn credit in their introductory psychology class (recall our discussion in Module 2 of convenience samples and issues with generalizability as a result). The participants were run one at a time and with three female confederates who were also undergraduate students but paid for their involvement. The researchers used minimal deception and led the participants to believe the study was on attitudes and opinions. They were first shown posters in a series of three trials. The posters had three items on them, either three colors, cartoons, or greeting cards, and the participant was asked to record for each poster the number of the item she liked best (of the three). The experimenter then explained that she had to transfer the responses to a computer coding sheet and that it would make life easier if all participants (the actual participant and the three confederates) could read their responses out loud. On each trial the participant went first, followed by the confederates. Her responses determined what the confederates would say. In the uniqueness condition, on all but 3 of the 18 trials the confederates all disagreed with the participant but agreed with one another. So if the participant preferred Color A the confederates all chose C. On the other three trials, the first confederate agreed with the participant while the other two disagreed with her and with each other. In the similarity condition, on all but 3 of the trials, the confederates agreed with the participant. If she chose Color C, then so did the three confederates. On the other three trials, none of the confederates agreed with the participant and two agreed with each other (meaning if the participant chose C, one chose A and two chose B, for instance). The participant then completed a series of dependent measures to include judgments of similarity to reference groups, self-categorization judgments, and word association. There was also a manipulation check such that participants were asked what percentage of the time they thought other participants agreed with their preference judgment in the first part of the study. Debriefing then occurred.

Results showed that for the manipulation check, subjects were aware of the extent to which participants agreed with them. The uniqueness group stated that the others agreed with them just 8% of the time while the similarity subjects estimated 77% of the time. The authors note that there was actually 17% and 83% agreement, respectively. In terms of how stable self-concept is, results showed that neither group appeared to have been influenced by the information about their similarity or uniqueness. In terms of the malleability of self-concept, the differences in the latencies between the two conditions for self-categorization judgments (i.e. their reaction times), suggests that different types of self-conceptions were mediating these judgments. This was also seen in the similarity to reference groups task such that both conditions felt more similar to in-groups than out-groups. It should be noted that the effect was not as strong for the similarity condition as their mean judgment of similarity to the in-group ( M = 4.93) was not as strong as the uniqueness condition ( M = 5.13), and their judgment of out-groups was higher ( M = 2.26) than the uniqueness condition ( M = 1.82).

Markus and Kunda (1986) conclude that both the stability and malleability of the self-concept were demonstrated in their study, though if one only looked at the results of the first part of the study (the showing of the posters with the three items to choose from) “one would tend to infer that the self-conceptions of these individuals were relatively unresponsive to the self-relevant information provided by the study” (pg. 864). Further examination of the word association, latency, and similarity tasks show that “…underlying these similar general self-descriptions were very different temporary self-conceptions” (pg. 864). When individuals were led to feel unique, they became disturbed by this and following the preference manipulation viewed their uniqueness as negative while the state of similarity to others became positive and desirable. They recruited conceptions of themselves as similar to others and made these endorsements relatively quickly (as shown through shorter latencies). Those made to feel extremely similar to others responded in the exact opposite way.

Finally, they say that the self-concept is a set of self-conceptions and from it, “the individual constructs a working self-concept that integrates the core self-conceptions with those elicited by the immediate context. In this sense, the self-concept becomes similar to that suggested by the symbolic interactionists. Thus, for Mead (1934) there was no fixed self-concept, only the current self-concept that was negotiated from the available set of self-conceptions” (Markus and Kunda, 1986, pg. 865).

3.1.2. Self-Schemas

As we interact with our world, we gather information that we need to organize in a way that we can obtain it again when needed. Basically, we store it away in memory and retrieve it when we encounter the person, object, or concept at a later time. This element of cognition is called a schema and as we can have schemas concerning external objects or ideas, we too can have them about ourselves, called a self-schema. These self-schemas make up our self-concept in much the same way that the words on this page make up the module you are reading, and this module is just one of many in the textbook. Markus (1977) defined self-schemata as, “cognitive generalizations about the self, derived from past experience, that organize and guide the processing of the self-related information contained in an individual’s social experiences (pg. 64).”

Self-schemas represent a person’s domain specific attributes or abilities and experiences as they relate to that domain. This allows for quicker encoding, more confident evaluation, accurate retrieval of domain-relevant information, and the ability to adapt to different information processing goals (Carpenter, 1988; Greenwald, 1980; Markus, 1977). Individuals with a self-schema in a domain are said to be schematic while those lacking one are aschematic for that ability (Cross & Markus, 1994). According to Markus (1977), aschematic individuals are not able to recognize their ability in a given domain and do not assign their ability any critical personal importance.

They can also help to shape social perception when the description of person is ambiguous. One study showed that when a target (Chris) is described as equally likely to be independent or dependent, participants classified as independence-schematics rated Chris as more independent and dependence-schematics rated him as more dependent or less likely to act independently compared to aschematics. The authors say that self-schemas serve a motivational role such that they help to foster the self-system’s stability, validation, and perpetuation (Green & Sedikides, 2001).

3.1.2.1. Types of self-schemas. Prieto, Cole, and Tageson (1992) compared depressed, clinic-referred children; nondepressed, clinic-referred children; and nondepressed, non-clinic referred children on three cognitive measures of positive and negative self-schemas. On a word recognition measure and an incidental word recall measure, depressed individuals had a less positive self-schema compared to the other two groups. Only non-depressed groups recalled significantly more positive words than negative ones. The results suggest that such negative self-schemas affect how new information is stored and accessed. Another study found that depressive self-schemas were a result of peer victimization such that individuals who experienced relational and verbal victimization more so than physical victimization by their peers had stronger negative and weaker positive self-cognitions and an elimination of the “normative memorial bias for recall of positive self-referential words” (Cole et al., 2014).

Self-schemas have also been identified for race-ethnicity (Oyserman, 2008; Oyserman et al., 2003), body weight (Altabe & Thompson, 1996; Markus, Hamill, & Sentis, 1987), gender (Markus, Crane, Bernstein, & Siladi, 1982), exercise (Kendzierski, 1990), religion (McIntosh, 1995), and illness (Clemmey & Nicassio, 1997), to name a few. Lodge and Hamill (1986) even propose a partisan schema related to political knowledge and interest. Those described as schematics are high in interest and knowledge and show a “consistency bias” such that they recall more policy statements consistent with a congressman’s party affiliation than those inconsistent with it. They also can classify campaign statements as Republican or Democrat. Aschematics, or those low in interest and knowledge, perform at no better than chance levels in the same task. The authors note that the restructuring of memory shown by schematics, and in particular those scoring especially high on interest and knowledge which they call sophisticates, demonstrates a serious bias in how political information is processed.

3.1.2.2. Self-perception theory. One way we gain knowledge about ourselves is through observing ourselves, called introspection or looking inward. We notice food preferences, particular music genres we like, the types of clothing we prefer to wear, and the type of person we consider to be a friend. But what we gain self-knowledge about tends to be things that are not central or critical (Bem, 1972). Why is that? The things about us that are most important make up the attitudes we express, the beliefs we hold, the traits we display, and the emotions we prefer to display and so are at our core. Self-perception helps us to learn about the more secondary aspects of the self.

3.1.2.3. Possible selves. Not only are we concerned about the person we are right now, but we focus on the person we might become, which Markus and Nurius (1986) call possible selves . These could be positive conceptions of our future self, but likewise, they could be something we are afraid of becoming and could elicit guilt and anxiety in the individual (Carver et al., 1999). According to Inglehart, Markus, and Brown (1988) our possible selves allow us to focus attention on specific, task-relevant cognitions, emotions and actions, thereby allowing us to move from our current state to the desired one (Oyserman & Markus, 1990a), especially when a possible self is seen as a self-regulator (i.e. a student who spends more time on homework, improved grades, and participated in class more because they realize they are not doing well now, but could in the future if they engage in specific types of behaviors; Oyserman et al., 2004). Across two studies, Cross and Markus (1994) showed that schematic individuals were better able to direct their attention to the problem at hand and concentrate on it while aschematic individuals were quicker to endorse negative possible selves related to logical reasoning ability. Hence, self-schemas can help foster competence by “providing a foundation for the development of possible selves related to that ability” (pg. 434). They continue, “…the possible self may link effective steps and strategies for solving reasoning problems with beliefs about one’s ability and competence in the domain. Bringing to mind a positive, desired view of oneself in the future as logical and analytical may also help the student dispel anxiety or worry during the task” (pg. 435). Research has also shown that when balance between feared and expected possible selves does not exist, the outcomes can be negative such as the initiation and maintenance of delinquent activity in adolescents (Oyserman and Markus, 1990b).

3.1.2.4. The self-reference effect. Would it surprise you to learn that humans have a tendency to more efficiently process, and recall more accurately, information about ourselves? Probably not. This is called the self-reference effect (Higgins & Bargh, 1987). Craik and Lockhart (1972) proposed the depth of processing (DOP) framework which says that how well a memory trace is retained is determined by the nature of the encoding operations such that deep, meaningful analyses result in a more durable trace than shallow, structural analyses of a stimulus. Up to 1977 it was believed that better retention could be achieved by semantic encoding though Rogers, Kuiper, and Kriker (1977) showed that self-referent encoding produced even better recall. The self-reference effect has since been replicated in numerous studies (for an overview of this research, please see Symons & Johnson, 1997).

Since the self-reference effect is a property of memory, we might expect that it is affected by the aging process. Across three studies, Gutchess, et al., (2007) showed that under some circumstances, older adults can benefit from self-referencing as much as young adults can but in general, they are more limited in their application of it. The authors speculate that “older adults may be limited in their application of self-referencing due to its demand on cognitive resources and their diminished ability to apply the strategy flexibly and broadly in other types of evaluative judgments” (pg. 834).

In terms of what area of the brain might control the self-reference effect, research using lesioning has found a role for the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Patients with focal brain damage to the mPFC were given a standard trait judgment paradigm and damage to this area was found to abolish the self-reference effect, suggesting that the structure is important for self-referential processing and the neural representation of the self (Philippi et al., 2012). The implications of this research go beyond social psychology, too. The authors write, “The ability to detect and encode information for self-relevance might contribute not only to the formation of a self-concept, but also more broadly to psychological and social functioning. Across a variety of psychopathological conditions and personality disorders, self-referential processing appears to be dysfunctional, making it a major target for psychotherapy.” To read this article yourself, please visit: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3297026/ .

3.1.3. Self-Discrepancies

Self-discrepancy theory was postulated by Higgins (1987) to distinguish between the various self-states proposed by sociology, psychology, and even philosophy. Higgins says there are two cognitive dimensions which underlie the various self-state representations. The first is the domains of the self , numbering three total – the actual, ideal, and ought selves. The actual self includes the attributes that you are believed to possess, whether by yourself or another person. The ideal self includes all attributes that someone, whether you or another person, hope or wishes for you to possess. The ought self are the attributes that someone (yourself or another person) believes you should possess (i.e. linked to a sense of duty, obligation, or responsibility). Higgins exemplifies the ideal and ought self through the example of the conflict a hero faces between their personal wishes and their sense of duty.

The second cognitive dimension is what he calls standpoints on the self , or whose perspective on the self is involved. The two basic standpoints are your own personal standpoint and the standpoint from a significant other such as a spouse, parent, sibling, or close friend. A person can have a self-state representation for any number of these significant others.

The two cognitive dimensions can then be combined to form six basic types of self-state representations: actual/own, actual/other, ideal/own, ideal/other, ought/own, and ought/other. Our self-concept is derived from the first two, while the last four are self-directive standards or acquired guides for being, or as he calls them, self-guides . Self-discrepancy theory therefore proposes that people differ as to which self-guide they are motivated to meet, and that people do not necessarily possess all four (we might have only ought or ideal self-guides). We are motivated to “reach a condition where our self-concept matches our personally relevant self-guides” (pg. 321).

If this does not happen, we can experience sadness, disappointment, fear, dissatisfaction, apprehension, or feel threatened. For instance, if a discrepancy exists between the actual/own and ideal/own states, meaning the person feels their personal hopes or wishes have not been fulfilled, they will be vulnerable to dejected-related emotions such as disappointment, frustration, and dissatisfaction. If the discrepancy is between actual/own and ideal/other, meaning they have failed to obtain a significant other’s hopes or wishes for them, they may feel shame, embarrassment, or feel downcast. If the discrepancy is between actual/own and ought/other, meaning the current state of our attributes from our standpoint does not match the state the person believes some significant other considers to be our duty or obligation to obtain, then we might experience agitation-related emotions and feel fear or threatened. Finally, an actual/own and ought/own discrepancy occurs when the current state of our attributes, from our standpoint, do not match the state we believe is our duty or obligation to obtain and so we feel self-contempt, guilt, and uneasiness (Higgins, 1987).

In sum, self-discrepancy theory helps us to understand discrepancies between our view of our self and who we would ideally like to be or believe other people think we should be.

3.1.4. How Others Affect Our Sense of Self

3.1.4.1. The looking-glass self. Sociologist Charles Cooley (1902) stated that people based their sense of self on how they think others see them. This social interaction serves as a sort of mirror in which people use the judgments of others to measure their own worth, behavior, and values. He calls this the looking-glass self , and it occurs in three steps. First, we imagine how we appear to others when in a social situation. Second, we imagine what others think of our appearance. Third, we form opinions and feelings about this perceived judgment and then respond to it. Let’s say for instance you are assigned to a small group in your social psychology class and are asked to discuss the topic of self-discrepancy theory. You have not interacted with these individuals thus far this semester, and so you want to demonstrate to these fellow students that you are knowledgeable of the concept. As you discuss the material, you take note of how your fellow classmates respond to your thoughts and applications of the concept of self-discrepancy theory. What is their body language? Do they maintain eye contact with you? Do they seem to be distracted or are they focused? What words do they use in response to your comments? If your classmates generally have positive feedback such as commenting constructively on your thoughts or listening intently, you will feel confident that they see you as competent and knowledgeable. If, on the other hand, they look away often, are playing a game on their phone, or have negative comments, you will likely feel that they do not see you as knowledgeable. To make matters more complicated, in the future your professor has you work with a different group of classmates for a different activity. The new task provides a different context for the interaction and the new set of students changes the nature of those involved. So, how you use the information obtained from this new group of individuals will likely be different than the first group. And of course, not all feedback carries the same weight. Maybe you know one of your group members is an A student and doing very well in the class. If they provide positive feedback this will mean more to you than a student praising your analysis who you know is struggling.

3.1.4.2. Reflected appraisals. Building off Cooley’s work, Felson (1985) said that we come to see ourselves as those important to us see us, called a reflected appraisal. In an interesting study of adolescents from the Netherlands, Verkuyten (1988) found that the general self-esteem of ethnic minorities was relatively high, despite the fact that they have low status, experience discrimination and prejudice, and have little power to influence policymakers. So why was their self-esteem higher than expected? As support for the reflected appraisal process, they derived their self-esteem from fellow family members who regarded them highly.

3.1.4.3. Social comparison theory. Oftentimes, we are uncertain of our abilities and so look to others for a clue. A college baseball player may compare his batting average against those of his teammates to see how well he is doing. Festinger (1954) called this the social comparison theory . We make such comparisons as a way to bring about self-improvement or to motivate us to be better. If the players’ batting average is not the lowest, but close, he may ask for additional batting practice or tips from the batting coach. We also compare ourselves to others to enhance our positive self-image. If the player learns that his batting average is better than most of his teammates, he will feel good about his hitting ability. Of course, he might also develop a superior attitude or become biased or judgmental.

How might social media affect the social comparisons we make? Social networking sites such as Facebook give the impression that others are doing better than they are which can be detrimental to how we view ourselves. In a study of 231 adults aged 18-25, Facebook use was found to lead to greater levels of negative social comparison which resulted in seeing oneself as less socially competent and less physically attractive. This effect was weaker among happier individuals (de Vries & Kuhne, 2015). A similar study of Instagram “likes” found that exposing female undergraduates to thin-ideal images led to greater levels of body and facial dissatisfaction than average images and that greater investment in Instagram likes led to higher levels of appearance comparison and facial dissatisfaction (Tiggerman et al., 2018).

The benefit of social comparison is that it can lead to efforts to self-improve. How so? We could make a specific type of social comparison called an upward social comparison in which we compare our traits and abilities against someone who is more skilled than we are. This can lead us to engage in motivated behavior to improve, but it could also leave us feeling incompetent, shameful, or jealous (Collins, 1996).

3.1.4.4. Arousal as information about us. Stimuli are forever present in our sensory world and we have perceptions of them. These perceptions lead us to respond. For example, if you are walking down a street and hear footsteps behind you, you might perceive this as a threat if it is late at night and you thought you were alone on the street. This could lead you to walk quicker to your car or house or turnaround to confront the person behind you. What if you heard footsteps but is the middle of the day, on campus, and in between classes? You would likely perceive this as just another student going to class and have no reaction. Schachter (1964) proposed his two-factor theory of emotion which states that how we perceive our own emotions depends on two factors: 1) how much physiological arousal we experience such as rapid breathing, sweating, and/or a pounding heart, and 2) the cognitive interpretation or label we apply such as angry, scared, or happy. Others help us with the second factor such that we will examine their reactions to a given situation to help us interpret the arousal we are experiencing. Say for instance we are at a movie and out of nowhere the killer jumps out and attacks the protagonist. When this happens, we jump in our seat and scream, and notice that other moviegoers have the same reaction. We thus realize we experienced a high level of arousal and label the emotion as scared. Soon after we likely laugh at ourselves since we knew all along the event was not real but a mere fiction on the screen.

3.1.5. The Self and Culture

The self does not exist on an island but in the context of the society and culture in which it lives. As such, there is a great deal of variability in terms of what the self-concept is from culture to culture. First, culture includes all the beliefs, customs, institutions, experience, values, attitudes, art, religion, etc. of a group of people. Each culture establishes norms , or rules, for how its members should behave. For instance, Western cultures view the self as independent or individualistic , meaning that individuals reject conformity, focus on individual traits and goals, and seek personal achievement while Asian cultures are interdependent or collectivistic and identify the self in a social context, believe in blending in, focus on group goals, promote solidarity, and are against egotism. According to Markus and Kitayma (1991) the independent construal of self is bounded, unitary, and stable; focuses on being unique, realizing internal attributes, and promoting ones’ goals; and sees the role of others as self-appraisal and linked to social comparison and reflected appraisal. In terms of the interdependent self, they say the structure is flexible; the task is to belong and fit in, occupy one’s place and promote other’s goals; and our relationships with others in specific contexts define the self. The independent is internal and private, focused on one’s abilities, thoughts, and feelings while the interdependent is external and public, and focused on statuses, roles, and relationships (Markus & Kitayma, 1991).

Research shows that East Asians, namely those from Korea, have more flexibility in their self-concept compared to Americans (Choi & Choi, 2002) and that Asian Americans, compared to European Americans, show variability across relationship contexts but stability within them (English & Serena, 2007). In another study, when trait self-perceptions across different relationships were inconsistent, relationship quality and authenticity was lower for European Americans but not East Asian Americans. When there was inconsistency within the same relationship, both ethnic groups showed negative outcomes (English & Chen, 2011).

Describe how self-esteem is a need.
Identify and define types of self-esteem.
Clarify what happens to self-esteem across the life span.
Clarify if there are gender and cross-cultural differences in self-esteem.
Define Terror Management Theory and clarify its relevance to self-esteem.
Describe self-efficacy and locus of control and how they relate to the self.
Define self-regulation.
Define self-awareness and describe issues related to it.
Differentiate public and private self-consciousness.
Define self-enhancement and describe strategies used in it.

3.2.1. Self-Esteem Defined and Described

3.2.1.1. Self-esteem as a need. Psychologist Abraham Maslow described a hierarchy of needs as one way to understand motivation and specifically the push of motivated behavior (contrasted with the pull that comes from outside us). According to Maslow, there are five types of needs arranged in a hierarchy, or more so in a pyramid formation. Lower level needs must be fulfilled before higher level ones can be. At the bottom are the physiological needs which are what we need to survive. They include food, water, sex, temperature, oxygen, etc. At the next level are needs centered on our safety and security , or living in a safe environment, being safe from Mother Nature, and having enough money to pay the bills. With this level satisfied, we can next focus on feeling socially connected to others and being in mature relationships, which he called the love and belonginess needs . Fourth are our self-esteem needs or being independent, gaining mastery, how we feel about ourselves, and being responsible. At the pinnacle of the pyramid are our self-actualization needs , which Carl Rogers and other humanistic psychologists discussed. This level focuses on realizing our full potential, feeling fulfilled and satisfied, and seeking personal growth. We also pursue interests out of intrinsic interest and not extrinsic demands. For our purposes, Maslow’s fourth level will be focused on and self-esteem can be defined as how we see ourselves, including both positive and negative evaluative components.

3.2.1.2. Types of self-esteem. Is self-esteem a unitary concept though? Rosenberg (1979) proposed a global self-esteem and subsequent research has supported domain specific self-esteem such as for academic matters (Rosenberg et al., 1995). So, which causes which? Does global self-esteem lead to specific or vice versa? The authors propose that global could be the result of specific self-esteem since it is “based on the judgments of various parts of the self, the parts (specifics) might be seen as responsible for the whole (global)” (pg. 148). In terms of the specific arising from global, they say, “assessments of particular facets of the self may well be based on one’s overall feelings of self-worth” (pg. 148). They conclude that global and specific self-esteem are in fact neither equivalent nor interchangeable, global appears to be heavily affective in nature and associated with psychological well-being while specific is more judgmental and evaluative arising from a cognitive component; specific facets of the self vary in their level of abstraction and some types such as academic self-esteem affect global self-esteem more than other types; the degree to which we value our behavior affects how much specific self-esteem affects global; and finally, in the case of school performance it is affected by self-esteem but in terms of the specific type and not global (Rosenberg et al., 1995).

What are some of the specific types of self-esteem.? According to Gentile et al. (2009) they might include:

Physical appearance – what we look like
Athletics – how good we are in sports
Academics – our general performance in school
Social Acceptance – our friendships, peer relationships, and social approval
Family – Our family can serve as a source support and help affirm our beliefs about our own self-worth
Behavioral conduct – includes our perception of how socially unacceptable our behavior is
Affect – Feeling happy, satisfied, and free from anxiety which lead to better emotional well-being
Personal self – Our evaluation of our personality independent from the physical body or others
Self-satisfaction – Our measure of happiness with oneself as a person
Moral-ethical self-concept – Our perception of moral-ethical attributes and how satisfied we are with our religion or lack of one

3.2.1.3. Self-esteem across the life span. Our next question centers on whether self-esteem can change throughout our life. Trzesniewski et al., (2003) tested this very question across two studies and found that, “stability is relatively low during early childhood, increases through adolescence and young adulthood, and then declines during midlife and old age” (pg. 215). This effect held across gender, nationality, and ethnicity. How can we account for these trends? First, self-esteem was least stable during childhood, though the authors question whether self-esteem measures are valid for young children as they may not fully understand the meaning of questions on such scales or cannot form abstract concepts of themselves, such as being good or bad. Second, self-esteem is lower in early adolescence and increases after this likely due to the turmoil puberty brings about in terms of rapid maturational changes. By late adolescence and early adulthood, the individual has the resources and autonomy necessary to deal with these changes. Finally, self-esteem stability decreases from midlife to old age likely because in midlife there are few environmental changes but as we transition into late adulthood, there are a great deal of life changes and shifting social circumstances such as children moving out, retirement, health problems and the death of loved ones. In regard to late adulthood, they add, “Another possibility is that as individuals age they may begin to review their lifelong accomplishments and experiences, leading in some cases to more critical self-appraisals and in other cases to greater acceptance of their faults and limitations” (pg. 216).

Interestingly, data from 187 newlywed couples shows that the birth of the first child does affect self-esteem over the first five years of marriage. Changes mostly affect the mother and are negative in nature with a sudden decline in self-esteem the first year after the child’s birth and a gradual decline continuing over the next four years. The study utilized a control group of parents who had no child during the same period and for which there was no change in self-esteem. This suggests that the change in self-esteem of the parents with a child was likely due to the birth of their first child (Bleidorn et al., 2016).

3.2.1.4. Gender and cross-cultural differences in self-esteem. Gentile et al. (2009) conducted a meta-analysis of 115 studies and assessed the 10 different domains of self-esteem mentioned at the end of the previous section. They found that gender differences vary greatly across the different domains of self-esteem. In some cases, there was no difference at all (i.e. academic, social acceptance, family, and affect), while other domains showed a moderate amount of variation (i.e. males higher on physical appearance, athletics, personal, and self-satisfaction; females higher on behavioral conduct and moral-ethical).

But are there cross-cultural differences in gender and self-esteem? Bleidorn et al. (2016) tackled the issue in an Internet sample of 985,937 individuals from 48 nations and found that self-esteem increased from late adolescence to middle adulthood, there were significant gender gaps, and that males consistently report higher self-esteem than females. These findings are important as they show that the trends, which are consistent with the literature but previous studies only examined Western samples, are in fact cross-culturally valid and suggest universal mechanisms at least in part. These mechanisms might include biological sources including genetics or hormones or universal sociocultural factors such as socially learned gender roles and stereotypes.

Despite these cross-cultural similarities, there was a difference across nations in terms of the magnitude of gender-specific trajectories, suggesting that universal explanations may not be at work but culture-specific influences such as a nation’s GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita, mean age at marriage, and HDI (Human Development Index; measures of living a long life, being educated, and having a decent standard of living) are responsible. Their data suggests that wealthy, developed, egalitarian, and individualistic nations had relatively large gender differences in self-esteem, though they decrease throughout early and middle adulthood. In contrast, collectivistic, poorer, developing nations marked by greater gender inequality and an earlier age at marriage show smaller gender gaps, though these increase during early and middle adulthood.

Bleidorn et. al. (2016) conclude that universal influences on self-esteem do not tell the whole story, and that “systematic cultural differences in the magnitude and shape of gender and age differences in self-esteem provide evidence for contextual influences on the self-esteem development in men and women” (pg. 408).

3.2.2. Terror Management Theory (TMT)

3.2.2.1. What is TMT? Ernest Becker (1962, 1973, & 1975) stated that it is the human capacity for intelligence, to be able to make decisions, think creatively, and infer cause and effect, that leads us to an awareness that we will someday die. This awareness manifests itself as terror and any cultural worldviews that are created need to provide ways to deal with this terror, create concepts and structures to understand our world, answer cosmological questions, and give us a sense of meaning in the world.

Based on this notion, Terror Management Theory (TMT; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon, 1986) posits that worldviews serve as a buffer against the anxiety we experience from knowing we will die someday. This cultural anxiety buffer has two main parts. First, we must have faith in our worldviews and be willing to defend them. Second, we derive self-esteem from living up to these worldviews and behaving in culturally approved ways. So, culture supports a belief in a just world and meeting the standards of value of the culture provides us with immortality in one of two ways. Literal immortality is arrived at via religious concepts such as the soul and the afterlife. Symbolic immortality is provided by linking our identity to something higher such as the nation or corporation and by leaving something behind such as children or cultural valued products. It has also been linked to the appeal of fame (Greenberg, Kosloff, Solomon, Cohen, and Landau, 2010).

Finally, based on whether death thoughts are in focal attention or are unconscious, we employ either proximal or distal defenses. Proximal defenses involve the suppression of death-related thoughts, a denial of one’s vulnerability, or participating in behavior that will reduce the threat of demise (i.e. exercise) and occur when thought of death is in focal attention. On the other hand, distal defenses are called upon when death thoughts are unconscious and involve strivings for self-esteem and faith in one’s worldview and assuage these unconscious mortality concerns through the symbolic protection a sense of meaning offers.

3.2.2.2. The typical mortality salience study. In a typical mortality salience (MS) study, participants are told they are to take part in an investigation of the relationship between personality traits and interpersonal judgments. They complete a few standardized personality assessments which are actually filler items to sustain the cover story. Embedded in the personality assessments is a projective personality test which consists of two open ended questions which vary based on which condition the participant is in. Participants in the MS condition are asked to write about what they think will happen to them when they die and the emotions that the thought of their own death arouses in them. Individuals in the control condition are asked to write about concerns such as eating a meal, watching television, experiencing dental pain, or taking an exam. Next, they complete a self-report measure of affect, typically the PANAS (Positive-Affect, Negative-Affect Scale), to determine the effect of MS manipulation on their mood. Finally, they are asked to make judgments about individuals who either directly or indirectly threaten or bolster their cultural worldviews.

3.2.2.3. Worldview defense. General findings on TMT have shown that when mortality is made salient, we generally display unfavorable attitudes toward those who threaten our worldview and celebrate those who uphold our view. This effect has been demonstrated in relation to anxious individuals even when part of one’s in-group (Martens, Greenberg, Schimel, Kosloff, and Weise, 2010) such that mortality reminders led participants to react more negatively toward an anxious police liaison from their community (Study 1) or to a fellow university student who was anxious (Study 2). Mortality salience has also been found to elevate preference for political candidates who are charismatic and espouse the same values associated with the participant’s political worldview, whether conservative or liberal (Kosloff, Greenberg, Weise, and Solomon, 2010).

Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, and Lyon (1989) examined reactions of participants to those who violated or upheld cultural worldviews across a series of six experiments. In general, they hypothesized that when people are reminded of their own mortality, they are motivated to maintain their cultural anxiety buffer and are punitive toward those who violate it and benevolent to those who uphold it. Experiments 1 and 3 provided support for the hypothesis that subjects induced to think about their own mortality increased their desire to punish the moral transgressor (i.e. to recommend higher bonds for an accused prostitute) while rewarding the hero (Experiment 3). Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1 and extended them by showing that increasing MS does not lead subjects to derogate just any target as it had no effect on evaluations of the experimenter. Also, MS increased punishment of the transgressor only among subjects who believed the target’s behavior was truly immoral.

Experiments 4 – 6 tested alternative explanations for the findings. First, self-awareness could lead individuals to behave in a manner consistent with their attitudes and standards. The results of Study 4 showed that unlike MS, self-awareness does not encourage harsher bond recommendations and in fact, heightened self-awareness reduces how harshly a prostitute is treated among individuals with positive attitudes toward prostitution. In Study 5, physiological arousal was monitored and MS was found not to arise from mere heightened arousal. Finally, Experiment 6 showed that particular features of the open-ended death questionnaire did not lead to the findings of Studies 1-5, but rather to requiring subjects to think about their own deaths.

McGregor, Lieberman, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, Simon, and Pyszcznski (1998) tested the hypothesis that MS increases aggression against those who threaten one’s worldview by measuring the amount of hot sauce allocated to the author of a derogatory essay. In the study, politically conservative and liberal participants were asked to think about their own death (MS) or their next important exam (control). They were then asked to read an essay that was derogatory toward either conservatives or liberals. Finally, participants allocated a quantity of very spicy hot sauce to the author of the essay, knowing that the author did not like spicy foods and would have to consume the entire sample of hot sauce. As expected, MS participants allocated significantly more hot sauce to the author of the worldview-threatening essay than did control participants.

In a second study, participants thought about their own mortality or dental pain and were given an opportunity to aggress against someone who threatened their worldview. Half of the MS participants allocated the hot sauce before evaluating the target while the other half evaluated the target before allocating the hot sauce. Results of Study 2 showed that MS participants allocated significantly more hot sauce when they were not able to verbally derogate the targets prior to the administration of hot sauce. However, when MS participants were able to first express their attitudes toward the target, the amount of hot sauce allocated was not significantly greater than for the controls. This finding suggests that people will choose the first mode of worldview defense provided to them.

3.2.2.4. Self-esteem. According to the anxiety buffer hypothesis, if a psychological structure provides protection against anxiety, then strengthening that structure should make an individual less prone to displays of anxiety or anxiety related behavior in response to threats while weakening that structure should make a person more prone to exhibit anxiety or anxiety related behavior in response to threats. In support of this, Greenberg et al. (1992) showed that by increasing self-esteem, self-reported anxiety in response to death images and physiological arousal in response to the threat of pain could be reduced. Furthermore, the authors found no evidence that this effect was mediated by positive affect. Additional support for the function of self-esteem in reducing anxiety was provided by Harmon-Jones, Simon, Greenberg, Pyszcynski, Solomon, and McGregor (1997) who showed that individuals with high self-esteem, whether induced experimentally (Experiment 1) or dispositionally (Experiment 2), did not respond to MS with increased worldview defense and that this occurred due to the suppression of death constructs (Experiment 3).

3.2.3. Self-Efficacy and Locus of Control

Self-Efficacy (Bandura, 1986) is our sense of competence and feeling like we can deal with life’s problems. It includes our beliefs about our ability to complete a task and affects how we think, feel, and motivate ourselves. When our self-efficacy is high, we feel like we can cope with life events and overcome obstacles. Difficult tasks are seen as challenges and we set challenging goals. In contrast, if it is low, we feel hopeless, helpless, and that we cannot handle what life throws at us. We avoid difficult tasks and throw in the towel quickly when things get tough. These individuals are easily depressed and stressed.

Our sense of competence is affected by the degree to which we blame internal or external forces for our success and failures. Using Julian Rotter’s (1973) concept of locus of control, we have an internal locus of control if we believe we are in control of our own destiny, but if we believe outside forces determine our life, we have an external locus of control.

So how do self-efficacy and locus of control intersect with one another. A study of students from a mid-sized public university in the northeastern area of the United States showed that students with an external locus of control and who are low in academic self-efficacy should be identified as they enter college and interventions directed at them to help them perform better in their classes (Drago, Rheinheimer, & Detweiler, 2018). A study of 147 women with type 1 diabetes examined the relationship between self-efficacy, locus of control, and what their expectations were of preconception counseling (Grady & Geller, 2016). Using the Diabetes-Specific Locus of Control (DLC) measure which assesses beliefs about internal, chance, and powerful others loci of control in terms of how diabetes is managed (the measure has 5 subscales: internal-autonomy, internal-blame, chance, powerful other – health professionals, and powerful other – nonmedical), a measure to assess preconception planning, and sociodemographic data, the researchers tested the hypothesis that expectations of preconception counseling would be associated with beliefs about disease control and self-efficacy. The results showed that self-efficacy for planning a healthy pregnancy predicted outcome expectations of preconception counseling. The authors write, “…women’s self-efficacy was positively associated with their perceived usefulness of preconception counseling and birth control use, whereas self-blame about disease management negatively correlated with these views” (pg. 41). The authors suggest that efforts should be taken to improve self-efficacy and empower women with diabetes to confidently control their disease” (Grady & Geller, 2016).

3.2.4. Self-Regulation

We cannot always act or say what we feel. At times, we have to practice what social psychologists call self-regulation or controlling and directing our thoughts, feelings, and actions so that we can achieve a societal or personal goal. The good news is that much of our self-regulation occurs outside of conscious awareness but if we are trying to engage in meaningful behavioral change, we might have to focus much of our energy into self-control. One study linked successful self-regulation to executive functions to include updating, inhibiting, and shifting, which results in the ability to take goal-direction action such as losing weight (Dohle, Diel, & Hofmann, 2018).

Do concerted efforts at self-regulation reduce the amount of energy available for such activities in subsequent tasks? The question implies that self-regulation is a limited resource. Baumeister, Bratslasky, Muraven, and Tice (1998) tested this over four experiments and described this temporary reduction in the self’s ability to engage in volitional action caused by engaging in a volitional act previously ego depletion . The researchers first attempted to show that exerting self-control in terms of resisting temptation (Experiment 1) or a preliminary act of choice and responsibility (Experiment 2) would reduce the person’s ability to self-regulate on a subsequent, frustrating and difficult task. Results showed that people asked to resist eating chocolates and to make themselves eat radishes instead gave up much faster when next asked to complete a difficult puzzle than those who could indulge and eat the chocolate. Likewise, people who freely and deliberately consented to make a counterattitudinal or proattitudindal speech gave up quickly when asked to do the puzzle while those who expected to make the counterattitudinal speech under low-choice conditions showed no reduction in self-control. They state that it was the act of responsible choice, and not the behavior itself, that depleted the self and reduced persistence on the subsequent task. Experiments 3 and 4 further confirmed the finding that an initial act of volition leads to ego depletion in subsequent tasks. The good news is that this resource is replenished with time and specific factors could hasten or delay this replenishment (Baumeister et al., 1998).

3.2.5. Self-Awareness

Duval and Wicklund (1972) proposed that our self-regulation can either be directed inward and toward the self or directed outward and toward the environment. We are usually focused outward, but there are times when our attention is turned inward. For instance, if you walk by a mirror you might stop to see how you look in your new jeans. If we see a video of ourselves, are asked to talk about ourselves in an interview, or are required to give a presentation in our social psychology class, we experience an increased level of self-awareness and compare ourselves against a high standard which leads to reduced self-esteem since we realize we do not meet the standard. We then engage in motivated behavior to meet the standard, reassess whether we have, and then continue making adjustments until we finally meet the standard or give up and turn away from the self (Carver & Scheier, 1981). As you might expect, the process is aversive and so we want to resolve it (Flory et al., 2000). If we do not, we could experience depression (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987), engage in binge eating (Heatherton & Baumeister), and engage in counternormative behavior such as cheating (Diener & Wallbom, 1976) to name a few of the negative effects. Two recent studies found that when male participants were exposed to an intervention designed to focus their attention onto inhibitory, self-awareness cues, they engaged in significantly less alcohol-related physical aggression behaviors toward a female confederate compared to controls (Gallagher & Parrott, 2016) but for men with an internal and not an external locus of control (Purvis, Gallagher, & Parrott, 2016).

It is possible that some individuals are more self-focused than others, a distinction referred to as public vs. private self-consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). Public self-consciousness refers to an individual who focuses on themselves as a social object and is concerned by how they appear to others. In contrast, private self-consciousness refers to an individual who focuses on the internal self, is introspective, and attends to one’s thoughts, feelings, and motives. Scheier, Buss, and Buss (1978) found that for those high in private self-consciousness, the correlation between aggressive behavior and self-report of aggressiveness was significantly higher than for those low in private self-consciousness or high or low public self-consciousness. Public self-consciousness has also been found to relate to social aspects of identity while private self-consciousness was related to personal aspects (Cheek & Briggs, 1982).

3.2.6. Self-Enhancement

Self-enhancement is a fundamental component of human nature and involves our tendency to see ourselves in a positive light. This often occurs after our self-esteem has been negatively affected in some way (Beauregard & Dunning, 1998).

According to Sedikides & Gregg (2008), self-enhancement can be done in one of several ways. First, we might self-advance or self-protect either by augmenting positivity or reducing the negativity of the self-concept. Second, self-enhancement can occur either publicly or privately whereby in the case of the former we engage in favorable self-presentation and the latter is an internal affair. Third, we tend to self-enhance in domains that matter most to us. Finally, self-enhancement is either candid or tactical, meaning “one can both seize an opportunity for overt and immediate self-advancement, or one can forgo it in favor of other activities liable to facilitate delayed self-enhancement” (pg. 104).

People can also engage in positive illusions (Taylor & Brown, 1988) in which they hold opinions of themselves that are exaggerated or falsely positive regarding abilities and skills. These positive illusions include inflating their perceptions of themselves (i.e. self-aggrandizement), believing they have more control over events than they do (i.e. exaggerated perceptions of control), and being overly optimistic about their future (i.e. unrealistic optimism). Positive illusions have been shown to lead to successful adjustment to stressful events (Taylor & Armor, 1996); increased satisfaction in close relationships when an individual idealized their partner and is in turn idealized by them (Barelds & Dijkstra, 2011; Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996); and better outcomes for physical health later in life in terms of more satisfaction with leisure time, higher self-esteem, better perceived health, and less boredom proneness when retirees hold an exaggerated youthful bias (Gana, Alaphillippe, & Bailly, 2002). Positive illusions have been reported in parenting as well in which parents have a tendency to rate their own children as possessing more positive and less negative attributes than other children (Wenger & Fowers, 2008).

Have you ever worried about doing well on a test and so create an excuse to cover poor performance such as saying you were sick when you took it? If so, you engaged in behavioral self-handicapping (Jones & Berglas, 1978). We self-handicap when we are uncertain about our abilities and anticipate a threat to our self-esteem. Instead of saying we failed the exam because our ability was low or we did not study, we instead blame it on being sick or not sleeping well the night before. Self-handicapping can take two forms – behavioral and claimed. Behavioral self-handicapping occurs when we actively acquire an impediment such as drug or alcohol abuse (Arkin & Baumgardner, 1985) or do not have enough time to practice (Baumeister, Hamilton, & Tice, 1985). Claimed self-handicapping occurs when a person only reports obstacles to their success such as suffering from test anxiety (Smith, Snyder, and Handelsman, 1982) or being in a bad mood (Baumgarder, Lake, and Arkin, 1985). Between the two, behavioral handicaps are more convincingly tied to performance and so more credible, while claimed handicaps serve as an excuse for failure but do not necessarily decrease the person’s chance of success (Zuckerman & Tsai, 2005). Finally, Stewart & Walker (2014) found that self-handicapping was predicted by perfectionism and an external locus of control in a study of 79 university students (they also found that perfectionism predicted low self-efficacy).

We might even engage in the social comparison process to feel better about ourselves. How so? Instead of comparing our performance to others to see where we rate, we will look for someone we know performs worse than we do or is worse off than we are, and then make a downward social comparison (Wills, 1981). This makes us feel better about ourselves because no matter how bad off we are at the time, that person is in a far worse predicament. Maybe we know we are in a batting slump over the past 10 games and have experienced a reduction in our self-esteem as a result. We might compare ourselves against another teammate who has underperformed all year and realize that our situation is temporary and not seemingly permanent like theirs.

People have a tendency to evaluate themselves much higher than they evaluate others. For instance, they are smarter, better looking, more capable, and more honest than other people. This is called the “better than average” ( BTA) effect. Across five studies, Brown (2012) showed that the BTA is stronger for important attributes than ones that do not matter and when participants experienced a threat to their feelings of self-worth. It has also been shown that the effect holds for easy tasks which produce underconfidence, but not for difficult ones which lead to overconfidence and making a worse-than-average bias (Larrick, Burson, & Soll, 2007). Finally, Kanten and Teigen (2008) asked 385 students to rate themselves or an acquaintance relative to their peers on several personality traits. The results showed that participants saw themselves as superior to most others at all points in time. The authors describe a better than average improvement effect such that participants said they were more superior now compared to the past and expected to be even more superior in the future.

Finally, Cialdini et al. (1976) said that people have a tendency to publicly announce their associations with successful others in a process they called “ bask in reflected glory ” (BIRG). In a series of three field experiments involving 300 university students across seven universities in the United States, Cialdini et al. (1976) found that participants strived to bask in the glory of successful others even though they were not the cause of their success, such as wearing school apparel and saying ‘we’ after their team was victorious but not when they lost (in the case of a loss, participants often said ‘they lost’ instead of ‘we lost’). In another study, two days before the 1999 general election in Flanders researchers counted and recorded houses displaying at least one poster or one removable lawn sign supporting a political party (a total of 462 addresses for posters and 177 addresses for lawn signs). The day after the elections, the houses were checked to see if the poster or lawn sign (s) was/were still present. The results showed that the better the election result, the more houses that still displayed the sign/poster. Winners flaunted their association with the winning party, supporting BIRG while supporters of the losing party tried to conceal their association (Boen et al., 2002).

Define self-presentation.
Define self-promotion and describe how it is used in self-presentation.
Define ingratiation and describe how it is used in self-presentation.
Define false modesty and describe how it is used in self-presentation.
Define self-verification and describe how it is used in self-presentation.
Define self-monitoring and describe how it is used in self-presentation.

3.3.1. Self-Presentation Defined

Think about the last date you went on, especially a first date. What did you do beforehand? You likely showered and groomed yourself, maybe even rehearsed what you would say in the mirror. You also likely took great care to pick your clothes out to make a good first impression. Any strategies we use to make ourselves appear in a more positive light to others is called self-presentation. We intentionally try to control or shape their impressions of us (Schlenker, 2012). First impressions are especially important. Oftentimes, if we make a bad first impression it can be virtually impossible to overcome even if subsequent interactions are much more positive.

3.3.2. Specific Strategies Used in Self-Presentation

So that we can successfully shape the view others have of us to be positive, we need to engage in effortful behavior. How so? One strategy is to use self-promotion or engaging in behaviors or saying positive things about oneself. We often engage in this type of behavior on a first date or in an interview. Research has also shown that individuals higher in narcissism and lower in self-esteem engage in greater levels of online activity on social networking sites such as Facebook and use more self-promotional content to include About Me, Main Photo, View Photos, and status updates. The study also found gender differences insofar as males engaged in more self-promotion in the About Me and Notes sections while females displayed more self-promotional main photos (Mehdizadeh, 2010).

Another strategy is called ingratiation or complimenting, flattering, or engaging in other acts that lead a person to do things for you or like you. This is a typical strategy used by salespeople to have you engage in one clear behavior – buy a car or other product. Politicians are known to use the strategy also so that you come to like them while they are campaigning and then subsequently vote for them on election day. Cialdini (2007) writes in his book Influence: The Power of Persuasion , “Apparently we have such an automatically positive reaction to compliments that we can fall victim to someone who uses them in an obvious attempt to win our favor” (pg. 176).

Maybe you have been on a team at work before and had an idea that completely revolutionized the way your company completed a service for its clients. Did you gloat about your performance? Not likely. You were more likely to downplay your performance and talk about the contributions of your fellow teammates instead. The end result is that you will be seen as likeable and competent by others but for what is called false modesty , you must have been successful in your performance and others must know about it already (i.e. a fan was watching the big game and saw the wide receiver catch the game winning touchdown).

Another strategy is to choose situations or interpret behavior in ways that confirm already held beliefs or to avoid situations and criticism that might contradict these beliefs. Essentially, we want to confirm our existing self-concept but from the eyes of others. This behavior can best be described as self-verification .

Finally, we engage in self-monitoring or observing our own behavior so that we can make adjustments to produce the impression we desire in others and to meet the demands of the situation (Snyder, 1987). For instance, a literature review of self-monitoring through paper diaries, the internet, personal digital assistants, and digital scales in relation to weight loss, found that more frequent self-monitoring of diet, physical activity, or weight led to more successful outcomes for weight management (Burke, Wang, & Sevick, 2011).

Define the self-serving bias.
Describe how social desirability is a form of the self-serving bias.
Contrast the false consensus and false uniqueness effects.
Outline the benefits, and perils, of optimism and pessimism.

Our final section covers cognitive biases and heuristics used to increase our sense of self, though we have discussed others already throughout this module.

3.4.1. The Self-Serving Bias

First, the self-serving bias is our tendency to see ourselves in a favorable light. We take credit for our successes but blame failures on outside forces. This bias is often displayed by students who are quicker to explain a bad grade on a test as the instructor creating a test that was too difficult or testing on information not in the study guide. When the student does well, though, it is due to their skill and time spent studying, and not necessarily to the test being extra easy.

We even have a tendency to see ourselves as less likely to exhibit a self-serving bias than others (Friedrich, 1996; Myers, 1990). Friedrich (1996) documented this effect across two studies. First, 47 upper level undergraduates enrolled in either a statistics or industrial/organizational psychology course completed an anonymous survey at the beginning of class having them read a paragraph about the results of a SAT survey and then respond to a paragraph describing the self-serving bias. At the end they were asked, “How often do you think (you; the average person) make this kind of mistake when judging or evaluating (yourself; him- or herself)?” and indicated their answer on a 9-point scale (1 meaning almost never and 9 indicating nearly all the time). The results showed that students generally saw themselves as significantly less likely to distort their self-perceptions. In the second study, 38 introductory psychology students were lectured on research related to the self-serving bias during the last third of a regularly scheduled class. At the beginning of the next class they were given a questionnaire asking them to what degree they thought that they or the average person (depending on the condition they were in) would make the mistake. The same 9-point scale was used. Results of the second study were consistent with the first such that students believed others are more likely to commit the self-serving bias than they are.

Another way we see the self-serving bias play out in research is through the social desirability effect or when participants only provide information that appears to be what is expected by society or is desirable. If asked questions about sexual activity, some may report lower levels of activity than is true or not mention acts of sexual impropriety. Though our society has become sexually charged, there are still limits to what is acceptable. We will talk more about self-serving behavior when we discuss attribution theory in Module 4.

3.4.1.1. Explaining self-serving bias. So, what are potential causes of the self-serving bias? In a 2008 article, Shepperd, Malone, and Sweeny cite a few different classes of explanations. First, the previously discussed self-enhancement and self-presentation are offered as motivation-driven reasons (please see the previous sections for a discussion).

Second, they offer cognitive-driven explanations. The outcomes might be inconsistent with expectations such that our expectations are grounded in experience and we utilize cognitive mechanisms that might mute, dampen, or even erase previous negative experiences but not positive ones. Our outcomes may also not be consistent with our self-schema meaning that our views of our skills and abilities are often overly positive and that we view ourselves as the kind of person who produces positive outcomes, not negative ones. Positive outcomes are consistent with our self-schema while negative outcomes lead to two possible conclusions: the negative outcome had an internal cause and our positive self-schema is not correct, or the negative outcome had an external cause and our positive self-schema remains intact. A third possibility is that outcomes are inconsistent with actions . Positive expectations usually lead to goal-directed behavior. The authors offer the example of a boy who prepares to ask a girl out on a date by rehearsing what he will say, dressing nice, and acting charming. If she accepts his offer, he will see it as due to his efforts but if she rejects him, he will likely regroup and try again a few times. If the answer continues to be ‘no’ then he will believe the cause is not with him but something external.

A fourth cognitive explanation is called biased hypothesis-testing . When failure occurs in place of expected success, we are likely to ask ‘why did this happen?’ Like scientist’s, people form hypotheses to answer the question and then collect data to test it. But they are often not good scientists and engage in confirmation bias and see only information that confirms rather than disconfirms their hypothesis. People also find case-positive information more diagnostic than case-negative. Finally, people engage in different standards of proof in which they form a proposition or hypothesis and proceed to evaluate evidence. Unlike biased hypothesis-testing though, they consider all information and do not omit disconfirming evidence. How much information is needed to accept or reject their hypothesis also varies insofar as they require more information to accept an undesired hypothesis and less for a desired hypothesis. For instance, the specific hypothesis tested (i.e. ‘Am I smart?’ or ‘Am I stupid?’) determines what information is sought out in biased hypothesis testing while in different standards of proof the exact hypothesis determines how much information is required to draw a conclusion (more proof for the question centered on whether they are stupid and less for if they are smart).

Shepperd, Malone, and Sweeny (2008) conclude that the self-serving bias can only be understood using both motivational and cognitive driven explanations.

3.4.2. Overestimating Our Opinions and Skills

People often overestimate to what degree their opinion is shared by others. This tendency is called the false consensus effect (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). It may occur because people are biased in viewing their own positions as what everyone else subscribes to as well, or because they overgeneralize from case information with their opinion serving as one salient type of case information (Alicke & Largo, 1995). The false consensus effect has been demonstrated in regard to smoking behavior (thinking that half or more than half of adults or peers smoked led to the most smoking involvement; Botvin et al., 1992); drug use (Wolfson, 2000); engaging in health protective or defeating behaviors (Suls, Wan, & Sanders, 1988); a willingness to escalate a disturbance (Russell & Arms, 1995); presidential preferences such that supporters of a candidate predicted a higher percentage of support for the candidate than other candidates (Brown, 1982); determining the extent to which other voters would vote like you (Koestner et al., 1995); and illicit drug use by elite athletes (Dunn, Thomas, Swift, & Burns, 2011).

Likewise, we tend to underestimate to what degree others share our abilities and skills. This tendency is called the false uniqueness effect . We might see our math ability as rare, our future to be brighter, or our opinion of a social matter to be more desirable. One study found that participants believed their first name to be unique, whether it was rare or common. The effect held for both male and female names and the researchers also found that when we consider making a name change, rare names are often considered (Kulig, 2013).

3.4.3. Optimism…to the Extreme

Of course, seeing the jar as half full and not half empty has obvious benefits for mental health. This is the essence of the difference between being optimistic and pessimistic. Scheier and Carver (1985) offered a theory of dispositional optimism which defines it as, “a stable individual difference that reflects the general perception that future positive outcomes will be common and future negative outcomes will be rare” (Gallagher, Lopez, & Pressman, 2012). Research has shown that being optimistic results in higher levels of subjective well-being for college students (Gallagher & Lopez, 2009) and adults (Isaacowitz, 2005), leads to more adaptive coping mechanisms (Carver et al., 2009; Nes & Segerstrom, 2006), can bring about greater success on the job (Seligman & Schulman, 1986), results in goal attainment (Segerstrom & Nes, 2006), and brings about better physical health (Giltay et al., 2004).

Is optimism universal? Gallagher, Lopez, and Pressman (2012) conducted a study using representative samples from 142 countries numbering over 150,000 participants and found that individuals of all ages, races, education levels, and socioeconomic backgrounds and most countries are optimistic and that this optimism leads to better subjective well-being and health. Optimism is not merely a benefit of living in an industrialized nation either.

But is there such a thing as being too optimistic to the point of being unrealistic? The answer is yes and Weinstein (1980) identified a tendency people have to think they are invulnerable and that others will be the victims of misfortune but not themselves. He called this error in judgment, which results in a bias towards favorable outcomes, unrealistic optimism . For instance, college students in one study were unrealistically optimistic about the likelihood they would develop alcohol related problems in the future such as having a hangover, missing classes, or having an argument with a friend over their drinking. The negative consequences of unrealistic optimism were found to be both proximal and distal (Dillard, Midboe, & Klein, 2009). Another study found that patient’s participating in early-phase oncology trials display the unrealistic optimism bias in relation to their expectation of the therapeutic benefit of the trial and that this tendency can undermine the informed consent of participants (Jansen et al., 2011).

Everything is not always roses and so expressing some pessimism can actually help us to be realistic. Defensive pessimism can help us manage our anxiety and pursue our goals by setting low expectations and mentally exploring possible outcomes of goal-relevant tasks (Norem, 2008; Norem & Cantor, 1986). Hazlett, Molden, and Sackett (2011) found that participants who were focused on growth and advancement preferred optimistic forecasts and perform better when they express an optimistic outlook while those who were concerned with safety and security preferred pessimistic forecasts and perform better when they express a pessimistic outlook.

Module Recap

That’s it. We spent an entire module talking about our – self and should feel no guilt over it. Kidding. To be serious though, we all try and answer the question of who we are and philosophers have been tackling issues related to what it means to be human and matters of human existence since the dawn of time. Our discussion focused on the self-concept, self-esteem, self-presentation, and biases and heuristics we make/use to protect our sense of self. We hope you enjoyed the wide array of issues we covered and with this topic out of the way, we can now continue our discussion in Part II of how we think about ourselves and others by focusing on ‘others.’ After this, we will round out Part II by discussing the attitudes we have about ourselves, others, and things in our world.

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Self-Concept in Psychology: Definition & Examples

Saul Mcleod, PhD

Editor-in-Chief for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MRes, PhD, University of Manchester

Saul Mcleod, PhD., is a qualified psychology teacher with over 18 years of experience in further and higher education. He has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of Clinical Psychology.

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Olivia Guy-Evans, MSc

Associate Editor for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MSc Psychology of Education

Olivia Guy-Evans is a writer and associate editor for Simply Psychology. She has previously worked in healthcare and educational sectors.

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The self-concept is a general term for how someone thinks about, evaluates, or perceives themselves. To be aware of oneself is to have a concept of oneself.

It’s formed through experiences, interactions, and reflections, and plays a pivotal role in influencing behavior, emotions, and interpersonal relationships. A healthy self-concept promotes well-being, while a negative one can lead to emotional and social challenges.

Baumeister (1999) provides the following self-concept definition: “The individual’s belief about himself or herself, including the person’s attributes and who and what the self is.”

The self-concept is an important term for both social and humanistic psychology . Lewis (1990) suggests that the development of a concept of self has two aspects:

(1) The Existential Self

This is “the most basic part of the self-scheme or self-concept; the sense of being separate and distinct from others and the awareness of the constancy of the self” (Bee, 1992).

The existential self is a concept within developmental psychology, particularly in the study of infant development. It refers to the basic and most fundamental understanding that an individual exists as a separate and distinct entity from others.

This realization typically begins in infancy, as early as a few months old, when a baby recognizes its existence apart from the external world.

The child realizes that they exist as a separate entity from others and continue to exist over time and space.

The existential self is the foundation upon which more complex aspects of self-concept, like the categorical self (understanding oneself in terms of categorical memberships like gender, skills, and age), are built.

According to Lewis (1990), awareness of the existential self begins as young as two to three months old and arises in part due to the child’s relationship with the world. For example, the child smiles, and someone smiles back, or the child touches a mobile and sees it move.

(2) The Categorical Self

Having realized that he or she exists as a separate experiencing being, the child becomes aware that he or she is also an object in the world.

The categorical self involves the understanding that one can be categorized into various groups based on traits, roles, and attributes.

Just as other objects, including people, have properties that can be experienced (big, small, red, smooth, and so on), so the child is becoming aware of himself or herself as an object which can be experienced and which has properties.

The self, too, can be put into categories such as age, gender, size, or skill. Two of the first categories to be applied are age (“I am 3”) and gender (“I am a girl”).

In early childhood, the categories children apply to themselves are very concrete (e.g., hair color, height, and favorite things). Later, self-description also begins to include reference to internal psychological traits, comparative evaluations, and how others see them.

For instance, a child might identify as being a “big boy” or “big girl,” differentiate themselves by saying they have “brown hair,” or later recognize they are “good at drawing.” The categorical self lays the foundation for more intricate self-identifications as one matures.

Self-image refers to the mental representation or picture that individuals have of themselves, encompassing both physical appearance and personal traits.

It’s how people perceive themselves and believe others perceive them. Personal experiences, interactions with others, societal standards, and media influences, can shape this perception.

This does not necessarily have to reflect reality. Indeed, a person with anorexia who is thin may have a self-image in which the person believes they are fat.

A person’s self-image is affected by many factors, such as parental influences, friends, the media, etc.

Self-image is a significant component of one’s overall self-concept and is crucial to self-esteem and confidence. It can influence behavior, choices, relationships, and overall mental well-being. Over time, a person’s self-image can change based on experiences, feedback, achievements, and personal reflections.

The Twenty Statements Test

Kuhn (1960) investigated the self-image by using The Twenty Statements Test .

He asked people to answer “Who am I?” in 20 different ways.

He found that the responses could be divided into two major groups. These were social roles (external or objective aspects of oneself such as son, teacher, friend) and personality traits (internal or affective aspects of oneself such as gregarious, impatient, humorous).

The list of answers to the question “Who Am I?” probably includes examples of each of the following four types of responses:

Physical Description : I’m tall, have blue eyes…etc.
Social Roles : We are all social beings whose behavior is shaped to some extent by the roles we play. Such roles as student, housewife, or member of the football team not only help others to recognize us but also help us to know what is expected of us in various situations.
Personal Traits : These are the third dimension of our self-descriptions. “I’m impulsive…I’m generous…I tend to worry a lot,”…etc.
Existential Statements (abstract ones): These can range from “I’m a child of the universe” to “I’m a human being” to “I’m a spiritual being, “…etc.

Typically, young people describe themselves more in terms of personal traits, whereas older people feel defined to a greater extent by their social roles.

Actual Self

The actual self is how individuals currently see themselves based on their self-awareness and introspection. It represents the attributes, roles, competencies, and characteristics that a person believes they genuinely possess at the present moment.

While “actual self” and “self-image” are closely related and often used interchangeably in casual discussions, they are distinct concepts within the realm of psychology. Here’s a breakdown of the differences:

Represents an individual’s current perception of themselves based on attributes, roles, and abilities they believe they genuinely possess.
Serves as a baseline for comparison with other self-representations, like the ideal self or ought self.
Refers to the mental representation or picture an individual has of themselves.
It encompasses both physical appearance and perceived personal traits.
Self-image is about how people perceive themselves and how they believe they are seen by others.

In essence, the “actual self” is a broader construct that might include one’s self-image as a component.

The actual self covers the entirety of an individual’s current self-perception, while the self-image focuses more on the visual or representational aspect and perceived traits.

Both, however, are integral parts of an individual’s overall self-concept.

Self-Esteem

Self-esteem (also known as self-worth) refers to the extent to which we like, accept, or approve of ourselves or how much we value ourselves.

Self-esteem always involves a degree of evaluation, and we may have either a positive or a negative view of ourselves.

Factors influencing self-esteem include:

Childhood experiences
Feedback from others
Comparisons with peers
Societal standards and cultural influences
Personal achievements or failures

High Self-Esteem : Individuals with high self-esteem generally believe that they have good qualities and value themselves positively. They often handle life challenges better, are more resilient, and have a positive outlook on life.

Confidence in our own abilities
Self-acceptance
Not worrying about what others think

Low Self-Esteem: Those with low self-esteem tend to view themselves negatively, doubt their abilities, and are more critical of themselves. They are more susceptible to experiencing feelings of worthlessness, depression, and anxiety.

Lack of confidence
Want to be/look like someone else
Always worrying about what others might think

Having a balanced self-esteem is crucial for mental well-being. While high self-esteem is generally beneficial, overly inflated self-esteem can lead to narcissism . On the other hand, chronically low self-esteem can contribute to a host of psychological issues, including depression and anxiety.

Measurement

There are several ways of measuring self-esteem. For example, Harrill Self-Esteem Inventory is a questionnaire comprising 15 statements about a range of interests.

Another example is the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), which is a neutral cartoon given to the participant, who then has to devise a story about what’s going on.

Argyle (2008) believes 4 major factors influence self-esteem.

1. The Reaction of Others

If people admire us, flatter us, seek out our company, listen attentively and agree with us, we tend to develop a positive self-image.

If they avoid, neglect, and tell us things about ourselves that we don’t want to hear, we develop a negative self-image.

2. Comparison with Others

If the people we compare ourselves with (our reference group) appear to be more successful, happier, richer, and better looking than ourselves, we tend to develop a negative self-image, BUT if they are less successful than us, our image will be positive.

3. Social Roles

Some social roles carry prestige, e.g., doctor, airline pilot, TV presenter, and premiership footballer, and this promotes self-esteem.

Other roles carry a stigma. E.g., a prisoner, mental hospital patient, refuse collector, or unemployed person.

4. Identification

Roles aren’t just “out there.” They also become part of our personality, i.e., we identify with the positions we occupy, the roles we play, and the groups we belong to.

But just as important as all these factors are the influence of our parents! (See Coopersmith’s research.)

Experiments

Morse and Gergen (1970) showed that our self-esteem might change rapidly in uncertain or anxiety-arousing situations.

Participants were waiting for a job interview in a waiting room. They sat with another candidate (a confederate of the experimenter) in one of two conditions:

A) Mr. Clean – dressed in a smart suit, carrying a briefcase opened to reveal a slide rule and books.

B) Mr. Dirty – dressed in an old T-shirt and jeans, slouched over a cheap sex novel.

The self-esteem of participants with Mr. Dirty increased whilst those with Mr. Clean decreased! No mention was made of how this affected the subjects’ performance in the interview.

Self-esteem affects performance at numerous tasks, though (Coopersmith, 1967), so one could expect Mr. Dirty’s subjects to perform better than Mr. Clean.

Even though self-esteem might fluctuate, there are times when we continue to believe good things about ourselves, even when evidence to the contrary exists. This is known as the perseverance effect.

Miller and Ross (1975) showed that people who believed they had socially desirable characteristics continued in this belief even when the experimenters tried to get them to believe the opposite.

Does the same thing happen with bad things if we have low self-esteem? Maybe not. Perhaps with very low self-esteem, all we believe about ourselves might be bad.

The ideal self refers to the person an individual aspires to become. It embodies one’s goals, ambitions, and dreams, encompassing attributes, behaviors, and traits a person values and wishes to possess. This concept is pivotal in understanding personal development and self-concept.

Key points about the ideal self:

Comparison with Real Self: The ideal self stands in contrast to the “real self,” which represents how a person currently sees themselves. The gap between these two concepts can influence self-esteem. A smaller gap can lead to higher self-esteem, while a larger gap can result in feelings of dissatisfaction or inadequacy.
Dynamic Nature: The ideal self is not static; it evolves based on life experiences, societal influences, personal aspirations, and changing values.
Motivation: The ideal self can serve as a motivational force, pushing individuals to pursue personal growth, learn new skills, and strive for self-improvement.
Potential Pitfalls: While the ideal self can be a source of inspiration, an unattainable or overly perfectionistic ideal self can lead to disappointment, low self-esteem, and mental distress.

Carl Rogers, a humanistic psychologist, emphasized the importance of achieving congruence between the real self and the ideal self for overall psychological well-being.

If there is a mismatch between how you see yourself (e.g., your self-image) and what you’d like to be (e.g., your ideal self), this will likely affect how much you value yourself.

Therefore, there is an intimate relationship between self-image, ego-ideal, and self-esteem. Humanistic psychologists study this using the Q-Sort Method .

A person’s ideal self may not be consistent with what actually happens in the life and experiences of the person. Hence, a difference may exist between a person’s ideal self and actual experience. This is called incongruence.

Where a person’s ideal self and actual experience are consistent or very similar, a state of congruence exists. Rarely, if ever, does a total state of congruence exist; all people experience a certain amount of incongruence.

The development of congruence is dependent on unconditional positive regard . Rogers believed that for a person to achieve self-actualization , they must be in a state of congruence.

Michael Argyle (2008) says there are four major factors that influence its development:

The ways in which others (particularly significant others) react to us.
How we think we compare to others
Our social roles
The extent to which we identify with other people

Argyle, M. (2008). Social encounters: Contributions to social interaction . Aldine Transaction

Baumeister, R. F. (Ed.) (1999). The self in social psychology . Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press (Taylor & Francis).

Bee, H. L. (1992). The developing child . London: HarperCollins.

Coopersmith, S. (1967). The antecedents of self-esteem . San Francisco: Freeman.

Kuhn, M. H. (1960). Self-attitudes by age, sex and professional training. Sociological Quarterly , 1, 39-56.

Lewis, M. (1990). Self-knowledge and social development in early life. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), Handbook of personality (pp. 277-300). New York: Guilford.

Miller, D. T., & Ross, M. (1975). Self-serving biases in the attribution of causality: Fact or fiction? Psychological Bulletin, 82, 213–225

Morse, S. J. & Gergen, K. J. (1970). Social comparison, self-consistency and the concept of self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 16, 148-156.

Rogers, C. (1959). A theory of therapy, personality and interpersonal relationships as developed in the client-centered framework. In (ed.) S. Koch, Psychology: A study of a science. Vol. 3: Formulations of the person and the social context . New York: McGraw Hill.

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Culture, Method, and the Content of Self-Concepts: Testing Trait, Individual-Self-Primacy, and Cultural Psychology Perspectives

Monica whitty.

Queen’s University Belfast

Guy J. Curtis

University of Western Sydney

Fernando A. Ortiz

Washington State University

Jose Alberto S. Reyes

De La Salle University - Manila

Three theoretical perspectives on cultural universals and differences in the content of self-concepts were tested in individualistic (United States, n = 178; Australia, n = 112) and collectivistic (Mexico, n = 157; Philippines, n = 138) cultures, using three methods of self-concept assessment. Support was found for both trait perspectives and the individual-self-primacy hypothesis. In contrast, support for cultural psychology hypotheses was limited because traits and other personal attributes were not more salient, or social attributes less salient, in individualistic cultures than collectivistic cultures. The salience of some aspects of self-concept depended on the method of assessment, calling into question conclusions based on monomethod studies.

Ethnographic and cross-cultural studies of self-concept continue to interest anthropologists and psychologists. Ethnographic accounts, particularly in Asian and Pacific Island cultures, have contrasted the more relational, collectivistic, or sociocentric conception of self in these cultures with the more individualistic or idiocentric conception of self in Western cultures ( Lebra, 1994 ; Mageo, 1998 ; Rosenberger, 1994 ). Similarly, cultural psychologists argue that the self is a cultural construction, and that we can expect significant cultural differences in both content and processes associated with the self ( Heine, 2001 ; Markus & Kitayama, 1991 ). A number of cross-cultural studies of the content of self-concepts have been conducted, but they have sampled a limited range of cultures, relied almost exclusively on a single method of data collection, and have failed to directly measure and test the explanatory variables that are hypothesized to underlie individual and cultural differences in self-concept content. In this study, we sought to address these limitations, while testing three theoretical perspectives on cultural universals and differences in self-concept content.

Theoretical Perspectives on Self-Concept Content across Cultures

Trait psychology.

Trait psychologists have argued that certain trait dimensions are evolved, heritable, and universal across cultures ( MacDonald, 1998 ; McCrae, 2000 ). The existence of heritable traits with adaptive significance, in combination with an ecological-realist perspective on person perception ( Baron & Misovich, 1993 ), leads to the prediction that trait attributes will be an aspect of self-concept in all cultures. The ecological-realist perspective postulates that traits can be perceived directly through certain evolved indicators (e.g., facial expression, gait, vocal qualities, etc.), particularly if one is able to observe oneself or others in the context of trait-relevant activities. Similarly, from Funder’s (1995) Realistic Accuracy Model, we can expect that people in all cultures interpret behavior in terms of traits to some degree, and thus develop an awareness of their traits as part of their self-concepts. Indeed, even anthropologists who have emphasized the sociocentric nature of the self in some cultures have observed that personality traits are still used to describe people in these cultures, at least under appropriate conditions ( Lutz, 1985 ; Mageo, 1998 ; White, 1985 ; Whiting, 1996 ). The apparent existence of trait terms in all languages ( Dixon, 1977 ; Saucier & Goldberg, 1996 ) also suggests that trait concepts are a universal aspect of self-concept. For the purpose of this study, trait psychology perspectives will be considered supported if participants in all cultures describe themselves in terms of trait attributes with at least moderate frequency.

Individual-self-primacy hypothesis

Gaertner, Sedikides, Vevea, and Iuzzini (2002 , p. 574) defined the individual self as consisting “of those attributes that render the person unique from fellow in-group members” and the collective self as composed “of attributes that are shared with in-group members.” While acknowledging that both the individual and collective self are important components of a person’s self-concept, Gaertner, Sedikides, and Graetz (1999) and Gaertner et al. argued that theoretical and empirical considerations support the motivational primacy of the individual or personal self. The individual-self-primacy hypothesis is consistent with evolutionary theory, which posits that natural selection acts on the individuals of each species rather than the group. From this perspective, the individual self is seen as an adaptive human trait that has evolved in response to the ecological and social pressures experienced by the human species ( Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997 ).

Based on a recent meta-analysis, Gaertner et al. (2002) concluded that people react more strongly to threats or enhancements to the individual self than to the collective self, supporting the individual-self-primacy hypothesis over the collective-self-primacy hypothesis. In an open-ended self-description task, Gaertner et al. (1999 , Study 4) also found that respondents listed more aspects of their individual self than their collective self, regardless of their level of individualism or collectivism, and cited this result as additional support for the individual-self-primacy hypothesis. Gaertner et al. (2002) also addressed the question of whether the motivational primacy of the individual self might vary across cultures. If individual-self-primacy is limited to individualistic cultures only, it would support a contextual-primacy hypothesis. The contextual-primacy hypothesis posits that neither the individual nor the collective self is inherently primary. Rather, the primacy of the individual or collective self varies as a function of contextual influences such as culture. Gaertner et al. reviewed evidence, however, that the primacy of the individual self is relatively immune to cultural variation, and thus concluded that the contextual-primacy hypothesis is not supported.

Some researchers have argued that it is important to distinguish the collective self from the relational self, which involves the salience in self-concept of one’s close relationships ( Cheek, Smith, & Tropp, 2002 ; Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 2000 ; Kashima & Hardie, 2000 ). However, in doing so, it is not entirely clear how to treat the relational self in tests of the individual-self-primacy versus collective-self-primacy hypotheses. Some researchers view the relational self as an aspect of the collective or interdependent self (Cross et al.; Singelis, 1994 ). However, some studies indicate that relational identity may be more strongly associated with personal identity than collective identity (Cheek et al.; Kashima & Hardie, 2000 ), perhaps because relational identities involve a connection between separate individuals (i.e., personal selves), not between the individual and a group or collective. Furthermore, some research indicates that the importance of relational selves is more a function of gender than culture (Cross et al.; Kashima & Hardie, 2000 ). Thus, relational identities may not exhibit the differences between individualistic and collectivistic cultures that are expected for individual and collective identities. Indeed, Cross et al. noted that memberships in groups or collectives are relatively unimportant for Americans, as compared to East Asians, but that close relationships are an important aspect of self-concept for Americans.

Sedikides and Gaertner (2001 , p. 19) acknowledged that the scope of their theory did not enable them to address the importance of the relational self relative to the individual and collective self. However, they did speculate that dyadic relationships “become important only to the extent to which they are psychologically glued to,” or reduced to, the level of the individual self, for example, through attachment processes. This leaves open the possibility that the relational self might rival the individual self in importance if relational selves are closely integrated with the individual self.

For the purpose of this study, the individual-self-primacy hypotheses will be considered supported if participants in all cultural groups (a) generate a greater proportion of individual or personal attributes (e.g., traits, values, preferences, emotions) than social or collective attributes in their spontaneous self-descriptions; and (b) average higher on measures of personal identity than social and collective identity (but not necessarily relational identity). On the other hand, if the relative importance of personal versus social and collective aspects of the self depends on the culture, it will be viewed as support for the contextual-primacy hypothesis.

Cultural psychology

Cultural psychologists view the self as socially constructed and hence variable across cultures ( Heine, 2001 ; Markus & Kitayama, 1991 ). In more extreme versions, the very idea of the individual person as a separate psychological entity with a distinct sense of self is questioned. However, in a detailed critique of the conceptual reasoning and empirical evidence for this extreme view, Spiro (1993) concluded that such a lack of self-other differentiation in non-Western or collectivistic cultures is dubious and that some authors may have conflated the distinction between interpersonal autonomy and intrapsychic autonomy. 1 The more typical view of cultural psychologists, however, is that cultures vary in the relative salience of different aspects of self-concept or identity. Traits and other personal attributes are expected to be more salient in individualistic cultures than in collectivistic cultures, whereas social and collective attributes are expected to be more salient in collectivistic cultures than in individualistic cultures (e.g., Kanagawa, Cross, & Markus, 2001 ; Rhee, Uleman, Lee, & Roman, 1995 ).

Cultural psychologists have most often attributed individual and cultural differences in the content of self-concepts to differences in independent versus interdependent self-construals ( Kanagawa et al., 2001 ; Markus & Kitayama, 1991 ). Independent self-construals (i.e., the conception of self as an autonomous and unique entity) are thought to be most prevalent in individualistic or Western cultures, whereas interdependent self-construals (i.e., the conception of self as connected to ingroups) are thought to be most prevalent in collectivistic cultures such as those in Asia, Africa, Latin American, and many southern European countries ( Heine, 2001 ; Markus & Kitayama, 1991 , 1998 ). Cultural psychologists expect traits and other personal attributes to be less salient elements of self-concept for individuals and cultures with predominantly interdependent rather than independent self-construals. Rather, for people with interdependent self-construals, “the fundamental relatedness of the self to others may be the primary unit of the self rather than abstracted and internalized attributes or attitudes” (Kanagawa et al., p. 91).

In addition to self-construal explanations, several theorists have attributed the expected emphasis on traits in individualistic cultures to implicit theories of social causality that emphasize trait explanations ( Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993 ; Morris & Peng, 1994 ). Such “implicit trait theories” may be more prevalent in individualistic cultures because it is more instrumental to infer dispositions in those cultures ( Church et al., 2005 ; Krull, 1993 ; Markus & Kitayama, 1991 ). Both self-construal and implicit theory explanations of self-concept differences seem plausible. However, a limitation of previous studies is that these potential explanatory variables have not been directly assessed or tested. In this study, cultural psychology perspectives will be considered supported if (a) personal attributes or identities are more important aspects of self-concept, and social and collective attributes or identities less important, for participants in individualistic cultures, as compared to collectivistic cultures; and (b) self-construals and implicit theories have some explanatory value in predicting individual differences in these aspects of self-concept or identity in all cultures.

Finally, we note that these three theoretical perspectives—trait psychology, individual-self-primacy, and cultural psychology—are not necessarily inconsistent with each other. Indeed, all three perspectives would be simultaneously supported if we found that: (a) trait attributes are a salient aspect of self-concept in all cultures, supporting trait perspectives; (b) personal attributes are more salient than social and collective attributes in all cultures, supporting the individual-self-primacy hypothesis; and (c) people in individualistic cultures emphasize traits and other personal attributes more, and social and collective attributes less, than people in collectivistic cultures. We turn now to the available empirical evidence.

Empirical Evidence

Table 1 presents a summary of cross-national studies of self-concept content, nearly all of which have employed the Twenty Statements Test (TST: Kuhn & McPartland, l954). In administering the TST, researchers have asked participants to respond to the statement “I am…,” or the questions “Who am I?” or “Who are you?” up to 20 times by filling in 20 blank lines. For each study, the first three columns of Table 1 describe the sample, data collection method and coder reliability, and relevant findings for specific self-concept categories. The last two columns are particularly important for an evaluation of trait, individual-self-primacy, and cultural psychology perspectives on self-concept content. In the fourth column we report the proportion of pure trait (T), personal attribute (PA), and social or collective attribute (S) responses. The personal attribute (PA) category includes pure traits, but also personal values, interests, beliefs, goals, and so forth. The proportions were computed by combining relevant categories or subcategories using the data provided in the original articles. 2

Cross-National Studies of Self-Concept Content

Study Cultures (n)	Method and Coder Reliability	Relevant Findings for Specific Categories	Proportions of Pure Traits (T), Personal Attributes (PA), and Social/Collective Attributes (S)	Conclusions
U.S. (169) Hong Kong (137) Japan (327) College students	TST (20 responses to the question “Who am I?”) Coder reliability on 16 protocols per culture: range = .70–.97, mean = .85; two subcategories discarded because agreement less than .70.	Hong Kong and U.S. > Japanese in general psychological attributes and family subcategory; Japanese > Hong Kong and U.S. in choices (preferences), aspirations, personal facts, social identities with a self-reference, and sex and age subcategories. Authors interpreted results in terms of Japanese tendency toward concrete and context-specific social perception and thought.	Hong Kong: T .44 PA .57 S .38 Japan: T .26 PA .47 S .41 U.S.: T .41 PA .53 S .46 PA and S proportions estimated because not all subcategories reported by authors.	Trait perspectives supported by moderate use of traits in all cultures. Individual-self-primacy hypothesis probably supported by greater proportion of personal than social attributes in all cultures, although PA and S proportions had to be estimated from reported information. In U.S.-Japanese comparisons, support for CP hypotheses for general psychological attributes and some social identities (not family); however, Japanese greater than U.S. on other personal attribute categories (e.g., preferences, aspirations). CP hypotheses were not supported because U.S. and Hong Kong were similar in most categories.
U.S. (111) Japan (159) College students	TST (5 most important responses to “I am …” stem); plus open-ended contextualized descriptions of self at home, school, and with close friends Coder reliability on unspecified number of random protocols: U.S., .86; Japan, .88	For TST: U.S. > Japanese in pure psychological attributes; Japanese > U.S. in social and universal (e.g., human being) attributes, but also physical attributes, preferences, wishes, and activities. In contextualized self-descriptions, some patterns reversed: US > Japanese in preferences, wishes, and qualified attributes; Japanese > US on pure psychological attributes	For TST: US: T .58 PA .76 S .09 Japan: T .19 PA .57 S .27 For contextualized descriptions: U.S.: T .26 PA .87 S .03 Japan: T .41 PA .83 S .05	Trait perspectives supported by moderate use of traits in both cultures (for Japanese, more so in contextualized descriptions) Individual-self-primacy hypothesis supported by greater proportion of personal than social attributes in both cultures. For TST, support for CP hypotheses for pure psychological and social attributes, but Japanese > US on other personal attribute categories (e.g., physical, preferences, etc). Completion of open-ended contextual descriptions immediately after TST might have induced subjects to use alternative categories of response in contextualized descriptions.
U.S. (Illinois) (561) U.S. (Hawaii, European) (28) U.S. (Hawaii, Chinese) (19) U.S. (Hawaii, Japanese) (37) Greece (118) Hong Kong (118) China (39) College students, except university graduates in China	TST (20 responses to “I am…” stem) Coder reliability for percentage of social entity responses was .97.	Proportions of social entity responses: China: .52 Hawaii, Chinese: .29 Hawaii, Japanese: .28 Hawaii, European: .21 Hong Kong: .20 U.S. (Illinois): .19 Greece: .15	Only social entity responses analyzed, see previous column.	Although pure traits and other personal attributes were not coded, the generally modest proportions of social entity responses (except in the China sample) strongly suggests that the proportion of personal attribute responses was substantially greater, thus supporting the individual-self-primacy hypothesis. Little support for CP hypotheses, except for China results. However, China sample was very small and older, reducing confidence in results.
Great Britain (20) Australia (32) Malaysia (26) Adult, middle-class, white-collar workers	TST (10 responses to “I am …” stem given; 7 responses scored, weighted by order of response) All cultures responded in English. “First-round” coder reliability was .85.	Malaysians > Australians, British in group responses (i.e., social identities). Malaysians < Australians in idiocentric responses (i.e., personal attributes, including traits, states, attitudes, beliefs, etc.) No cultural differences in allocentric responses (similar to relational identities), which author judged less relevant to hypotheses	Australia: PA (idiocentric) .68 S (group) .19 Britian: PA (idiocentric) .61 S (group) .18 Malaysia: PA (idiocentric) .48 S (group) .41	Use of global idiocentric category did not allow separate consideration of pure traits vs. other personal attributes. Individual-self-primacy hypothesis supported by greater proportion of personal (idiocentric) than social (group) attributes in all cultures. CP hypotheses supported by cultural differences in group and idiocentric responses Small sample sizes reduce confidence in results. Uncertain impact of using English language, a language of instruction, in Malaysian sample.
U.S. (317) India (306) College students	TST (20 responses to question “Who am I?”) Coder reliability: range = .70–.97, mean = .86	U.S. > India for self-evaluations and most of its subcategories (e.g., psychological attributes); India > US on social identities (except self-identity subcategory), interests, and ambitions (both self and other).	U.S. males: T .22 PA .74 S .26 U.S. females: T .21 PA .73 S .26 Indian males: T .00 PA .55 S .34 Indian females: T .00 PA .66 S .28	Trait perspectives not supported because Indian students gave no pure trait (psychological attribute) responses. Individual-self-primacy hypothesis supported by greater proportion of personal than social attributes in all cultures. CP hypotheses supported for most self-evaluation categories, including pure psychological attributes, and for most social identity categories, but Indians > U.S. on other personal attribute categories (interests, ambitions) Possible rival interpretation: 75% of Indian participants, but only 47% of U.S. participants, were living with parents, which might account for greater individuation in U.S. participants.
England Bulgaria India Sample sizes not reported. All female college students	Open-ended narrative “Please tell us in depth what sort of person YOU are.” Narrative descriptions of short and long term acquaintances also obtained. Both British and Indian samples responded in English. Coder reliability for 10–17% of data exceeded 92% in England, 90% in India, and 80% in Bulgaria.	No significant cultural differences in use of unqualified traits across self and other descriptions, but all cultural groups used traits less in self descriptions than in other descriptions. Indians > British and Bulgarians in references to other people in self descriptions, but gave more references to self in descriptions of others. Bulgarians < British and Indians in use of spatio-temporal qualifiers. Greater Indian reference to others in self-descriptions and reference to self in other descriptions interpreted as support for greater interconnectedness among Indians.	In self and other descriptions combined: India: T .31 PA .37 S .20 England: T .33 PA .34 S .17 Bulgaria: T .38 PA .39 S .12	Trait perspectives supported by moderate use of traits in all cultures. Individual-self-primacy hypothesis supported by greater proportion of personal (idiocentric) than social (group) attributes in all cultures. CP hypotheses not supported because no cultural differences in references to unqualified traits and personal attributes in general. Also contrary to CP expectations: Bulgarian sample responded in the most individualistic manner, giving marginally more unqualified traits and fewer spatio-temporal qualifiers. Confidence in results reduced by failure to report sample sizes.
U.S. European American (97) U.S. Asian American (151) Korea (105) College students	TST (20 responses to the stem “I am…”) Coder reliability for general categories, based on 20% of all responses, ranged from .76–1.00.	In general, European American self-descriptions were both more abstract and autonomous than Koreans, with Asian Americans intermediate as a function of extent of Asian identification. For specific categories, European Americans used more overall traits, pure traits, and emotional states than Koreans, and fewer specific attributes (preferences, aspirations, activities) and global descriptions (e.g., human being). Contrary to authors’ predictions, European Americans used more social identities and physical descriptions than Koreans, perhaps because of the salience of ethnic diversity in New York City. Results for Asian Americans varying in Asian identification were generally consistent with expectations, with more Asian identified participants resembling Koreans and unidentified being even more extreme than the European Americans (e.g., in the use of traits).	European Americans: T .29 PA .65 S .21 Unidentified Asian Americans: T .39 PA .72 S .12 “Singly identified” Asian Americans: T .25 PA .61 “Doubly identified” Asian Americans: T .17 PA .57 S .30 Koreans: T .12 PA .66 S .16	Trait perspectives supported, although pure trait use was modest in Koreans and Asian Americans with high Asian identification. Individual-self-primacy hypothesis supported because personal attributes far exceeded social attributes in all groups. CP hypotheses only partially supported: Koreans used fewer traits than European Americans, but social identities were used more by European Americans than Koreans and Koreans used non-trait personal attributes more than European Americans. Authors interpreted greater use of specific attribute category (preferences, aspirations, activities) to Korean tendency toward more specific or concrete (vs. abstract) responding.
U.S. (93) Hong Kong (89) College students	TST (20 responses to “I am …” stem) Category reliabilities for 15 protocols in each culture ranged from .68–1.00.	No significant cultural differences in prevalence of pure traits, which were by far the predominant response in both cultures. Hong Kong Chinese > Americans in social roles and global identities, but also preferences and attitudes. Americans > Hong Kong Chinese in physical characteristics, hopes, and future planning. Measures of values did not predict proportion of responses in the self-concept categories.	U.S.: T .50 PA .85 S .11 Hong Kong: T .55 PA .75 S .19	Trait perspectives supported by preponderance of traits in both cultures. Individual-self-primacy hypothesis supported because personal attributes far exceeded social attributes in all groups. CP hypotheses partially supported: Greater prevalence in Hong Kong of social roles and global identities, but also preferences and attitudes. Failure of value measures to predict self-concept categories raises questions about method effects and weakens cultural value explanations of self-concept content.
U.S. international students in Kenya (17) Kenya college students (15) Kenya urban adults (10) Kenya Maasai (21) Kenya Samburu (18)	TST (15 responses to question “Who am I?”) Coder reliability for 25 random profiles was .95 for overall percentage of social responses, .85 across all general coding categories.	U.S. and Kenyan college students did not differ significantly and made frequent reference to “personal characteristics” (psychological and interpersonal traits), whereas Maasai and Samburu tribal members rarely referred to traits. Kenyan urban workers were intermediate. Maasai and Samburu tribal members gave primarily social responses, which included ascribed characteristics and especially roles and memberships; U.S. and Kenyan college students gave few social responses.	U.S.: T .48 PA .74 S .12 Kenya college students: T .38 PA .67 S .16 Kenyan urban workers: T .12 PA .35 S .57 Maasai: T .02 PA .14 S .76 Samburu: T .01 PA .15 S .84	Trait perspectives not supported for rural tribal members. Individual-self-primacy hypothesis supported for college students but not for urban workers or rural tribal members. CP hypotheses generally supported, particularly for comparisons involving less educated and more rural participants. Results suggest strong impact of urbanization, education, and Westernization on individuation of self-concept. Small samples reduce confidence in results. Oral administration to illiterate Maasai and Samburu may have primed social responses.
Philippines (157) Comparisons made with U.S. and Hong Kong data reported by College students	TST (20 responses to the question “Who am I?”) Coder reliability for 50 random protocols exceeded .85 for all categories.	As in , the largest proportion of responses referred to personality traits. Filipinos < Hong Kong and U.S. in social roles; Filipinos > Hong Kong on global identities (e.g., I am a human being).	Philippines: T .55 PA .21 S .01	Trait perspectives supported by predominance of trait attributes. Individual-self-primacy hypothesis supported by much higher proportion of personal than social attributes. CP hypotheses not supported: these was a higher proportion of traits in the Philippines than in the U.S. comparison sample and a very low proportion of social roles in this collectivistic culture. Responding in English, rather than a native language, may have influenced results. For example, Filipinos may have “accommodated” to the American cultural values associated with the English language.
Hong Kong high school students (165) Sweden college students (100) Ethiopia college Students (100)	TST (20 responses to question “Who am I?”) Coder reliability on half of responses in each culture: .89 in Hong Kong; .90 plus in Sweden and Ethiopia.	Only college students in Sweden and Ethiopia were formally compared; in 24 -tests comparing the two cultures for scores based on 7, 10, or 20 unweighted and weighted responses, only one significant difference: Ethiopia > Sweden for large group responses when 20 unweighted responses scored. No cultural differences in idiographic, small group, or allocentric (interpersonal, relational) responses	Based on 20 unweighted responses: Ethiopia: PA (idiocentric) .72 S .27 Sweden: PA .76 S .23 Hong Kong males: PA .61 S .37 Hong Kong females: PA .56 S .42 S responses combine large group, small group, and allocentric (relational) responses	Individual-self-primacy hypothesis supported by large majority of idiographic responses, which includes traits and other personal attributes, in all cultural groups. CP hypotheses were not supported because Ethiopian and Swedish participants failed to show cultural differences.
Australia (207) Canada (206) New Zealand (152) South Africa, White (179) China 177) Ethiopia (165) Philippines (157) Turkey 156) South Africa, Black (171) 1 and 2 year College students	TST (20 responses to the question “Who am I?”) Coder reliability for 50 protocols in one collectivist and one individualistic culture exceeded .90 for all categories.	In all cultures and both genders, the greatest proportion of responses (50–80%) were idiocentric (personal qualities, attitudes, traits, states, beliefs, Etc.). Contrary to expectations, idiocentric responses tended to be less frequent and large group responses more frequent in individualistic cultures than collectivistic cultures. Small group (4–5%) and allocentric (interpersonal, relational) (10–11%) responses were elicited with similar frequency across individualistic and collectivistic cultures. There was considerable variability among the individualistic and among the collectivistic cultures.	Combined individualistic cultures: PA (idiocentric) M = .66; F = .55 S M = .34; F = .44 Combined collectivistic cultures: PA (idiocentric) M = .70; F = .73 S M = .30; F = .27	Individual-self-primacy hypothesis supported by predominance of personal (idiocentric) attributes over social attributes. CP hypotheses not supported because personal attributes less frequent and large group responses more frequent in individualistic than collectivistic cultures.
U.S. (128) Japan (128) All female college students	TST (20 responses to the question “Who are you?” presented orally by the experimenter or by audiotape.) Authority, group, peer, And solitary experimental conditions. Coder reliability, computed across all protocols, ranged from .97–1.00 across Categories.	Combining all four experimental conditions, U.S. > Japan in use of abstract, internal attributes such as qualified psychological attributes, pure psychological attributes, and attitudes, but also relationships (friends and family). Japanese > U.S. on physical attributes and appearance, activities, short-term activities, Individuating self-references (e.g. human being), immediate situation, possessions, and miscellaneous. No cultural differences in social memberships and roles, preferences or interests, goals or aspirations, abilities, or others’ judgments. Japanese responses were more variable across experimental conditions than American responses.	U.S.: T .18 PA .68 S .20 Japan: T .07 PA .56 S .15	Trait perspectives received only modest support, given limited proportion of traits in Japanese sample. Individual-self-primacy hypothesis supported by predominance of personal over social attribute responses in both cultures. CP hypotheses only partially supported: Greater use of psychological attributes (traits) by U.S. Respondents supportive, but greater U.S. reference to relationships and lack of cultural differences in social memberships and roles not supportive. Cultural differences better understood in terms of U.S. tendency to use abstract psychological Attributes and greater Japanese tendency to use actions and behaviors rather than dispositions. Use of only female samples a limitation.
Study 1: Hong Kong (105) India (214) Nepal (73) Nigeria (107) Zimbabwe (302) 1 and 2 year college students Study 2: Taiwan (136) Hong Kong (60) Seniors in high school	TST (20 responses to the question “Who are you?”) In both studies, coder reliability for 20 protocols per country exceeded .90 for all four categories.	Study 1: Significant country and country × gender effects for all four categories of response (idiocentric, large group, small group, and allocentric), revealing variability among collectivistic cultures. Nonetheless, idiocentric responses were most prevalent in all cultures, followed by large group responses. Study 2: Culture effects found for idiographic (Taiwan > Hong Kong) and large group responses (Hong Kong > Taiwan).	Study 1: PA (idiographic) responses ranged from .40–.52 for men and women in Hong Kong, India, and Zimbabwe, And from .61–.65 in Nepal and Nigeria. PA > S (small/large group responses) for All groups except Hong Kong males. Study 2: PA (idiographic) : Hong Kong, M = .55, F = .48 Taiwan, M = .60, F = .63	Cultural variability indicated that collectivism does not have uniform impact on content of self-concepts. Largest proportion of idiocentric responses in all collectivistic cultures consistent with primacy of individual self. Use of global categories (idiocentric, large group, small group, and allocentric) was a disadvantage because researchers could not Differentiate traits from other types of personal attributes. Allocentric category included some interpersonal traits (e.g., I am a sociable person), so it was excluded from PA and S proportions.
, Study 1) Canada (125) Japan (186) College students in introductory psychology courses	Open-ended self-descriptions for present and when 16 years old Coder reliability for 40 random protocols per countr y: α = .95 for favorable private self-statements; α = .96 for unfavorable private self-statements; α = .75 for favorable relational self-statements; α = .54 for unfavorable relational self-statements	In both cultures, private self-statements exceeded relational self-statements for descriptions of self presently and at age 16. Other findings addressed cultural differences in self-enhancement and revealed a culture × valence × type of self-statement interaction. For example, Canadians reported more favorable and fewer unfavorable private self-appraisals than Japanese, and Canadians reported more favorable relational self-statements than Japanese and about the same number of unfavorable relational self-statements.	Number of self-statements in present self-descriptions: Canada: PA (private) Favorable, M = 4.44 Unfavorable, M = 1.06 S (relational) Favorable, M = .82 Unfavorable, M = .17 Japan: PA (private) Favorable, M = 2.34 Unfavorable, M = 2.58 S (relational) Favorable, M = .36 Unfavorable, M = .16	Use of global private self-statement category did not allow separate consideration of pure traits vs. other personal attributes. Individual-self-primacy supported by greater numbers of private than relational self-statements in both cultures. CP hypotheses regarding self-enhancement supported (i.e., more favorable self-statements in Canada than Japan); however, overall cultural differences in private versus relational self-statements did not support CP hypotheses.

Note . Findings summarized for each article are those that are most relevant to the present study. TST = Twenty Statements Test. M = male; F = Female; CP = cultural psychology.

As seen in Table 1 , trait psychology perspectives were supported in most studies. Respondents usually provided at least a modest to moderate proportion of pure trait responses. The most striking exception was the study by Dhawan, Roseman, Naidu, Thapa, and Rettek (1995) . Apparently, none of the 306 Asian Indians in that study listed pure traits as an aspect of self-concept. In addition, trait use was very modest in the Korean sample studied by Rhee et al. (1995) , the Japanese sample studied by Kanagawa et al. (2001) , and the less educated Kenyan samples studied by Ma and Schoeneman (1997) . The extremely small sample sizes in the Ma and Shoeneman study reduces confidence in their results, however. It is also difficult to make sense of the widely varying percentages of traits reported in different studies, even for the same cultures. For example, in Table 1 , the proportions of pure trait responses in United States samples range from .18 to .58. Japanese, Korean, and Indian samples have made consistently less use of traits (range = .00 to .31), but participants in some other collectivistic cultures, including Hong Kong (.44, .55) and the Philippines (.55) have made frequent use of pure traits in their self descriptions ( Bond & Cheung, 1983 ; Ip & Bond, 1995 ; Watkins & Gerong, 1997 ). The use of a broad idiocentric or private self-appraisal category by some researchers, encompassing not only traits but also other personal attributes, precludes testing trait perspectives in those studies (e.g., Bochner, 1994 ; Ross, Heine, Wilson, & Sugimori, 2005 ; Watkins, Adair, Akande, Gerong, et al., 1998; Watkins, Cheng, Mpofu, Olowu, Singh-Sengupta, & Regmi, 2003 ).

The individual-self-primacy hypothesis was supported in virtually all of the studies. Indeed, in many studies the proportion of personal attributes listed by respondents was substantially greater than the proportion of social and collective attributes. The sole exception involved the very small sample of less educated Kenyans studied by Ma and Schoeneman (1997) , whose respondents listed mainly social and collective attributes.

Cultural psychology perspectives have been supported in some but not all studies. Although there are exceptions ( Ip & Bond, 1995 ), comparisons of the United States with East Asian cultures and India have generally supported the expectation that references to abstract or pure traits will be less frequent in collectivistic cultures ( Bond & Cheung, 1983 ; Cousins, 1989 ; Dhawan et al., 1995 ; Kanagawa et al., 2001 ; Rhee et al., 1995 ). However, it is important to differentiate between pure traits and other personal attributes, because a frequent pattern in comparisons of the American samples with Chinese, Japanese, and Indian samples is for Americans to refer more to traits, but less to other personal attributes ( Bond & Cheung, 1983 ; Cousins, 1989 ; Dhawan et al.; Ip & Bond, 1995 ; Rhee et al.). Some authors have interpreted these differences in terms of an abstract-specific distinction, with Americans more inclined to describe themselves with abstract traits and Asians describing themselves with specific or concrete preferences, goals, and activities (e.g., Kanagawa et al.; Rhee et al.). Shweder and Bourne (1984) attributed this Asian pattern to a distinct, non-western style of thinking that is concrete and context-specific.

A number of studies also support the cultural psychology expectation that people in collectivistic cultures incorporate more social or allocentric elements in their self-concepts ( Bochner, 1994 ; Cousins, 1989 ; Dhawan et al., 1995 ; Ip & Bond, 1995 ; Lalljee & Angelova, 1995 ; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990 ). However, there are a number of prominent exceptions to this pattern as well. For example, in the study by Rhee et al. (1995) , Americans unexpectedly gave more social identity responses than Koreans. Kanagawa et al. (2001) found no differences between Americans and Japanese in the proportion of responses referring to social memberships and roles, and Americans more than Japanese referred to relationships (including family relationships). For additional results that are counter to the hypothesized pattern for collectivistic cultures, see Bond and Cheung (1983) , Watkins and Gerong (1997) , and Watkins, Yau, Dahlin, & Wondimu (1997) . 3

In summary, previous studies have supported the individual-self-primacy hypothesis most consistently. Trait perspectives have been supported for most cultures, but less so for selected Asian cultures. Cultural psychology hypotheses have been supported best in comparisons involving East Asian cultures. This raises the question of whether cultural psychology hypotheses are valid for comparisons of individualistic and collectivistic cultures generally, or mainly for comparisons involving East Asian cultures. Studies in additional individualistic and collectivistic cultures are needed.

Methodological Issues

The TST might be less culturally biased than structured inventories, because it allows respondents to describe themselves in their own words, using terms that are particularly salient or accessible ( Bond & Cheung, 1983 ; Kanagawa et al., 2001 ). In contrast, objective inventories provide a pre-structured set of constructs and items that may be less salient or interpreted differently across cultures. On the other hand, TST limitations include the subjective coding process, the diverse coding systems used, and questions about the optimal number and weighting of responses ( Watkins et al., 1997 ). Gaertner et al. (1999) suggested that the usual TST stem (“I am…” or “Who am I?”) may bias self-descriptions toward the individual self. Accordingly, one promising approach might be to assess the content of self-concepts using open-ended self-descriptive narratives, which a number of researchers have described as particularly suited to assessing self-concept or identity (e.g., McAdams, Diamond, de St. Aubin, & Mansfield, 1997 ).

Only a few researchers have applied objective inventories to measure cross-cultural differences in self-concept content, with mixed results ( Carpenter & Karakitapoglu-Aygün, 2005 ; Cheek, Tropp, Chen, & Underwood, 1994 ; Oyserman, 1993 ; Watkins, Adair, Akande, Cheng, et al., 1998 ). In the largest study, Watkins et al. administered an inventory about sources of self-esteem in five individualistic and ten collectivistic cultures. They found that the majority of respondents in all cultures rated family relationships, personal goals, being friendly, and being honest as important to self-esteem. Also, people in collectivistic cultures, as compared to people in individualistic cultures, reported greater salience of family relationships but not social relationships. Based on such results, the researchers questioned the validity of claims relating individualism-collectivism to the content of self-concepts.

Unfortunately, few researchers have investigated the convergence of alternative methods of assessing self-concept content. Kashima and Hardie (2000) found that TST scores for individual, relational, and collective self were quite distinct from objective measures of personal, social, and collective identity, individualism-collectivism, and independent and interdependent self-construals (see also Grace & Cramer, 2003 ). Kashima and Hardie concluded that the “meanings captured by TST categories need to be better understood in future research”(p. 42). Similarly, Dabul, Bernal, and Knight (1995) found that Mexican Americans gave more allocentric and fewer idiocentric responses than European Americans in open-ended interviews. However, in follow-up importance ratings, the two ethnic groups did not differ significantly in the mean importance of either allocentric or idiocentric descriptors. Clearly, questions remain about the relationship between open-ended versus structured inventory methods and there is a need for cross-cultural studies that apply multiple methods.

Overview of the Present Study

In this study, we tested trait, individual-self-primacy, and cultural psychology perspectives on the content of self-concepts across cultures. In doing so, we addressed several of the limitations of research in this area. First, we studied a more diverse sample of cultures described in the literature as individualistic (United States, Australia) and collectivistic (Mexico, Philippines) ( Church, 1987 ; Díaz-Loving & Draguns, 1999 ; Hofstede, 2001 ). Second, we included three methods of self-concept assessment, which varied along a continuum from open-ended self-descriptive narrative to structured inventory. Third, we used a relatively refined rather than global coding system for the open-ended methods and all responses were coded by three or four raters. Fourth, we included direct assessments of two hypothesized explanatory variables, self-construals and implicit theories. The study has significance for culture and personality theory generally, and, in particular, for our understanding and assessment of self-concepts across cultures.

United States

The United States sample included 178 college students (62 men, 116 women) at Washington State University. Mean age was 20.2 years ( SD = 3.8) and students from all year levels were sampled. Self-reported ethnic backgrounds were as follows: European American ( n = 156, 87.6%), Chicano/Latino/Hispanic ( n = 5, 2.8%), Asian/Pacific Islander ( n = 3, 1.7%), African-American ( n = 2, 1.1%), Native American ( n = 2, 1.1 %), bi- or multi-racial ( n = 8, 4.5%), and other or not reporting ( n = 2, 1.1%). A supplemental sample of 217 students (77 men, 140 women; mean age = 20.8 years, SD = 3.6) from the same university completed the Aspects of Identity Questionnaire (AIQ-IV) only. Self-reported ethnic backgrounds in the supplemental sample were as follows: European American ( n = 170, 78.3%), Chicano/Latino/Hispanic ( n = 13, 6.0%), Asian/Pacific Islander ( n = 8, 3.7%), African-American ( n = 4, 1.8%), Native American ( n = 1, .5 %), bi- or multi-racial ( n = 16, 7.4%), and not reporting ( n = 5, 2.3%). We had not used the AIQ-IV in previous cross-cultural studies and wanted a larger sample (total n = 395) to investigate measurement equivalence using confirmatory factor analyses (CFA). 4

The Australian sample included 112 students (25 men, 87 women) at the University of Western Sydney. Mean age was 22.2 ( SD = 6.7). The majority were first-year students (86.6%), the remaining students represented all year levels. Self-reported ethnic backgrounds were as follows: Anglo-Celtic or European Australian ( n = 67, 59.8%), Asian Australian ( n = 12, 10.7%), Middle Eastern ( n = 10, 8.9%), bi- or multi-ethnic ( n = 10, 8.9%), other ( n = 10, 8.9%), and not reporting ( n = 3, 2.7%). No supplemental AIQ-IV sample was collected in Australia.

The Mexican sample included 157 college students (33 men, 124 women) at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, Iztacala. Mean age was 20.1 years ( SD = 2.4). Most were first year (66.9%) or fourth year (32.5%) students. A supplemental sample of 222 students (86 men, 136 women; mean age = 23.1 years, SD = 3.8) from the same university completed the AIQ-IV instrument only (total n = 379). All participants identified themselves as Mestizo (mixed Spanish and indigenous Indian ethnicity), the majority ethnic group in Mexico.

Philippines

The Filipino sample included 138 students (53 men, 85 women) at De La Salle College in Lipa City, located 90 kilometers south of Manila. Mean age was 18.4 years ( SD = 1.2). Most students were in their second (40.6%), third (34.1%), or fourth (24.6%) year in college. A supplemental sample of 195 students (64 men, 131 women; mean age = 18.1 years, SD = 1.4) from four Philippine universities completed the AIQ-IV instrument only (total n = 333). All participants identified their ethnicity as Filipino.

Instruments

Languages and translation.

All instruments were administered in the language of instruction at the relevant universities, English in the United States and Australia, Spanish in Mexico, and Filipino (the national language based largely on the Tagalog language) in the Philippines. For the Australian instruments, a few items in the American English versions were modified slightly to reflect Australian English usage (e.g., behavior became behaviour ). All United States participants described English as their native and best language. Ninety-eight percent of Australian participants described English as their best language, with 84% listing it as their native language. All Mexican participants listed Spanish as their native and best language. Ninety-nine percent of Filipino participants listed Filipino (Tagalog) as their native and best language. All instruments were translated from English into Spanish and Filipino (Tagalog) using bilingual native speakers and the backtranslation method.

Measures of Self-Concept and Identity

Twenty statements test (tst; kuhn & mcpartland, 1954 ).

For this task, we presented participants with a single sheet of paper, labeled Self-Description Task, on which the sentence stem “I am…” appeared 15 times. 5 Participants were given 10 minutes to “complete each of the lines by writing a phrase that describes you.” To code the responses, we adapted the coding systems of Rhee et al. (1995) and Kanagawa et al. (2001) . Table 2 shows the original coding categories, subcategories, and sample responses. For some categories, coders also judged whether the descriptors were positive, negative, or neutral; or autonomous, social, or indeterminant. Autonomous responses involve personal preferences, goals, competencies, and so forth that can be pursued more independently (e.g., “I like reading,” “I am good in math”), whereas social responses refer to personal preferences, goals, and so forth that require the involvement of other people (e.g., “I like visiting my friends,” “I want to help others”). Coder reliability and scoring are addressed in a separate section below.

Original Coding Categories for TST and Self-descriptive Narratives (WAY)

Note. TST = Twenty Statements Test; WAY = “Writing about Yourself” self-descriptive narratives.

Self-descriptive narrative—Writing About Yourself (WAY)

For this task, we presented participants with a single sheet of blank paper, labeled “Writing about Yourself.” The top of the page contained the following instructions:

“In the space below (and on the back of this page if necessary), write one or more paragraphs about yourself. Although there is no specific length requirement, your paragraph(s) should be complete enough so that someone reading it would have a very good idea or understanding of you.”

Participants were given 10 minutes to complete the task. We used the same coding system for the TST and WAY so that scores from the two instruments would be comparable.

Aspects of Identity Questionnaire (AIQ-IV; Cheek et al., 1994 , 2002 )

The AIQ-IV is a 45-item objective inventory that measures the importance of four identity orientations in individuals’ self-concepts: (a) personal identity, or the importance of one’s psychological traits and other personal attributes (e.g., “My personal values and moral standards”); (b) relational identity, or how individuals see themselves in the context of their intimate relationships (e.g., “My relationships with the people I feel close to”); (c) social identity, or how individuals see themselves in more general interpersonal contexts (e.g., “My reputation, what others think of me”); and (d) collective identity, or how individuals represent their various reference group identities (e.g., “My race or ethnic background”). We added two new items to the Personal Identity scale (“My personality characteristics,” and “My personal abilities and talents”). Although the existing Personal Identity items refer to personal values, goals, dreams, academic ability, and so forth, none explicitly addressed personality traits or general abilities and talents. Participants filled in a blank space next to each item with a number from 1 (“not important to my sense of who I am”) to 5 (“extremely important to my sense of who I am”).

Across the four cultural groups, alpha reliabilities ranged from .80–.83 for the Personal Identity scale, .82–.91 for the Relational Identity scale, .80–.82 for the Social Identity scale, and .67–.77 for the Collective Identity scale. Cheek and Tropp (1997) summarized research supporting the construct validity of the instrument. Cross-cultural measurement equivalence of the inventory measures in the study is addressed in a separate section below.

Measures of Explanatory Variables

Self-construal scale (scs).

The 30-item SCS ( Singelis, 1994 ) was used to measure independent and interdependent self-construals. Items were rated using a 6-point agreement scale (strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, somewhat agree, strongly agree). Based on principal-axis factor analyses in each culture, we dropped three items with poor factor loadings on the intended factors. Alpha reliabilities across the four cultural groups ranged from .61–.77 for the independent self-construal scale and .66–.79 for the interdependent self-construal scale. Although the structure and validity of the SCS has recently generated controversy ( Levine et al., 2003 ), many cross-cultural studies have reported results consistent with self-construal theory ( Gudykunst & Lee, 2003 ).

Personality Beliefs Inventory (PBI)

The PBI ( Church et al., 2003 ) measures implicit trait and contextual theories or beliefs. The trait beliefs items measure beliefs about (a) the longitudinal stability of traits; (b) the cross-situational consistency of trait-relevant behavior; (c) the ability to predict individuals’ behavior from their traits; and (d) the ability to infer traits from relatively few behavioral instances. The contextual beliefs items measure beliefs about (a) the longitudinal instability of traits; (b) the variability of behavior across situations; (c) the difficulty of predicting specific behaviors from traits; and (d) the difficulty of inferring traits from a few instances of behavior. Church et al. (2003 , 2005 ; Church, Katigbak, del Prado, Ortiz et al., 2006 ) showed that trait and contextual beliefs represent relatively independent dimensions, not bipolar opposites. A 39-item version of the PBI was administered. Items were rated on a 6-point agreement scale (strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, somewhat agree, strongly agree). Based on principal-axis analyses in each culture, we eliminated six items that did not load well on the intended factors in one or more cultures. Across the four cultures, alpha reliabilities ranged from .74–.86 for the Trait Beliefs scale and from .72–.81 for the Contextual Beliefs scale. Church et al. reported validity evidence for the PBI in both individualistic and collectivistic cultures.

In Mexico, Australia, and the Philippines, volunteer participants filled out the five instruments in three regular class sessions, separated by one week. The instruments completed in each session were as follows: Session 1, the WAY and PBI; Session 2, TST and SCS; and Session 3, AIQ-IV. The procedure was the same in the United States, except that the PBI and SCS were completed outside of class and returned to the researchers at the next session. Participants in Australia, and some students in the United States, received partial or extra course credit for participation. The instruments were ordered so that (a) the three measures of self-concept or identity were separated by one-week intervals to reduce carry-over effects, and (b) participants’ responses to the less structured instruments (WAY, TST) would not be biased by prior exposure to the identity scales in the structured inventory (AIQ-IV).

Coding and Scoring of TST and WAY Responses

In preparation for coding, the research team annotated each meaningful or codable unit of self-description on the TST and WAY response sheets. Coders were subsequently instructed to provide a single best code for each meaningful unit. There were initially two coders for each language. Subsequently, minor changes in a few coding guidelines were made to improve reliability and additional coders were added. Ultimately, there were four coders each for the American, Australian, and Mexican responses, and three coders for the Philippine responses.

Coders were provided with approximately six hours of training, and were given written “rules of thumb” and prototypical examples of each category, derived from pilot testing of the coding system. Preliminary analyses indicated that coders had difficulty achieving an acceptable level of agreement for some of the more refined distinctions in the category system, for example, the distinctions between positive, negative, and neutral characteristics; between autonomous, social, and indeterminate characteristics; and between preferences, aspirations, activities, and attitudes, which Rhee et al. (1995) also combined into a single category. Acceptable coder reliability was obtained after combining the relevant categories. For the retained categories, which are shown in Table 3 , proportion agreement between pairs of coders for the TST was as follows: United States ( M = .90; range = .87–.98); Australia ( M = .83; range = .80–.91), Mexico ( M = .80; range = .74–.91); Philippines ( M = .89; range = .89–.90). For the WAY, proportion agreement was as follows: United States ( M = .88; range = .86–.95); Australia ( M = .83; range = .80–.88), Mexico ( M = .75; range = .69–.86); Philippines ( M = .88; range = .88–.89). Coding disagreements were resolved by “majority vote” (i.e., 3 out of 4 coders in three cultures; 2 out of 3 coders in the Philippines). For some responses, “tie votes,” in which two coders favored one code and two coders favored a different code, were resolved in favor of the two additional raters if they agreed, because they had applied the system after a few coding refinements had been made. Any remaining responses were excluded as too vague or ambiguous to enable coder agreement. Across the four cultures, the proportion of responses left unscored ranged from .01 to .06 for the TST and from .03 to .08 for the WAY.

Convergent Correlations of TST and WAY Self-concept Scores in Four Cultures

	Culture
Self-concept category	U.S.	Australia	Mexico	Philippines
Personal attributes	.15	.31	.15	.22
Pure traits	.27	.32	.28	.20
Qualified traits	.08	.06	.24	.12
Preferences, aspirations, etc.	.20	.19	.07	.13
Competencies	.12	.19	.15	.21
Physical descriptions	.17	.38	.32	.24
Emotional states	.19	.08	.03	−.04
Social identities	.21	.33	.31	.26
Other categories
Peripheral information	.04	.16	.19	.05
Individuating self-reference	−.09	.25	.05	.09

For the TST, the mean number of responses in the four cultures was as follows: United States, M = 15.5 ( SD = 1.3); Australia, M = 16.4 ( SD = 3.2); Mexico, M = 16.5 ( SD = 3.1); and Philippines, M = 16.1 ( SD = 2.27). Thus, the average participant completed all 15 stems, plus one additional codable response, although a few participants provided as few as 7 or 8 responses. In an ANOVA, the main effect for culture was significant ( F [3, 583] = 4.5, p < .01, eta 2 = .02). Post-hoc Scheffé t -tests revealed that only the mean difference between the United States and Mexican sample was significant ( p < .05). Not surprisingly, the mean number of responses for the open-ended WAY was more variable within and across cultures, as follows: United States, M = 16.6 ( SD = 6.6); Australia, M = 18.5 ( SD = 6.5); Mexico, M = 20.1 ( SD = 7.1); and Philippines, M = 12.8 ( SD = 5.4). The Mexicans provided significantly more codable responses than the Americans and Filipinos, and the Filipinos provided significantly fewer codable responses than the other three groups ( p < .05).

As in previous studies, we controlled for the number of responses given by each participant by deriving proportion scores for each participant for each coding category. These were obtained by dividing the number of responses in each category by the participant’s total number of responses for the instrument. We also computed a total Personal Attributes score, which is the sum of the proportion scores for six personal attribute categories (see Table 3 ). All proportion scores were arcsine transformed to improve distributional properties ( Kanagawa et al., 2001 ), but the original proportions are reported in Table 4 . Separate scores were obtained for the TST and WAY tasks.

Proportion Scores for Self-concept Categories in Four Cultures

	TST				WAY
Self-concept category	U.S.	Australia	Mexico	Philippines	U.S.	Australia	Mexico	Philippines
Personal attributes	.73	.74	.86	.87	.60	.59	.70	.58
Pure traits	.45	.39	.54	.41	.10	.09	.13	.13
Qualified traits	.03	.06	.12	.15	.01	.01	.04	.03
Preferences, aspirations, etc.	.09	.13	.08	.19	.41	.38	.40	.30
Competencies	.05	.05	.02	.06	.03	.03	.03	.04
Physical descriptions	.07	.06	.04	.05	.04	.07	.07	.06
Emotional states	.04	.04	.06	.01	.01	.01	.03	.02
Social identities	.21	.17	.08	.08	.30	.25	.16	.27
Other categories
Peripheral information	.04	.03	.00	.02	.03	.05	.02	.04
Individuating self-reference	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00	.01	.02	.03

Cross-Cultural Measurement Equivalence of Inventory Measures

We conducted multigroup confirmatory factor analyses (CFA), using AMOS 4.0, to test the structural equivalence of the three inventory measures (AIQ-IV, SCS, PBI) across the four cultures (the supplemental samples were included in the AIQ-IV analyses). For each instrument, the latent constructs—the four aspects of identity for the AIQ-IV, independent and interdependent self-construals for the SCS, and trait and contextual beliefs for the PBI—were measured by three to four item parcels, each consisting of randomly assigned items or, in the case of the PBI, items from existing content facets ( Kishton & Widaman, 1994 ). For each instrument, the fit indices for models in which the factor loadings were constrained to equality across cultures were excellent (e.g., CFI indices ranging from .97–.98; RMSEA indices of .03 for each instrument). However, there were some cultural differences in the freely estimated correlations, corrected for measurement error, between the latent constructs for each instrument. The correlations among the four identity scales in the AIQ-IV tended to be lower in the two individualistic cultures (range = .29–.65 in the United States, .13–.64 in Australia) than in the two collectivistic cultures (.48–.73 in Mexico, .44–.86 in the Philippines). The correlations between independent and interdependent self-construals (SCS) were generally modest in the American ( r = .35), Australian ( r = −.16), and Mexican ( r = .29) samples, but not in the Philippine sample ( r = .60). Similarly, trait and contextual beliefs (PBI) were modestly inversely related in the American ( r = −.17), Australian ( r = −.15), and Mexican ( r = −.14) samples, but substantially positively correlated in the Philippine ( r = .61) sample. These results suggest that measurement inequivalence, acquiescence response bias, or both were a problem for the self-construal and implicit theory measures in the Philippine sample. Many cross-cultural psychologists view between-culture mean comparisons with Likert-type scales to be risky because they can be affected by remaining measurement inequivalencies and by cultural differences in response styles and reference groups ( Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002 ; Smith, 2004 ). Therefore, we report only within-culture analyses with the self-construal and implicit theory measures. Despite questions about how well these two instruments functioned in the Philippine sample, we did not discard the Philippine results for these two measures because they were essentially the same as the results in the other three cultures.

Convergence of Self-concept and Identity Measures

Before addressing the extent of support for trait psychology, individual-self-primacy, and cultural psychology perspectives, we considered an important methodological question: How well do alternative measures of self-concept or identity converge? Table 3 shows the convergent correlations between category scores for the TST and WAY. These results reveal a modest to moderate degree of convergence for most of the categories. Many, but not all, of the categories with nonsignificant correlations were those that were infrequently used.

Convergence of the open-ended TST and WAY scores with the AIQ-IV identity scores was poor, so we merely summarize the results. Few correlations were statistically significant and there were no sensible or consistent patterns in the results. For example, across the four cultures, only 1 of 48 correlations relating AIQ-IV Personal Identity scores to TST or WAY scores for the personal attribute categories was statistically significant, and only 2 of 24 correlations relating AIQ-IV Relational, Social, or Collective Identity scores to social identity scores on the TST and WAY were statistically significant and both correlations were in the unexpected direction. These results are consistent with those of Kashima and Hardie (2000) , who found that TST and AIQ scores for comparable aspects of self-concept or identity were weakly correlated. Because of the limited convergence of self-concept and identity scores across methods, itself an important finding, we tested the three theoretical perspectives—trait psychology, individual-self-primacy hypothesis, and cultural psychology—separately using scores from each method.

Cultural Differences in Self-Concept and Identity

Open-ended methods.

Table 4 shows the mean raw proportions in each category for the TST and WAY. Trait perspectives were supported because pure trait responses were frequently listed as an aspect of self-concept in all four cultures. However, it is clear that trait responses were elicited much more readily by the TST than by the self-descriptive narratives (WAY). Across cultures, the mean proportion of pure trait responses ranged from .39 to .54 for the TST, but from .09 to .13 for the WAY. The individual-self-primacy hypothesis was strongly supported with both open-ended methods, because respondents in all four cultures mentioned substantially more personal attributes than social attributes with both the TST and WAY. Indeed, across these two methods and the four cultures, the mean proportion of personal attribute responses ranged from .58 to .87, while the mean proportion of social identity responses ranged from .08 to .30.

To test whether cultural differences were consistent with cultural psychology hypotheses, we conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA for each category with culture and gender as between-subjects factors and method (TST vs. WAY) as the repeated factor. Because of the large number of effects being tested, we set a conservative alpha level of .01. The results were consistent with two main conclusions. First, cultural mean differences generally did not support cultural psychology hypotheses, because participants in the two individualistic cultures did not give more personal attribute responses, or fewer social identity responses, than participants in the two collectivistic cultures. Second, the method of data collection was important. For the general Personal Attributes category, there was a significant method effect (Wilks’ Λ = .72, F [1, 575] = 220.19, p < .01, η 2 = .28), with more personal attributes elicited in all cultures using the sentence completion method (TST) than the self-descriptive narratives (WAY). There was also a significant method × culture interaction effect (Wilks’ Λ = .92, F [3, 575] = 17.41, p < .01, η 2 = .08). Contrary to cultural psychology expectations, follow-up Tukey tests revealed that Mexicans and Filipinos gave more personal attribute responses than Americans and Australians for the TST, and Mexicans gave more personal attribute responses than the other three cultural groups in the self-descriptive narratives (WAY).

Looking at specific categories of personal attributes, there were significant method effects for traits (η 2 = .62), qualified traits (η 2 = .21), competencies (η 2 = .03), and emotions (η 2 = .06), which were all mentioned more frequently in the sentence completion task (TST) than in the self-descriptive narratives (WAY). In contrast, responses in the combined category of preferences, goals, activities, and attitudes (η 2 = .51) were much more frequent in the self-descriptive narratives (range of F [1, 575] statistics = 16.4 to 921.1, p < .01). With the exception of the pure traits, all of the specific personal attribute categories also exhibited significant method × culture interaction effects (range of F [3, 575] statistics = 4.4 to 40.9, p < .01), but these interaction effects were generally small and not very interpretable. There were also a few isolated two- or three-way interaction effects involving gender, but the effects were again small (η 2 < .03) and did not reveal any patterns.

Finally, there was also a significant method effect for the social identities category (Wilks’ Λ = .83, F [1, 575] = 121.74, p < .01, η 2 = .18). More social identity responses were elicited in all four cultures with the self-descriptive narratives (WAY) than with the sentence completion task (TST). The method × culture interaction effect was also statistically significant (Wilks’ Λ = .95, F [3, 575] = 9.7, p < .01, η 2 = .05). Contrary to cultural psychology perspectives, follow-up Tukey tests indicated that Americans and Australians gave more social identity responses than Mexicans and Filipinos in the sentence completion task (TST), and Mexicans gave fewer social identity responses than the other three cultural groups in the self-descriptive narratives (WAY).

Aspects of identity (AIQ-IV)

The AIQ-IV mean scale scores, which are shown for each culture in Table 5 , enable tests of the individual-self-primacy hypothesis and cultural psychology hypotheses. To test the individual-self-primacy hypothesis, we compared the four scale scores within each culture, using paired-sample t -tests. In all four cultures, Personal Identity was rated as significantly more important than both Social and Collective Identity. This is consistent with the individual-self-primacy hypothesis. As discussed earlier, it is less clear how to treat Relational Identity in tests of this hypothesis. In all four cultures, Relational Identity was also significantly more important to participants than Social or Collective Identity, and Relational Identities were more similar in importance to Personal Identities than to Social or Collective Identities. Importantly, in all four cultures, Relational Identity scores were more highly correlated with Personal Identity scores than with Social or Collective Identity scores (see Table 6 ). These correlations suggest that a strong relational identity presumes, or is not very distinct from, a strong personal identity. In this interpretation, the similar importance of Personal and Relational Identities in this study may not be inconsistent with the individual-self-primacy hypothesis. 6

Means and Standard Deviations for Aspects of Identity (AIQ-IV) Scales in Four Cultures

	Culture
Aspects of identity scale	U.S.	Australia	Mexico	Philippines
Personal identity
Mean	4.10	4.09	4.30	4.19
SD	.45	.48	.48	.45
Relational identity
Mean	4.25	4.14	3.91	4.17
SD	.58	.69	.62	.47
Social identity
Mean	3.20	3.15	2.89	3.60
SD	.62	.69	.72	.63
Collective identity
Mean	3.02	2.73	2.92	3.76
SD	.68	.79	.67	.68

Note. For each construct, means with different superscripts are significantly different in the between-culture

comparisons ( p < .05).

Scale Intercorrelations for Aspects of Identity Questionnaire (AIQ-IV) in Four Cultures

Scale	Relational identity	Social identity	Collective identity
U. S. ( = 395)
Personal identity	.56	.27	.35
Relational identity		.27	.34
Social identity			.25
Australia ( = 112)
Personal identity	.57	.42	.36
Relational identity		.32	.13
Social identity			.41
Mexico ( = 379)
Personal identity	.63	.45	.44
Relational identity		.50	.45
Social identity			.41
Philippines ( = 333)
Personal identity	.72	.44	.49
Relational identity		.37	.42
Social identity			.44

While the test of the individual-self-primacy hypothesis involved within-culture comparisons of AIQ-IV scores, the test of cultural psychology hypotheses required between-culture comparisions. We conducted a multivariate analysis of variance with culture and gender as independent variables and the four aspects of identity as dependent variables. The main effects for culture (Wilks’ Λ = .61, F [12, 3196] = 55.43, p < .01, η 2 = .15) and gender (Wilks’ Λ= .96, F [4, 1208] = 11.54, p < .01, η 2 = .04) were statistically significant, but the interaction effect was not (Wilks’ Λ = .98, F [12, 3196] = 1.74, p > .05). The gender effects were modest in size, with women averaging higher than men in Personal Identity (η 2 = .03) and Relational Identity (η 2 = .03; p < .01). Cultural psychology hypotheses were not supported because (a) the two individualistic cultures did not average higher than the two collectivistic cultures on the Personal Identity scale; indeed, the Mexican sample averaged significantly higher than the other three cultural groups in follow-up Tukey tests (p < .01); and (b) only the Filipino sample, and not the Mexican sample, averaged higher than the two individualistic cultures in Social and Collective Identities. For the Relational Identity scale, the Mexicans averaged significantly lower than the other three cultural groups, who did not differ significantly from each other. As in the Mexican TST and WAY results, the Mexican AIQ-IV scores were not consistent with expectations for a collectivistic culture, while the Filipino results (i.e., their higher Social and Collective Identity scores) were partially supportive of expectations.

Predictive Utility of the Explanatory Variables

Drawing on cultural psychology theory, we predicted that explanatory variables associated with individualism (i.e., independent self-construals, implicit trait beliefs) would predict self-descriptions in terms of personal attributes, including traits. In contrast, explanatory variables linked in theory to collectivism (i.e., interdependent self-construals, implicit contextual beliefs) would predict self-descriptions in terms of social and collective attributes and identities. To test these predictions, we conducted hierarchical multiple regressions in which TST and WAY scores for total personal attributes, pure traits, and social identities (arcsine-transformed proportion scores) and the four identity scores from the AIQ-IV were predicted by the self-construal and implicit beliefs variables.

In each hierarchical regression the hypothesized predictors (e.g., the individualistic variables for personal attribute responses) were entered in Step 1 and the remaining predictors were added in Step 2. For example, in predicting TST scores for personal attributes, the two individualistic variables were entered in Step 1 and the two collectivistic variables were added in Step 2. In this example, the β coefficients and ΔR 2 values in Step 1 test whether the individualistic variables significantly predict personal attribute responses, while the Step 2 results indicate whether they continue to do in the context of the collectivistic variables. The maximum correlation between any two predictors ranged from .26 to .47 across the four cultures and inspection of the collinearity statistics in each culture indicated no significant problems with multicollinearity (e.g., variance inflation factors [VIF] ranged from 1.12 to 1.44 across the four cultures).

Inspection of the hierarchical regression results for the TST and WAY revealed that the individualistic and collectivistic explanatory variables were poor predictors of the proportions of personal attributes, pure traits, and social attribute responses elicited by these two instruments. There were only a few significant β coefficients, perhaps due to chance, and no consistent or strong prediction patterns. The results for the AIQ-IV were more positive, probably because the AIQ-IV and SCS share a similar structured method of assessment. Table 7 shows the AIQ-IV results for each culture. Consistent with cultural psychology expectations, independent self-construals were associated with greater importance of personal identity in all four cultures and interdependent self-construals were generally associated with greater importance of social and collective identity (the Step 1 β coefficients were at least marginally significant in the Mexican and Filipino samples). Interestingly, relational identity was more consistently and strongly predicted by independent self-construals than by interdependent self-construals, again suggesting that the importance of relational identity is more associated with the independent or personal self than the collective self.

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting AIQ-IV Aspects of Identity Scores from Self-Construals and Implicit Beliefs

	United States				Australians				Mexicans				Filipinos
	β		ΔR		β		ΔR		β		ΔR		β		ΔR
Criteria/Predictors	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2
Personal identity			.13	.02			.05	.02			.06	.03			.18	.01
Independent	.31	.33			.22	.24			.24	.21			.43	.39
Trait beliefs	.12	.16			−.03	−.07			.02	−.01			−.02	−.05
Interdependent		−.13				.14				.16				.09
Contextual beliefs		.06				−.02				.06				.05
Relational identity			.02	.05			.04	.07			.05	.05			.10	.05
Interdependent	.13	.06			−.18	.17			.13	.07			.30	.22
Contextual beliefs	.04	.04			−.09	−.10			.17	.12			.04	.04
Independent		.19				.22				.20				.27
Trait beliefs		.08				.13				.09				−.13
Social identity			.06	.03			.08	.00			.03	.02			.04	.11
Interdependent	.22	.17			.27	.29			.15	.14			.16	.03
Contextual beliefs	.06	.09			−.09	−.10			.09	.05			.05	.03
Independent		.03				.06				.14				.40
Trait beliefs		.17				−.03				−.03				−.11
Collective identity			.04	.01			.07	.01			.05	.01			.04	.04
Interdependent	.18	.15			.22	.19			.22	.19			.17	.09
Contextual beliefs	.07	.07			.12	.14			.00	.01			.04	.02
Independent		.10				−.04				−.01				.24
Trait beliefs		.04				.08				.11				−.07

Follow-up Analyses

Autonomous versus social responses.

In our primary analyses of the TST and WAY, we did not differentiate between autonomous and social responses in the relevant personal attribute categories (i.e., preferences, aspirations, activities, attitudes, competencies, and emotional states), because coder agreement was not sufficiently high for this distinction across all responses. Like previous researchers, we treated the responses in these categories as personal attribute or idiocentric responses, because they refer to the individual’s personal preferences, goals, and so forth, rather than their social identities or group memberships.

Although some responses were difficult to code as definitively autonomous, social, or indeterminant, the coders exhibited consensus (i.e., at least 2 of 3 judges in the Philippines; at least 3 of 4 judges in the other three cultures) for the majority of these responses. In a follow-up analysis, we compared the ratio of consensus autonomous and social responses given in the four cultures to explore whether autonomous responses might be more prevalent in individualistic cultures and social responses more prevalent in collectivistic cultures. For the TST, the ratio of autonomous to social responses across all relevant categories was approximately 3:1 in the American, Australian, and Philippine samples, with a higher ratio (4½:1) in the Mexican sample. For the self-descriptive narratives (WAY), the ratio of autonomous to social responses was approximately 2:1 in the American, Australian, and Philippine samples, with the Mexican sample again exhibiting a higher ratio (3½:1). In general, this pattern held up well within the individual response categories for which the autonomous-social distinction was made (i.e., preferences, aspirations, etc.). Thus, the autonomous-social distinction was not systematically associated with the individualism-collectivism distinction.

Cultural differences in the specific traits attributed to self

In our primary results, traits were very salient aspects of self-concept in all four cultures, at least when the TST method was used. Therefore, we conducted a second follow-up analysis to explore whether the cultures differed not in the overall “traitedness” of self-concepts, but in the specific traits viewed as self-descriptive. To make the task manageable, we focused on the first trait response made by each respondent to the TST, the open-ended method that elicited the most trait responses. We reasoned that respondents’ first trait response would be among the most salient or accessible in his or her self-concept. Several theorists have proposed that agentic traits are internalized or valued more in individualistic cultures, whereas communal traits are internalized more in collectivistic cultures ( Kurman, 2001 ; Paulhus & John, 1998 ; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003 ). Indeed, a recent meta-analysis of cultural differences in self-enhancement tendencies by Sedikides, Gaertner, and Vevea (2005) supports this view. Therefore, we hypothesized that participants in the two individualistic cultures would describe themselves in terms of agentic traits more than communal traits, whereas participants in the two collectivistic cultures would exhibit the opposite pattern.

We defined agentic traits as traits that refer to personal effectiveness and social dominance ( Sedikides et al., 2003 ) and communal traits as traits that refer to concern with social connection and harmony and the willingness to be a contributing member of the group ( Kurman, 2001 ; Sedikides et al.). Four judges were also given examples of prototypical agentic (e.g., independent, assertive, competent) and communal (e.g., cooperative, loyal, conforming) traits, drawing on previous studies that have made this distinction. For each language, a native speaking judge rated the first trait mentioned by each participant on a 9-point scale, indicating an extremely good (1), very good (2), good (3), or fair (4) example of an agentic trait; not an example of either an agentic or communal trait (5); or fair (6), good (7), very good (8) or extremely good (9) example of a communal trait. Ratings were obtained for each trait (or its equivalent translation in the other languages) by at least three of the four raters (some traits were not mentioned in all four cultures). Traits with mean ratings of 3 or lower were classified as agentic and traits with mean ratings of 7 or higher were classified as communal. In this manner, from 45.1% (Mexico) to 59.0% (United States) of the trait terms were classified as prototypical agentic or communal traits. We found that agentic traits were more frequently mentioned than communal traits in the American (37.1% vs. 21.9%), Australian (30.6% vs. 18.9%), and Mexican (31.3% vs. 13.8%) samples. In contrast, agentic traits were infrequently used in the Philippine sample (13.8%) relative to the proportion of communal traits (33.3%) (overall χ 2 [3] = 26.97, p < .01). These results suggest that people in different cultures may vary less in the overall traitedness of their self-concepts, than in the specific traits they consider self-descriptive. 7

We tested three theoretical perspectives on cultural universals and differences in self-concept content, while addressing several limitations of previous studies in this area. Strengths of the study included (a) the sampling of more than one individualistic and collectivistic culture, including collectivistic cultures outside East Asia; (b) systematic comparisons of three methods of assessing self-concept or identity; (c) explicit tests of cross-cultural measurement equivalence; and (d) direct measurement of hypothesized explanatory variables.

Trait Psychology Perspectives

There was clear support for trait psychology perspectives in the study because participants in all four cultures described themselves in terms of pure traits with considerable frequency, at least with the sentence completion task (TST). The TST clearly elicited trait responses more readily than did the open-ended self-descriptive narratives (WAY). However, this does not negate the finding that respondents in all four cultures could readily describe themselves in terms of traits. If trait attributes were not salient or chronically accessible for individuals in all four cultures, it is unlikely that they would have been generated with such frequency in the sentence completion responses (TST). These results are consistent with a realistic and universal perspective on traits, which proposes that traits are real and that individuals in all cultures incorporate traits as an aspect of self-concept ( Baron & Misovich, 1993 ; Funder, 1995 ; McCrae, 2000 ). The primary unexplained anomaly in previous studies was the apparent absence of pure trait responses in the Asian Indian sample investigated by Dhawan et al. (1995) . However, Lalljee and Angelova (1995) found that Asian Indians do use pure trait descriptors relatively frequently (.31) in self and other descriptions.

Individual-Self-Primacy Hypothesis

Support for the individual-self-primacy hypothesis ( Gaertner et al., 2002 ) was also strong. To infer the motivational primacy of the individual self, Gaertner et al. have primarily drawn on studies that investigated the impact of threat and enhancement on the individual and collective self. However, as we did in the present study, Gaertner et al. (1999 , Study 4) have also used the greater spontaneous frequency of mention of individual over collective attributes in self-descriptions to support the individual-self-primacy hypothesis. In the present study, participants in all four cultures mentioned personal attributes much more frequently than social attributes with both the TST and WAY and participants rated aspects of personal identity to be more important for their sense of self than aspects of social or collective identity with the AIQ-IV. Evidence of individual-self-primacy across cultures is consistent with an evolutionary basis for the individual self ( Gaertner et al., 2002 ; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997 ).

The primary unresolved issue regarding the individual-self-primacy hypothesis is how to view relational identities. In the AIQ-IV results, relational identities were similar in importance to personal identities for participants in all four cultures, and always substantially greater in importance than social and collective identities. Furthermore, our correlational results, and those of some other researchers ( Cheek et al., 2002 ; Kashima & Hardie, 2000 ), suggest that relational identities are more strongly associated with personal identities than social or collective identities. If the salience of close interpersonal relationships presumes, or is correlated with, the existence of strong personal identities, then the comparable importance of personal and relational identities in each of the four cultures could be consistent with the individual-self-primacy hypothesis. Indeed, Sedikides and Gaertner (2001) suggested that the relational self may become important through psychological processes that reduce it to the level of the individual self. In any case, our results suggest a gap in the alternative hypotheses specified by Gaertner et al. (1999 , 2002) , because they do not explicitly address the relational self. To date, these researchers have investigated only the relative importance of the individual and collective self, and have defined the collective self only in terms of natural or experimental groups (e.g., sororities and fraternities, political groups), not close interpersonal dyads. The results of the present study highlight the importance of differentiating relational identity from social or collective identity (Cheek et al.; Cross et al., 2000 ; Kashima & Hardie, 2000 ).

Cultural Psychology Perspectives

Overall, support for cultural psychology perspectives was limited. In open-ended self-descriptions, participants in the two individualistic cultures did not mention personal attributes more, or social identities less, than participants in collectivistic cultures. Furthermore, with the structured measure of identity (AIQ-IV), participants in the two individualistic cultures did not consistently rate personal identity as more important, and social and collective identity as less important, than participants in the two collectivistic cultures. Indeed, only two findings were consistent with cultural psychology hypotheses and both involved the structured inventory (AIQ-IV): (a) the Filipino sample (but not the Mexican sample) averaged higher than the two individualistic cultures in the importance of social and collective identities; and (b) independent and interdependent self-construals showed some ability to predict individual differences in the expected aspects of identity. Implicit trait and contextual theories did not predict self-concept attributes or identity. Apparently, belief in the stability and predictive value of traits is independent of the centrality or importance of different aspects of self-concept or identity.

We should note that some TST researchers have found better support for selected cultural psychology hypotheses than we did. However, these studies have generally involved participants in Japan, Korea, and India. Even then, although Americans have reported more pure traits than respondents in these Asian cultures, Asians more than Americans have tended to report alternative personal attributes such as preferences, aspirations, interests, and activities ( Bond & Cheung, 1983 ; Cousins, 1989 ; Dhawan et al., 1995 ; Ip & Bond, 1995 ; Rhee et al., 1995 ). This indicates that Asians are not reticent to describe themselves in terms of personal attributes. Rather, these cultural differences seem to reflect differential tendencies to describe oneself in abstract terms (i.e., traits) versus more specific or concrete terms (i.e., preferences, aspirations, etc.) ( Kanagawa et al., 2001 ; Rhee et al.; Shweder & Bourne, 1982).

It is also important to note that the results for collectivistic cultures outside Asia (i.e., Greece, Bulgaria, Kenyan college students, Ethiopia, Turkey, Nepal, and Nigeria) have generally failed to support cultural psychology hypotheses (see Table 1 ). This suggests that cultural psychology hypotheses regarding the content of self-concepts might not apply to comparisons of individualistic and collectivistic cultures generally. This could explain why our Mexican results largely failed to conform to expectations. Indeed, although Mexico is typically viewed as collectivistic, Malloy, Albright, Díaz-Loving, Dong, and Lee (2004) have argued that both Mexicans and Americans are socialized to evaluate people in terms of traits, a characteristic typically attributed to individualistic cultures. Similarly, Church, Katigbak, del Prado, Valdez-Medina et al. (2006) found that Filipinos, but not Mexicans, exhibited lower interobserver agreement in trait ratings than Americans and also raised the possibility that some cultural psychology hypotheses might apply only to selected Asian cultures, rather than to collectivistic cultures more generally. In addition, given the substantial method effects identified in this study, even those studies that supported cultural psychology hypotheses might not have done so had they used alternative methods of assessment.

Method Effects

While we were able to address the validity of trait, individual-self-primacy, and cultural psychology hypotheses, also important was our finding of substantial method effects for some categories of self-concept content. At the level of individuals, there was modest to moderate convergence between the two open-ended measures, but poor convergence with the structured inventory scores. As suggested by Gaertner et al. (1999) , the TST apparently elicits pure traits, presumably because the format solicits relatively succinct self-descriptions such as trait attributes. In contrast, the more discursive self-descriptive narratives (WAY) elicited more social identity responses, and especially more responses that refer to preferences, aspirations, activities, or attitudes.

Both the sentence completion task (TST) and self-descriptive narratives (WAY) can be viewed as “operant” measures, as defined by McClelland (1984) , because the responses were generated spontaneously by the participants. In contrast, “respondent” measures such as the AIQ-IV provide specific structured stimuli (i.e., inventory items), to which participants respond. McClelland noted that people tend to avoid giving similar responses to operant measures in repeat testing. Thus, it is conceivable that such “alternation” behavior reduced the degree of convergence of the TST and WAY category scores. However, respondents filled out the self-concept measures at one-week intervals to reduce alternation or carry-over effects. Therefore, we believe the differences between the TST and WAY results are more likely the result of format differences that solicit relatively succinct attributes (e.g., traits) versus more discursive self-descriptions (e.g., preferences, goals, activities), respectively. Indeed, McClelland argued that operant measures are more likely than respondent measures to be influenced by subtle differences in testing conditions.

McClelland’s (1984) distinction between operant and respondent measures may also be relevant in explaining the lack of convergence between the two open-ended (operant) measures and the structured (respondent) inventory (AIQ-IV) at the level of individuals. In McClelland’s view, operant and respondent measures assess theoretically distinct aspects of personality and should not be expected to correlate highly. Indeed, whereas the TST and self-descriptive narratives are advocated by researchers as a way to tap those aspects of self that are particularly salient or accessible in one’s self-concept ( Bond & Cheung, 1983 ; Kanagawa et al., 2001 ; McAdams et al., 1997 ), the structured inventory may assess more deliberate choices or values among a broader range of researcher-provided aspects of identity, some of which may not have been spontaneously salient or accessible to respondents. One might be inclined to attribute greater validity to the structured inventory results because they were better predicted by the self-construal scores. However, the self-construal and AIQ-IV measures also shared a similar respondent method of assessment. An important implication of our results is that researchers who investigate self-concept or identity across cultures should apply multiple and diverse methods of assessment.

An Alternative Approach

One of our follow-up analyses suggested an alternative approach to the analysis of open-ended measures such as the TST and self-descriptive narratives. Rather than focusing on the categories of descriptors generated (e.g., pure traits, social roles), more consistent or valid cultural differences might be found by analyzing the specific traits, roles, or relationships mentioned. To conduct a comprehensive analysis of this type in our multinational data set would involve a major new undertaking. However, we illustrated the approach in our analysis of respondents’ first TST trait responses. The different pattern of agentic versus communal traits in the Philippine sample, as compared to the other cultural samples, suggested that this approach might be promising. Some specific examples can also be cited. In their first trait responses to the TST, only Filipinos described themselves as “simple” (e.g., “a simple person”). For Filipinos, the term connotes a person who is modest, and not flamboyant or attention-seeking. In addition, whereas the trait term “intelligent” was mentioned with some frequency as the first TST trait descriptor by Americans, Australians, and Mexicans, no Filipinos used this trait descriptor first, perhaps another indication of modesty in their self-descriptions. In a similar approach, TST researchers in two previous studies tallied the specific Big Five traits mentioned as self-descriptive by their respondents, but did not find much support for their hypotheses regarding cultural differences ( Ip & Bond, 1995 ; Watkins & Gerong, 1997 ). However, the Big Five domains might not be the best categories for capturing cultural differences in self-concept, because each of the Big Five domains contains both agentic and communal traits ( Wiggins & Trapnell, 1996 ). The agentic-communal distinction might better differentiate individualistic and collectivistic cultures (e.g., see Sedikides et al., 2005 ).

Limitations

Some limitations of the study should be noted. We sampled university students in each culture, who may be more individualistic, or differ in other aspects of self-concept, than more representative samples in each culture, particularly in the two collectivistic cultures, Mexico and the Philippines. It would be useful to investigate how well our results generalize to less educated or more traditional (e.g., rural) samples. However, it should also be noted that most of the studies that have tested cultural psychology perspectives, including those that support cultural psychology hypotheses, have been conducted with college students (see Table 1 ).

We addressed a limitation of previous studies by sampling new individualistic and collectivistic cultures. In retrospect, however, it would also have been beneficial to include one or more East Asian cultures, in which support for cultural psychology hypotheses has been better. Had we found better support for cultural psychology perspectives in the East Asian cultures, it would have strengthened our proposal that cultural psychology hypotheses apply better to East Asian cultures than to collectivistic cultures more generally. However, even without inclusion of an East Asian sample, the results of the present study and many other studies in Table 1 call into question the generalizability of cultural psychology hypotheses regarding the content of self-concepts.

We improved on previous cross-cultural studies of self-concept by incorporating three different methods of self-concept assessment. Nonetheless, all three methods involved self-report and our comparisons assumed a degree of comparability across cultures in participants’ ability or willingness to provide accurate or genuine self-descriptions. However, given the anonymous nature of the data, the similar numbers and categories of responses given across cultures, and the reasonable cross-cultural equivalence of the inventory measures, we doubt that self-report biases were a significant problem. Finally, our results do not address cultural psychology hypotheses that involve other aspects of behavior, such as causal attributions ( Norenzayan, Choi, & Nisbett, 2002 ), self-enhancement biases ( Heine, 2005 ), and cross-role consistency of self-descriptions ( Suh, 2002 ).

Final Remarks

In summary, we successfully tested alternative theoretical perspectives on cultural universality versus differences in the content of self-concepts. We found support for trait perspectives and the individual-self-primacy hypothesis, while raising questions about the validity of cultural psychology perspectives on the content of self-concepts, particularly outside selected Asian cultures. We also found that the method of assessment affected the salience of some self-concept categories, which should limit researchers’ confidence in the results of previous monomethod studies. Finally, a follow-up analysis suggested that cultures may differ less in the “traitedness” of self-concepts than in the specific traits (e.g., agentic vs. communal) viewed as self-descriptive. Additional multimethod studies in a larger variety of cultures are needed as researchers further test these alternative theoretical perspectives.

Acknowledgments

This research was supported by National Institute of Health grant MH59941. We are grateful to Mercy Laurena-Malabanan, Adrian M. Altura, Francis Louie Endaya, Rheadel R. Famine, Danilo L. Linatoc, Jr., Ellen L. Vergara, and Dr. Florencio V. Reyes for assistance in data collection in the Philippines, and to Nerissa B. Adams, Cheryl Anderson, Carlos Guillen, Humberto Hernandez, Tomas Madrigal, Francisco C. Mesch, and Shawn Miller for their assistance in coding.

1 Spiro (1993) pointed out, for example, that the meaning of Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) assertion that, in non-Western cultures, “others are included within the boundaries of the self” is ambiguous; if it is meant to imply that other-representations are included in one’s self-representations, then it would suggest severe psychopathology.

2 The judgments of which subcategories in these studies represent pure traits (T), personal attributes (PA), and social or collective attributes (S) were generally straightforward and were based on the original authors’ definitions and examples of each category. In some studies, the proportion of pure traits could not be determined from the data reported and are not listed separately. For the Bond and Cheung (1983) study it was necessary to estimate the PA and S categories because not all of the subcategories were reported by these researchers. Given the pattern of results in Table 1 it is unlikely that our conclusions would be significantly affected by minor differences in the category definitions used by a few researchers.

3 In a test of a dynamic constructivist view of the self, Hong and colleagues (e.g., Hong et al., 2003 ) have shown that the content of self-concepts can be manipulated to increase reference to core attributes of one’s cultural group by priming the cultural identity of the respondent. We will not address priming effects, however, because we are interested in the typical or baseline salience of different aspects of self-concept.

4 There was some ethnic diversity within the United States and Australian samples. Specific minority subgroups were too small to analyze separately. However, in supplemental analyses we did compare participants of European heritage and non-European heritage on the key variables in the study to determine whether the cross-national comparisons would differ if participants who were not of European heritage in these two samples were excluded. The results and conclusions did not change when the ethnic minorities in these two countries were retained in their respective samples. Only one variable, AIQ-IV Collective Identity, exhibited significant mean differences between the European and non-European heritage subgroups, with the former subgroup averaging lower in both countries. Thus, scores for this variable would have been slightly lower if ethnic minorities had been excluded. However, the relative rank of the country means in relation to the other country samples did not change, nor did our conclusions. Therefore, we included all participants in our analyses.

5 Although the majority of TST researchers have requested 20 responses, other researchers have requested or coded fewer responses (e.g., 5 to 15; see Table 1 ). Some TST researchers have suggested that not much is gained by scoring more than 10 responses ( Bochner, 1994 ) and that respondents in some cultures may not be able to respond to as many as 20 sentence stems in a meaningful way ( Watkins et al., 1997 ). Such considerations were weighed in deciding to request 15 TST responses from the participants in each culture.

6 Details of the paired-sample t -tests were as follows: In the United States sample, all four scale means were significantly different from each other, with Relational Identity described as most important, followed by Personal Identity, Social Identity, and Collective Identity, in that order. In the Australian sample, the means for Personal and Relational Identity were not significantly different, both were significantly higher than the Social Identity mean, which, in turn, was significantly higher than the Collective Identity mean. In the Mexican sample, Personal Identity was significantly more important than Relational Identity, and both were significantly higher than Social and Collective Identity, which were not significantly different from each other. In the Philippine sample, Personal and Relational Identity were not significantly different from each other, both were significantly more important than Collective Identity, which was, in turn, significantly more important than Social Identity.

7 There is no a priori reason to expect that participants whose first trait response was agentic versus communal would differ in their implicit trait or contextual beliefs. However, we might expect independent self-construals to be associated with agentic self-descriptions and interdependent self-construals to be associated with communal self-descriptions. In all four cultures, we did find that participants who listed an agentic trait as their first trait response averaged higher in independent self-construals than respondents who gave a communal trait as their first trait response. Also, respondents who first gave a communal trait response averaged either higher (in Australia and the Philippines) or the same (in the United States and Mexico) in interdependent self-construals than respondents who gave an agentic response first. Given the limited number of agentic and communal responses available in our follow-up analysis, however, these mean differences were not statistically significant.

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Self Concept Essay | Essay on Self Concept for Students and Children in English

February 7, 2024 by Prasanna

Self Concept Essay: Self-concept refers to how a person thinks about, evaluates, and perceives themselves. It is a concept of being aware of oneself or having a concept of oneself. It is considered a person’s belief about oneself and the person’s attributes about what they think about oneself.

The self-concept embodies the answer to “Who am I? It is the extent to which self-knowledge is defined. It applies to a person’s attitudes and dispositions.

You can also find more Essay Writing articles on events, persons, sports, technology and many more.

Long and Short Essays on Self Concept for Students and Kids in English

We are providing essay samples to students on a long essay of 500 words in English and a short essay on 150 words in English on the topic Self Concept Essay for reference.

Long Essay on Self Concept 500 Words in English

Long Essay on Self Concept is usually given to classes 7, 8, 9, and 10.

According to Burns, in 1982, “self concept is an image which an individual has of themselves.” Conceptualization and its process form its origin. Self-concept is an important aspect of life because it molds our thinking process and how we act and behave in our everyday life. It is one primary effect that impacts managerial thinking. It has a powerful influence on one of the many behaviours.

The self-concept has three components, which are self-image, ideal self, and self-esteem. Self-image is how the person sees oneself. Self-esteem is how much the person values themselves, and the ideal self is how the person wishes himself to be. The concept of one’s self is active, dynamic, and malleable. The self-concept can be influenced by surrounding social situations and even if a person tends to motivate themselves.

With age, people tend to grow in knowledge, skills, and awareness about themselves. This consciousness is called self. It is the reflection of one’s own identity as an individual, as a person. There are various ways in which a person thinks about themselves. Self-concept is the thinking aspect of oneself. It forms a primary part of the personality and reflects many personality traits in a person.

It is a mental image that a person has about his strengths and weaknesses. These are the set of opinions, attitudes, and cognitions that an individual has on themselves. The self-concept can be distinguished from self-awareness. It is the extent to which self-knowledge can be defined.

The self-concept in a person includes the past, present, and future of an individual, where the future selves define what the person might become or what they yearn to become, or what they are afraid of becoming. People hold a perception of their past and future selves, based on which they hold their perception of their present selves.

The concept of oneself is considered malleable when a person is at his younger age and is still going through the process of discovering his habits, behaviours, likes, and dislikes. With age, perceptions become more organized and detailed. They form a better idea of what they want to become and what is most important for them.

Various psychologists have put forward different domains for a self-concept which are, social domain, which is the ability to interact with others; competence domain is the ability to meet the basic needs; affect domain is the state of awareness; the physical domain is the feeling about the appearance of oneself, the academic domain is the awareness of success and failure in school and family domain refers to how the individual functions with family.

The concept that a person has of himself is not always aligned with reality. The degree to which a person’s self-concept matches up to the reality is defined as congruence and incongruence. When self-concept aligns with reality, it is called congruence; it is called incongruence when it does not match up. It is always best to think positively regarding oneself for self-encouragement.

Short Essay on Self Concept 150 Words in English

Short Essay on Self Concept is usually given to classes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

Self-concept is the personal knowledge of an individual about who they are, how they are encompassing all their thoughts and feelings. It includes knowledge about how a person behaves, their capabilities, and their characteristics.

The self-concept of an individual develops rapidly during a person’s childhood and adolescence. It tends to take shape, and further changes as a person learn more about themselves. The self-concept should be understood by the structure of awareness and knowledge. People pay attention to themselves and notice both their internal states as well as external behaviours.

People collect information regarding themselves and based on this information, the concept of one’s self tends to build up, and people expand their ideas about who they are. Self-concept is not a single unitary concept; it is dynamic and is impacted by both the individual and society. Self-approval can contribute to greater success in an individual if he or she accepts themselves as they are.

10 Lines on Self Concept Essay in English

1. Carl Rogers has mentioned three components of self-concept; they are self-image, self-esteem, and ideal self. 2. One’s own motivation can influence the self-concept for seeking self-knowledge. 3. The self-concept has an active structure, and it changes from time to time. 4. Adolescence is the critical period for the ideal development of the self-concept. 5. Self-concept is made up of multiple schemes. 6. The self-concept has large cognitive and motivational roots. 7. The influence of society can manipulate the self-concept. 8. It is hierarchical and depends on an individual’s perception. 9. The ideal self-concept of an individual helps a person to construct himself in the proper way. 10. The concept of one’s self differs from one individual to another depending upon their surroundings and upbringings.

FAQ’s on Self Concept Essay

Question 1. Can self-concept influence one’s academic performance?

Answer: There are various factors in which a person’s academic performance depends. The self-concept can influence the performance to a certain extent.

Question 2. Does the Self-concept have any influence on self-confidence?

Answer: Yes, it does. If one has a good perspective about oneself, it will have an advantage in a person’s self-confidence.

Question 3. What factors affect a person’s self-concept?

Answer: The factors are age, gender, and religion, along with self-esteem and self-image.

Question 4. Who created the self-concept?

Answer: Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow popularized the term “self-concept.”

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Self Concept Essay | Positive and Negative Self Concept, Long and Short Essays on Self Concept Theory

Self Concept Essay: Self-concept is how an individual thinks about oneself, based on their habits, skills, and attitude. In other words, it is the ability to reflect on one’s own characteristics and behavior. Self-concept is the image we have of ourselves in the mind, and also the views we think others have about us. The self-concept plays an important part in our overall well-being. It involves the ways we look at our characteristics, how we present ourselves and interact with others, and it even influences our decisions and actions. The self-concept is an awareness that contains knowledge about us. It includes our beliefs about our personality, physical appearance, abilities, values, and goals. It is a representation of the consciousness that we exist as individuals.

Self-concept is all about our beliefs, preferences, and attitudes guiding us towards our personal existence. It forms the basis of how we think, behaves, and perform in our various life roles at different points in time. The self-concept starts to develop at a young age when an individual is going through the process of self-discovery and identity formation. With age and experience, the self-concept becomes much more organized.

Students can find more English Essay Writing Topics, Ideas, Easy Tips to Write Essay Writing and many more.

Theory of Self Concept

There are different theories available on self-concept, being it a part of psychological studies. According to one theory, the self-concept has two main attributes namely Personal Identity and Social Identity. Personal Identity is the unique personality trait that characterizes a person. On the other hand, social identity is based on an individual’s role in social circles and groups. Another theory suggests that the self-concept is multidimensional and can be demonstrated through the following traits of human behavior.

Affect: Awareness about emotional beliefs
Academic: Success or failure in academics
Competence: Ability to respond to basic needs
Family: Interaction within family circles
Personal: Awareness about physical characteristics, appearance, health, etc.
Social: Capability to interact in social groups

As per psychologist Carl Rogers, the self-concept comprises three different aspects namely ideal self (the ambition), self-image (your view about yourself), and self-esteem (how you value your presence and role in society).

Positive and Negative Self Concept

A positive self-concept is a belief about oneself that helps to successfully face various challenges of life and then make some positive impact on the lives of others. The development of the self-concept in a child is often influenced by the response received from adults. A positive self-concept helps the child to feel confident and involved in various activities. Positive self-concept improves mental and emotional health and plays an important role in nurturing constructive relationships. There are various aspects that can have an influence on the development of self-concepts such as age, gender, religion, and traditions.

A positive self-concept helps us to recognize our own abilities and potentials while being realistic about our liabilities and limitations. But with a negative self-concept, we tend to focus on our failures, weaknesses, and imperfections. We sometimes get influenced by rejection, judgment, and criticism from other people. This gradually shapes the self-concept of what we believe about ourselves, our capabilities, and the world around us. In many ways, our self-image is related to the people who have some kind of opinion about us.

Influence in Careers

Positive and negative self-concepts can also influence career decisions. A positive self-concept would drive you towards seeking more opportunities for growth. You can develop the ability to handle rejections and failures much better and look for career success. Recognizing self-worth and keeping self-esteem are the byproducts of self-concept which can increase engagement in work. A positive self-concept is particularly important for team leaders to improve relationships with coworkers and to understand how their beliefs and behaviors affect themselves as well as others in the organization.

Short Essay on Self Concept

Factors influencing self-concept

The formation of the self-concept begins from early childhood. It continues to develop and evolve throughout life under the influence of various internal and external factors. These factors include emotional, social, physical, practical, mental, and spiritual beliefs and attributes. A healthy self-concept makes you feel good about yourself and deserve respect from others. But with a negative self-concept, you put little value on your opinions and ideas and lose self-confidence. Many theories indicate that there is a strong relationship between self-concept and motivation to perform. A person with a positive self-concept can view himself as intelligent and competent, whereas a low self-concept makes a person unapproachable and de-motivated. The theory suggests that we often view ourselves the same way that others perceive us. This tendency was referred to as the looking glass effect. Thus self-concept evolves through social interactions because we as social animals are concerned with how others look at us.

Developing a positive self-concept

The self-concept is not always aligned to reality in the sense of how you see yourself and how you wish you were. If there is a mismatch between the two, the self-concept is said to be ‘incongruent’. The roots of incongruence can be generated from childhood when parents place conditions on their love and affection in return for certain expectations to be fulfilled. Unconditional love, on the other hand, fosters congruence and positive self-concept. There are ways we can develop our self-concept in a more positive manner. It can begin with looking within ourselves, our beliefs, and our thought processes. We should devote efforts to shorten the gap between our ‘ideal’ self and ‘real’ self by making some realistic expectations. Represent your positive attitude through words and actions while interacting, and make important choices about your lifestyle and habits that impact the self-concept and help to reach your ideal selves.

FAQ’s on Self Concept Essay

Question 1. What is an important self-concept that helps students in academic achievement?

Answer: Students’ self-concept is reflected through their perceptions of their capabilities to succeed in academic tasks and motivates them to perform.

Question 2. What does social psychologist Henri Tajfel’s social identity theory suggest in the context of self-concept?

Answer: Henri Tajfel’s social identity theory suggests that the self-concept is composed of two parts as Personal identity and Social identity.

Question 3. Why is understanding self-concept important for managers in an organization?

Answer: Recognizing self-worth by managers can improve engagement and influence the work environment with self-confidence and motivation.

Legon Journal of the Humanities Journal / Legon Journal of the Humanities / Vol. 35 No. 1 (2024) / Articles (function() { function async_load(){ var s = document.createElement('script'); s.type = 'text/javascript'; s.async = true; var theUrl = 'https://www.journalquality.info/journalquality/ratings/2407-www-ajol-info-ljh'; s.src = theUrl + ( theUrl.indexOf("?") >= 0 ? "&" : "?") + 'ref=' + encodeURIComponent(window.location.href); var embedder = document.getElementById('jpps-embedder-ajol-ljh'); embedder.parentNode.insertBefore(s, embedder); } if (window.attachEvent) window.attachEvent('onload', async_load); else window.addEventListener('load', async_load, false); })();

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Akan concepts and proverbs on abusua, ‘family’, kofi agyekum.

The paper explores the Akan concept of family based on their cultural ideologies and proverbs. The paper adopts the framework of language ideology that looks at how a people rationalise their language and culture based on their worldview, religious beliefs and anthropological notions. The data for this paper is collected from library studies on books on Akan proverbs and other literary books. Part of the data is collected from Akan folksongs, folktales, interviews and discussions with some renowned Akan scholars. The proverbs collected are subjected to semantic, stylistic and pragmatics analysis. The paper will find out whether the proverbs that relate to family are still applicable in modern times where globalisation, westernisation, modernisation and foreign religion are taking over the Akan family system and some of the aspects of Akan culture and beliefs. This paper is a follow up of other papers I have done on the Akan concept of face, poverty, marriage and death.

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Natural Selection and the World of Street Art: Evolution in Urban Spaces

This essay explores the intersection of natural selection and street art, illustrating how the principles of evolutionary biology apply to urban cultural phenomena. It discusses how street artists adapt their styles and techniques to thrive in the competitive and ever-changing urban environments, drawing parallels to how organisms evolve to survive in different habitats. The essay highlights how variations in artistic expression, influenced by environmental pressures, lead to the prominence of certain styles and techniques, much like advantageous traits in biological populations. Additionally, it examines the rapid evolution of street art due to the dynamic nature of urban spaces and the mutualistic relationships between artists and their communities, showcasing the resilience and adaptability inherent in both natural and cultural systems.

How it works

Natural selection, a key concept in evolutionary biology, shapes the living world through differential survival and reproduction. Surprisingly, this principle extends beyond biology into cultural realms, such as the dynamic and ever-evolving world of street art. Just as species adapt to their environments, street artists adapt their techniques, styles, and messages to thrive in the competitive and changing urban landscapes. This intersection of natural selection and street art offers a unique perspective on adaptation and survival in the cultural domain.

Natural selection relies on variation within a population.

In the urban jungle, this translates to the diverse styles and techniques that street artists employ. Each artist brings a unique approach, influenced by their background, experiences, and the environment. These variations are akin to genetic differences in a population. For instance, some artists might use bold, vibrant colors to stand out, while others might specialize in intricate stencils or politically charged messages. The urban environment acts as a selective pressure, determining which styles gain prominence and which fade into obscurity.

Consider the bustling streets of a city as a canvas where different styles of street art compete for attention. Just as animals in a forest adapt to their surroundings, street artists must navigate the challenges of urban spaces. They contend with law enforcement, the ever-changing urban landscape, and the need to capture the public’s attention. An artist who can quickly create a stunning mural that resonates with the local community is more likely to see their work preserved and celebrated. This success can be compared to an organism thriving in a favorable habitat.

Urban environments impose unique selection pressures on street artists. One clear example is the shift from traditional graffiti to street art that incorporates elements of the environment. Banksy, a renowned street artist, often uses his surroundings creatively, integrating his art with urban features like walls, signs, and even existing graffiti. This innovative approach can be seen as a form of directional selection, where one extreme phenotype—here, the integration of art with urban elements—is favored due to its ability to captivate and engage the public.

Fitness in the context of street art can be likened to an artist’s ability to leave a lasting impact and inspire others. An artist whose work is photographed, shared on social media, and discussed in art circles demonstrates high cultural fitness. Their style and techniques are more likely to be emulated and adapted by other artists, spreading their influence. This is similar to how advantageous traits in a biological population become more common over generations.

Street art also evolves rapidly due to the dynamic nature of urban environments. The temporary nature of street art pieces means they are often painted over or removed, much like how genetic drift affects small populations. However, the constant flow of new ideas and influences, akin to gene flow in biology, keeps the art scene vibrant and diverse. Artists from different backgrounds bring new techniques and perspectives, introducing fresh genetic material into the cultural gene pool.

Adaptations in street art are not limited to techniques and styles. Artists must also develop strategies to navigate the legal and social landscapes of urban areas. Some artists, like Shepard Fairey, have managed to transition from illegal street art to mainstream recognition, creating commercially successful pieces while retaining their street credibility. This ability to adapt to different contexts and audiences mirrors the way organisms adapt to diverse environments.

The influence of natural selection extends to the tools and materials street artists use. Urban environments pose unique challenges, such as exposure to the elements and the need for quick execution to avoid detection. Artists who develop durable techniques, like using weather-resistant paints or creating large-scale murals rapidly, are more likely to see their work endure. This practical adaptation is akin to how plants in urban areas evolve traits to withstand pollution and limited soil space.

One of the most fascinating aspects of street art is its ability to create symbiotic relationships between artists and their communities. Street art often reflects and amplifies the voices of marginalized groups, addressing social and political issues that resonate with local residents. In return, the community supports and protects the artwork, creating a mutually beneficial relationship. This interaction mirrors the mutualistic relationships found in nature, where both parties gain from their association.

Urban environments also serve as living laboratories for the evolution of street art. Researchers and enthusiasts can observe how styles and techniques spread and evolve in real-time, providing insights into cultural adaptation and innovation. The rapid changes and diversity within urban art scenes offer a unique opportunity to study the principles of natural selection outside traditional biological contexts.

For example, the rise of digital street art, where artists use projection mapping and augmented reality, showcases the adaptation to new technologies and media. These digital interventions allow artists to create ephemeral pieces that can be seen and experienced in new ways, pushing the boundaries of what street art can be. This technological adaptation parallels the way organisms evolve new traits to exploit emerging ecological niches.

In conclusion, natural selection is a powerful and pervasive force that shapes not only the biological world but also cultural phenomena like street art. By examining how street artists adapt to the challenges and opportunities of urban environments, we gain a deeper understanding of the principles of natural selection. This perspective enriches our appreciation of both biological and cultural evolution, highlighting the resilience and creativity that drive adaptation and survival. Whether in the natural world or the vibrant urban art scene, the dynamics of natural selection continue to shape the intricate and interconnected tapestry of life and culture.

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Critic’s Notebook

I Saw My Anxiety Reflected in ‘Inside Out 2.’ It Floored Me.

In a way that’s both cathartic and devastating, Pixar’s latest portrays how anxiety can take hold, our critic writes.

Share full article

A still from the movie “Inside Out 2” shows the character of Anxiety — an orange cartoon with big eyes and frayed hair — waving to other animated characters.

By Maya Phillips

At the climax of Pixar’s “Inside Out 2,” Riley, a freshly pubescent teen with a gaggle of new personified emotions, becomes so overwhelmed with anxiety that she has a panic attack.

In the theater, I whispered to my friend that I’d forgotten to bring my panic attack medication. I’d said it as a joke — but at the sight of this anxious animated teenager, my whole body’s choreography changed. My muscles tensed. I pressed my right palm down hard to my chest and took a few deep yoga breaths, trying to cut off the familiar beginnings of an attack.

This depiction of how quickly anxiety can take hold was overwhelming. I saw my own experiences reflected in Riley’s. “Inside Out 2” felt personal to me in a way that was equally cathartic and devastating: It’s a movie that so intimately understands how my anxiety disorder upends my everyday life.

“Inside Out 2” picks up two years after the 2015 film “Inside Out,” as Riley is about to start high school. With puberty comes a group of new emotions, led by Anxiety. A manic orange sprite voiced by Maya Hawke, Anxiety bumps out the old emotions and inadvertently wreaks havoc on Riley’s belief system and self-esteem as she tries to manage the stress of a weekend hockey camp.

When an emotion takes over in the “Inside Out” movies, a control board in Riley’s mind changes to that feeling’s color; Anxiety’s takeover, however, is more absolute. She creates a stronghold in Riley’s imagination, where she forces mind workers to illustrate negative hypothetical scenarios for Riley’s future. Soon, Riley’s chief inner belief is of her inadequacy; the emotions hear “I’m not good enough” as a low, rumbling refrain in her mind.

I’m familiar with anxiety’s hold on the imagination; my mind is always writing the script to the next worst day of my life. It’s already embraced all possibilities of failure. And my anxiety’s ruthless demands for perfection often turn my thoughts into an unrelenting roll-call of self-criticisms and insecurities.

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Exploring The Impact of Culture on The Self
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Self Concept Essay: Self-concept is how an individual thinks about oneself, based on their habits, skills, and attitude. In other words, it is the ability to reflect on one's own characteristics and behavior. Self-concept is the image we have of ourselves in the mind, and also the views we think others have about us. The self-concept plays an ...
The Influence of Bill Nye's Physical Stature on his Public Persona
Essay Example: Bill Nye, commonly known as "The Science Guy," has become a beloved figure in popular culture due to his engaging and accessible approach to science education. While much of his appeal stems from his charismatic personality and ability to simplify complex scientific concepts,
Akan concepts and proverbs on abusua, 'family'
The paper explores the Akan concept of family based on their cultural ideologies and proverbs. The paper adopts the framework of language ideology that looks at how a people rationalise their language and culture based on their worldview, religious beliefs and anthropological notions. The data for this paper is collected from library studies on books on Akan proverbs and other literary books.
Natural Selection and the World of Street Art: Evolution in Urban
Essay Example: Natural selection, a key concept in evolutionary biology, shapes the living world through differential survival and reproduction. Surprisingly, this principle extends beyond biology into cultural realms, such as the dynamic and ever-evolving world of street art. Just as species
"Inside Out 2" Understands How Anxiety Effects Me
A manic orange sprite voiced by Maya Hawke, Anxiety bumps out the old emotions and inadvertently wreaks havoc on Riley's belief system and self-esteem as she tries to manage the stress of a ...