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Political and Social Foundations for Reform: Anti-Corruption Strategies for the Philippines

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Report by Michael Johnston

Published June 15, 2012

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Corruption in the Philippines diverts, delays, and distorts economic development, undermines the quality and credibility of democracy, and reduces the quality of life. That is so not just because of its extent but also because it comes in particularly disruptive and intractable forms. Philippine corruption is an example of the Oligarch-and-Clan syndrome—one found in countries offering significant and expanding political and economic opportunities in a setting of very weak institutions, but a pattern shaped by historical, cultural, and geographical influences specific to the country. Oligarch-and-Clan corruption is particularly disruptive, in development terms. Because of institutional weaknesses and the power of corrupt oligarchs and their followings, it often faces ineffective opposition. More than other syndromes it is closely linked to violence, and sharply limits the state’s ability to perform such basic functions as revenue collection, maintenance of institutional foundations for the economy, law enforcement, conflict resolution, and dealing with security threats.

Michael Johnston

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The Philippines: a social structure of corruption

• Published: 06 February 2024

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The anticorruption community largely views corruption as a government or development issue. But in the Philippines, corruption is a social structure. The very social bonds and social structures that are good at building civic unity and solidarity are also good at spreading and maintaining corruption, and this is why corruption is so difficult to remove. Patrons use these societal features to implement a ubiquitous social structure of corruption by means of maneuvered friendships that makes it difficult for the masses to know when a patron is acting as a friend or foe. The social structure encompasses the whole of society and corrupts the encircled government, political, and development systems as easily as it infiltrates all other segments of society. It is why oversight and sector-based anticorruption initiatives underperform, and why initiatives must pivot towards addressing this social structure.

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Governance and Good Governance: A New Framework for Political Analysis

Douglass north’s theory of institutions: lessons for law and development.

Public Sector Strategies in Curbing Corruption: A Review of the Literature

Data availability.

The author’s interview notes generated during and/or analyzed during the current study are not publicly available to help ensure confidentiality of the interviewees, but are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

Pronounced ‘leader’ in English, lider is a term used in the Philippines specifically referring to individuals (or leaders) in the community that are sought by candidates to convince the electorate to vote for that particular candidate. Liders are the individuals that perform the physical exchange of money for votes with the electorate.

A barangay is the lowest level of elected government. Each city or municipality is comprised of multiple barangays (villages).

See Appendix for a full list of respondents.

Interviews 2–3, 6, 14–16, 18–20, 22, 25, 39, 41–42, 44–50.

Utang na loob is usually translated as “debt of gratitude.” The literal translation is “debt of inside” or “internal debt.” It can also be translated as “reciprocity” or “lifelong reciprocation.”

Interviews 1,14,21,24,42–44.

The paper uses the term ‘client’ to represent the economically lower-class voters who are in clientelistic relationships with political families/candidates (patrons).

Interviews 1,14,24,42–44.

Clans are a connection of least ten extended families – usually more – where each extended family could have more than a hundred members. Clans then have a minimum of a thousand members and usually much more.

Interviews 2,5–6,9–10,14–51.

Interviews 3–6,9–10,12,14–23,25–26,27–51.

Interviews 3–6, 9–10,12,14–23,25–26,27–51.

Interviews 14–22,25–26,39,47–50.

Interviews 16,22,27–38.

Interviews 14,16,21,24,39,42–44.

Interviews 16,22.

Interview 22.

Interview 23.

Interviews 1,20.

Interviews 2,5,14–23,26,32–39,41,45,47–51.

Interviews 15–16,20,22.

Interviews 27–31.

Interview 24.

Interviews 2,6,10.

Interview 22–23.

Interviews 14,18,32–38.

Interviews 32–38.

Interviews 1,10,18–22,32–38,47–49,50–51.

Interviews 2–4,6,14–15,20,22,40,45–49.

Interview 16.

Interviews 2–3.

Interview 3.

Interviews 1,3–6,10,12,15,50.

Interview 15.

Interviews 2–3,6,15.

BARMM consists of the region formally known as the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) plus the addition of Cotabato City and villages in northern Cotabato.

Interviews 3–4.

Interview 1.

Interview 3–4,6,10,12.

Interview 7.

Interviews 2–3,6,14–16,18–20,22,25,39,41–42,44–50.

Interviews 1,3–7,10,12,14–15.

Interviews 1,3–4,6,9–10,14,16–18,24.

Interviews 1, 3–4,6,9–10,14,16–18,24.

COMELEC is the Commission on Elections in charge of ensuring fair and free elections.

Interviews 3–4,6–7.

Interview 6.

Interviews 14–15,25–26.

Interviews 14–16,25–26,32–38.

Interviews 14–15,25–26,32–38.

Interviews 14–16,20,22–23,25–38.

Interview 21.

Interview 2.

Interview 14,21,49.

Interviews 2,16,20,22–23,27–31.

Interviews 1,2.

Interviews 52,54–59,61–64,66–67.

Interviews 6,14,16,18–19,21–23,25,50.

Interviews 3–4,18,52,54–59,61–64,66–67.

Interviews 3–4,6–8,52,54–55,56–58,61,64.

Interviews 2–3,6,14–16,18–22,25,39,41–42,44–50.

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Combating corruption in the Philippines: an update

Author(s) : World Bank. Philippines Country Management Unit. East Asia and Pacific Regional Office (Philippines)

Organization : World Bank. Philippines Country Management Unit, East Asia and Pacific Regional Office,

Imprint : Manila, World Bank, 2001

Collation : 64 p.

Series : Pre-2003 Economic or Sector Report

Notes : Incl.bibl.

The war against corruption in the Philippines has taken a fresh turn with the installation of the new government in 2001. Addressing corruption was one of the new administration ' s announced priorities, but a detailed anticorruption strategy and action plan have yet to emerge. Chapter 1 discusses the nine-point approach to fighting corruption in the Philippines as proposed by the World Bank in November 1999 which comprises policy reforms and deregulation, reforming campaign finance, increasing public oversight, reforming the budget process, improving meritocracy in civil services, targeting selected agencies, enhancing sanctions, developing private sector partnerships, and supporting judicial reform. Chapter 2 discusses the widening government deficit which begun in late 1999 and the events shaping this change. Chapter 3 highlights the areas where progress was made during this time and focuses on the emergence of new initiatives. Finally, Chapter 4 addresses the new Government 's commitment.

• Anti-corruption strategies, Judiciary, Legal framework, Corporate sector, Corruption, Economic and social development, Educational management, Central administration, Finance, Budgets, Governance, Public sector
• Asia and the Pacific Philippines

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Strategies of corruption prevention in the Philippines

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Martinez, Rommel L

Description

This paper argues that one effective strategy for tackling corruption in the Philippines is to more actively involve civil society groups in the governance of the country. This papers examines how this approach is effective for two major areas of corruption, election irregularities and the misuse of public funds by elected officials. Civil society groups can galvanise community support for change and provide ongoing public pressure to ensure better practices are maintained. The paper begins ... [Show more] with general background information on the Philippines before reviewing the overall situation of corruption. This review shows that appropriate anti-corruption laws are in place but have not been enforced due to a general public acceptance of corruption. The two areas of corruption under particular focus are the examined. A range of corruption prevention strategies are offered in each case.

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Today’s front page, Wednesday, May 8, 2024

How to Find a Solution to Corruption in the Philippines

• BusinessMirror
• July 26, 2022
• 2 minute read

Table of Contents Hide

Cause of corruption in the philippines, effects of corruption in the philippines, solution for corruption in the philippines, corruption, morality, and inclusivity, how to stop corruption in the philippines.

Corruption in the Philippines has been an accepted truth for many years. When running for a position, many politicians use the concept of being “clean” to separate themselves from the corrupt ones. However, politicians are just one of the many causes of corruption here in the Philippines.

Commonly associated with the act of giving or asking for money or bribes to win contracts or favors, for abusing political powers and diverting public funds, corruption is a common problem in all countries, developed or developing. One could truly say that corruption is a cancer of society. Indeed, even Pope Francis has called it a “gangrene of the people.”

From the everyday traffic enforcers to established institutions, corruption seems to be a mainstay here in the Philippines. These corrupt practices negatively impact economic growth as it deters investments too. In recent years, the adverse effects of the long-term corruption the country has been experiencing is felt more.

Corruption in the Philippines, most unfortunately, has become a staple issue–one that seems to have no solution. The belief that politics is evil is further enforced by just how widespread it is. But why is corruption so widespread in the country?

The short answer is that there is a severe lack of transparency and accountability in the country. This is further worsened by monopoly on products and services. Coupled together, corruption becomes ever-present from a micro (such as small individual bribes in a private corporation) to macro-level (like the more problematic judicial corruption in the Philippines ).

In fact, if we take a closer look we see many forms of corruption present in the Philippines.

The principal forms of corruption are extortion and bribery. Extortion happens when, say, a public officer explicitly demands or broadly hints for a payment in exchange for something he can grant. Bribery is the other side of the coin, and it is the one who seeks the favor who offers money.  Often this practice is called SOP or “facilitation.” This is achieved through the so-called envelope.

With money and gifts, one can buy deals, contracts and favors. Such payments, for example, can “encourage” a purchasing officer to buy one product instead of another. It can also convince a politician or a bureaucrat to award a contract, or to approve an administrative rule (such as building permits), or to release public funds to fictitious non-governmental organizations.

These bribe-taking incidents are also common among lesser public servants such as traffic enforcers. Many people have repeatedly reported being victimized at least once by a traffic enforcer for “swerving” (incidentally, there is no such offense in the law). When people try to argue their case without this knowledge, most enforcers would relent and say that they would not issue a ticket with the implicit understanding of a bribe. Corruption more easily spreads when there are opportunities, when risk is minimal in comparison to benefits obtained. In many cases, this happens when people have enormous autonomy to approve contracts to the bribe-giver.

Corruption has many adverse effects on a state, most of which are especially felt economically.

First and foremost, it is a known deterrent to various investments because it can negatively affect assessments on the risks and returns associated with an investment. This is the reason we started the project “Integrity for Jobs”, creating Integrity Circles in LGUs that are committed to ethical operations.

Additionally, corruption will direct talent away from productive activities toward rent-seeking activities. More important, while corruption affects the whole economy, it seems to target the poor. It hurts the poor as it introduces costs and benefits that create a bias against the poor; corruption can causally be linked to the worsening of income distribution.

The question of how to prevent corruption in the Philippines is always present, but the best way to answer it is by understanding its root causes.

Corruption flourishes when someone has monopoly power over a product or service and has discretion to decide how much to receive, and where accountability and transparency are weak. Incompetence and corruption are also closely linked together. So, to fight corruption, we—and that includes all of us—must reduce monopoly power, reduce discretion and increase accountability in many ways.

Reducing monopoly power means enabling competition; in this context we are so happy that the Philippines has competition legislation in place and has the Philippine Competition Commission (PCC) to implement the law. However, it would be great if the PCC would be allowed to do its job without court interference, in the interest of removing monopolies/duopolies so that corruption can be properly addressed, reduced and finally eliminated.

Limiting discretion means clarifying the rules of the game and making them available to everyone. This includes putting government contracts and procurement plans online, creating online manuals on what is required to obtain a permit, build a house, start a business and so forth. Making sources like these available deter corruption as it makes it easier to cross check these processes and ensure that everything is in order.

Finally approving the freedom of information (FOI) bills in both Houses of Congress would be another big step in the right direction. We have been talking about the FOI for too long already. In fact, it is arguable that corruption cases, such as Philhealth corruption , could have certainly been avoided if the FOI bill was already approved.

Another example for reducing discretion: Simplify the tax code, make it simpler to understand and thereby reduce discretion of BIR employees. This is how we can lessen corruption from private entities, as well as tax evasion. A clearer set of taxation laws helps people recognize what they need to contribute and potentially where their taxes should go as well.

Enhancing accountability means many things, and creative leaders in the government and the private sector use a remarkable variety of methods. One way to improve accountability is to improve the measurement of performance. Another method is listening and learning from businesses and from citizens. This includes mechanisms for public complaints, but it goes beyond the reporting of individual instances of abuse of corrupt systems.

Accountability is also increased by inviting outsiders to audit, monitor and evaluate. This is exactly the reason we created Integrity Circles as one of the main avenues to address accountability, transparency and integrity. We did this in the Integrity for Jobs (I4J) project, a project co-funded by the European Commission and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. We started with nine LGUs and are happy to announce that 60 LGUs are now part of this endeavor. Allow me to add that Integrity Circles are composed of people working in the LGU, being involved in business, and representing civil society (in many cases the Church). But let’s not forget the press; the media can be and should be an important source of accountability.

What about ethics and morality? Corruption has always been linked to dishonesty and “dirtiness”. In fact, one of the most prevalent effects of corruption in the Philippines is giving fuel to the belief that politics is inherently dirty.

Successful leaders in the government and the private sector must set a good example. As mentioned above, the key to fighting corruption are better systems that provide better incentives for imperfect human beings to perform in the public interest—and to avoid corruption.

Often it is said that corruption is unavoidable, that it is common practice, that those who refuse are ridiculed as “religious” or “scrupulous” or “holier than thou.” As many give in to it, a state of permissiveness arises. Integrity becomes harder to fulfill, especially when one is confronted with issues like career advancement, breaks in life, and earning of income, unless one is firmly rooted on solid principles and has been nurtured in an upright manner.

Corruption cannot be tackled without a strong civic society. The population must have powers to challenge politicians, bureaucrats and erring company managers. Governments must agree to introduce transparency in their operations and allow information to flow freely. The Right to Information Act in India that allows citizens to demand information from bureaucrats has given much hope to activists in India. In the Philippines the Freedom of Information bills are not moving in Congress.

Barriers to participation in the economic life of a society must be removed. Corruption has its losers—the population at large and those who are denied participation in economic activity. When those who are hurt by corruption are allowed to voice their discontent, the chances of a decline in corruption increase.

Considering how ingrained corruption is in the country, finding the answers to this question can be quite difficult.

There are many studies concerning corruption, which tells us that it is a common phenomenon globally. Finding a solution to corruption in the Philippines will undoubtedly take time and it will take both institutional and cultural changes to enact it well. However, on a micro-level, staying morally upright is one of the best ways to combat the ever-growing corruption.

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A look at how corruption works in the Philippines

The Philippines is perceived to be one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Of 180 countries, the Philippines ranked 116 in terms of being least corrupt. This means that the country is almost on the top one-third of the most corrupt countries, based on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International.

According to CPI, the Philippines scored a total of 33 points out of 100. Even as far back as 2012, it has fluctuated around the same CPI score, with the highest score being 38 points in 2014 and the lowest being 33 points in 2021 and 2022. To further contextualize how low it scored, the regional average CPI score for the Asia-Pacific region is 45, with zero as highly corrupt. And of the 31 countries and territories in the region, the Philippines placed 22nd (tied with Mongolia).

It must be noted, however, that CPI measures perceptions of corruption and is not necessarily the reality of the state of corruption. CPI reflects the views of experts or surveys of business people on a number of corrupt behavior in the public sector (such as bribery, diversion of public funds, nepotism in the civil service, use of public office for private gain, etc.). CPI also measures the available mechanisms to prevent corruption, such as enforcement mechanisms, effective prosecution of corrupt officials, red tape, laws on adequate financial disclosure and legal protection for whistleblowers.

These data are taken from other international organizations, such as the World Bank, World Economic Forum, private consulting companies and think tanks.

Of course, measuring actual corruption is quite difficult, especially as it involves under-the-table activities that are only discovered when they are prosecuted, like in the case of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, which was estimated to be up to $10 billion based on now-deleted Guinness World Records and cited as the “biggest robbery of a government.” Nevertheless, there still exists a correlation between corruption and corruption perceptions.

4 Syndromes

Corruption does not come in a single form as well. In a 2007 study, Michael Johnston, a political scientist and professor emeritus at Colgate University in the United States, studied four syndromes (categories) of corruption that were predominant in Asia, citing Japan, Korea, China and the Philippines as prime examples of each category.

The first category is Influence Market Corruption, wherein politicians peddle their influence to provide connections to other people, essentially serving as middlemen. The second category is Elite Cartel Corruption, wherein there exist networks of elites that may collude to protect their economic and political advantages. The third form of corruption is the Official Mogul Corruption, wherein economic moguls (or their clients) are usually the top political figures and face few constraints from the state or their competitors.

Finally, there is the form of corruption that the Philippines is familiar with. Oligarch-and-Clan Corruption is present in countries with major political and economic liberalization and weak institutions. Corruption of this kind has been characterized by Johnston as having “disorderly, sometimes violent scramble among contending oligarchs seeking to parlay personal resources into wealth and power.” Other than the Philippines, corruption in Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka falls under the same syndrome.

In the Philippines, Oligarch-and-Clan Corruption manifests itself in the political system. As Johnston noted, in this kind of corruption, there is difficulty in determining what is public and what is private (i.e., who is a politician and who is an entrepreneur). Oligarchs attempt to use their power for their private benefit or the benefit of their families. From the Aquinos, Binays, Dutertes, Roxases and, most notoriously, the Marcoses, the Philippines is no stranger to political families. In a 2017 chart by Todd Cabrera Lucero, he traced the lineage of Philippine presidents and noted them to be either related by affinity or consanguinity.

Corruption in the Philippines by oligarch families is not unheard of. In fact, the most notable case of corruption in the Philippines was committed by an oligarchic family—the Marcos family. The extent of the wealth stolen by former dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr. and his wife has been well-documented. In fact, several Supreme Court cases clearly show the extent of the wealth that the Marcoses had stolen.

In an Oligarch-and-Clan system of corruption, oligarchs will also leverage whatever governmental authority they have to their advantage. Going back to the Marcos example, despite their convictions, the Marcoses have managed to weasel their way back into power, with Ferdinand Marcos Jr. becoming the 17th President despite his conviction for tax violation. Several politicians have also been convicted of graft and corruption (or have at least been hounded by allegations of corruption) and still remain in politics. As observed by Johnston in his article, though Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos are the popular images of corruption in the Philippines, he also noted other entrenched oligarchs throughout the country.

Finally, factions also tend to be “unstable and poorly disciplined.” The term “balimbing” is often thrown around in local politics but, more than that, the Philippines is also familiar with politically-motivated violence and disorder.

All these features are characteristics of Oligarch-and-Clan corruption, where these oligarchic families continue to hold power and politicians exploit their positions to enrich themselves or their families.

Corruption, no matter what kind, needs to be curbed. It results in loss of government money, which could have been used to boost the economy and help ordinary citizens, especially those from the lower income sectors.

According to the 2007 study, the Office of the Ombudsman had, in 1999, pegged losses arising from corruption at P100 million daily, whereas the World Bank estimates the losses at one-fifth of the national government budget. For relatively more updated figures, former Deputy Ombudsman Cyril Ramos claimed that the Philippines had lost a total of P1.4 trillion in 2017 and 2018. These estimates are in line with the World Bank estimates of one-fifth (or 20 percent) of the national budget.

So grave is the adverse effect of corruption that the international community recognized it as an international crime under the United Nations Convention Against Corruption where perpetual disqualification of convicted officials is recommended.

But the question stands: can corruption be eradicated in developing countries like the Philippines? Many Philippine presidents promised to end corruption in their political campaigning, but none has achieved it so far. If the government truly wants to end corruption, it must implement policies directed against corruption, such as lifting the bank secrecy law, prosecuting and punishing corrupt officials, increasing government transparency and more. INQ

This is part of the author’s presentation at DPI 543 Corruption: Finding It and Fixing It course at Harvard Kennedy School, where he is MPA/Mason fellow.

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This article reflects the personal opinion of the author and not the official stand of the Management Association of the Philippines or MAP. He is a member of MAP Tax Committee and MAP Ease of Doing Business Committee, co-chair of Paying Taxes on Ease of Doing Business Task Force and chief tax advisor of Asian Consulting Group. Feedback at [email protected] and [email protected] .

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Invisible no more: Shedding light on police violence and corruption in the Philippines

The Philippines was romanticized and dubbed the “ Pearl of the Orient Seas ” by national hero and writer José Rizal due to the country’s elegant organic beauty. However, the pearl’s beauty has been tainted by increasing police brutality, accelerated in recent years.

After becoming the 16th President of the Philippines in 2016, Rodrigo Duterte was quick and adamant about carrying out a “ war on drugs ” campaign. Duterte implemented extreme measures targeting criminals and non-compliant citizens from impoverished communities to restore peace and order in the country.

In his first press conference after being elected as president, Duterte pledged to end crime, corruption, and the illegal drug trade within three to six months of being elected. However, Duterte implemented this pledge through the promotion of a new measure: “shoot-to-kill” orders.

“What I will do is urge Congress to restore [the] death penalty by hanging,” Duterte said in his first press conference. “If you resist, show violent resistance, my order to police [will be] to shoot to kill. Shoot to kill for organized crime. You heard that? Shoot to kill for every organized crime.”

Unfortunately, Duterte’s strategies to combat the issues faced by Filipinos have conditioned and emboldened the police, creating a sense of invincibility. The implications of Duterte’s extreme strategies include the manslaughter of innocent citizens and the manifestation of police corruption in the country. However, as a new president leads the country, the future of the Philippines’ criminal justice system seems committed to less violent means.

‘Shoot-To-Kill’

Duterte’s shoot-to-kill orders evolved dangerously, putting more innocent Filipino lives at risk and perpetuating the human rights crisis in the country. The global COVID-19 pandemic was not a barrier to Duterte’s anti-crime operations.

Amidst the pandemic, the government implemented an “ Enhanced Community Quarantine ” (ECQ) for the country’s capital, Manila, as well as the entire island of Luzon in an effort to mitigate the spread of the virus. During the lockdown, Filipinos were confined in their homes, transportation was suspended, food and health services were regulated, and uniformed personnel patrolled the streets to enforce strict quarantine measures.

During the ECQ, the government did not fulfill its promises as residents did not receive relief support. On April 1, 2020, frustration from community members erupted into political demonstrations in the streets of San Roque, Quezon City. Advocates and protestors asked for answers from the government in regard to their promised supplies and food aid.

Duterte’s response? “ Shoot them dead .”

In a televised address on the same day as the protests, Duterte ordered the police and military to shoot troublemakers if they felt their lives were in danger. “My orders are to the police and military, also village officials, that if there is trouble or the situation arises that people fight and your lives are on the line, shoot them dead,” Duterte said.

According to the World Population Review’s most recent annual data, the Philippines is the country with the world’s highest number of police killings, with over 6,000 between 2016 and 2021.

As of February 2022, based on the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency’s (PDEA) Real Numbers PH data , since Duterte took office in 2016, the government implemented 229,868 operations against illegal drugs, which resulted in the arrest of a total of 331,694 suspects. Beyond this, according to the PDEA, the total number of killings during anti-drug operations reached 6,235.

In November 2021, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project published a comprehensive database of the Philippines revealing that since 2016, at least 7,742 civilians have been killed in anti-drug raids, which is approximately 25 percent higher than the figure issued by the government.

As described by Eliza Romero, a coordinator for the Malaya Movement , a US-based alliance that advocates for human rights, freedom, and democracy in the Philippines, Duterte’s fierce rhetoric has given an invitation to vigilante and extrajudicial violence among the community.

“The shoot-to-kill order will just encourage more extrajudicial killings and vigilantism,” Romero said in an interview with Foreign Policy. “It will give private citizens and barangay [village] captains impunity to commit more human rights violations with the protection of the law while normalizing carnage.”

Behind every number is a real person—whose story has been invisible and whose life has been reduced by police officers who one day decided to target an innocent victim; a brother or sister; a son or daughter; a husband or wife; a father or mother.

Karla A., daughter of Renato A. who was killed in December 2016, recounts her experiences after losing her father at the age of 10, stating in an interview with the Human Rights Watch (HRW), “I was there when it happened when my papa was shot. I saw everything, how my papa was shot. … Our happy family is gone. We don’t have anyone to call father now. We want to be with him, but we can’t anymore.”

Emboldening the Police

Duterte’s enforcement measures to achieve public order put innocent citizens in a battle they have already lost. What is worse is that Duterte not only normalized but justified the killing of innocent citizens. Duterte assured the police impunity , stating that he would not only protect them from human rights abuses but ultimately pardon them if ever they are convicted for carrying out his anti-drug campaigns. This leads to the intensification of corruption within police departments in the country.

Duterte’s shoot-to-kill orders have not shown mercy to victims as he has always been in favor of the police. He never failed to show support for the police in carrying out his campaigns in his public and televised addresses. For instance, Duterte gave orders to Bureau of Customs Commissioner Rey Leonardo Guerrero stating that “Drugs are still flowing in. I'd like you to kill there [in communities]… anyway, I'll back you up and you won't get jailed. If it's drugs, you shoot and kill. That’s the arrangement,” Duterte said .

Duterte’s vow to protect the police results in police officers feeling emboldened and invincible. Police officers who have followed Duterte’s orders are promoted through the ranks. Police officers are not held accountable for the deaths of innocent civilians; the country’s own President pardons them. On top of this, police officers are falsifying evidence to justify unlawful killings and avoid legal repercussions.

The HRW published a report titled “‘License to Kill’: Philippine Police Killings in Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs,” which analyzed a total of 24 incidents that led to 32 deaths, involving Philippine National Police (PNP) personnel between October 2016 and January 2017. The report concluded that police officers would falsely claim self-defense to justify these killings.

To further strengthen their claims, police officers would plant guns, spent ammunition, and drug packets next to the bodies of victims. In turn, the victims would seem more guilty of being part of drug-related activities. Other times, police officers would work closely with masked gunmen to carry out these extrajudicial killings. In other words, police officers have succeeded in rooting their endeavors in deceit.

Fortunately, there have been instances where some police officers were legally prosecuted in police killings. Three police officers were found guilty of murdering a 17-year-old teenager in 2017, the first conviction of officers ever since Duterte launched his war on drugs.

A Look Into the Future

The Philippines as the “Pearl of the Orient Seas” has lost its luster due to the many problems that the nation continues to face—one of the most prominent ones is Duterte’s explicit abuse of police power. Similar to how pearls lose their glow when not provided with the care it needs, the integrity of police officers has dried out and become yellowed over time due to the government’s complicity.

Time and time again, Duterte has remained an instigator in instances relating to police brutality in the country. Luckily, the Philippines can combat pearl discoloration through the implementation of robust policies that would ensure increased transparency within police departments.

Freshly elected Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. makes the restoration of the yellowed pearl an achievable goal. At the 121st Police Service anniversary celebration held at Camp General Rafael T. Crame in Quezon City—the national headquarters of the PNP—Marcos Jr. brings an opportunity for redemption. Aside from calling the PNP officers “vanguards of peace,” Marcos Jr. urged them to continue serving the community with integrity in order to restore public confidence.

“The use of force must always be reasonable, justifiable, and only undertaken when necessary. Execution of authority must be fair, it must be impartial,” Marcos Jr. said . “It must be devoid of favoritism and discrimination, regardless of race, gender, social economic status, political affiliation, [and] religious belief. It is only then that you can effectively sustain with great respect and wide support the authority that you possess as uniformed servicemen of the Republic.”

Beyond this, Marcos Jr. highlighted his hope for reforming the police system under the leadership of newly installed PNP Chief Police General Rodolfo Azurin Jr. Moreover, Marcos Jr.’s aspirations to increase accountability within police departments will be complemented by Azurin Jr.’s launching of a peace and security framework titled “MKK=K” or “Malasakit + Kaayusan + Kapayapaan = Kaunlaran” which translates to policies founded on “the combination of care, order and peace shall equate to progress.”

On the other hand, it is understandable if Filipino citizens and human rights activists have lost hope for the possibility of achieving meaningful progress in reforming the broken police system. Marcos Jr. is the son of Ferdinand Marcos Sr. , an ousted dictator who infamously declared martial law in the country, and Filipinos are still navigating the trauma of the Marcos era 50 years later.

Currently, Marcos Jr. pledges to continue the campaign against illegal drugs but with an emphasis on drug prevention and rehabilitation . Under this new framework, the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) implemented a program dubbed “Buhay Ingatan, Droga’y Ayawan (Value Life, Shun Drugs)” which aims to address the root of the problem by suppressing the demand for illegal drugs. According to DILG Secretary Benjamin ‘Benhur’ Abalos Jr., the initiative needs support and solidarity from all sectors of the community in order to ensure its effectiveness.

Simultaneously, Marcos Jr. has no intention to cooperate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) on their investigation of the country’s drug war killings. Based on the ICC ’s official website, their purpose “is intended to complement, not to replace, national criminal systems; it prosecutes cases only when States do not are unwilling or unable to do so genuinely.” However, Marcos Jr. stated in an interview that “The ICC, very simply, is supposed to take action when a country no longer has a functioning judiciary… That condition does not exist in the Philippines. So I do not see what role the ICC will play in the Philippines.”

Nearly five months into Marcos Jr.’s administration, the University of the Philippines’ Dahas Project revealed that 152 people have died in anti-drug police raids as of Nov. 30. The report further disclosed that the drug casualties under Marcos Jr. “[are] exceeding the 149 killings recorded during the final six months of the Duterte government. During the first half of the year under Duterte, the average daily rate was 0.8. So far under Marcos, the rate stands at one per day.”

In the Philippines, police officers have repeatedly assumed the roles of prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner. HRW Deputy Director for Asia Phil Robertson points out shortcomings in Marcos Jr.’s campaigns describing that “Using a drug rehabilitation approach means little when police and mystery gunmen are still executing suspected drug users and dealers. Law enforcers should receive clear orders to stop the ‘drug war’ enforcement once and for all.” The only way to effectively mitigate police killings in the Philippines is by abandoning violent and punitive measures against illegal drugs.

Ultimately, despite these obstacles, the yellowed pearl can still brighten. Under new leadership for both the national government and police department, the Philippines may embark on a journey of reconstruction and rehabilitation. In this process, the hope is to finally shed light on the issue of police violence in the country, implement fruitful solutions to combat the problem and advocate for innocent victims who might have felt invisible in their battle against police brutality. Once the light has been restored, the Philippines can finally live up to its billing as the beautiful and pure “Pearl of the Orient Seas”.

Laurinne Jamie Eugenio

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10 Solutions to Stop Corruption in the Philippines

June 16, 2014 By Victorino Q. Abrugar 11 Comments

“Don’t let a person who has dirty hands handle your country, your life, and the future of your children.”

Perhaps it’s impossible to stop corruption in the Philippines. But we need to use a strong word like STOP to protect the public funds from our dishonest and selfish government officials. Of course there’s still a number of leaders in our nation who are honest and conscientious. But with the reality that our country is facing right now, I doubt if that number is big.

Corruption is a persistent cancer that’s killing our country and destroying the lives of many Filipinos. It’s like a contagious disease that infects and transforms the young generation of leaders from righteous ones into wrongdoers. If this disease persists any longer, our present and future will be in big trouble. So without further ado, I’m sharing the following 10 solutions to fight corruption in our native soil.

1. Punish the vote sellers and vote brokers Corrupt voters give birth to corrupt politicians. In order to stop corruption, we have to start eliminating it at its birth, that is, during elections.

Most of us are aware that vote buying is illegal. But actually, vote selling is also prohibited by the law. According to Section 261 (a), Article 22 of the Omnibus Election Code, both vote buying and vote selling are prohibited and punishable. In other words, it’s not only the candidates, their supporters, or the vote buyers who can be found guilty of an election offense, but the voters or vote sellers can also be punished according to the code.

I know it seems impossible to arrest all vote sellers and put them in jail for committing an election offense. There’s no prison that can accommodate all the Filipinos who sell their votes during elections. Just imagine how many are they? It could be a large percentage of the Philippine population!

But I believe many of those who sell their votes are not aware of the law. So to decrease the number of vote sellers in the Philippines, the COMELEC and other concerned agencies should do their best to educate and warn all voters across the country. Informing people through the Internet and social media isn’t enough since 2/3 of our population don’t have a good access to the Internet yet. Our government have to increase efforts to reach, educate and warn voters in the rural areas.

Vote selling may be difficult to prove and vote sellers may not be punished in jail, but if they’ll become aware that their acts are against the law, they might just be punished by their own conscience.

Moreover, vote selling and vote buying in the Philippines become a great problem because they are usually organized from the national to the barangay level. Hence, it would be a better solution if the government can obliterate these organizations or vote brokers (whether they are inside or outside the government), who manage the wide corruption of votes in the Philippines.

2. Annual assessment of all public officials by the BIR Majority of politicians in the Philippines are rich and generating income from businesses. Even the poorest mayor in Metro Manila has a net worth of P3.31 million . Therefore, the BIR should not only focus on examining small business owners and professionals, but should also concentrate on investigating the politicians and the companies that are fully or partially owned by them.

The government should not only require public officials to submit their financial statements or statements of assets and liabilities, but they should also assess or audit these public officials annually and make their statements available to the public. This way, the public will know how they are earning income and increasing their net worth, whether it’s coming from their salary or from their business.

Public officials should be a role model of public trust. They desire to be in a public office. Hence, they should not complain if they will be required to undergo annual tax examination.

3. A more effective and efficient tax system . Solution #2 won’t be effective if our tax system will not be improved. To effectively and efficiently collect taxes from taxpayers, especially from politicians, we have to upgrade our tax system, make registrations/tax declarations/payments online, and eliminate unnecessary regulations that only make our system more complicated. The BIR should not only invest in human resources, but also on technology like what Singapore and other countries that have a more efficient tax system are doing.

Creating a better tax system is a job that must be initiated by our congressmen and senators – the lawmakers. Thus, they have to consult not only with the BIR, Department of Finance and DTI, but also with various independent tax experts, the business sector, and other taxpayers who are affected by our tax system.

4. Regular surprise examination of all government offices The Civil Service Commission is the agency mandated to promote and administer efficient and effective personnel in the government. They should see to it that the Anti-Red Tape Law or RA 9485 is well enforced in all government offices.

Government employees can also commit corruption. If they don’t do their job to serve the public well or if they don’t work for the hours the government is paying them, that’s already a form of corruption. Thus, the CSC should ensure that all government personnel are doing their job well and complying with the Anti-red tape law and other applicable laws in our country. They should obey the no noon breaks policy, should work beyond 5pm when necessary, and should not commit fixing or connive with fixers.

But when is the last time that the CSC conducted surprise examination to check if the Anti-Red tape law is obeyed by government agencies? They should do it more frequently. Installing CCTVs on all government and public offices can also be a better solution.

5. Timely governmental audit by COA or by an Independent auditing firm The Commission on Audit is the government agency responsible for examining, preventing and reporting frauds happening in the government. But are they doing their job efficiently? Scams are already uncovered and reported to the public after 3 years or more. Just consider the current Pork Barrel scam.

As an accountant, I know that timeliness is key to relevance. If frauds are reported late, it’s already difficult to recover the funds misappropriated by the culprits. Corruption in the government should be detected earlier, not after 3 years or 5 years. If COA cannot be efficient, then why not we consider hiring independent auditing firms to examine the financial statements and transactions of our government bodies?

6. Strict regulation of all corporations in the Philippines The Securities and Exchange Commission or SEC is the commission that is responsible for regulating all corporations and partnerships, including foundations in the Philippines. But look at what happened to the foundations involved in the Pork Barrel scam? Think of how Janet Napoles use those foundations to hide all her illegal transactions. To avoid this kind of scam from happening again, the SEC should set stricter rules for regulating all corporations, especially foundations in the country. They should ensure that all the members and board of trustees of any foundation are real and in good faith.

7. Strict implementation of the FOI bill The Senate, under Senate Bill No. 1733, has already passed the Freedom of Information Bill . Once enacted, the FOI bill will require government officials to act or comply with the request for information within 15 working days. It will grant citizens the right to access records or information under the control of the government, with some exceptions.

The FOI Bill is a good solution to fight corruption in the Philippines. So let’s hope that it will be enacted as a law soonest. But though it will be a good solution, its success will still depend on its implementation. Thus, the government should do its best to make sure that the law will have a clear implementing rules and regulations, and that it will be enforced effectively as intended.

8. Improved integrity in our justice system We have existing good laws in the Philippines. The problem is the low integrity of our justice system. Our laws, themselves, suffer from injustice because they aren’t respected and protected by the authorities that should be protecting them in the first place. Corrupt politicians and government officials are not usually sent to jail.

To improve the integrity of our justice system, there should be a collaboration among the DOJ, Office of the Ombudsman, PNP, NBI, courts, and the civil society to uphold justice in our country. There should also be a more effective witness protection program to make sure that all witnesses or whistle blowers, including their families will be safe and protected. Moreover, they should be rewarded and well-compensated to support their family while they are under a witness protection.

9. Continuing professional education requirements for politicians Being a politician or a public official is one of the greatest profession in the world. It requires a lot of leadership skills and knowledge in law, economy, ethics, humanity and others. To make sure our government officials, senators, congressmen, mayors, governors, et cetera are currently capable in doing their respective job, they should be required to have a minimum credit units of continuing professional education every year. If they can’t comply, then they should be fired out from their positions.

Another solution is to implement a quota requirement for all legislators in our country. Senators and congressmen, as their main job is to create laws, should maintain a certain number of laws proposed or passed every year as a quota. Pork barrel should definitely be abolished so that they can only concentrate in enacting useful laws that can make our country progress and make the lives of the Filipinos better.

10. Reduce the number of government officials If all else fails then the last solution to reduce corruption in the Philippines is simply to reduce the number of government officials in our country. We have so many lawmakers. We have around 292 congressmen, including party-list representatives . If our house of congress cannot produce a good number of useful laws, then why not consider decreasing the congressional seats to limit only to capable representatives?

We also have a lot of barangay officials across the nation, whom can only be used as brokers of vote selling and buying during national elections. Although barangay officials can be helpful, as there are actually honest officials in this level, we have to consider whether barangay elections can be beneficial in the national level.

Which of the above do you think is the best solution to fight corruption in our country? Do you have any other solution to share with us to stop or at least weaken corruption in the Philippines? Don’t hesitate to share your comments below.

About Victorino Q. Abrugar

Vic promotes tourism-related businesses, brands and places. He's the marketing strategist of FAQ.PH. He believes that the key to success is to always do what to do next. Want to promote your business? Contact him at [email protected].

September 4, 2014 at 4:51 pm

Hello Sir Vic, I worked and live in Hongkong for 15years, from 1991-2006 – I remember shoplifting a $1. Hongkong dollar pen, is lifetime criminal record. (One example, is the son of the CEO of HangSeng Bank, he steal one CD from a Retail Shop, it made a big issue or headlines in all news media – i forgot what year is that) In the Pinas, Government Officials Billion Dollars Corruption, Scam, Annomalies, Over Pricing Project, they still living like a King. Mayabang pa na nakanakaw sila sa budget nang Government , it must be a Criminal Record and no more position in any Government Offices or Agency. I will contribute to finance an Ads that say don’t Elect Candidates that engage in Vote Buying and giving MILLION PESOS PADULAS TO COMELEC OFFICIAL. In the Comelec offices, only assign media people and public School teachers work as temporary workers with pay as Comelec officials and watchers. No Election – No Comelec, gov’t can save money.

September 4, 2014 at 5:26 pm

Hi Sir Felix. Thank you for sharing your story and insights. Indeed we have to make our next elections, particularly the 2016 elections way better, cleaner and faster.

September 4, 2014 at 5:53 pm

In Canada, to save voters from their precious working hours. Any qualified and or valid voters, can vote any day of the month before the election day, by personally going to polling stations or by online voting. No need voters ID, show your Canada Passport or Certificate of Citizenship ID to qualify – they will sign up for you, they can scan your document too., fast and easy (Passport, Social Insurance Number and Citizenship ID are the same Number for ever, Bar Codes readable documents (only with expiration date.) Only two persons setting in their computers in the polling station except at week-end (and they are urging people to join in voting process because its very low turn-out, they are very busy, they said) No watchers, No Comelec officials, no security, no police, no candidate supporters, very quite, and no other person can intervene in the polling station. All computers are hooked up on-line to Comelec main data base. Polling station are open at weekends to let people vote on their free time (not on their working hours) Manipulating and /or intervening in the Election Process is Criminal Offence.( Bisan kami naboto kami gihap dito, So kahit nasa Leyte ako makaboto pa rin ako on-line, minsan Pumunta ako sa office nang Congressman or Member of Parliament walang tao sa office nila except one secretary and ako lang, pero Filipino pa rin kami. there is no place like home.) Can we do this in PINAS? intervening and Manipulating Election Process is a Criminal Offences?

October 7, 2014 at 1:21 pm

Thanks for sharing. But I think these solutions still largely depend on the current government who has the power to implement them. I’m just an ordinary student. What can I do? Can you also do a write up about this? The issue of corruption in this country is overwhelming. 🙁

October 8, 2014 at 2:58 am

Hi Michelle. Thanks for sharing your thoughts and sentiment. It would be interesting to write about what the youth can do to fight corruption in the Philippines. We will try to write a post about it. We are also open for contribution of articles from our readers.

October 10, 2014 at 10:38 am

ThEy are all good solutions and brilliant ideas but what can we do to implement it to our hard hearted people? What will it take so that all solutions will be made? I am not being negative but minsan kasi we are only good to make suggestions pero wala pa rin nangyayari.:(

November 11, 2015 at 2:32 pm

you sir or madam are right but we need to start small like a barangay for example then we graduall increase the fight against corruption to another level

November 14, 2014 at 12:19 am

Those are great suggestions for the solutions to stop the corruption in the Filipino people, but remember the very people who will institute such measures are already a part of the corruptible society. The solution is the Odang0’s Doctrine. A 25 year plan…

December 22, 2014 at 10:02 am

Do you have any suggestions for what a foreigner can do in their own way when living here? Since I don’t think I’ll ever have the chance to vote in this country. I will never accept a bribe/fix situation, and will make a loud noise about it if anyone offers.

March 30, 2016 at 5:50 am

Maayong buntag Sir Vic, First of all i want to say that in 2010 I did not just fell in love with a wonderful Pinay, i also fell in love with the beautiful country and it s people. So i ask her Father for permission to marry her and we got married march 18, 2014 in Hong Kong. Unfortunately my beloved wife passed away september 6, 2014 and the terror of corruption started with my father in law, when my wife died, i was working in germany. My father in law gave wrong information to the doctor, telling him she was single in order to become the sole legal heir because we got a conjugal bankaccount in Iligan City. Now i am trying to get a corrected death certificate to withdraw the money. i spent already a lot of money to the nso in manila to get our marriage registered to proof that I am the sole legal heir, now the lawyer in charge at the nso branch in Iligan is asking more and more papersand for every paper to sign he ask between 5000 to 7500 piso…and of course he dont give a reciept…now i m bankrupt for i am not rich and i cant get the corrected death cert to change my marital status and withdraw the money…please, is there anyone who could give me a good advice how to stop that vulture to rob me?

May 11, 2016 at 6:48 pm

One of the most effective way of reducing corruption is payment thru online transaction. kasi wla nang red tape dyan. then identified corrupt agencies must be overhauled completely. GSIS ,SSS,Custom, BIR, DA,NFA, DOTC and others while waiting for FEDERAL govt to operate our country

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Please note you do not have access to teaching notes, police corruption and its control in the philippines.

Asian Education and Development Studies

ISSN : 2046-3162

Article publication date: 26 November 2019

Issue publication date: 31 March 2020

The purpose of this paper is to analyse police corruption in the Philippines and to assess measures to control it.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper identifies the causes of police corruption and assesses anti-corruption measures adopted by the Philippine National Police and other agencies. The paper utilizes surveys, interviews, reported cases and official documents to determine the extent of police corruption, identify its causes and assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures.

Police corruption is systemic in the Philippines. Political and economic circumstances, both historical and contemporary, combined with weak internal controls and other inadequate anti-corruption measures perpetuate systemic police corruption.

Originality/value

The paper contributes to the academic literature on police corruption in the Philippines. It would be of interest to policymakers, scholars, as well as anti-corruption and development practitioners who are involved in institutional and governance reforms.

• Organizational culture
• Office of the Ombudsman
• Police corruption
• Philippine National Police

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Kevin Agojo, Yegor Barroquillo, Carlo Manongsong, Karl Deximo and Michelle Sta. Romana for their research assistance.

Batalla, E.V.C. (2020), "Police corruption and its control in the Philippines", Asian Education and Development Studies , Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 157-168. https://doi.org/10.1108/AEDS-05-2018-0099

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Copyright © 2019, Emerald Publishing Limited

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[ANALYSIS] The Philippine National Police’s efforts to cure the PNP

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This is AI generated summarization, which may have errors. For context, always refer to the full article.

Guia Abogado/Rappler

There is recent news of a Senate bill ( SB 2449 ) authored by Senator Bato de la Rosa and three others (Revilla, Ejercito and Zubiri), seeking to introduce “organizational reforms” to the Philippine National Police (PNP). The senators have ignored the crying need for  institutional  reform – to reduce drastically the endemic corruption, and “investigative shortcuts” taken: torture/physical abuse , planting of evidence and extrajudicial killings (EJKs), among others.  

Introducing organizational reforms when institutional reform is needed is like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic when it was sinking.  

Besides, my unimpeachable source opines that SB 2449’s main purpose is merely to accommodate the burgeoning number of generals in the PNP who are currently seeking command positions. You will agree with me, Reader, when I say that the authors are not exactly the brightest bulbs in the Senate.

Then there is the news that 47 Philippine National Police (PNP) Brigadiers General, 7 Majors General and 1 Lieutenant General (55 in all), recently took their oath before President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. At least, the President talked to them about “zero tolerance for corruption and human rights abuses” in the PNP. He could have given more specific suggestions on how to achieve that (there’s been a plan since 2005), but at this point, I’ll take it.   

It is not as if the PNP hasn’t tried to cure itself. But the attempts come in ebbs and flows, depending on the quality of the PNP leadership, as well as its ability to withstand political interference (to put it bluntly, not to have such brown noses). 

Let us give credit where credit is due. 

For example, the PNP has claimed, as of the end of 2022, that  100% of its responses to calls for assistance are done within 15 minutes  (this was in the Commission on Audit report). It had hit its target. Whether that target response time is too long or just right, I do not know. And whether that 100% is correct, I should like to hear from Filipinos who have called for PNP help. But that is the claim, and unless proven otherwise, I will take it at face value.  

Then, there is a more recent achievement. The PNP’s Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management (DIDM) recently announced that all (100%) of its 7,264 investigators occupying investigative positions have finally all been formally trained. 

You may wonder, Reader, why this should deserve credit.  

In the first place, before one becomes an investigator, you may ask, shouldn’t one have been properly trained? Well, apparently not in an institution like the PNP (which shows how deep their problem runs). Because when now retired Police Deputy Director General (PDDG) Arturo Cacdac, Jr. took over the directorate in 2010 (yes, 2010), one of the first things he learned was that  only one in four personnel occupying investigative positions all over the country had formal training in investigation – 5,409 out of the 7,264 (74.46%) were clueless.

It took him all of 13 years to correct that situation, but the day before he retired, it was accomplished. He did it. Now, Filipinos can rest assured that police investigators know what they are doing, or at least have received formal training.  

After Jemboy Baltazar’s death, CHR chair says whole PNP should be retrained

Now, about the quality of the PNP leadership. Again, we have examples. In 2004, Transparency International’s “Global Corruption Barometer” wrote that based on their surveys in the country,  the PNP was identified as the most corrupt national institution in the Philippines.  This 2004 report covered the year 2003. Who was the chief PNP then? General Hermogenes Ebdane, who was PNP chief from July 2002 to August 2004. So, on this basis, one can say that he is the example of poor leadership. Moreover, it must be noted that one of the demands of the Oakwood rebels (mostly from PMA) in July 2003 was the resignation of Ebdane as chief PNP. Of course, the Oakwood mutiny failed , but for them to demand Ebdane’s resignation, who is himself an alumnus of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), must say something about what was going on in the PNP at the time.  

Ebdane’s successor Edgar Aglipay acknowledged publicly the weaknesses of the PNP, and took steps to improve PMA’s image and, to some extent, its substance:  

• A campaign against the “kotong” operations of police – solicitation of petty bribes for minor traffic offenses;
•  a campaign to get officers back in proper uniform, properly groomed; deployment of police in their three basic functions of patrolling, traffic management and investigation;
• Even Camp Crame (police headquarters) was cleaned and landscaped. And he created two disciplinary barracks – one in Subic, one in Camp Molintas, Benguet for retraining errant personnel, which survive up to today. 

Aglipay’s performance was evocative of Ping Lacson who served in 2000 (anti-kotong, police had to have at worst a 34-inch waist), but it was very visible to the public eye that something was being done.  And when he left, eight months later, he presented an anti-corruption plan to President Arroyo, describing the endemic corruption – from recruitment to retirement – in the PNP and what to do about it.  Whether it was followed or not, I have no idea.

Interestingly, Ebdane, despite his obviously poor performance in the PNP, was greatly rewarded after he left. Then-President Gloria Arroyo made him national security adviser immediately upon his retirement, then appointed him to her Cabinet as secretary of Public Works and Highways where he served for four and a half years (taking off for a while to be secretary of National Defense). 

This suggests that in the Philippines (at least, at that time), performance as a public official is immaterial, even to the extent that your younger colleagues in the military abjure you. It is political clout – who you know, rather than what you know – that determines your fate.  

But back to corruption and poor management in the PNP. It ebbs and it flows, with more flowing than ebbing. 

One of the great scandals of PNP corruption, subject to Senate investigations in 2006, was the “Recruitment-for-a-fee-scam”, wherein people who were not qualified – flunked the admissions test, or failed the neuropsychiatric exam, or had a criminal record – had only to pay the required bribe, and the impediments would disappear; or even qualified recruits were subject to extortions. Just as bad, if not worse, there were recruits who were admitted because of their influential political backers.  

Can you imagine the impact of that scam on the fresh PNP recruits? In effect, the message is that corruption is the way of life in the PNP, and it starts at recruitment.  

This problem was finally solved (but not fully) in 2016 when General Oscar Albayalde was head of the National Capital Region (NCR). Each applicant was given a bar code so that when he took exams or underwent any procedure, his ID was that barcode. No names. It made it infinitely more difficult to tamper with exam results or other records. The system has since been adopted by the entire PNP all over the country. Note that it took ten years to solve. 

General Albayalde, as NCR and later chief PNP, was one of those that caused the problems of the organization to ebb, rather than to flow. He was well known for his midnight-to-dawn visits to police precincts to keep them on their toes. And he suspended the whole Caloocan police force (all 1100 ) when Kian Lloyd de Los Santos was killed , subjecting them to 45 days of disciplinary action and retraining. Unfortunately – and this is another problem of the PNP – factions with political backing were interested in getting him out, either because he was too efficient or incorrupt. Charges were leveled against him, forcing his resignation. Those charges were later dropped, or dismissed. We lost a good man. 

But you may ask, Reader, why were recruits willing or able to pay anywhere from P50,000 to over P200,000, just to get admitted to the PNP? We will discuss that sometime in the future. – Rappler.com

Solita “Winnie” Monsod was the first National Economic and Development Authority secretary appointed after the fall of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986. She is a professor emerita at the UP School of Economics where she taught starting 1983. She finished her degree in economics in UP and obtained her masters in economics at the University of Pennsylvania. She is a board director of Rappler Inc.

[ANALYSIS] The PNP, through the eyes of the PNP

Please abide by Rappler's commenting guidelines .

Prof. Winnie Monsod is very correct in asking: “Why were recruits willing or able to pay anywhere from P50,000 to over P200,000, just to get admitted to the PNP? This is similar to the issue in the MBHTE-BARMM about a P300,000 payment for a teaching position. And who knows how much will one pay for a cabinet position? Are we living in a Country ruled by the Lords of Corruption?

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