gender and sexuality identity essay

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Sexuality vs. Gender: What's the Difference?

While often conflated, they're not the same thing—let's clear up the confusion

Cynthia Vinney, PhD is an expert in media psychology and a published scholar whose work has been published in peer-reviewed psychology journals.

Dr. Monica Johnson is a clinical psychologist and owner of Kind Mind Psychology, a private practice in NYC specializing in evidence-based approaches to treating a wide range of mental health issues (e.g., depression, anxiety, trauma, and personality disorders). Additionally, she works with marginalized groups of people, including BIPOC, LGBTQ+, and alternative lifestyles, to manage minority stress.

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Sexuality and gender are often assumed to be related concepts, but they are actually separate and distinct. Understanding the difference between sexuality vs. gender is important because, while both are important parts of an individual's sense of self, if you don't know what each one is, you may make incorrect assumptions.

For example, some people may assume that someone who is transgender is gay. But a transgender person's gender identity and sexual orientation aren't connected.

At a Glance

To better understand the differences between sexuality vs. gender, it's important to start by defining gender identity. Becoming more informed about these differences and the way that different identities can intersect can help you understand the impact of discrimination against gender-diverse and sexual minority individuals and the factors that can help mediate the negative effects of stigma and prejudice.

Understanding Sexuality vs. Gender

To understand the difference between sexuality vs. gender, it's helpful to know what each term means.

• Gender is socially constructed and one's innermost concept of themselves as a man, woman, and/or nonbinary person. People define their gender identity in a variety of deeply personal ways that can include man or woman but can also extend to identities such as agender, genderfluid , gender nonconforming , and a variety of others .
• Sexuality  refers to who a person is attracted to and can include a plethora of orientations. While being gay, heterosexual, and bisexual are perhaps the most well-known sexual orientations, there are  many others , such as  asexual and pansexual .

While the terms are often conflated, recognizing the differences between sexuality and gender is important. Sexuality and gender are essential aspects of a person's identity and play a part in shaping a person's experiences throughout life.  

What Is Gender and Gender Identity?

The American Psychological Association (APA) defines gender identity as "a person’s deeply felt, inherent sense of being a boy, a man, or male; a girl, a woman, or female; or an alternative gender, which may or may not correspond to a person’s sex assigned at birth."

Gender identity is personal and an inherent part of an individual's sense of self. While gender is often presented as a binary that only includes men and women, in reality, gender is a spectrum. People can define their gender in a variety of waysinc! This includes a combination of woman and man, a completely separate gender, or no gender at all.

The four types of gender applied to living and nonliving things are masculine, feminine, neuter, and common.

Gender Identity vs. Gender Expression

Gender identity is internal and may not always be obvious to the outside world. That's because gender expression —the way one presents themselves through their external appearance and behavior with things like clothes, hairstyles, voice, and body language—may or may not conform to their gender identity.

Gender Identity vs. Sex

The terms sex and gender are often used interchangeably, and people often assume that the sex one is assigned at birth dictates the gender one is. In reality, though, gender identity and sex refer to different things.

While gender identity refers to how one defines themselves, sex is biological and dictated by one's anatomy, hormones, and chromosomes.

Just like gender identity, sex is a continuum that isn't limited to male or female, as people can also be born intersex , meaning their bodies aren't biologically male or female.

What Is Sexuality?

Sexuality is another word for sexual orientation. The APA defines sexual orientation as "a component of identity that includes a person's sexual or emotional attraction to another person and the behavior that may result from this attraction.

Sexual vs. Romantic Attraction

It's important to recognize that sexual and emotional attraction may not always match for asexual and aromantic people. Someone may be sexually attracted to one gender but experience no romantic attraction, whereas they may be romantically attracted to another gender but not want to engage in sexual acts.

Sexual Fluidity

Sexual orientation can change at any point during one's lifetime, which is known as sexual fluidity . In particular, as people age and get to know themselves and their preferences better. This often gives them the opportunity to learn more about themselves and who they are attracted to, leading to the evolution of their sexuality. In fact, for some people, sexuality is fluid throughout their lives.

Effects of Sexuality and Gender Discrimination

Unfortunately, transgender people or those whose sexual orientation is something other than heterosexual often encounter discrimination and prejudice . In the past few decades, both gender identity and sexual orientation have become political flashpoints.

Social and Political Effects

A case revolving around whether people who were not heterosexual had the right to marry went all the way to the Supreme Court, and the judges' ruling led to marriage equality. Many states have passed or are debating laws about issues involving transgender people, such as whether to prevent transgender men and women from using the bathroom that matches their gender identity.

The fact that issues surrounding the rights of gender-diverse and sexual minority people are up for debate contributes to a climate where discrimination is still common against anyone who isn't straight and cisgender . Research shows gender diverse and sexual minority individuals suffer from physical and psychological abuse, bullying, and persecution in a variety of contexts, including school, the workplace, and health care.

People can become preoccupied with an individual's gender expression or sexual orientation if it doesn't conform to social norms, and they may make their lack of support clear by doing things like using incorrect pronouns to refer to the individual.

In fact, a 2019 report of the experiences of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer ( LGBTQ ) youth in American schools, found that over half of LGBTQ+ students were verbally harassed and that over one-fifth were physically harassed due to their sexual orientation or gender expression.

Mental Health Effects

This kind of prejudice and discrimination puts gender-diverse and sexual minority individuals at an increased risk of mental health issues, including depression, anxiety, substance abuse, and suicide. On the other hand, an individual's journey to determining their sexuality or gender identity is personal. Suppressing one's true gender or sexual identity can lead to mental health issues as well.

Discrimination continues to be a serious problem for people with diverse identities, but there are things that can help. Studies have shown that the mental distress triggered by discrimination can be mediated by:

• Social and familial support
• Contact with other sexual minorities or others who are gender diverse
• Expectations of acceptance

Taking steps to combat discrimination based on sexuality and gender can be beneficial. LGBTQ students in schools with gay-straight alliances, LGBTQ-inclusive curriculums, and supportive educators felt safer and experienced a greater sense of belonging at school.

Both gender identity and sexual orientation are important to parts of a person's overall identity. But it's important to recognize they are not the same thing and knowing the differences between sexuality vs. gender is critical.

In each case, social constructs surrounding sexuality and gender continue to result in prejudices that negatively impact gender-diverse and sexual minority individuals. This may be one reason why many people continue to conflate these constructs.

People must recognize that for individuals, sexuality and gender are not inherently linked. Never make assumptions about a person's sexual orientation based on gender or vice versa. Instead, people need to feel free to explore and define their gender identity and sexual orientation in the way that feels best to them. In doing so, they can be the truest version of themselves.

American Psychological Association Divisions 16 and 44.  Key Terms And Concepts In Understanding Gender Diversity And Sexual Orientation Among Students . 2015.

Human Rights Campaign. Glossary of Terms .

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine; Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education; Committee on National Statistics; Committee on Measuring Sex, Gender Identity, and Sexual Orientation. Measuring Sex, Gender Identity, and Sexual Orientation . (Becker T, Chin M, Bates N, eds.). National Academies Press (US); 2022.

Morris BJ. History of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender social movements . American Psychological Association.

Adams C. The difference between sexual orientation and gender identity . CBS News. 2017.

GLSEN. The 2019 National School Climate Survey: The Experiences of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Youth in Our Nation's School: Executive Summary . 2020.

Moleiro C, Pinto N. Sexual orientation and gender identity: Review of concepts, controversies and their relation to psychopathology classification systems .  Front Psychol . 2015;6. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01511

By Cynthia Vinney, PhD Cynthia Vinney, PhD is an expert in media psychology and a published scholar whose work has been published in peer-reviewed psychology journals.

Understanding Gender, Sex, and Gender Identity

It's more important than ever to use this terminology correctly..

Posted February 27, 2021 | Reviewed by Kaja Perina

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Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene hung a sign outside her Capitol office door that said “There are TWO genders: MALE & FEMALE. ‘Trust the Science!’” There are many reasons to question hanging such a sign, but given that Rep. Taylor Greene invoked science in making her assertion, I thought it might be helpful to clarify by citing some actual science. Put simply, from a scientific standpoint, Rep. Taylor Greene’s statement is patently wrong. It perpetuates a common error by conflating gender with sex . Allow me to explain how psychologists scientifically operationalize these terms.

According to the American Psychological Association (APA, 2012), sex is rooted in biology. A person’s sex is determined using observable biological criteria such as sex chromosomes, gonads, internal reproductive organs, and external genitalia (APA, 2012). Most people are classified as being either biologically male or female, although the term intersex is reserved for those with atypical combinations of biological features (APA, 2012).

Gender is related to but distinctly different from sex; it is rooted in culture, not biology. The APA (2012) defines gender as “the attitudes, feelings, and behaviors that a given culture associates with a person’s biological sex” (p. 11). Gender conformity occurs when people abide by culturally-derived gender roles (APA, 2012). Resisting gender roles (i.e., gender nonconformity ) can have significant social consequences—pro and con, depending on circumstances.

Gender identity refers to how one understands and experiences one’s own gender. It involves a person’s psychological sense of being male, female, or neither (APA, 2012). Those who identify as transgender feel that their gender identity doesn’t match their biological sex or the gender they were assigned at birth; in some cases they don’t feel they fit into into either the male or female gender categories (APA, 2012; Moleiro & Pinto, 2015). How people live out their gender identities in everyday life (in terms of how they dress, behave, and express themselves) constitutes their gender expression (APA, 2012; Drescher, 2014).

“Male” and “female” are the most common gender identities in Western culture; they form a dualistic way of thinking about gender that often informs the identity options that people feel are available to them (Prentice & Carranza, 2002). Anyone, regardless of biological sex, can closely adhere to culturally-constructed notions of “maleness” or “femaleness” by dressing, talking, and taking interest in activities stereotypically associated with traditional male or female gender identities. However, many people think “outside the box” when it comes to gender, constructing identities for themselves that move beyond the male-female binary. For examples, explore lists of famous “gender benders” from Oxygen , Vogue , More , and The Cut (not to mention Mr. and Mrs. Potato Head , whose evolving gender identities made headlines this week).

Whether society approves of these identities or not, the science on whether there are more than two genders is clear; there are as many possible gender identities as there are people psychologically forming identities. Rep. Taylor Greene’s insistence that there are just two genders merely reflects Western culture’s longstanding tradition of only recognizing “male” and “female” gender identities as “normal.” However, if we are to “trust the science” (as Rep. Taylor Greene’s recommends), then the first thing we need to do is stop mixing up biological sex and gender identity. The former may be constrained by biology, but the latter is only constrained by our imaginations.

American Psychological Association. (2012). Guidelines for psychological practice with lesbian, gay, and bisexual clients. American Psychologist , 67 (1), 10-42. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0024659

Drescher, J. (2014). Treatment of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender patients. In R. E. Hales, S. C. Yudofsky, & L. W. Roberts (Eds.), The American Psychiatric Publishing textbook of psychiatry (6th ed., pp. 1293-1318). American Psychiatric Publishing.

Moleiro, C., & Pinto, N. (2015). Sexual orientation and gender identity: Review of concepts, controversies and their relation to psychopathology classification systems. Frontiers in Psychology , 6 .

Prentice, D. A., & Carranza, E. (2002). What women should be, shouldn't be, are allowed to be, and don't have to be: The contents of prescriptive gender stereotypes. Psychology of Women Quarterly , 26 (4), 269-281. https://doi.org/10.1111/1471-6402.t01-1-00066

Jonathan D. Raskin, Ph.D. , is a professor of psychology and counselor education at the State University of New York at New Paltz.

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Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender

Feminism is said to be the movement to end women’s oppression (hooks 2000, 26). One possible way to understand ‘woman’ in this claim is to take it as a sex term: ‘woman’ picks out human females and being a human female depends on various biological and anatomical features (like genitalia). Historically many feminists have understood ‘woman’ differently: not as a sex term, but as a gender term that depends on social and cultural factors (like social position). In so doing, they distinguished sex (being female or male) from gender (being a woman or a man), although most ordinary language users appear to treat the two interchangeably. In feminist philosophy, this distinction has generated a lively debate. Central questions include: What does it mean for gender to be distinct from sex, if anything at all? How should we understand the claim that gender depends on social and/or cultural factors? What does it mean to be gendered woman, man, or genderqueer? This entry outlines and discusses distinctly feminist debates on sex and gender considering both historical and more contemporary positions.

1.1 Biological determinism

1.2 gender terminology, 2.1 gender socialisation, 2.2 gender as feminine and masculine personality, 2.3 gender as feminine and masculine sexuality, 3.1.1 particularity argument, 3.1.2 normativity argument, 3.2 is sex classification solely a matter of biology, 3.3 are sex and gender distinct, 3.4 is the sex/gender distinction useful, 4.1.1 gendered social series, 4.1.2 resemblance nominalism, 4.2.1 social subordination and gender, 4.2.2 gender uniessentialism, 4.2.3 gender as positionality, 5. beyond the binary, 6. conclusion, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the sex/gender distinction..

The terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ mean different things to different feminist theorists and neither are easy or straightforward to characterise. Sketching out some feminist history of the terms provides a helpful starting point.

Most people ordinarily seem to think that sex and gender are coextensive: women are human females, men are human males. Many feminists have historically disagreed and have endorsed the sex/ gender distinction. Provisionally: ‘sex’ denotes human females and males depending on biological features (chromosomes, sex organs, hormones and other physical features); ‘gender’ denotes women and men depending on social factors (social role, position, behaviour or identity). The main feminist motivation for making this distinction was to counter biological determinism or the view that biology is destiny.

A typical example of a biological determinist view is that of Geddes and Thompson who, in 1889, argued that social, psychological and behavioural traits were caused by metabolic state. Women supposedly conserve energy (being ‘anabolic’) and this makes them passive, conservative, sluggish, stable and uninterested in politics. Men expend their surplus energy (being ‘katabolic’) and this makes them eager, energetic, passionate, variable and, thereby, interested in political and social matters. These biological ‘facts’ about metabolic states were used not only to explain behavioural differences between women and men but also to justify what our social and political arrangements ought to be. More specifically, they were used to argue for withholding from women political rights accorded to men because (according to Geddes and Thompson) “what was decided among the prehistoric Protozoa cannot be annulled by Act of Parliament” (quoted from Moi 1999, 18). It would be inappropriate to grant women political rights, as they are simply not suited to have those rights; it would also be futile since women (due to their biology) would simply not be interested in exercising their political rights. To counter this kind of biological determinism, feminists have argued that behavioural and psychological differences have social, rather than biological, causes. For instance, Simone de Beauvoir famously claimed that one is not born, but rather becomes a woman, and that “social discrimination produces in women moral and intellectual effects so profound that they appear to be caused by nature” (Beauvoir 1972 [original 1949], 18; for more, see the entry on Simone de Beauvoir ). Commonly observed behavioural traits associated with women and men, then, are not caused by anatomy or chromosomes. Rather, they are culturally learned or acquired.

Although biological determinism of the kind endorsed by Geddes and Thompson is nowadays uncommon, the idea that behavioural and psychological differences between women and men have biological causes has not disappeared. In the 1970s, sex differences were used to argue that women should not become airline pilots since they will be hormonally unstable once a month and, therefore, unable to perform their duties as well as men (Rogers 1999, 11). More recently, differences in male and female brains have been said to explain behavioural differences; in particular, the anatomy of corpus callosum, a bundle of nerves that connects the right and left cerebral hemispheres, is thought to be responsible for various psychological and behavioural differences. For instance, in 1992, a Time magazine article surveyed then prominent biological explanations of differences between women and men claiming that women’s thicker corpus callosums could explain what ‘women’s intuition’ is based on and impair women’s ability to perform some specialised visual-spatial skills, like reading maps (Gorman 1992). Anne Fausto-Sterling has questioned the idea that differences in corpus callosums cause behavioural and psychological differences. First, the corpus callosum is a highly variable piece of anatomy; as a result, generalisations about its size, shape and thickness that hold for women and men in general should be viewed with caution. Second, differences in adult human corpus callosums are not found in infants; this may suggest that physical brain differences actually develop as responses to differential treatment. Third, given that visual-spatial skills (like map reading) can be improved by practice, even if women and men’s corpus callosums differ, this does not make the resulting behavioural differences immutable. (Fausto-Sterling 2000b, chapter 5).

In order to distinguish biological differences from social/psychological ones and to talk about the latter, feminists appropriated the term ‘gender’. Psychologists writing on transsexuality were the first to employ gender terminology in this sense. Until the 1960s, ‘gender’ was often used to refer to masculine and feminine words, like le and la in French. However, in order to explain why some people felt that they were ‘trapped in the wrong bodies’, the psychologist Robert Stoller (1968) began using the terms ‘sex’ to pick out biological traits and ‘gender’ to pick out the amount of femininity and masculinity a person exhibited. Although (by and large) a person’s sex and gender complemented each other, separating out these terms seemed to make theoretical sense allowing Stoller to explain the phenomenon of transsexuality: transsexuals’ sex and gender simply don’t match.

Along with psychologists like Stoller, feminists found it useful to distinguish sex and gender. This enabled them to argue that many differences between women and men were socially produced and, therefore, changeable. Gayle Rubin (for instance) uses the phrase ‘sex/gender system’ in order to describe “a set of arrangements by which the biological raw material of human sex and procreation is shaped by human, social intervention” (1975, 165). Rubin employed this system to articulate that “part of social life which is the locus of the oppression of women” (1975, 159) describing gender as the “socially imposed division of the sexes” (1975, 179). Rubin’s thought was that although biological differences are fixed, gender differences are the oppressive results of social interventions that dictate how women and men should behave. Women are oppressed as women and “by having to be women” (Rubin 1975, 204). However, since gender is social, it is thought to be mutable and alterable by political and social reform that would ultimately bring an end to women’s subordination. Feminism should aim to create a “genderless (though not sexless) society, in which one’s sexual anatomy is irrelevant to who one is, what one does, and with whom one makes love” (Rubin 1975, 204).

In some earlier interpretations, like Rubin’s, sex and gender were thought to complement one another. The slogan ‘Gender is the social interpretation of sex’ captures this view. Nicholson calls this ‘the coat-rack view’ of gender: our sexed bodies are like coat racks and “provide the site upon which gender [is] constructed” (1994, 81). Gender conceived of as masculinity and femininity is superimposed upon the ‘coat-rack’ of sex as each society imposes on sexed bodies their cultural conceptions of how males and females should behave. This socially constructs gender differences – or the amount of femininity/masculinity of a person – upon our sexed bodies. That is, according to this interpretation, all humans are either male or female; their sex is fixed. But cultures interpret sexed bodies differently and project different norms on those bodies thereby creating feminine and masculine persons. Distinguishing sex and gender, however, also enables the two to come apart: they are separable in that one can be sexed male and yet be gendered a woman, or vice versa (Haslanger 2000b; Stoljar 1995).

So, this group of feminist arguments against biological determinism suggested that gender differences result from cultural practices and social expectations. Nowadays it is more common to denote this by saying that gender is socially constructed. This means that genders (women and men) and gendered traits (like being nurturing or ambitious) are the “intended or unintended product[s] of a social practice” (Haslanger 1995, 97). But which social practices construct gender, what social construction is and what being of a certain gender amounts to are major feminist controversies. There is no consensus on these issues. (See the entry on intersections between analytic and continental feminism for more on different ways to understand gender.)

2. Gender as socially constructed

One way to interpret Beauvoir’s claim that one is not born but rather becomes a woman is to take it as a claim about gender socialisation: females become women through a process whereby they acquire feminine traits and learn feminine behaviour. Masculinity and femininity are thought to be products of nurture or how individuals are brought up. They are causally constructed (Haslanger 1995, 98): social forces either have a causal role in bringing gendered individuals into existence or (to some substantial sense) shape the way we are qua women and men. And the mechanism of construction is social learning. For instance, Kate Millett takes gender differences to have “essentially cultural, rather than biological bases” that result from differential treatment (1971, 28–9). For her, gender is “the sum total of the parents’, the peers’, and the culture’s notions of what is appropriate to each gender by way of temperament, character, interests, status, worth, gesture, and expression” (Millett 1971, 31). Feminine and masculine gender-norms, however, are problematic in that gendered behaviour conveniently fits with and reinforces women’s subordination so that women are socialised into subordinate social roles: they learn to be passive, ignorant, docile, emotional helpmeets for men (Millett 1971, 26). However, since these roles are simply learned, we can create more equal societies by ‘unlearning’ social roles. That is, feminists should aim to diminish the influence of socialisation.

Social learning theorists hold that a huge array of different influences socialise us as women and men. This being the case, it is extremely difficult to counter gender socialisation. For instance, parents often unconsciously treat their female and male children differently. When parents have been asked to describe their 24- hour old infants, they have done so using gender-stereotypic language: boys are describes as strong, alert and coordinated and girls as tiny, soft and delicate. Parents’ treatment of their infants further reflects these descriptions whether they are aware of this or not (Renzetti & Curran 1992, 32). Some socialisation is more overt: children are often dressed in gender stereotypical clothes and colours (boys are dressed in blue, girls in pink) and parents tend to buy their children gender stereotypical toys. They also (intentionally or not) tend to reinforce certain ‘appropriate’ behaviours. While the precise form of gender socialization has changed since the onset of second-wave feminism, even today girls are discouraged from playing sports like football or from playing ‘rough and tumble’ games and are more likely than boys to be given dolls or cooking toys to play with; boys are told not to ‘cry like a baby’ and are more likely to be given masculine toys like trucks and guns (for more, see Kimmel 2000, 122–126). [ 1 ]

According to social learning theorists, children are also influenced by what they observe in the world around them. This, again, makes countering gender socialisation difficult. For one, children’s books have portrayed males and females in blatantly stereotypical ways: for instance, males as adventurers and leaders, and females as helpers and followers. One way to address gender stereotyping in children’s books has been to portray females in independent roles and males as non-aggressive and nurturing (Renzetti & Curran 1992, 35). Some publishers have attempted an alternative approach by making their characters, for instance, gender-neutral animals or genderless imaginary creatures (like TV’s Teletubbies). However, parents reading books with gender-neutral or genderless characters often undermine the publishers’ efforts by reading them to their children in ways that depict the characters as either feminine or masculine. According to Renzetti and Curran, parents labelled the overwhelming majority of gender-neutral characters masculine whereas those characters that fit feminine gender stereotypes (for instance, by being helpful and caring) were labelled feminine (1992, 35). Socialising influences like these are still thought to send implicit messages regarding how females and males should act and are expected to act shaping us into feminine and masculine persons.

Nancy Chodorow (1978; 1995) has criticised social learning theory as too simplistic to explain gender differences (see also Deaux & Major 1990; Gatens 1996). Instead, she holds that gender is a matter of having feminine and masculine personalities that develop in early infancy as responses to prevalent parenting practices. In particular, gendered personalities develop because women tend to be the primary caretakers of small children. Chodorow holds that because mothers (or other prominent females) tend to care for infants, infant male and female psychic development differs. Crudely put: the mother-daughter relationship differs from the mother-son relationship because mothers are more likely to identify with their daughters than their sons. This unconsciously prompts the mother to encourage her son to psychologically individuate himself from her thereby prompting him to develop well defined and rigid ego boundaries. However, the mother unconsciously discourages the daughter from individuating herself thereby prompting the daughter to develop flexible and blurry ego boundaries. Childhood gender socialisation further builds on and reinforces these unconsciously developed ego boundaries finally producing feminine and masculine persons (1995, 202–206). This perspective has its roots in Freudian psychoanalytic theory, although Chodorow’s approach differs in many ways from Freud’s.

Gendered personalities are supposedly manifested in common gender stereotypical behaviour. Take emotional dependency. Women are stereotypically more emotional and emotionally dependent upon others around them, supposedly finding it difficult to distinguish their own interests and wellbeing from the interests and wellbeing of their children and partners. This is said to be because of their blurry and (somewhat) confused ego boundaries: women find it hard to distinguish their own needs from the needs of those around them because they cannot sufficiently individuate themselves from those close to them. By contrast, men are stereotypically emotionally detached, preferring a career where dispassionate and distanced thinking are virtues. These traits are said to result from men’s well-defined ego boundaries that enable them to prioritise their own needs and interests sometimes at the expense of others’ needs and interests.

Chodorow thinks that these gender differences should and can be changed. Feminine and masculine personalities play a crucial role in women’s oppression since they make females overly attentive to the needs of others and males emotionally deficient. In order to correct the situation, both male and female parents should be equally involved in parenting (Chodorow 1995, 214). This would help in ensuring that children develop sufficiently individuated senses of selves without becoming overly detached, which in turn helps to eradicate common gender stereotypical behaviours.

Catharine MacKinnon develops her theory of gender as a theory of sexuality. Very roughly: the social meaning of sex (gender) is created by sexual objectification of women whereby women are viewed and treated as objects for satisfying men’s desires (MacKinnon 1989). Masculinity is defined as sexual dominance, femininity as sexual submissiveness: genders are “created through the eroticization of dominance and submission. The man/woman difference and the dominance/submission dynamic define each other. This is the social meaning of sex” (MacKinnon 1989, 113). For MacKinnon, gender is constitutively constructed : in defining genders (or masculinity and femininity) we must make reference to social factors (see Haslanger 1995, 98). In particular, we must make reference to the position one occupies in the sexualised dominance/submission dynamic: men occupy the sexually dominant position, women the sexually submissive one. As a result, genders are by definition hierarchical and this hierarchy is fundamentally tied to sexualised power relations. The notion of ‘gender equality’, then, does not make sense to MacKinnon. If sexuality ceased to be a manifestation of dominance, hierarchical genders (that are defined in terms of sexuality) would cease to exist.

So, gender difference for MacKinnon is not a matter of having a particular psychological orientation or behavioural pattern; rather, it is a function of sexuality that is hierarchal in patriarchal societies. This is not to say that men are naturally disposed to sexually objectify women or that women are naturally submissive. Instead, male and female sexualities are socially conditioned: men have been conditioned to find women’s subordination sexy and women have been conditioned to find a particular male version of female sexuality as erotic – one in which it is erotic to be sexually submissive. For MacKinnon, both female and male sexual desires are defined from a male point of view that is conditioned by pornography (MacKinnon 1989, chapter 7). Bluntly put: pornography portrays a false picture of ‘what women want’ suggesting that women in actual fact are and want to be submissive. This conditions men’s sexuality so that they view women’s submission as sexy. And male dominance enforces this male version of sexuality onto women, sometimes by force. MacKinnon’s thought is not that male dominance is a result of social learning (see 2.1.); rather, socialization is an expression of power. That is, socialized differences in masculine and feminine traits, behaviour, and roles are not responsible for power inequalities. Females and males (roughly put) are socialised differently because there are underlying power inequalities. As MacKinnon puts it, ‘dominance’ (power relations) is prior to ‘difference’ (traits, behaviour and roles) (see, MacKinnon 1989, chapter 12). MacKinnon, then, sees legal restrictions on pornography as paramount to ending women’s subordinate status that stems from their gender.

3. Problems with the sex/gender distinction

3.1 is gender uniform.

The positions outlined above share an underlying metaphysical perspective on gender: gender realism . [ 2 ] That is, women as a group are assumed to share some characteristic feature, experience, common condition or criterion that defines their gender and the possession of which makes some individuals women (as opposed to, say, men). All women are thought to differ from all men in this respect (or respects). For example, MacKinnon thought that being treated in sexually objectifying ways is the common condition that defines women’s gender and what women as women share. All women differ from all men in this respect. Further, pointing out females who are not sexually objectified does not provide a counterexample to MacKinnon’s view. Being sexually objectified is constitutive of being a woman; a female who escapes sexual objectification, then, would not count as a woman.

One may want to critique the three accounts outlined by rejecting the particular details of each account. (For instance, see Spelman [1988, chapter 4] for a critique of the details of Chodorow’s view.) A more thoroughgoing critique has been levelled at the general metaphysical perspective of gender realism that underlies these positions. It has come under sustained attack on two grounds: first, that it fails to take into account racial, cultural and class differences between women (particularity argument); second, that it posits a normative ideal of womanhood (normativity argument).

Elizabeth Spelman (1988) has influentially argued against gender realism with her particularity argument. Roughly: gender realists mistakenly assume that gender is constructed independently of race, class, ethnicity and nationality. If gender were separable from, for example, race and class in this manner, all women would experience womanhood in the same way. And this is clearly false. For instance, Harris (1993) and Stone (2007) criticise MacKinnon’s view, that sexual objectification is the common condition that defines women’s gender, for failing to take into account differences in women’s backgrounds that shape their sexuality. The history of racist oppression illustrates that during slavery black women were ‘hypersexualised’ and thought to be always sexually available whereas white women were thought to be pure and sexually virtuous. In fact, the rape of a black woman was thought to be impossible (Harris 1993). So, (the argument goes) sexual objectification cannot serve as the common condition for womanhood since it varies considerably depending on one’s race and class. [ 3 ]

For Spelman, the perspective of ‘white solipsism’ underlies gender realists’ mistake. They assumed that all women share some “golden nugget of womanness” (Spelman 1988, 159) and that the features constitutive of such a nugget are the same for all women regardless of their particular cultural backgrounds. Next, white Western middle-class feminists accounted for the shared features simply by reflecting on the cultural features that condition their gender as women thus supposing that “the womanness underneath the Black woman’s skin is a white woman’s, and deep down inside the Latina woman is an Anglo woman waiting to burst through an obscuring cultural shroud” (Spelman 1988, 13). In so doing, Spelman claims, white middle-class Western feminists passed off their particular view of gender as “a metaphysical truth” (1988, 180) thereby privileging some women while marginalising others. In failing to see the importance of race and class in gender construction, white middle-class Western feminists conflated “the condition of one group of women with the condition of all” (Spelman 1988, 3).

Betty Friedan’s (1963) well-known work is a case in point of white solipsism. [ 4 ] Friedan saw domesticity as the main vehicle of gender oppression and called upon women in general to find jobs outside the home. But she failed to realize that women from less privileged backgrounds, often poor and non-white, already worked outside the home to support their families. Friedan’s suggestion, then, was applicable only to a particular sub-group of women (white middle-class Western housewives). But it was mistakenly taken to apply to all women’s lives — a mistake that was generated by Friedan’s failure to take women’s racial and class differences into account (hooks 2000, 1–3).

Spelman further holds that since social conditioning creates femininity and societies (and sub-groups) that condition it differ from one another, femininity must be differently conditioned in different societies. For her, “females become not simply women but particular kinds of women” (Spelman 1988, 113): white working-class women, black middle-class women, poor Jewish women, wealthy aristocratic European women, and so on.

This line of thought has been extremely influential in feminist philosophy. For instance, Young holds that Spelman has definitively shown that gender realism is untenable (1997, 13). Mikkola (2006) argues that this isn’t so. The arguments Spelman makes do not undermine the idea that there is some characteristic feature, experience, common condition or criterion that defines women’s gender; they simply point out that some particular ways of cashing out what defines womanhood are misguided. So, although Spelman is right to reject those accounts that falsely take the feature that conditions white middle-class Western feminists’ gender to condition women’s gender in general, this leaves open the possibility that women qua women do share something that defines their gender. (See also Haslanger [2000a] for a discussion of why gender realism is not necessarily untenable, and Stoljar [2011] for a discussion of Mikkola’s critique of Spelman.)

Judith Butler critiques the sex/gender distinction on two grounds. They critique gender realism with their normativity argument (1999 [original 1990], chapter 1); they also hold that the sex/gender distinction is unintelligible (this will be discussed in section 3.3.). Butler’s normativity argument is not straightforwardly directed at the metaphysical perspective of gender realism, but rather at its political counterpart: identity politics. This is a form of political mobilization based on membership in some group (e.g. racial, ethnic, cultural, gender) and group membership is thought to be delimited by some common experiences, conditions or features that define the group (Heyes 2000, 58; see also the entry on Identity Politics ). Feminist identity politics, then, presupposes gender realism in that feminist politics is said to be mobilized around women as a group (or category) where membership in this group is fixed by some condition, experience or feature that women supposedly share and that defines their gender.

Butler’s normativity argument makes two claims. The first is akin to Spelman’s particularity argument: unitary gender notions fail to take differences amongst women into account thus failing to recognise “the multiplicity of cultural, social, and political intersections in which the concrete array of ‘women’ are constructed” (Butler 1999, 19–20). In their attempt to undercut biologically deterministic ways of defining what it means to be a woman, feminists inadvertently created new socially constructed accounts of supposedly shared femininity. Butler’s second claim is that such false gender realist accounts are normative. That is, in their attempt to fix feminism’s subject matter, feminists unwittingly defined the term ‘woman’ in a way that implies there is some correct way to be gendered a woman (Butler 1999, 5). That the definition of the term ‘woman’ is fixed supposedly “operates as a policing force which generates and legitimizes certain practices, experiences, etc., and curtails and delegitimizes others” (Nicholson 1998, 293). Following this line of thought, one could say that, for instance, Chodorow’s view of gender suggests that ‘real’ women have feminine personalities and that these are the women feminism should be concerned about. If one does not exhibit a distinctly feminine personality, the implication is that one is not ‘really’ a member of women’s category nor does one properly qualify for feminist political representation.

Butler’s second claim is based on their view that“[i]dentity categories [like that of women] are never merely descriptive, but always normative, and as such, exclusionary” (Butler 1991, 160). That is, the mistake of those feminists Butler critiques was not that they provided the incorrect definition of ‘woman’. Rather, (the argument goes) their mistake was to attempt to define the term ‘woman’ at all. Butler’s view is that ‘woman’ can never be defined in a way that does not prescribe some “unspoken normative requirements” (like having a feminine personality) that women should conform to (Butler 1999, 9). Butler takes this to be a feature of terms like ‘woman’ that purport to pick out (what they call) ‘identity categories’. They seem to assume that ‘woman’ can never be used in a non-ideological way (Moi 1999, 43) and that it will always encode conditions that are not satisfied by everyone we think of as women. Some explanation for this comes from Butler’s view that all processes of drawing categorical distinctions involve evaluative and normative commitments; these in turn involve the exercise of power and reflect the conditions of those who are socially powerful (Witt 1995).

In order to better understand Butler’s critique, consider their account of gender performativity. For them, standard feminist accounts take gendered individuals to have some essential properties qua gendered individuals or a gender core by virtue of which one is either a man or a woman. This view assumes that women and men, qua women and men, are bearers of various essential and accidental attributes where the former secure gendered persons’ persistence through time as so gendered. But according to Butler this view is false: (i) there are no such essential properties, and (ii) gender is an illusion maintained by prevalent power structures. First, feminists are said to think that genders are socially constructed in that they have the following essential attributes (Butler 1999, 24): women are females with feminine behavioural traits, being heterosexuals whose desire is directed at men; men are males with masculine behavioural traits, being heterosexuals whose desire is directed at women. These are the attributes necessary for gendered individuals and those that enable women and men to persist through time as women and men. Individuals have “intelligible genders” (Butler 1999, 23) if they exhibit this sequence of traits in a coherent manner (where sexual desire follows from sexual orientation that in turn follows from feminine/ masculine behaviours thought to follow from biological sex). Social forces in general deem individuals who exhibit in coherent gender sequences (like lesbians) to be doing their gender ‘wrong’ and they actively discourage such sequencing of traits, for instance, via name-calling and overt homophobic discrimination. Think back to what was said above: having a certain conception of what women are like that mirrors the conditions of socially powerful (white, middle-class, heterosexual, Western) women functions to marginalize and police those who do not fit this conception.

These gender cores, supposedly encoding the above traits, however, are nothing more than illusions created by ideals and practices that seek to render gender uniform through heterosexism, the view that heterosexuality is natural and homosexuality is deviant (Butler 1999, 42). Gender cores are constructed as if they somehow naturally belong to women and men thereby creating gender dimorphism or the belief that one must be either a masculine male or a feminine female. But gender dimorphism only serves a heterosexist social order by implying that since women and men are sharply opposed, it is natural to sexually desire the opposite sex or gender.

Further, being feminine and desiring men (for instance) are standardly assumed to be expressions of one’s gender as a woman. Butler denies this and holds that gender is really performative. It is not “a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts follow; rather, gender is … instituted … through a stylized repetition of [habitual] acts ” (Butler 1999, 179): through wearing certain gender-coded clothing, walking and sitting in certain gender-coded ways, styling one’s hair in gender-coded manner and so on. Gender is not something one is, it is something one does; it is a sequence of acts, a doing rather than a being. And repeatedly engaging in ‘feminising’ and ‘masculinising’ acts congeals gender thereby making people falsely think of gender as something they naturally are . Gender only comes into being through these gendering acts: a female who has sex with men does not express her gender as a woman. This activity (amongst others) makes her gendered a woman.

The constitutive acts that gender individuals create genders as “compelling illusion[s]” (Butler 1990, 271). Our gendered classification scheme is a strong pragmatic construction : social factors wholly determine our use of the scheme and the scheme fails to represent accurately any ‘facts of the matter’ (Haslanger 1995, 100). People think that there are true and real genders, and those deemed to be doing their gender ‘wrong’ are not socially sanctioned. But, genders are true and real only to the extent that they are performed (Butler 1990, 278–9). It does not make sense, then, to say of a male-to-female trans person that s/he is really a man who only appears to be a woman. Instead, males dressing up and acting in ways that are associated with femininity “show that [as Butler suggests] ‘being’ feminine is just a matter of doing certain activities” (Stone 2007, 64). As a result, the trans person’s gender is just as real or true as anyone else’s who is a ‘traditionally’ feminine female or masculine male (Butler 1990, 278). [ 5 ] Without heterosexism that compels people to engage in certain gendering acts, there would not be any genders at all. And ultimately the aim should be to abolish norms that compel people to act in these gendering ways.

For Butler, given that gender is performative, the appropriate response to feminist identity politics involves two things. First, feminists should understand ‘woman’ as open-ended and “a term in process, a becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully be said to originate or end … it is open to intervention and resignification” (Butler 1999, 43). That is, feminists should not try to define ‘woman’ at all. Second, the category of women “ought not to be the foundation of feminist politics” (Butler 1999, 9). Rather, feminists should focus on providing an account of how power functions and shapes our understandings of womanhood not only in the society at large but also within the feminist movement.

Many people, including many feminists, have ordinarily taken sex ascriptions to be solely a matter of biology with no social or cultural dimension. It is commonplace to think that there are only two sexes and that biological sex classifications are utterly unproblematic. By contrast, some feminists have argued that sex classifications are not unproblematic and that they are not solely a matter of biology. In order to make sense of this, it is helpful to distinguish object- and idea-construction (see Haslanger 2003b for more): social forces can be said to construct certain kinds of objects (e.g. sexed bodies or gendered individuals) and certain kinds of ideas (e.g. sex or gender concepts). First, take the object-construction of sexed bodies. Secondary sex characteristics, or the physiological and biological features commonly associated with males and females, are affected by social practices. In some societies, females’ lower social status has meant that they have been fed less and so, the lack of nutrition has had the effect of making them smaller in size (Jaggar 1983, 37). Uniformity in muscular shape, size and strength within sex categories is not caused entirely by biological factors, but depends heavily on exercise opportunities: if males and females were allowed the same exercise opportunities and equal encouragement to exercise, it is thought that bodily dimorphism would diminish (Fausto-Sterling 1993a, 218). A number of medical phenomena involving bones (like osteoporosis) have social causes directly related to expectations about gender, women’s diet and their exercise opportunities (Fausto-Sterling 2005). These examples suggest that physiological features thought to be sex-specific traits not affected by social and cultural factors are, after all, to some extent products of social conditioning. Social conditioning, then, shapes our biology.

Second, take the idea-construction of sex concepts. Our concept of sex is said to be a product of social forces in the sense that what counts as sex is shaped by social meanings. Standardly, those with XX-chromosomes, ovaries that produce large egg cells, female genitalia, a relatively high proportion of ‘female’ hormones, and other secondary sex characteristics (relatively small body size, less body hair) count as biologically female. Those with XY-chromosomes, testes that produce small sperm cells, male genitalia, a relatively high proportion of ‘male’ hormones and other secondary sex traits (relatively large body size, significant amounts of body hair) count as male. This understanding is fairly recent. The prevalent scientific view from Ancient Greeks until the late 18 th century, did not consider female and male sexes to be distinct categories with specific traits; instead, a ‘one-sex model’ held that males and females were members of the same sex category. Females’ genitals were thought to be the same as males’ but simply directed inside the body; ovaries and testes (for instance) were referred to by the same term and whether the term referred to the former or the latter was made clear by the context (Laqueur 1990, 4). It was not until the late 1700s that scientists began to think of female and male anatomies as radically different moving away from the ‘one-sex model’ of a single sex spectrum to the (nowadays prevalent) ‘two-sex model’ of sexual dimorphism. (For an alternative view, see King 2013.)

Fausto-Sterling has argued that this ‘two-sex model’ isn’t straightforward either (1993b; 2000a; 2000b). Based on a meta-study of empirical medical research, she estimates that 1.7% of population fail to neatly fall within the usual sex classifications possessing various combinations of different sex characteristics (Fausto-Sterling 2000a, 20). In her earlier work, she claimed that intersex individuals make up (at least) three further sex classes: ‘herms’ who possess one testis and one ovary; ‘merms’ who possess testes, some aspects of female genitalia but no ovaries; and ‘ferms’ who have ovaries, some aspects of male genitalia but no testes (Fausto-Sterling 1993b, 21). (In her [2000a], Fausto-Sterling notes that these labels were put forward tongue–in–cheek.) Recognition of intersex people suggests that feminists (and society at large) are wrong to think that humans are either female or male.

To illustrate further the idea-construction of sex, consider the case of the athlete Maria Patiño. Patiño has female genitalia, has always considered herself to be female and was considered so by others. However, she was discovered to have XY chromosomes and was barred from competing in women’s sports (Fausto-Sterling 2000b, 1–3). Patiño’s genitalia were at odds with her chromosomes and the latter were taken to determine her sex. Patiño successfully fought to be recognised as a female athlete arguing that her chromosomes alone were not sufficient to not make her female. Intersex people, like Patiño, illustrate that our understandings of sex differ and suggest that there is no immediately obvious way to settle what sex amounts to purely biologically or scientifically. Deciding what sex is involves evaluative judgements that are influenced by social factors.

Insofar as our cultural conceptions affect our understandings of sex, feminists must be much more careful about sex classifications and rethink what sex amounts to (Stone 2007, chapter 1). More specifically, intersex people illustrate that sex traits associated with females and males need not always go together and that individuals can have some mixture of these traits. This suggests to Stone that sex is a cluster concept: it is sufficient to satisfy enough of the sex features that tend to cluster together in order to count as being of a particular sex. But, one need not satisfy all of those features or some arbitrarily chosen supposedly necessary sex feature, like chromosomes (Stone 2007, 44). This makes sex a matter of degree and sex classifications should take place on a spectrum: one can be more or less female/male but there is no sharp distinction between the two. Further, intersex people (along with trans people) are located at the centre of the sex spectrum and in many cases their sex will be indeterminate (Stone 2007).

More recently, Ayala and Vasilyeva (2015) have argued for an inclusive and extended conception of sex: just as certain tools can be seen to extend our minds beyond the limits of our brains (e.g. white canes), other tools (like dildos) can extend our sex beyond our bodily boundaries. This view aims to motivate the idea that what counts as sex should not be determined by looking inwards at genitalia or other anatomical features. In a different vein, Ásta (2018) argues that sex is a conferred social property. This follows her more general conferralist framework to analyse all social properties: properties that are conferred by others thereby generating a social status that consists in contextually specific constraints and enablements on individual behaviour. The general schema for conferred properties is as follows (Ásta 2018, 8):

Conferred property: what property is conferred. Who: who the subjects are. What: what attitude, state, or action of the subjects matter. When: under what conditions the conferral takes place. Base property: what the subjects are attempting to track (consciously or not), if anything.

With being of a certain sex (e.g. male, female) in mind, Ásta holds that it is a conferred property that merely aims to track physical features. Hence sex is a social – or in fact, an institutional – property rather than a natural one. The schema for sex goes as follows (72):

Conferred property: being female, male. Who: legal authorities, drawing on the expert opinion of doctors, other medical personnel. What: “the recording of a sex in official documents ... The judgment of the doctors (and others) as to what sex role might be the most fitting, given the biological characteristics present.” When: at birth or after surgery/ hormonal treatment. Base property: “the aim is to track as many sex-stereotypical characteristics as possible, and doctors perform surgery in cases where that might help bring the physical characteristics more in line with the stereotype of male and female.”

This (among other things) offers a debunking analysis of sex: it may appear to be a natural property, but on the conferralist analysis is better understood as a conferred legal status. Ásta holds that gender too is a conferred property, but contra the discussion in the following section, she does not think that this collapses the distinction between sex and gender: sex and gender are differently conferred albeit both satisfying the general schema noted above. Nonetheless, on the conferralist framework what underlies both sex and gender is the idea of social construction as social significance: sex-stereotypical characteristics are taken to be socially significant context specifically, whereby they become the basis for conferring sex onto individuals and this brings with it various constraints and enablements on individuals and their behaviour. This fits object- and idea-constructions introduced above, although offers a different general framework to analyse the matter at hand.

In addition to arguing against identity politics and for gender performativity, Butler holds that distinguishing biological sex from social gender is unintelligible. For them, both are socially constructed:

If the immutable character of sex is contested, perhaps this construct called ‘sex’ is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already gender, with the consequence that the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all. (Butler 1999, 10–11)

(Butler is not alone in claiming that there are no tenable distinctions between nature/culture, biology/construction and sex/gender. See also: Antony 1998; Gatens 1996; Grosz 1994; Prokhovnik 1999.) Butler makes two different claims in the passage cited: that sex is a social construction, and that sex is gender. To unpack their view, consider the two claims in turn. First, the idea that sex is a social construct, for Butler, boils down to the view that our sexed bodies are also performative and, so, they have “no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute [their] reality” (1999, 173). Prima facie , this implausibly implies that female and male bodies do not have independent existence and that if gendering activities ceased, so would physical bodies. This is not Butler’s claim; rather, their position is that bodies viewed as the material foundations on which gender is constructed, are themselves constructed as if they provide such material foundations (Butler 1993). Cultural conceptions about gender figure in “the very apparatus of production whereby sexes themselves are established” (Butler 1999, 11).

For Butler, sexed bodies never exist outside social meanings and how we understand gender shapes how we understand sex (1999, 139). Sexed bodies are not empty matter on which gender is constructed and sex categories are not picked out on the basis of objective features of the world. Instead, our sexed bodies are themselves discursively constructed : they are the way they are, at least to a substantial extent, because of what is attributed to sexed bodies and how they are classified (for discursive construction, see Haslanger 1995, 99). Sex assignment (calling someone female or male) is normative (Butler 1993, 1). [ 6 ] When the doctor calls a newly born infant a girl or a boy, s/he is not making a descriptive claim, but a normative one. In fact, the doctor is performing an illocutionary speech act (see the entry on Speech Acts ). In effect, the doctor’s utterance makes infants into girls or boys. We, then, engage in activities that make it seem as if sexes naturally come in two and that being female or male is an objective feature of the world, rather than being a consequence of certain constitutive acts (that is, rather than being performative). And this is what Butler means in saying that physical bodies never exist outside cultural and social meanings, and that sex is as socially constructed as gender. They do not deny that physical bodies exist. But, they take our understanding of this existence to be a product of social conditioning: social conditioning makes the existence of physical bodies intelligible to us by discursively constructing sexed bodies through certain constitutive acts. (For a helpful introduction to Butler’s views, see Salih 2002.)

For Butler, sex assignment is always in some sense oppressive. Again, this appears to be because of Butler’s general suspicion of classification: sex classification can never be merely descriptive but always has a normative element reflecting evaluative claims of those who are powerful. Conducting a feminist genealogy of the body (or examining why sexed bodies are thought to come naturally as female and male), then, should ground feminist practice (Butler 1993, 28–9). Feminists should examine and uncover ways in which social construction and certain acts that constitute sex shape our understandings of sexed bodies, what kinds of meanings bodies acquire and which practices and illocutionary speech acts ‘make’ our bodies into sexes. Doing so enables feminists to identity how sexed bodies are socially constructed in order to resist such construction.

However, given what was said above, it is far from obvious what we should make of Butler’s claim that sex “was always already gender” (1999, 11). Stone (2007) takes this to mean that sex is gender but goes on to question it arguing that the social construction of both sex and gender does not make sex identical to gender. According to Stone, it would be more accurate for Butler to say that claims about sex imply gender norms. That is, many claims about sex traits (like ‘females are physically weaker than males’) actually carry implications about how women and men are expected to behave. To some extent the claim describes certain facts. But, it also implies that females are not expected to do much heavy lifting and that they would probably not be good at it. So, claims about sex are not identical to claims about gender; rather, they imply claims about gender norms (Stone 2007, 70).

Some feminists hold that the sex/gender distinction is not useful. For a start, it is thought to reflect politically problematic dualistic thinking that undercuts feminist aims: the distinction is taken to reflect and replicate androcentric oppositions between (for instance) mind/body, culture/nature and reason/emotion that have been used to justify women’s oppression (e.g. Grosz 1994; Prokhovnik 1999). The thought is that in oppositions like these, one term is always superior to the other and that the devalued term is usually associated with women (Lloyd 1993). For instance, human subjectivity and agency are identified with the mind but since women are usually identified with their bodies, they are devalued as human subjects and agents. The opposition between mind and body is said to further map on to other distinctions, like reason/emotion, culture/nature, rational/irrational, where one side of each distinction is devalued (one’s bodily features are usually valued less that one’s mind, rationality is usually valued more than irrationality) and women are associated with the devalued terms: they are thought to be closer to bodily features and nature than men, to be irrational, emotional and so on. This is said to be evident (for instance) in job interviews. Men are treated as gender-neutral persons and not asked whether they are planning to take time off to have a family. By contrast, that women face such queries illustrates that they are associated more closely than men with bodily features to do with procreation (Prokhovnik 1999, 126). The opposition between mind and body, then, is thought to map onto the opposition between men and women.

Now, the mind/body dualism is also said to map onto the sex/gender distinction (Grosz 1994; Prokhovnik 1999). The idea is that gender maps onto mind, sex onto body. Although not used by those endorsing this view, the basic idea can be summed by the slogan ‘Gender is between the ears, sex is between the legs’: the implication is that, while sex is immutable, gender is something individuals have control over – it is something we can alter and change through individual choices. However, since women are said to be more closely associated with biological features (and so, to map onto the body side of the mind/body distinction) and men are treated as gender-neutral persons (mapping onto the mind side), the implication is that “man equals gender, which is associated with mind and choice, freedom from body, autonomy, and with the public real; while woman equals sex, associated with the body, reproduction, ‘natural’ rhythms and the private realm” (Prokhovnik 1999, 103). This is said to render the sex/gender distinction inherently repressive and to drain it of any potential for emancipation: rather than facilitating gender role choice for women, it “actually functions to reinforce their association with body, sex, and involuntary ‘natural’ rhythms” (Prokhovnik 1999, 103). Contrary to what feminists like Rubin argued, the sex/gender distinction cannot be used as a theoretical tool that dissociates conceptions of womanhood from biological and reproductive features.

Moi has further argued that the sex/gender distinction is useless given certain theoretical goals (1999, chapter 1). This is not to say that it is utterly worthless; according to Moi, the sex/gender distinction worked well to show that the historically prevalent biological determinism was false. However, for her, the distinction does no useful work “when it comes to producing a good theory of subjectivity” (1999, 6) and “a concrete, historical understanding of what it means to be a woman (or a man) in a given society” (1999, 4–5). That is, the 1960s distinction understood sex as fixed by biology without any cultural or historical dimensions. This understanding, however, ignores lived experiences and embodiment as aspects of womanhood (and manhood) by separating sex from gender and insisting that womanhood is to do with the latter. Rather, embodiment must be included in one’s theory that tries to figure out what it is to be a woman (or a man).

Mikkola (2011) argues that the sex/gender distinction, which underlies views like Rubin’s and MacKinnon’s, has certain unintuitive and undesirable ontological commitments that render the distinction politically unhelpful. First, claiming that gender is socially constructed implies that the existence of women and men is a mind-dependent matter. This suggests that we can do away with women and men simply by altering some social practices, conventions or conditions on which gender depends (whatever those are). However, ordinary social agents find this unintuitive given that (ordinarily) sex and gender are not distinguished. Second, claiming that gender is a product of oppressive social forces suggests that doing away with women and men should be feminism’s political goal. But this harbours ontologically undesirable commitments since many ordinary social agents view their gender to be a source of positive value. So, feminism seems to want to do away with something that should not be done away with, which is unlikely to motivate social agents to act in ways that aim at gender justice. Given these problems, Mikkola argues that feminists should give up the distinction on practical political grounds.

Tomas Bogardus (2020) has argued in an even more radical sense against the sex/gender distinction: as things stand, he holds, feminist philosophers have merely assumed and asserted that the distinction exists, instead of having offered good arguments for the distinction. In other words, feminist philosophers allegedly have yet to offer good reasons to think that ‘woman’ does not simply pick out adult human females. Alex Byrne (2020) argues in a similar vein: the term ‘woman’ does not pick out a social kind as feminist philosophers have “assumed”. Instead, “women are adult human females–nothing more, and nothing less” (2020, 3801). Byrne offers six considerations to ground this AHF (adult, human, female) conception.

• It reproduces the dictionary definition of ‘woman’.
• One would expect English to have a word that picks out the category adult human female, and ‘woman’ is the only candidate.
• AHF explains how we sometimes know that an individual is a woman, despite knowing nothing else relevant about her other than the fact that she is an adult human female.
• AHF stands or falls with the analogous thesis for girls, which can be supported independently.
• AHF predicts the correct verdict in cases of gender role reversal.
• AHF is supported by the fact that ‘woman’ and ‘female’ are often appropriately used as stylistic variants of each other, even in hyperintensional contexts.

Robin Dembroff (2021) responds to Byrne and highlights various problems with Byrne’s argument. First, framing: Byrne assumes from the start that gender terms like ‘woman’ have a single invariant meaning thereby failing to discuss the possibility of terms like ‘woman’ having multiple meanings – something that is a familiar claim made by feminist theorists from various disciplines. Moreover, Byrne (according to Dembroff) assumes without argument that there is a single, universal category of woman – again, something that has been extensively discussed and critiqued by feminist philosophers and theorists. Second, Byrne’s conception of the ‘dominant’ meaning of woman is said to be cherry-picked and it ignores a wealth of contexts outside of philosophy (like the media and the law) where ‘woman’ has a meaning other than AHF . Third, Byrne’s own distinction between biological and social categories fails to establish what he intended to establish: namely, that ‘woman’ picks out a biological rather than a social kind. Hence, Dembroff holds, Byrne’s case fails by its own lights. Byrne (2021) responds to Dembroff’s critique.

Others such as ‘gender critical feminists’ also hold views about the sex/gender distinction in a spirit similar to Bogardus and Byrne. For example, Holly Lawford-Smith (2021) takes the prevalent sex/gender distinction, where ‘female’/‘male’ are used as sex terms and ‘woman’/’man’ as gender terms, not to be helpful. Instead, she takes all of these to be sex terms and holds that (the norms of) femininity/masculinity refer to gender normativity. Because much of the gender critical feminists’ discussion that philosophers have engaged in has taken place in social media, public fora, and other sources outside academic philosophy, this entry will not focus on these discussions.

4. Women as a group

The various critiques of the sex/gender distinction have called into question the viability of the category women . Feminism is the movement to end the oppression women as a group face. But, how should the category of women be understood if feminists accept the above arguments that gender construction is not uniform, that a sharp distinction between biological sex and social gender is false or (at least) not useful, and that various features associated with women play a role in what it is to be a woman, none of which are individually necessary and jointly sufficient (like a variety of social roles, positions, behaviours, traits, bodily features and experiences)? Feminists must be able to address cultural and social differences in gender construction if feminism is to be a genuinely inclusive movement and be careful not to posit commonalities that mask important ways in which women qua women differ. These concerns (among others) have generated a situation where (as Linda Alcoff puts it) feminists aim to speak and make political demands in the name of women, at the same time rejecting the idea that there is a unified category of women (2006, 152). If feminist critiques of the category women are successful, then what (if anything) binds women together, what is it to be a woman, and what kinds of demands can feminists make on behalf of women?

Many have found the fragmentation of the category of women problematic for political reasons (e.g. Alcoff 2006; Bach 2012; Benhabib 1992; Frye 1996; Haslanger 2000b; Heyes 2000; Martin 1994; Mikkola 2007; Stoljar 1995; Stone 2004; Tanesini 1996; Young 1997; Zack 2005). For instance, Young holds that accounts like Spelman’s reduce the category of women to a gerrymandered collection of individuals with nothing to bind them together (1997, 20). Black women differ from white women but members of both groups also differ from one another with respect to nationality, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation and economic position; that is, wealthy white women differ from working-class white women due to their economic and class positions. These sub-groups are themselves diverse: for instance, some working-class white women in Northern Ireland are starkly divided along religious lines. So if we accept Spelman’s position, we risk ending up with individual women and nothing to bind them together. And this is problematic: in order to respond to oppression of women in general, feminists must understand them as a category in some sense. Young writes that without doing so “it is not possible to conceptualize oppression as a systematic, structured, institutional process” (1997, 17). Some, then, take the articulation of an inclusive category of women to be the prerequisite for effective feminist politics and a rich literature has emerged that aims to conceptualise women as a group or a collective (e.g. Alcoff 2006; Ásta 2011; Frye 1996; 2011; Haslanger 2000b; Heyes 2000; Stoljar 1995, 2011; Young 1997; Zack 2005). Articulations of this category can be divided into those that are: (a) gender nominalist — positions that deny there is something women qua women share and that seek to unify women’s social kind by appealing to something external to women; and (b) gender realist — positions that take there to be something women qua women share (although these realist positions differ significantly from those outlined in Section 2). Below we will review some influential gender nominalist and gender realist positions. Before doing so, it is worth noting that not everyone is convinced that attempts to articulate an inclusive category of women can succeed or that worries about what it is to be a woman are in need of being resolved. Mikkola (2016) argues that feminist politics need not rely on overcoming (what she calls) the ‘gender controversy’: that feminists must settle the meaning of gender concepts and articulate a way to ground women’s social kind membership. As she sees it, disputes about ‘what it is to be a woman’ have become theoretically bankrupt and intractable, which has generated an analytical impasse that looks unsurpassable. Instead, Mikkola argues for giving up the quest, which in any case in her view poses no serious political obstacles.

Elizabeth Barnes (2020) responds to the need to offer an inclusive conception of gender somewhat differently, although she endorses the need for feminism to be inclusive particularly of trans people. Barnes holds that typically philosophical theories of gender aim to offer an account of what it is to be a woman (or man, genderqueer, etc.), where such an account is presumed to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for being a woman or an account of our gender terms’ extensions. But, she holds, it is a mistake to expect our theories of gender to do so. For Barnes, a project that offers a metaphysics of gender “should be understood as the project of theorizing what it is —if anything— about the social world that ultimately explains gender” (2020, 706). This project is not equivalent to one that aims to define gender terms or elucidate the application conditions for natural language gender terms though.

4.1 Gender nominalism

Iris Young argues that unless there is “some sense in which ‘woman’ is the name of a social collective [that feminism represents], there is nothing specific to feminist politics” (1997, 13). In order to make the category women intelligible, she argues that women make up a series: a particular kind of social collective “whose members are unified passively by the objects their actions are oriented around and/or by the objectified results of the material effects of the actions of the other” (Young 1997, 23). A series is distinct from a group in that, whereas members of groups are thought to self-consciously share certain goals, projects, traits and/ or self-conceptions, members of series pursue their own individual ends without necessarily having anything at all in common. Young holds that women are not bound together by a shared feature or experience (or set of features and experiences) since she takes Spelman’s particularity argument to have established definitely that no such feature exists (1997, 13; see also: Frye 1996; Heyes 2000). Instead, women’s category is unified by certain practico-inert realities or the ways in which women’s lives and their actions are oriented around certain objects and everyday realities (Young 1997, 23–4). For example, bus commuters make up a series unified through their individual actions being organised around the same practico-inert objects of the bus and the practice of public transport. Women make up a series unified through women’s lives and actions being organised around certain practico-inert objects and realities that position them as women .

Young identifies two broad groups of such practico-inert objects and realities. First, phenomena associated with female bodies (physical facts), biological processes that take place in female bodies (menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth) and social rules associated with these biological processes (social rules of menstruation, for instance). Second, gender-coded objects and practices: pronouns, verbal and visual representations of gender, gender-coded artefacts and social spaces, clothes, cosmetics, tools and furniture. So, women make up a series since their lives and actions are organised around female bodies and certain gender-coded objects. Their series is bound together passively and the unity is “not one that arises from the individuals called women” (Young 1997, 32).

Although Young’s proposal purports to be a response to Spelman’s worries, Stone has questioned whether it is, after all, susceptible to the particularity argument: ultimately, on Young’s view, something women as women share (their practico-inert realities) binds them together (Stone 2004).

Natalie Stoljar holds that unless the category of women is unified, feminist action on behalf of women cannot be justified (1995, 282). Stoljar too is persuaded by the thought that women qua women do not share anything unitary. This prompts her to argue for resemblance nominalism. This is the view that a certain kind of resemblance relation holds between entities of a particular type (for more on resemblance nominalism, see Armstrong 1989, 39–58). Stoljar is not alone in arguing for resemblance relations to make sense of women as a category; others have also done so, usually appealing to Wittgenstein’s ‘family resemblance’ relations (Alcoff 1988; Green & Radford Curry 1991; Heyes 2000; Munro 2006). Stoljar relies more on Price’s resemblance nominalism whereby x is a member of some type F only if x resembles some paradigm or exemplar of F sufficiently closely (Price 1953, 20). For instance, the type of red entities is unified by some chosen red paradigms so that only those entities that sufficiently resemble the paradigms count as red. The type (or category) of women, then, is unified by some chosen woman paradigms so that those who sufficiently resemble the woman paradigms count as women (Stoljar 1995, 284).

Semantic considerations about the concept woman suggest to Stoljar that resemblance nominalism should be endorsed (Stoljar 2000, 28). It seems unlikely that the concept is applied on the basis of some single social feature all and only women possess. By contrast, woman is a cluster concept and our attributions of womanhood pick out “different arrangements of features in different individuals” (Stoljar 2000, 27). More specifically, they pick out the following clusters of features: (a) Female sex; (b) Phenomenological features: menstruation, female sexual experience, child-birth, breast-feeding, fear of walking on the streets at night or fear of rape; (c) Certain roles: wearing typically female clothing, being oppressed on the basis of one’s sex or undertaking care-work; (d) Gender attribution: “calling oneself a woman, being called a woman” (Stoljar 1995, 283–4). For Stoljar, attributions of womanhood are to do with a variety of traits and experiences: those that feminists have historically termed ‘gender traits’ (like social, behavioural, psychological traits) and those termed ‘sex traits’. Nonetheless, she holds that since the concept woman applies to (at least some) trans persons, one can be a woman without being female (Stoljar 1995, 282).

The cluster concept woman does not, however, straightforwardly provide the criterion for picking out the category of women. Rather, the four clusters of features that the concept picks out help single out woman paradigms that in turn help single out the category of women. First, any individual who possesses a feature from at least three of the four clusters mentioned will count as an exemplar of the category. For instance, an African-American with primary and secondary female sex characteristics, who describes herself as a woman and is oppressed on the basis of her sex, along with a white European hermaphrodite brought up ‘as a girl’, who engages in female roles and has female phenomenological features despite lacking female sex characteristics, will count as woman paradigms (Stoljar 1995, 284). [ 7 ] Second, any individual who resembles “any of the paradigms sufficiently closely (on Price’s account, as closely as [the paradigms] resemble each other) will be a member of the resemblance class ‘woman’” (Stoljar 1995, 284). That is, what delimits membership in the category of women is that one resembles sufficiently a woman paradigm.

4.2 Neo-gender realism

In a series of articles collected in her 2012 book, Sally Haslanger argues for a way to define the concept woman that is politically useful, serving as a tool in feminist fights against sexism, and that shows woman to be a social (not a biological) notion. More specifically, Haslanger argues that gender is a matter of occupying either a subordinate or a privileged social position. In some articles, Haslanger is arguing for a revisionary analysis of the concept woman (2000b; 2003a; 2003b). Elsewhere she suggests that her analysis may not be that revisionary after all (2005; 2006). Consider the former argument first. Haslanger’s analysis is, in her terms, ameliorative: it aims to elucidate which gender concepts best help feminists achieve their legitimate purposes thereby elucidating those concepts feminists should be using (Haslanger 2000b, 33). [ 8 ] Now, feminists need gender terminology in order to fight sexist injustices (Haslanger 2000b, 36). In particular, they need gender terms to identify, explain and talk about persistent social inequalities between males and females. Haslanger’s analysis of gender begins with the recognition that females and males differ in two respects: physically and in their social positions. Societies in general tend to “privilege individuals with male bodies” (Haslanger 2000b, 38) so that the social positions they subsequently occupy are better than the social positions of those with female bodies. And this generates persistent sexist injustices. With this in mind, Haslanger specifies how she understands genders:

S is a woman iff [by definition] S is systematically subordinated along some dimension (economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and S is ‘marked’ as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female’s biological role in reproduction.

S is a man iff [by definition] S is systematically privileged along some dimension (economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and S is ‘marked’ as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of a male’s biological role in reproduction. (2003a, 6–7)

These are constitutive of being a woman and a man: what makes calling S a woman apt, is that S is oppressed on sex-marked grounds; what makes calling S a man apt, is that S is privileged on sex-marked grounds.

Haslanger’s ameliorative analysis is counterintuitive in that females who are not sex-marked for oppression, do not count as women. At least arguably, the Queen of England is not oppressed on sex-marked grounds and so, would not count as a woman on Haslanger’s definition. And, similarly, all males who are not privileged would not count as men. This might suggest that Haslanger’s analysis should be rejected in that it does not capture what language users have in mind when applying gender terms. However, Haslanger argues that this is not a reason to reject the definitions, which she takes to be revisionary: they are not meant to capture our intuitive gender terms. In response, Mikkola (2009) has argued that revisionary analyses of gender concepts, like Haslanger’s, are both politically unhelpful and philosophically unnecessary.

Note also that Haslanger’s proposal is eliminativist: gender justice would eradicate gender, since it would abolish those sexist social structures responsible for sex-marked oppression and privilege. If sexist oppression were to cease, women and men would no longer exist (although there would still be males and females). Not all feminists endorse such an eliminativist view though. Stone holds that Haslanger does not leave any room for positively revaluing what it is to be a woman: since Haslanger defines woman in terms of subordination,

any woman who challenges her subordinate status must by definition be challenging her status as a woman, even if she does not intend to … positive change to our gender norms would involve getting rid of the (necessarily subordinate) feminine gender. (Stone 2007, 160)

But according to Stone this is not only undesirable – one should be able to challenge subordination without having to challenge one’s status as a woman. It is also false: “because norms of femininity can be and constantly are being revised, women can be women without thereby being subordinate” (Stone 2007, 162; Mikkola [2016] too argues that Haslanger’s eliminativism is troublesome).

Theodore Bach holds that Haslanger’s eliminativism is undesirable on other grounds, and that Haslanger’s position faces another more serious problem. Feminism faces the following worries (among others):

Representation problem : “if there is no real group of ‘women’, then it is incoherent to make moral claims and advance political policies on behalf of women” (Bach 2012, 234). Commonality problems : (1) There is no feature that all women cross-culturally and transhistorically share. (2) Delimiting women’s social kind with the help of some essential property privileges those who possess it, and marginalizes those who do not (Bach 2012, 235).

According to Bach, Haslanger’s strategy to resolve these problems appeals to ‘social objectivism’. First, we define women “according to a suitably abstract relational property” (Bach 2012, 236), which avoids the commonality problems. Second, Haslanger employs “an ontologically thin notion of ‘objectivity’” (Bach 2012, 236) that answers the representation problem. Haslanger’s solution (Bach holds) is specifically to argue that women make up an objective type because women are objectively similar to one another, and not simply classified together given our background conceptual schemes. Bach claims though that Haslanger’s account is not objective enough, and we should on political grounds “provide a stronger ontological characterization of the genders men and women according to which they are natural kinds with explanatory essences” (Bach 2012, 238). He thus proposes that women make up a natural kind with a historical essence:

The essential property of women, in virtue of which an individual is a member of the kind ‘women,’ is participation in a lineage of women. In order to exemplify this relational property, an individual must be a reproduction of ancestral women, in which case she must have undergone the ontogenetic processes through which a historical gender system replicates women. (Bach 2012, 271)

In short, one is not a woman due to shared surface properties with other women (like occupying a subordinate social position). Rather, one is a woman because one has the right history: one has undergone the ubiquitous ontogenetic process of gender socialization. Thinking about gender in this way supposedly provides a stronger kind unity than Haslanger’s that simply appeals to shared surface properties.

Not everyone agrees; Mikkola (2020) argues that Bach’s metaphysical picture has internal tensions that render it puzzling and that Bach’s metaphysics does not provide good responses to the commonality and presentation problems. The historically essentialist view also has anti-trans implications. After all, trans women who have not undergone female gender socialization won’t count as women on his view (Mikkola [2016, 2020] develops this line of critique in more detail). More worryingly, trans women will count as men contrary to their self-identification. Both Bettcher (2013) and Jenkins (2016) consider the importance of gender self-identification. Bettcher argues that there is more than one ‘correct’ way to understand womanhood: at the very least, the dominant (mainstream), and the resistant (trans) conceptions. Dominant views like that of Bach’s tend to erase trans people’s experiences and to marginalize trans women within feminist movements. Rather than trans women having to defend their self-identifying claims, these claims should be taken at face value right from the start. And so, Bettcher holds, “in analyzing the meaning of terms such as ‘woman,’ it is inappropriate to dismiss alternative ways in which those terms are actually used in trans subcultures; such usage needs to be taken into consideration as part of the analysis” (2013, 235).

Specifically with Haslanger in mind and in a similar vein, Jenkins (2016) discusses how Haslanger’s revisionary approach unduly excludes some trans women from women’s social kind. On Jenkins’s view, Haslanger’s ameliorative methodology in fact yields more than one satisfying target concept: one that “corresponds to Haslanger’s proposed concept and captures the sense of gender as an imposed social class”; another that “captures the sense of gender as a lived identity” (Jenkins 2016, 397). The latter of these allows us to include trans women into women’s social kind, who on Haslanger’s social class approach to gender would inappropriately have been excluded. (See Andler 2017 for the view that Jenkins’s purportedly inclusive conception of gender is still not fully inclusive. Jenkins 2018 responds to this charge and develops the notion of gender identity still further.)

In addition to her revisionary argument, Haslanger has suggested that her ameliorative analysis of woman may not be as revisionary as it first seems (2005, 2006). Although successful in their reference fixing, ordinary language users do not always know precisely what they are talking about. Our language use may be skewed by oppressive ideologies that can “mislead us about the content of our own thoughts” (Haslanger 2005, 12). Although her gender terminology is not intuitive, this could simply be because oppressive ideologies mislead us about the meanings of our gender terms. Our everyday gender terminology might mean something utterly different from what we think it means; and we could be entirely ignorant of this. Perhaps Haslanger’s analysis, then, has captured our everyday gender vocabulary revealing to us the terms that we actually employ: we may be applying ‘woman’ in our everyday language on the basis of sex-marked subordination whether we take ourselves to be doing so or not. If this is so, Haslanger’s gender terminology is not radically revisionist.

Saul (2006) argues that, despite it being possible that we unknowingly apply ‘woman’ on the basis of social subordination, it is extremely difficult to show that this is the case. This would require showing that the gender terminology we in fact employ is Haslanger’s proposed gender terminology. But discovering the grounds on which we apply everyday gender terms is extremely difficult precisely because they are applied in various and idiosyncratic ways (Saul 2006, 129). Haslanger, then, needs to do more in order to show that her analysis is non-revisionary.

Charlotte Witt (2011a; 2011b) argues for a particular sort of gender essentialism, which Witt terms ‘uniessentialism’. Her motivation and starting point is the following: many ordinary social agents report gender being essential to them and claim that they would be a different person were they of a different sex/gender. Uniessentialism attempts to understand and articulate this. However, Witt’s work departs in important respects from the earlier (so-called) essentialist or gender realist positions discussed in Section 2: Witt does not posit some essential property of womanhood of the kind discussed above, which failed to take women’s differences into account. Further, uniessentialism differs significantly from those position developed in response to the problem of how we should conceive of women’s social kind. It is not about solving the standard dispute between gender nominalists and gender realists, or about articulating some supposedly shared property that binds women together and provides a theoretical ground for feminist political solidarity. Rather, uniessentialism aims to make good the widely held belief that gender is constitutive of who we are. [ 9 ]

Uniessentialism is a sort of individual essentialism. Traditionally philosophers distinguish between kind and individual essentialisms: the former examines what binds members of a kind together and what do all members of some kind have in common qua members of that kind. The latter asks: what makes an individual the individual it is. We can further distinguish two sorts of individual essentialisms: Kripkean identity essentialism and Aristotelian uniessentialism. The former asks: what makes an individual that individual? The latter, however, asks a slightly different question: what explains the unity of individuals? What explains that an individual entity exists over and above the sum total of its constituent parts? (The standard feminist debate over gender nominalism and gender realism has largely been about kind essentialism. Being about individual essentialism, Witt’s uniessentialism departs in an important way from the standard debate.) From the two individual essentialisms, Witt endorses the Aristotelian one. On this view, certain functional essences have a unifying role: these essences are responsible for the fact that material parts constitute a new individual, rather than just a lump of stuff or a collection of particles. Witt’s example is of a house: the essential house-functional property (what the entity is for, what its purpose is) unifies the different material parts of a house so that there is a house, and not just a collection of house-constituting particles (2011a, 6). Gender (being a woman/a man) functions in a similar fashion and provides “the principle of normative unity” that organizes, unifies and determines the roles of social individuals (Witt 2011a, 73). Due to this, gender is a uniessential property of social individuals.

It is important to clarify the notions of gender and social individuality that Witt employs. First, gender is a social position that “cluster[s] around the engendering function … women conceive and bear … men beget” (Witt 2011a, 40). These are women and men’s socially mediated reproductive functions (Witt 2011a, 29) and they differ from the biological function of reproduction, which roughly corresponds to sex on the standard sex/gender distinction. Witt writes: “to be a woman is to be recognized to have a particular function in engendering, to be a man is to be recognized to have a different function in engendering” (2011a, 39). Second, Witt distinguishes persons (those who possess self-consciousness), human beings (those who are biologically human) and social individuals (those who occupy social positions synchronically and diachronically). These ontological categories are not equivalent in that they possess different persistence and identity conditions. Social individuals are bound by social normativity, human beings by biological normativity. These normativities differ in two respects: first, social norms differ from one culture to the next whereas biological norms do not; second, unlike biological normativity, social normativity requires “the recognition by others that an agent is both responsive to and evaluable under a social norm” (Witt 2011a, 19). Thus, being a social individual is not equivalent to being a human being. Further, Witt takes personhood to be defined in terms of intrinsic psychological states of self-awareness and self-consciousness. However, social individuality is defined in terms of the extrinsic feature of occupying a social position, which depends for its existence on a social world. So, the two are not equivalent: personhood is essentially about intrinsic features and could exist without a social world, whereas social individuality is essentially about extrinsic features that could not exist without a social world.

Witt’s gender essentialist argument crucially pertains to social individuals , not to persons or human beings: saying that persons or human beings are gendered would be a category mistake. But why is gender essential to social individuals? For Witt, social individuals are those who occupy positions in social reality. Further, “social positions have norms or social roles associated with them; a social role is what an individual who occupies a given social position is responsive to and evaluable under” (Witt 2011a, 59). However, qua social individuals, we occupy multiple social positions at once and over time: we can be women, mothers, immigrants, sisters, academics, wives, community organisers and team-sport coaches synchronically and diachronically. Now, the issue for Witt is what unifies these positions so that a social individual is constituted. After all, a bundle of social position occupancies does not make for an individual (just as a bundle of properties like being white , cube-shaped and sweet do not make for a sugar cube). For Witt, this unifying role is undertaken by gender (being a woman or a man): it is

a pervasive and fundamental social position that unifies and determines all other social positions both synchronically and diachronically. It unifies them not physically, but by providing a principle of normative unity. (2011a, 19–20)

By ‘normative unity’, Witt means the following: given our social roles and social position occupancies, we are responsive to various sets of social norms. These norms are “complex patterns of behaviour and practices that constitute what one ought to do in a situation given one’s social position(s) and one’s social context” (Witt 2011a, 82). The sets of norms can conflict: the norms of motherhood can (and do) conflict with the norms of being an academic philosopher. However, in order for this conflict to exist, the norms must be binding on a single social individual. Witt, then, asks: what explains the existence and unity of the social individual who is subject to conflicting social norms? The answer is gender.

Gender is not just a social role that unifies social individuals. Witt takes it to be the social role — as she puts it, it is the mega social role that unifies social agents. First, gender is a mega social role if it satisfies two conditions (and Witt claims that it does): (1) if it provides the principle of synchronic and diachronic unity of social individuals, and (2) if it inflects and defines a broad range of other social roles. Gender satisfies the first in usually being a life-long social position: a social individual persists just as long as their gendered social position persists. Further, Witt maintains, trans people are not counterexamples to this claim: transitioning entails that the old social individual has ceased to exist and a new one has come into being. And this is consistent with the same person persisting and undergoing social individual change via transitioning. Gender satisfies the second condition too. It inflects other social roles, like being a parent or a professional. The expectations attached to these social roles differ depending on the agent’s gender, since gender imposes different social norms to govern the execution of the further social roles. Now, gender — as opposed to some other social category, like race — is not just a mega social role; it is the unifying mega social role. Cross-cultural and trans-historical considerations support this view. Witt claims that patriarchy is a social universal (2011a, 98). By contrast, racial categorisation varies historically and cross-culturally, and racial oppression is not a universal feature of human cultures. Thus, gender has a better claim to being the social role that is uniessential to social individuals. This account of gender essentialism not only explains social agents’ connectedness to their gender, but it also provides a helpful way to conceive of women’s agency — something that is central to feminist politics.

Linda Alcoff holds that feminism faces an identity crisis: the category of women is feminism’s starting point, but various critiques about gender have fragmented the category and it is not clear how feminists should understand what it is to be a woman (2006, chapter 5). In response, Alcoff develops an account of gender as positionality whereby “gender is, among other things, a position one occupies and from which one can act politically” (2006, 148). In particular, she takes one’s social position to foster the development of specifically gendered identities (or self-conceptions): “The very subjectivity (or subjective experience of being a woman) and the very identity of women are constituted by women’s position” (Alcoff 2006, 148). Alcoff holds that there is an objective basis for distinguishing individuals on the grounds of (actual or expected) reproductive roles:

Women and men are differentiated by virtue of their different relationship of possibility to biological reproduction, with biological reproduction referring to conceiving, giving birth, and breast-feeding, involving one’s body . (Alcoff 2006, 172, italics in original)

The thought is that those standardly classified as biologically female, although they may not actually be able to reproduce, will encounter “a different set of practices, expectations, and feelings in regard to reproduction” than those standardly classified as male (Alcoff 2006, 172). Further, this differential relation to the possibility of reproduction is used as the basis for many cultural and social phenomena that position women and men: it can be

the basis of a variety of social segregations, it can engender the development of differential forms of embodiment experienced throughout life, and it can generate a wide variety of affective responses, from pride, delight, shame, guilt, regret, or great relief from having successfully avoided reproduction. (Alcoff 2006, 172)

Reproduction, then, is an objective basis for distinguishing individuals that takes on a cultural dimension in that it positions women and men differently: depending on the kind of body one has, one’s lived experience will differ. And this fosters the construction of gendered social identities: one’s role in reproduction helps configure how one is socially positioned and this conditions the development of specifically gendered social identities.

Since women are socially positioned in various different contexts, “there is no gender essence all women share” (Alcoff 2006, 147–8). Nonetheless, Alcoff acknowledges that her account is akin to the original 1960s sex/gender distinction insofar as sex difference (understood in terms of the objective division of reproductive labour) provides the foundation for certain cultural arrangements (the development of a gendered social identity). But, with the benefit of hindsight

we can see that maintaining a distinction between the objective category of sexed identity and the varied and culturally contingent practices of gender does not presume an absolute distinction of the old-fashioned sort between culture and a reified nature. (Alcoff 2006, 175)

That is, her view avoids the implausible claim that sex is exclusively to do with nature and gender with culture. Rather, the distinction on the basis of reproductive possibilities shapes and is shaped by the sorts of cultural and social phenomena (like varieties of social segregation) these possibilities gives rise to. For instance, technological interventions can alter sex differences illustrating that this is the case (Alcoff 2006, 175). Women’s specifically gendered social identities that are constituted by their context dependent positions, then, provide the starting point for feminist politics.

Recently Robin Dembroff (2020) has argued that existing metaphysical accounts of gender fail to address non-binary gender identities. This generates two concerns. First, metaphysical accounts of gender (like the ones outlined in previous sections) are insufficient for capturing those who reject binary gender categorisation where people are either men or women. In so doing, these accounts are not satisfying as explanations of gender understood in a more expansive sense that goes beyond the binary. Second, the failure to understand non-binary gender identities contributes to a form of epistemic injustice called ‘hermeneutical injustice’: it feeds into a collective failure to comprehend and analyse concepts and practices that undergird non-binary classification schemes, thereby impeding on one’s ability to fully understand themselves. To overcome these problems, Dembroff suggests an account of genderqueer that they call ‘critical gender kind’:

a kind whose members collectively destabilize one or more elements of dominant gender ideology. Genderqueer, on my proposed model, is a category whose members collectively destabilize the binary axis, or the idea that the only possible genders are the exclusive and exhaustive kinds men and women. (2020, 2)

Note that Dembroff’s position is not to be confused with ‘gender critical feminist’ positions like those noted above, which are critical of the prevalent feminist focus on gender, as opposed to sex, kinds. Dembroff understands genderqueer as a gender kind, but one that is critical of dominant binary understandings of gender.

Dembroff identifies two modes of destabilising the gender binary: principled and existential. Principled destabilising “stems from or otherwise expresses individuals’ social or political commitments regarding gender norms, practices, and structures”, while existential destabilising “stems from or otherwise expresses individuals’ felt or desired gender roles, embodiment, and/or categorization” (2020, 13). These modes are not mutually exclusive, and they can help us understand the difference between allies and members of genderqueer kinds: “While both resist dominant gender ideology, members of [genderqueer] kinds resist (at least in part) due to felt or desired gender categorization that deviates from dominant expectations, norms, and assumptions” (2020, 14). These modes of destabilisation also enable us to formulate an understanding of non-critical gender kinds that binary understandings of women and men’s kinds exemplify. Dembroff defines these kinds as follows:

For a given kind X , X is a non-critical gender kind relative to a given society iff X ’s members collectively restabilize one or more elements of the dominant gender ideology in that society. (2020, 14)

Dembroff’s understanding of critical and non-critical gender kinds importantly makes gender kind membership something more and other than a mere psychological phenomenon. To engage in collectively destabilising or restabilising dominant gender normativity and ideology, we need more than mere attitudes or mental states – resisting or maintaining such normativity requires action as well. In so doing, Dembroff puts their position forward as an alternative to two existing internalist positions about gender. First, to Jennifer McKitrick’s (2015) view whereby gender is dispositional: in a context where someone is disposed to behave in ways that would be taken by others to be indicative of (e.g.) womanhood, the person has a woman’s gender identity. Second, to Jenkin’s (2016, 2018) position that takes an individual’s gender identity to be dependent on which gender-specific norms the person experiences as being relevant to them. On this view, someone is a woman if the person experiences norms associated with women to be relevant to the person in the particular social context that they are in. Neither of these positions well-captures non-binary identities, Dembroff argues, which motivates the account of genderqueer identities as critical gender kinds.

As Dembroff acknowledges, substantive philosophical work on non-binary gender identities is still developing. However, it is important to note that analytic philosophers are beginning to engage in gender metaphysics that goes beyond the binary.

This entry first looked at feminist objections to biological determinism and the claim that gender is socially constructed. Next, it examined feminist critiques of prevalent understandings of gender and sex, and the distinction itself. In response to these concerns, the entry looked at how a unified women’s category could be articulated for feminist political purposes. This illustrated that gender metaphysics — or what it is to be a woman or a man or a genderqueer person — is still very much a live issue. And although contemporary feminist philosophical debates have questioned some of the tenets and details of the original 1960s sex/gender distinction, most still hold onto the view that gender is about social factors and that it is (in some sense) distinct from biological sex. The jury is still out on what the best, the most useful, or (even) the correct definition of gender is.

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• World Wide Web Review: Webs of Transgender
• What is Judith Butler’s Theory of Gender Performativity? (Perlego, open access study guide/ introduction)

Beauvoir, Simone de | feminist philosophy, approaches: intersections between analytic and continental philosophy | feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on reproduction and the family | feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on the self | homosexuality | identity politics | speech acts

Acknowledgments

I am very grateful to Tuukka Asplund, Jenny Saul, Alison Stone and Nancy Tuana for their extremely helpful and detailed comments when writing this entry.

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Essay on Sexual Orientation And Gender Identity

Students are often asked to write an essay on Sexual Orientation And Gender Identity in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

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100 Words Essay on Sexual Orientation And Gender Identity

What is sexual orientation.

Sexual orientation refers to who you are attracted to emotionally and physically. It can be towards the opposite sex (heterosexuality), the same sex (homosexuality), or both sexes (bisexuality).

What is Gender Identity?

Gender identity refers to how you identify yourself in terms of being male, female, or something else. It is different from biological sex, which is determined by your chromosomes and reproductive organs.

Understanding Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

Sexual orientation and gender identity are two distinct aspects of a person’s identity. One’s sexual orientation does not determine their gender identity, and vice versa.

Respecting Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

It is important to respect everyone’s sexual orientation and gender identity. Everyone deserves to be treated with respect and dignity, regardless of who they are attracted to or how they identify themselves.

250 Words Essay on Sexual Orientation And Gender Identity

Sexual orientation.

Sexual orientation refers to an individual’s enduring physical, romantic, sexual, and/or emotional attraction to other people. It encompasses a wide range of feelings, behaviors, and identities.

People can be attracted to people of the opposite sex, the same sex, or both sexes. Some people may feel attracted to people regardless of their sex or gender identity.

Sexual orientation is not a choice. People are born with their sexual orientation, and it is not something they can change.

Gender Identity

Gender identity refers to an individual’s deeply felt sense of being male, female, a blend of both, or neither. It is not the same as biological sex, which is assigned at birth based on physical characteristics.

People may identify with a gender that is different from the sex they were assigned at birth. This is called being transgender.

Transgender people may experience discrimination and prejudice because of their gender identity. They may be denied jobs, housing, and healthcare. They may also be subjected to violence and harassment.

Importance of Understanding and Respecting Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

It is important to understand and respect sexual orientation and gender identity because everyone deserves to be treated with dignity and respect.

No one should be discriminated against or harassed because of their sexual orientation or gender identity.

We should all work to create a more inclusive and welcoming society for everyone.

500 Words Essay on Sexual Orientation And Gender Identity

Sexual orientation: an overview.

Sexual orientation refers to an individual’s attraction to others in terms of their gender. It encompasses various orientations, including being heterosexual (attracted to the opposite gender), homosexual (attracted to the same gender), or bisexual (attracted to both genders). Sexual orientation is a fundamental aspect of human diversity and is shaped by various factors, including biology, psychology, and social experiences.

Gender Identity: Understanding Self-Perception

Gender identity refers to an individual’s sense of being male, female, both, or neither, regardless of their biological sex assigned at birth. It is a complex and personal experience that involves a person’s innermost sense of self. Gender identity is distinct from sexual orientation and can be expressed through various aspects of a person’s life, such as their name, pronouns, and outward appearance.

Social Acceptance and Discrimination

Sexual orientation and gender identity have been topics of discussion and debate throughout history. While some societies have shown acceptance and understanding, others have faced discrimination and prejudice. Discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity, often referred to as sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) discrimination, can manifest in various forms, including social exclusion, denial of rights, and even violence.

The Importance of Equality and Inclusion

Promoting equality and inclusion for people of all sexual orientations and gender identities is crucial for creating a just and equitable society. It involves recognizing and respecting the diversity of human experiences, ensuring equal rights and opportunities, and fostering a culture of acceptance and inclusivity. Embracing diversity and celebrating differences are essential steps towards building a harmonious and tolerant world.

Challenges and the Way Forward

The journey towards full acceptance and equality for people of all sexual orientations and gender identities is ongoing. While progress has been made in many countries, challenges still exist. Efforts to educate and raise awareness about sexual orientation and gender identity are vital in combating discrimination and promoting understanding. Additionally, creating safe and supportive environments, both in schools and workplaces, is essential in fostering a sense of belonging and well-being among individuals from diverse backgrounds.

In conclusion, sexual orientation and gender identity are fundamental aspects of human diversity and should be recognized and respected. Promoting equality, inclusion, and acceptance for all individuals, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity, is a crucial step towards building a just and harmonious society.

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Home — Essay Samples — Sociology — Sexual Orientation — Understanding Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

Understanding Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

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Table of contents

Defining sexual orientation and gender identity, diverse perspectives on sexual orientation, diverse perspectives on gender identity, relevance of perspectives, 1. biological determinism, 2. social constructionism, 3. intersectionality, 1. gender essentialism, 3. gender affirmation, 1. reducing stigma and discrimination, 2. inclusive policies and practices, 3. affirming gender identity.

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11.1 Understanding Sex and Gender

Learning objectives.

• Define sex and gender and femininity and masculinity.
• Critically assess the evidence on biology, culture and socialization, and gender.
• Discuss agents of gender socialization.

Although the terms sex and gender are sometimes used interchangeably and do in fact complement each other, they nonetheless refer to different aspects of what it means to be a woman or man in any society.

Sex refers to the anatomical and other biological differences between females and males that are determined at the moment of conception and develop in the womb and throughout childhood and adolescence. Females, of course, have two X chromosomes, while males have one X chromosome and one Y chromosome. From this basic genetic difference spring other biological differences. The first to appear are the different genitals that boys and girls develop in the womb and that the doctor (or midwife) and parents look for when a baby is born (assuming the baby’s sex is not already known from ultrasound or other techniques) so that the momentous announcement, “It’s a boy!” or “It’s a girl!” can be made. The genitalia are called primary sex characteristics , while the other differences that develop during puberty are called secondary sex characteristics and stem from hormonal differences between the two sexes. In this difficult period of adolescents’ lives, boys generally acquire deeper voices, more body hair, and more muscles from their flowing testosterone. Girls develop breasts and wider hips and begin menstruating as nature prepares them for possible pregnancy and childbirth. For better or worse, these basic biological differences between the sexes affect many people’s perceptions of what it means to be female or male, as we shall soon discuss.

Gender as a Social Construction

If sex is a biological concept, then gender is a social concept. It refers to the social and cultural differences a society assigns to people based on their (biological) sex. A related concept, gender roles , refers to a society’s expectations of people’s behavior and attitudes based on whether they are females or males. Understood in this way, gender, like race as discussed in Chapter 7 “Deviance, Crime, and Social Control” , is a social construction . How we think and behave as females and males is not etched in stone by our biology but rather is a result of how society expects us to think and behave based on what sex we are. As we grow up, we learn these expectations as we develop our gender identity , or our beliefs about ourselves as females or males.

These expectations are called femininity and masculinity . Femininity refers to the cultural expectations we have of girls and women, while masculinity refers to the expectations we have of boys and men. A familiar nursery rhyme nicely summarizes these two sets of traits:

What are little boys made of?

Snips and snails,

And puppy dog tails,

That’s what little boys are made of.

What are little girls made of?

Sugar and spice,

And everything nice,

That’s what little girls are made of.

As this nursery rhyme suggests, our traditional notions of femininity and masculinity indicate that we think females and males are fundamentally different from each other. In effect, we think of them as two sides of the same coin of being human. What we traditionally mean by femininity is captured in the adjectives, both positive and negative, we traditionally ascribe to women: gentle, sensitive, nurturing, delicate, graceful, cooperative, decorative, dependent, emotional, passive, and weak. Thus when we say that a girl or woman is very feminine, we have some combination of these traits, usually the positive ones, in mind: she is soft, dainty, pretty, even a bit flighty. What we traditionally mean by masculinity is captured in the adjectives, again both positive and negative, our society traditionally ascribes to men: strong, assertive, brave, active, independent, intelligent, competitive, insensitive, unemotional, and aggressive. When we say that a boy or man is very masculine, we have some combination of these traits in mind: he is tough, strong, and assertive.

Infant girls traditionally wear pink, while infant boys wear blue. This color difference reflects the different cultural expectations we have for babies based on their (biological) sex.

Abby Bischoff – CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

These traits might sound like stereotypes of females and males in today’s society, and to some extent they are, but differences between men and women in attitudes and behavior do in fact exist (Aulette, Wittner, & Blakeley, 2009). For example, women cry more often than men do. Men are more physically violent than women. Women take care of children more than men do. Women smile more often than men. Men curse more often than women. When women talk with each other, they are more likely to talk about their personal lives than men are when they talk with each other (Tannen, 2001). The two sexes even differ when they hold a cigarette (not that anyone should smoke). When a woman holds a cigarette, she usually has the palm of her cigarette-holding hand facing upward. When a man holds a cigarette, he usually has his palm facing downward.

Sexual Orientation

Sexual orientation refers to a person’s preference for sexual relationships with individuals of the other sex ( heterosexuality ), one’s own sex ( homosexuality ), or both sexes ( bisexuality ). The term also increasingly refers to transgendered individuals, those whose behavior, appearance, and/or gender identity fails to conform to conventional norms. Transgendered individuals include transvestites (those who dress in the clothing of the opposite sex) and transsexuals (those whose gender identity differs from the physiological sex and who sometimes undergo a sex change).

It is difficult to know precisely how many people are gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgendered. One problem is conceptual. For example, what does it mean to be gay or lesbian? Does one need to actually have sexual relations with a same-sex partner to be considered gay? What if someone is attracted to same-sex partners but does not actually engage in sex with such persons? What if someone identifies as heterosexual but engages in homosexual sex for money (as in certain forms of prostitution) or for power and influence (as in much prison sex)? These conceptual problems make it difficult to determine the extent of homosexuality.

A second problem is empirical. Even if we can settle on a definition of homosexuality, how do we then determine how many people fit this definition? For better or worse, our best evidence of the number of gays and lesbians in the United States comes from surveys of national samples of Americans in which they are asked various questions about their sexuality. Although these are anonymous surveys, obviously at least some individuals may be reluctant to disclose their sexual activity and thoughts to an interviewer. Still, scholars think the estimates from these surveys are fairly accurate but that they probably underestimate by at least a small amount the number of gays and lesbians.

A widely cited survey carried out by researchers at the University of Chicago found that 2.8% of men and 1.4% of women identified themselves as gay/lesbian or bisexual, with greater percentages reporting having had sexual relations with same-sex partners or being attracted to same-sex persons (see Table 11.1 “Prevalence of Homosexuality in the United States” ). In the 2008 General Social Survey, 2.2% of men and 3.5% of women identified themselves as gay/lesbian or bisexual. Among individuals having had any sexual partners since turning 18, 2.2% of men reported having had at least some male partners, while 4.6% of women reported having had at least some female partners. Although precise numbers must remain unknown, it seems fair to say that between about 2% and 5% of Americans are gay/lesbian or bisexual.

Table 11.1 Prevalence of Homosexuality in the United States

Source: Data from Laumann, E. O., Gagnon, J. H., Michael, R. T., & Michaels, S. (1994). The social organization of sexuality . Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

If it is difficult to determine the number of people who are gay/lesbian or bisexual, it is even more difficult to determine why some people have this sexual orientation while most do not have it. Scholars disagree on the “causes” of sexual orientation (Engle, McFalls, Gallagher, & Curtis, 2006; Sheldon, Pfeffer, Jayaratne, Feldbaum, & Petty, 2007). Some scholars attribute it to unknown biological factor(s) over which individuals have no control, just as individuals do not decide whether they are left-handed or right-handed. Supporting this view, many gays say they realized they were gay during adolescence, just as straights would say they realized they were straight during their own adolescence. Other scholars say that sexual orientation is at least partly influenced by cultural norms, so that individuals are more likely to identify as gay or straight depending on the cultural views of sexual orientation into which they are socialized as they grow up. At best, perhaps all we can say is that sexual orientation stems from a complex mix of biological and cultural factors that remain to be determined.

The Development of Gender Differences

What accounts for differences in female and male behavior and attitudes? Do the biological differences between the sexes account for other differences? Or do these latter differences stem, as most sociologists think, from cultural expectations and from differences in the ways in which the sexes are socialized? These are critical questions, for they ask whether the differences between boys and girls and women and men stem more from biology or from society. As Chapter 2 “Eye on Society: Doing Sociological Research” pointed out, biological explanations for human behavior implicitly support the status quo. If we think behavioral and other differences between the sexes are due primarily to their respective biological makeups, we are saying that these differences are inevitable or nearly so and that any attempt to change them goes against biology and will likely fail.

As an example, consider the obvious biological fact that women bear and nurse children and men do not. Couple this with the common view that women are also more gentle and nurturing than men, and we end up with a “biological recipe” for women to be the primary caretakers of children. Many people think this means women are therefore much better suited than men to take care of children once they are born, and that the family might be harmed if mothers work outside the home or if fathers are the primary caretakers. Figure 11.1 “Belief That Women Should Stay at Home” shows that more than one-third of the public agrees that “it is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.” To the extent this belief exists, women may not want to work outside the home or, if they choose to do so, they face difficulties from employers, family, and friends. Conversely, men may not even think about wanting to stay at home and may themselves face difficulties from employees, family, and friends if they want to do so. A belief in a strong biological basis for differences between women and men implies, then, that there is little we can or should do to change these differences. It implies that “anatomy is destiny,” and destiny is, of course, by definition inevitable.

Figure 11.1 Belief That Women Should Stay at Home

Agreement or disagreement with statement that “it is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.”

Source: Data from General Social Survey, 2008.

This implication makes it essential to understand the extent to which gender differences do, in fact, stem from biological differences between the sexes or, instead, stem from cultural and social influences. If biology is paramount, then gender differences are perhaps inevitable and the status quo will remain. If culture and social influences matter much more than biology, then gender differences can change and the status quo may give way. With this backdrop in mind, let’s turn to the biological evidence for behavioral and other differences between the sexes and then examine the evidence for their social and cultural roots.

Biology and Gender

Several biological explanations for gender roles exist, and we discuss two of the most important ones here. One explanation is from the related fields of sociobiology (see Chapter 2 “Eye on Society: Doing Sociological Research” ) and evolutionary psychology (Workman & Reader, 2009) and argues an evolutionary basis for traditional gender roles.

Scholars advocating this view reason as follows (Barash, 2007; Thornhill & Palmer, 2000). In prehistoric societies, few social roles existed. A major role centered on relieving hunger by hunting or gathering food. The other major role centered on bearing and nursing children. Because only women could perform this role, they were also the primary caretakers for children for several years after birth. And because women were frequently pregnant, their roles as mothers confined them to the home for most of their adulthood. Meanwhile, men were better suited than women for hunting because they were stronger and quicker than women. In prehistoric societies, then, biology was indeed destiny: for biological reasons, men in effect worked outside the home (hunted), while women stayed at home with their children.

Evolutionary reasons also explain why men are more violent than women. In prehistoric times, men who were more willing to commit violence against and even kill other men would “win out” in the competition for female mates. They thus were more likely than less violent men to produce offspring, who would then carry these males’ genetic violent tendencies. By the same token, men who were prone to rape women were more likely to produce offspring, who would then carry these males’ “rape genes.” This early process guaranteed that rape tendencies would be biologically transmitted and thus provided a biological basis for the amount of rape that occurs today.

If the human race evolved along these lines, sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists continue, natural selection favored those societies where men were stronger, braver, and more aggressive and where women were more fertile and nurturing. Such traits over the millennia became fairly instinctual, meaning that men’s and women’s biological natures evolved differently. Men became, by nature, more assertive, daring, and violent than women, and women are, by nature, more gentle, nurturing, and maternal than men. To the extent this is true, these scholars add, traditional gender roles for women and men make sense from an evolutionary standpoint, and attempts to change them go against the sexes’ biological natures. This in turn implies that existing gender inequality must continue because it is rooted in biology. As the title of a book presenting the evolutionary psychology argument summarizes this implication, “biology at work: rethinking sexual equality” (Browne, 2002).

According to some sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists, today’s gender differences in strength and physical aggression are ultimately rooted in certain evolutionary processes that spanned millennia.

Vladimir Pustovit – Couple – CC BY 2.0.

Critics challenge the evolutionary explanation on several grounds (Hurley, 2007; Buller, 2006; Begley, 2009). First, much greater gender variation in behavior and attitudes existed in prehistoric times than the evolutionary explanation assumes. Second, even if biological differences did influence gender roles in prehistoric times, these differences are largely irrelevant in today’s world, in which, for example, physical strength is not necessary for survival. Third, human environments throughout the millennia have simply been too diverse to permit the simple, straightforward biological development that the evolutionary explanation assumes. Fourth, evolutionary arguments implicitly justify existing gender inequality by implying the need to confine women and men to their traditional roles.

Recent anthropological evidence also challenges the evolutionary argument that men’s tendency to commit violence, including rape, was biologically transmitted. This evidence instead finds that violent men have trouble finding female mates who would want them and that the female mates they find and the children they produce are often killed by rivals to the men. The recent evidence also finds those rapists’ children are often abandoned and then die. As one anthropologist summarizes the rape evidence, “The likelihood that rape is an evolved adaptation [is] extremely low. It just wouldn’t have made sense for men in the [prehistoric epoch] to use rape as a reproductive strategy, so the argument that it’s preprogrammed into us doesn’t hold up” (Begley, 2009, p. 54).

A second biological explanation for traditional gender roles centers on hormones and specifically on testosterone, the so-called male hormone. One of the most important differences between boys and girls and men and women in the United States and many other societies is their level of aggression. Simply put, males are much more physically aggressive than females and in the United States commit about 85%–90% of all violent crimes (see Chapter 7 “Deviance, Crime, and Social Control” ). Why is this so? As Chapter 7 “Deviance, Crime, and Social Control” pointed out, this gender difference is often attributed to males’ higher levels of testosterone (Mazur, 2009).

To see whether testosterone does indeed raise aggression, researchers typically assess whether males with higher testosterone levels are more aggressive than those with lower testosterone levels. Several studies find that this is indeed the case. For example, a widely cited study of Vietnam-era male veterans found that those with higher levels of testosterone had engaged in more violent behavior (Booth & Osgood, 1993). However, this correlation does not necessarily mean that their testosterone increased their violence: as has been found in various animal species, it is also possible that their violence increased their testosterone. Because studies of human males can’t for ethical and practical reasons manipulate their testosterone levels, the exact meaning of the results from these testosterone-aggression studies must remain unclear, according to a review sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences (Miczek, Mirsky, Carey, DeBold, & Raine, 1994).

Another line of research on the biological basis for sex differences in aggression involves children, including some as young as ages 1 or 2, in various situations (Card, Stucky, Sawalani, & Little, 2008). They might be playing with each other, interacting with adults, or writing down solutions to hypothetical scenarios given to them by a researcher. In most of these studies, boys are more physically aggressive in thought or deed than girls, even at a very young age. Other studies are more experimental in nature. In one type of study, a toddler will be playing with a toy, only to have it removed by an adult. Boys typically tend to look angry and try to grab the toy back, while girls tend to just sit there and whimper. Because these gender differences in aggression are found at very young ages, researchers often say they must have some biological basis. However, critics of this line of research counter that even young children have already been socialized along gender lines (Begley, 2009; Eliot, 2009), a point to which we return later. To the extent this is true, gender differences in children’s aggression may simply reflect socialization and not biology.

In sum, biological evidence for gender differences certainly exists, but its interpretation remains very controversial. It must be weighed against the evidence, to which we next turn, of cultural variations in the experience of gender and of socialization differences by gender. One thing is clear: to the extent we accept biological explanations for gender, we imply that existing gender differences and gender inequality must continue to exist. This implication prompts many social scientists to be quite critical of the biological viewpoint. As Linda L. Lindsey (2011, p. 52) notes, “Biological arguments are consistently drawn upon to justify gender inequality and the continued oppression of women.” In contrast, cultural and social explanations of gender differences and gender inequality promise some hope for change. Let’s examine the evidence for these explanations.

Culture and Gender

Some of the most compelling evidence against a strong biological determination of gender roles comes from anthropologists, whose work on preindustrial societies demonstrates some striking gender variation from one culture to another. This variation underscores the impact of culture on how females and males think and behave.

Margaret Mead (1935) was one of the first anthropologists to study cultural differences in gender. In New Guinea she found three tribes—the Arapesh, the Mundugumor, and the Tchambuli—whose gender roles differed dramatically. In the Arapesh both sexes were gentle and nurturing. Both women and men spent much time with their children in a loving way and exhibited what we would normally call maternal behavior. In the Arapesh, then, different gender roles did not exist, and in fact, both sexes conformed to what Americans would normally call the female gender role.

Margaret Mead made important contributions to the anthropological study of gender. Her work suggested that culture dramatically influences how females and males behave and that gender is rooted much more in culture than in biology.

U.S. Library of Congress – public domain.

The situation was the reverse among the Mundugumor. Here both men and women were fierce, competitive, and violent. Both sexes seemed to almost dislike children and often physically punished them. In the Mundugumor society, then, different gender roles also did not exist, as both sexes conformed to what we Americans would normally call the male gender role.

In the Tchambuli, Mead finally found a tribe where different gender roles did exist. One sex was the dominant, efficient, assertive one and showed leadership in tribal affairs, while the other sex liked to dress up in frilly clothes, wear makeup, and even giggle a lot. Here, then, Mead found a society with gender roles similar to those found in the United States, but with a surprising twist. In the Tchambuli, women were the dominant, assertive sex that showed leadership in tribal affairs, while men were the ones wearing frilly clothes and makeup.

Mead’s research caused a firestorm in scholarly circles, as it challenged the biological view on gender that was still very popular when she went to New Guinea. In recent years, Mead’s findings have been challenged by other anthropologists. Among other things, they argue that she probably painted an overly simplistic picture of gender roles in her three societies (Scheper-Hughes, 1987). Other anthropologists defend Mead’s work and note that much subsequent research has found that gender-linked attitudes and behavior do differ widely from one culture to another (Morgan, 1989). If so, they say, the impact of culture on what it means to be a female or male cannot be ignored.

Extensive evidence of this impact comes from anthropologist George Murdock, who created the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample of almost 200 preindustrial societies studied by anthropologists. Murdock (1937) found that some tasks in these societies, such as hunting and trapping, are almost always done by men, while other tasks, such as cooking and fetching water, are almost always done by women. These patterns provide evidence for the evolutionary argument presented earlier, as they probably stem from the biological differences between the sexes. Even so there were at least some societies in which women hunted and in which men cooked and fetched water.

More importantly, Murdock found much greater gender variation in several of the other tasks he studied, including planting crops, milking, and generating fires. Men primarily performed these tasks in some societies, women primarily performed them in other societies, and in still other societies both sexes performed them equally. Figure 11.2 “Gender Responsibility for Weaving” shows the gender responsibility for yet another task, weaving. Women are the primary weavers in about 61% of the societies that do weaving, men are the primary weavers in 32%, and both sexes do the weaving in 7% of the societies. Murdock’s findings illustrate how gender roles differ from one culture to another and imply they are not biologically determined.

Figure 11.2 Gender Responsibility for Weaving

Source: Data from Standard Cross-Cultural Sample.

Anthropologists since Mead and Murdock have continued to investigate cultural differences in gender. Some of their most interesting findings concern gender and sexuality (Morgan, 1989; Brettell & Sargent, 2009). Although all societies distinguish “femaleness” and “maleness,” additional gender categories exist in some societies. The Native Americans known as the Mohave, for example, recognize four genders: a woman, a woman who acts like a man, a man, and a man who acts like a woman. In some societies, a third, intermediary gender category is recognized. Anthropologists call this category the berdache , who is usually a man who takes on a woman’s role. This intermediary category combines aspects of both femininity and masculinity of the society in which it is found and is thus considered an androgynous gender. Although some people in this category are born as intersexed individuals (formerly known as hermaphrodites ), meaning they have genitalia of both sexes, many are born biologically as one sex or the other but adopt an androgynous identity.

An example of this intermediary gender category may be found in India, where the hirja role involves males who wear women’s clothing and identify as women (Reddy, 2006). The hirja role is an important part of Hindu mythology, in which androgynous figures play key roles both as humans and as gods. Today people identified by themselves and others as hirjas continue to play an important role in Hindu practices and in Indian cultural life in general. Serena Nanda (1997, pp. 200–201) calls hirjas “human beings who are neither man nor woman” and says they are thought of as “special, sacred beings” even though they are sometimes ridiculed and abused.

Anthropologists have found another androgynous gender composed of women warriors in 33 Native American groups in North America. Walter L. Williams (1997) calls these women “amazons” and notes that they dress like men and sometimes even marry women. In some tribes girls exhibit such “masculine” characteristics from childhood, while in others they may be recruited into “amazonhood.” In the Kaska Indians, for example, a married couple with too many daughters would select one to “be like a man.” When she was about 5 years of age, her parents would begin to dress her like a boy and have her do male tasks. Eventually she would grow up to become a hunter.

The androgynous genders found by anthropologists remind us that gender is a social construction and not just a biological fact. If culture does affect gender roles, socialization is the process through which culture has this effect. What we experience as girls and boys strongly influences how we develop as women and men in terms of behavior and attitudes. To illustrate this important dimension of gender, let’s turn to the evidence on socialization.

Socialization and Gender

Chapter 3 “Culture” identified several agents of socialization, including the family, peers, schools, the mass media, and religion. While that chapter’s discussion focused on these agents’ impact on socialization in general, ample evidence of their impact on gender-role socialization also exists. Such socialization helps boys and girls develop their gender identity (Andersen & Hysock, 2009).

Parents play with their daughters and sons differently. For example, fathers generally roughhouse more with their sons than with their daughters.

Jagrap – Roughhousing – CC BY-NC 2.0.

Socialization into gender roles begins in infancy, as almost from the moment of birth parents begin to socialize their children as boys or girls without even knowing it (Begley, 2009; Eliot, 2009). Many studies document this process (Lindsey, 2011). Parents commonly describe their infant daughters as pretty, soft, and delicate and their infant sons as strong, active, and alert, even though neutral observers find no such gender differences among infants when they do not know the infants’ sex. From infancy on, parents play with and otherwise interact with their daughters and sons differently. They play more roughly with their sons—for example, by throwing them up in the air or by gently wrestling with them—and more quietly with their daughters. When their infant or toddler daughters cry, they warmly comfort them, but they tend to let their sons cry longer and to comfort them less. They give their girls dolls to play with and their boys “action figures” and toy guns. While these gender differences in socialization are probably smaller now than a generation ago, they certainly continue to exist. Go into a large toy store and you will see pink aisles of dolls and cooking sets and blue aisles of action figures, toy guns, and related items.

Peer influences also encourage gender socialization. As they reach school age, children begin to play different games based on their gender (see the “Sociology Making a Difference” box). Boys tend to play sports and other competitive team games governed by inflexible rules and relatively large numbers of roles, while girls tend to play smaller, cooperative games such as hopscotch and jumping rope with fewer and more flexible rules. Although girls are much more involved in sports now than a generation ago, these gender differences in their play as youngsters persist and continue to reinforce gender roles. For example, they encourage competitiveness in boys and cooperation and trust among girls. Boys who are not competitive risk being called “sissy” or other words by their peers. The patterns we see in adult males and females thus have their roots in their play as young children (King, Miles, & Kniska, 1991).

Sociology Making a Difference

Gender Differences in Children’s Play and Games

In considering the debate, discussed in the text, between biology and sociology over the origins of gender roles, some widely cited studies by sociologists over gender differences in children’s play and games provide important evidence for the importance of socialization.

Janet Lever (1978) studied fifth-grade children in three different communities in Connecticut. She watched them play and otherwise interact in school and also had the children keep diaries of their play and games outside school. One of her central aims was to determine how complex the two sexes’ play and games were in terms of such factors as number of rules, specialization of roles, and size of the group playing. In all of these respects, Lever found that boys’ play and games were typically more complex than girls’ play and games. She attributed these differences to socialization by parents, teachers, and other adults and argued that the complexity of boys’ play and games helped them to be better able than girls to learn important social skills such as dealing with rules and coordinating actions to achieve goals.

Meanwhile, Barrie Thorne (1993) spent many months in two different working-class communities in California and Michigan observing fourth and fifth graders sit in class and lunchrooms and play on the school playgrounds. Most children were white, but several were African American or Latino. As you might expect, the girls and boys she observed usually played separately from each other, and the one-sex groups in which they played were very important for the development of their gender identity, with boys tending to play team sports and other competitive games and girls tending to play cooperative games such as jump rope. These differences led Thorne to conclude that gender-role socialization stems not only from practices by adults but also from the children’s own activities without adult involvement. When boys and girls did interact, it was often “girls against the boys” or vice versa in classroom spelling contests and in games such as tag. Thorne concluded that these “us against them” contests helped the children learn that boys and girls are two different and antagonistic sexes and that gender itself is antagonistic, even if there were also moments when both sexes interacted on the playground in more relaxed, noncompetitive situations. Boys also tended to disrupt girls’ games more than the reverse and in this manner both exerted and learned dominance over females. In all of these ways, children were not just the passive recipients of gender-role socialization from adults (their teachers), but they also played an active role in ensuring that such socialization occurred.

The studies by Lever and Thorne were among the first to emphasize the importance of children’s play and peer relationships for gender socialization. They also called attention to the importance of the traits and values learned through such socialization for outcomes later in life. The rise in team sports opportunities for girls in the years since Lever and Thorne did their research is a welcome development that addresses the concerns expressed in their studies, but young children continue to play in the ways that Lever and Thorne found. To the extent children’s play has the consequences just listed, and to the extent these consequences impede full gender inequality, these sociological studies suggest the need for teachers, parents, and other adults to help organize children’s play that is more egalitarian along the lines discussed by Lever, Thorne, and other scholars. In this way, their sociological work has helped to make a difference and promises to continue to do so.

School is yet another agent of gender socialization (Klein, 2007). First of all, school playgrounds provide a location for the gender-linked play activities just described to occur. Second, and perhaps more important, teachers at all levels treat their female and male students differently in subtle ways of which they are probably not aware. They tend to call on boys more often to answer questions in class and to praise them more when they give the right answer. They also give boys more feedback about their assignments and other school work (Sadker & Sadker, 1994). At all grade levels, many textbooks and other books still portray people in gender-stereotyped ways. It is true that the newer books do less of this than older ones, but the newer books still contain some stereotypes, and the older books are still used in many schools, especially those that cannot afford to buy newer volumes.

Women’s magazines reinforce the view that women need to be slender and wear many cosmetics in order to be considered beautiful.

Photo Editing Services Tucia.com – Glamour /Fashion Retouching by Tucia – CC BY 2.0.

Gender socialization also occurs through the mass media (Dow & Wood, 2006). On children’s television shows, the major characters are male. On Nickelodeon, for example, the very popular SpongeBob SquarePants is a male, as are his pet snail, Gary; his best friend, Patrick Star; their neighbor, Squidward Tentacles; and SpongeBob’s employer, Eugene Crabs. Of the major characters in Bikini Bottom, only Sandy Cheeks is a female. For all its virtues, Sesame Street features Bert, Ernie, Cookie Monster, and other male characters. Most of the Muppets are males, and the main female character, Miss Piggy, depicted as vain and jealous, is hardly an admirable female role model. As for adults’ prime-time television, more men than women continue to fill more major roles in weekly shows, despite notable women’s roles in shows such as The Good Wife and Grey’s Anatomy . Women are also often portrayed as unintelligent or frivolous individuals who are there more for their looks than for anything else. Television commercials reinforce this image (Yoder, Christopher, & Holmes, 2008). Cosmetics ads abound, suggesting not only that a major task for women is to look good but also that their sense of self-worth stems from looking good. Other commercials show women becoming ecstatic over achieving a clean floor or sparkling laundry. Judging from the world of television commercials, then, women’s chief goals in life are to look good and to have a clean house. At the same time, men’s chief goals, judging from many commercials, are to drink beer and drive cars.

Women’s and men’s magazines reinforce these gender images (Milillo, 2008). Most of the magazines intended for teenaged girls and adult women are filled with pictures of thin, beautiful models, advice on dieting, cosmetics ads, and articles on how to win and please your man. Conversely, the magazines intended for teenaged boys and men are filled with ads and articles on cars and sports, advice on how to succeed in careers and other endeavors, and pictures of thin, beautiful (and sometimes nude) women. These magazine images again suggest that women’s chief goals are to look good and to please men and that men’s chief goals are to succeed, win over women, and live life in the fast lane.

Another agent of socialization, religion, also contributes to traditional gender stereotypes. Many traditional interpretations of the Bible yield the message that women are subservient to men (Tanenbaum, 2009). This message begins in Genesis, where the first human is Adam, and Eve was made from one of his ribs. The major figures in the rest of the Bible are men, and women are for the most part depicted as wives, mothers, temptresses, and prostitutes; they are praised for their roles as wives and mothers and condemned for their other roles. More generally, women are constantly depicted as the property of men. The Ten Commandments includes a neighbor’s wife with his house, ox, and other objects as things not to be coveted (Exodus 20:17), and many biblical passages say explicitly that women belong to men, such as this one from the New Testament:

Wives be subject to your husbands, as to the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife as Christ is the head of the Church. As the Church is subject to Christ, so let wives also be subject in everything to their husbands. (Ephesians 5:22–24)

Several passages in the Old Testament justify the rape and murder of women and girls. The Koran, the sacred book of Islam, also contains passages asserting the subordinate role of women (Mayer, 2009).

This discussion suggests that religious people should believe in traditional gender views more than less religious people, and research confirms this relationship (Morgan, 1988). To illustrate this, Figure 11.3 “Frequency of Prayer and Acceptance of Traditional Gender Roles in the Family” shows the relationship in the General Social Survey between frequency of prayer and the view (seen first in Figure 11.1 “Belief That Women Should Stay at Home” ) that “it is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.” People who pray more often are more likely to accept this traditional view of gender roles.

Figure 11.3 Frequency of Prayer and Acceptance of Traditional Gender Roles in the Family

Percentage agreeing that “it is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.”

A Final Word on the Sources of Gender

Scholars in many fields continue to debate the relative importance of biology and of culture and socialization for how we behave and think as girls and boys and as women and men. The biological differences between females and males lead many scholars and no doubt much of the public to assume that masculinity and femininity are to a large degree biologically determined or at least influenced. In contrast, anthropologists, sociologists, and other social scientists tend to view gender as a social construction. Even if biology does matter for gender, they say, the significance of culture and socialization should not be underestimated. To the extent that gender is indeed shaped by society and culture, it is possible to change gender and to help bring about a society where both men and women have more opportunity to achieve their full potential.

Key Takeaways

• Sex is a biological concept, while gender is a social concept and refers to the social and cultural differences a society assigns to people based on their sex.
• Several biological explanations for gender roles exist, but sociologists think culture and socialization are more important sources of gender roles than biology.
• Families, schools, peers, the mass media, and religion are agents of socialization for the development of gender identity and gender roles.

For Your Review

• Write a short essay about one or two events you recall from your childhood that reflected or reinforced your gender socialization.
• Do you think gender roles are due more to biology or to culture and socialization? Explain your answer.

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Gender Identity Essay

Introduction, interaction between hormones and behavior, current arguments on sexual identity, biological influences on gender identity and sexual differentiation, environmental influences.

Gender refers to the state of being either male or female, which is distinguished by factors such as gender roles, social and economic status, perceptions, and ideals and values (Lee, 2005). Gender has been described as a psycho-sociocultural aspect. In contrast, sex is a biological concept that is determined by factors such as hormones and genetic make-up (Lee, 2005). Gender is also understood as evaluation of behavior based on individual perceptions and societal expectations.

Gender identity is defined as personal concepts and perceptions of self that are based on gender (Lee, 2005). This paper will explore determination of gender identity based on connections between hormones and behavior. In addition, it will scrutinize how biological and environmental factors affect gender identity. It will also explore current arguments on gender identity.

Research studies have revealed that hormones have great influence on behavior. For example, hormonal processes contribute towards hostile and aggressive behaviors (Lee, 2005). Studies associate certain behaviors with certain hormones. For example, testosterone is associated with aggressiveness. Studies on effect of hormones on behavior are based on the net effect of hormones on emotions. They cause varying level of moods or behavior depending on their concentrations.

For example, in adults, estrogen causes positive moods while lack of estrogen causes depressive moods (Lee, 2005). This is the same effect testosterone has on moods and behaviors. Some hormones affect behavior directly while others affect behavior indirectly. For example, hormones that determine body size affect behavior indirectly. Big-sized people are domineering and usually rough towards small-sized people. Abnormal activity of glands can also influence behavior directly.

Hormones respond by combining with specific cell receptors to form behavior. Puberty and prenatal periods are the most critical periods in human development that hormones have the greatest impact (Lee, 2005). During the prenatal period, any anomaly in production of hormones results in anomalies in gender identity.

For example, a study conducted on 25 androgenized girls found out that even though they were raised as girls, they exhibited masculine attitudes, sexuality, and grooming (Lee, 2005). After the development of Money’s theories on gender identity, several studies followed that established connections between gender identity and environmental factors.

Current arguments on sexual identify claim that is mainly determined by biological factors rather than environmental factors (Lee, 2005). This argument is based on lifestyles such as homosexuality and lesbianism. These arguments claim that people who adopt these lifestyles were born that way because of interaction between different biological factors.

Other arguments claim that such lifestyles can be caused by environmental factors. If an individual gets exposure to one of these lifestyles early in childhood, then he/she would adopt a similar lifestyle owing to influence of the environment (Lee, 2005). However, research has established that these lifestyles are mainly caused by influence of biological factors and further augmented by environmental factors.

The influence of biological factors on gender identity can be explained by considering functions of hormones and cerebral lateralization of the brain (Lee, 2005).

Gender is determined before birth by biological factors. Studies have revealed that brain lateralization and hormonal functions contribute in determination of gender. Males and females contain sexual and reproductive hormones in varying quantities. This is observed from childhood through adulthood although in each stage of development certain changes take place. During puberty, gender characteristics become more pronounced because attraction towards the opposite sex develops (Lee, 2005).

Brain lateralization follows different systems of development in males and females. For example, in females the left side of the brain is more developed compared to males whose right side is more developed. Variation in brain lateralization accounts for high performance by males in sciences and mathematics and better performance in languages by girls.

The first environmental child experiences after birth is the family (Lee, 2005). Mothers dress newborn babies in clothes that depict their gender. As they go through different development stages, children learn to discern their gender from how they are treated. Fathers influence boys and mothers influence girls.

Absence of a father in the family affects discernment of gender identity significantly. Other environments outside the family also play critical roles. Television, music, movies, and books depict different genders in different ways (Lee, 2005). Children pick gender cues from these environments and incorporate them in their gender identity discernment processes.

Environmental factors have the greatest influence on gender identity compared to other factors. Environments such as family and classrooms have the greater influence on gender identity compared to biological and psychological factors (Lee, 2005).

Gender differs from sex in that it is psycho-sociocultural while sex is biological. Aspects such as social and economic status, roles, and personal perceptions determine gender. Gender identity is influenced and determined by biological, psychological, and environmental factors.

The environment has the greatest influence compared to other factors. From childhood to adulthood, people interact with different environments that influence how they discern and define gender identity. According to the foregoing discussion, nurture has greater influence on gender identity than nature. Each of the three factors plays a different role in determination of gender identity.

Lee, J. (2005). Focus on Gender Identity . New York: Nova Publishers.

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Gender identity and gender expression.

• Jama Shelton Jama Shelton Hunter College, City University of New York
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199975839.013.1324
• Published online: 21 June 2023

Gender identity and gender expression are aspects of personal identity that impact an individual across multiple social dimensions. As such, it is critical that social workers understand the role of gender identity and gender expression in an individual’s life. Many intersecting factors contribute to an individual’s gender identity development and gender expression, as well as their experiences interacting with individuals, communities, and systems. For instance, an individual’s race, geographic location, disability status, cultural background, religious affiliation, age, economic status, and access to gender-affirming healthcare are some of the factors that may impact experiences of gender identity and gender expression. Gender identity and expression are dimensions of diversity that social workers will interact with at all levels of practice. As such, it is important for social work educational institutions to ensure their students are prepared for practice with people of all gender identities and expression, while also understanding the historical context of the social work profession in relation to transgender populations and the ways in which the profession has reinforced the sex and gender binaries.

• gender binary
• gender equity
• gender identity
• gender expression

What Are Gender Identity and Gender Expression?

Every individual has a gender identity, and every individual expresses their gender (see Table 1 ). Gender identity and gender expression are often referenced in relation to transgender, nonbinary, and gender-expansive people, yet one’s gender and the expression of gender are dimensions of identity that every individual possesses. Gender identity can be understood as an individual’s internal sense of self as it relates to gender. One’s gender is a deeply felt, personal sense of self as a girl/woman, boy/man, both a girl/woman and a boy/man, neither a girl/woman nor a boy/man, or a combination of a girl/woman and a boy/man. Additional words people may use to describe their gender include (but are not limited to): nonbinary, gender expansive, agender, multigender, two-spirited, gender-fluid, genderqueer, and muxe. Importantly, there is no external source that can dictate an individual’s gender identity.

Gender expression refers to the ways in which an individual expresses their gender outwardly. Gender expression may include an individual’s dress, hairstyle, mannerisms, and behaviors. These are typically based on stereotypes about gender within a particular cultural context. An individual’s gender expression may or may not conform to social norms that are typically associated with an individual’s gender or with gendered assumptions based on an individual’s assigned sex. Importantly, an individual’s gender presentation may or may not reflect their gender identity. Issues such as personal safety and access to accurately gendered items may impact an individual’s ability to express their gender in a way that aligns with their gender identity.

Table 1. Additional Relevant Terms

The sex and gender binaries.

The terms gender and sex are often used interchangeably. While these terms may be related in some instances, they are not the same. An individual’s sex is connected to their chromosomes, hormones, and anatomy. Typically, an individual is assigned a sex at birth, if not prior to birth. A sex assignment is most often made based on the appearance of a baby’s genitals. The options for sex assignment have historically been either male or female, which is then listed on an individual’s birth certificate. This is still often the case in the United States, even though evidence demonstrates that sex is not a binary construct ( Fausto-Sterling, 2018 ). Some states in the country allow an additional option (X) for the classification of sex on the birth certificate. While it is beyond the scope of this article to examine the category of intersex (discussed in “XXX”), intersex people cannot be overlooked in discussions of sex and gender. The binary construction of sex assumes the existence of only two sexes. This is an inaccurate and limiting construct that ignores human variability. Not only is it inaccurate and limiting, it is also harmful. Intersex babies and children often undergo surgical procedures that they do not consent to, and are required to take hormones in order to make their bodies fit within a binary that their bodies directly challenge.

An individual’s gender is most often presumed based on their sex assignment, and is presumed to fall within the binary gender categories of girl/woman and boy/man. For instance, if a baby is assigned female, the assumption is that the baby is a girl and will grow up to be a woman. With this assumption comes a set of gendered norms and expectations, societally reinforced in myriad ways including options for grooming and dress, presumptions about appropriate behavior and presentation, and even the choice of language used to praise or discipline (“such a pretty girl” or “that’s not ladylike”). However, an individual’s assigned sex does not always predict their gender; gender identity is more strongly linked to an individual’s experience of gender than to assigned sex ( Olson et al., 2015 ). Yet, the connection between an individual’s sex and their gender and the binary constructions of both sex and gender are so widely taught that this misperception is pervasive in the United States and in many Western countries despite the fact that “defining gender as a condition determined strictly by a person’s genitals is based on a notion that doctors and scientists abandoned long ago as oversimplified and often medically meaningless” ( Grady, 2018 ). In addition to the limitations of these binary categories, sex and gender are often viewed as immutable and stable over time. The lived experiences of intersex, nonbinary, transgender, and gender-expansive people demonstrate the inaccuracy of the binary system of sex and gender categorization.

It is important to note that an individual’s identification within the gender binary is not itself problematic. Because many laws and policies in the United States are based on a binary construction of sex and/or gender, it is the classification system itself that is flawed. Binary classifications are problematic when identification with the gender binary and associated gender expressions are required for entry within social and legal systems.

Beyond the Binary: Reconceptualizing Gender Identity and Gender Expression

Some think about gender identity and gender expression as a continuum, with binary classifications marking the endpoints and a range of identities and expressions in between. More contemporary understandings assert that gender identity and gender expression exist more as a “galaxy” rather than a continuum ( Action Canada for Sexual Health and Rights, n.d. ). This thinking is more in alignment with moving beyond binary conceptualizations of gender altogether and situates all gender identities and gender expressions as equally viable, without relying on the containment of binary categories.

Moving beyond the gender binary not only improves the lived experiences of transgender, nonbinary, and gender-expansive people but also opens up possibilities for everyone . The construct of gender carries with it prescribed ways of being ranging from what is “appropriate” physical and behavioral gender expression to what are appropriate fields of study and career choices. Truly moving beyond the gender binary can liberate all people from the constraints inherent in presumptive and prescribed notions of what is deemed socially, culturally, and politically appropriate.

How could moving beyond the gender binary be operationalized within the social work profession? Prior to discussing suggestions for moving beyond the binary in social work education, practice, and research, it is important to first examine the history of the social work profession as it relates to gender identity and gender expression.

Social Work, Gender Identity, and Gender Expression: A Brief History

Historically, the social work profession is rife with demands that nonconforming gender expressions and bodies adapt to mainstream gendered expectations. Examples include the profession’s support for the assimilative Native American Residential Schools, electroconvulsive therapies intended to “cure” homosexuality, and a host of welfare eligibility requirements that serve to police Black families for their deviation from White heteronormative standards ( Bowles & Hopps, 2014 ). Thus, common practices centered around promoting access to resources through acclimating and gaining membership to the status quo. As such, the profession of social work has been complicit in the policing of gender and the maintenance of the gender binary. It is important for the profession to reckon with this disciplinary approach to gender identity and expression in the past, while also developing equitable frameworks for the future.

The primary formal mechanism for the policing of gender and, thus the reification of the gender binary, is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). Gender identity disorder was first included in the DSM-III in 1980 , and included the diagnoses “gender identity disorder of childhood” and “transsexualism.” When updated in 1987 , the new DSM-III-R included gender identity disorder of adolescence and adulthood, nontranssexual type ( Drescher, 2009 ). Gender identity disorder of adolescence and adulthood, nontranssexual type, was removed from the DSM-IV and replaced with the category gender identity disorder, a diagnosis encompassing both gender identity disorder of childhood and transsexualism ( Shelton et al., 2019 ). The most recent version of the DSM (the DSM-5) replaced gender identity disorder with gender dysphoria. This shift in diagnostic terminology signifies a change in the understanding of the root causes of the challenges individuals face when their gender identity and gender expression fall outside of the dominant societal norms prescribed to the gender associated with their assigned sex. Namely that societal definitions of and expectations surrounding gender do not accurately reflect people’s lived experience of gender. However, the fact that a mental health diagnosis remains in the DSM is considered problematic by many, as gender related dissonance continues to be constructed as individual pathology.

The DSM solidified the notion of a gendered norm any deviation from which required correction. For decades, the remedy was to fit an individual into a gender that aligned with the expectations associated with their assigned sex. Through modern medicine, a new type of “correction” emerged for those who could gain access, through hormone treatment and affirming surgeries. Though these interventions are medical in nature, the psychiatric diagnoses remain a driving force in accessing these treatments. Further, gender-affirming treatments have reinforced the necessity of binary gender conformity, by supporting an individual in their transition from one gender to the other gender. It is important to note here that these treatments have been and continue to be life-saving for many individuals, and that identifying with the gender binary is not in itself problematic. As already stated, the gender binary is problematic when a binary classification is imposed and/or presumed and is not in alignment with an individual’s stated gender and understanding of their own body ( Ansara & Hegarty, 2012 ), and when identification or categorization within the gender binary is required for entry into and acceptance within social and legal systems ( Shelton et al., 2019 ).

The National Association of Social Workers released a position statement denouncing the continued inclusion of gender identity related diagnoses in the DSM-5, stating that diagnoses such as gender dysphoria should be approached from a medical model rather than a mental health model. Because of the authority that the DSM holds in social work and related professions, the inclusion of gender dysphoria perpetuates the notion that the variability of gender is a psychiatric condition, reinforcing cisnormativity and the binary gender system. Advocacy organizations argue that until gender related diagnoses are removed from the DSM, transgender and gender-expansive people will continue to suffer from stigma, discrimination, and the invalidation of their identities and experiences.

Social workers may find themselves in a gatekeeping role when working with individuals whose gender identity and/or gender expression expand beyond binary classifications or stretch the boundaries of what is typically considered appropriate gendered behavior based on an individual’s sex assignment. For instance, according to the Standards of Care put forth by the World Professional Association for Transgender Health ( WPATH, 2012 ), in order to access gender-affirming care (such as hormone treatment or surgery), an individual must obtain a letter of recommendation from a qualified mental health professional diagnosing their persistent gender dysphoria and indicating their readiness for care ( Coleman et al, 2022 ). Thus, the notion that individuals whose gender identities expand beyond the binary cisgender norm are not only pathologized but also viewed as incapable of owning their own bodily expertise. The same requirements are not expected from cisgender individuals seeking body altering surgeries, such as breast augmentation, hair implants, or facelifts.

Notably, not every nonbinary, gender-expansive, or transgender individual desires gender-affirming medical procedures. There is no single way to be nonbinary, gender expansive, or transgender, just as there is no single way to be a girl, woman, boy, or man. Each individual person experiences and expresses their gender in their own unique way.

Social Work and Gender Equity

Social workers are charged with confronting injustice; social justice is a core value of the profession. In recognition of the social worker’s responsibility to work toward social justice, the Council on Social Work Education (CSWE) (2015 ) generated accreditation standards requiring social workers to understand diversity and difference in the context of privilege, power, oppression, and marginalization to eliminate biases (Competency 2). Because gender identity and gender expression are included as dimensions of diversity that professionals must understand and value, social workers have an ethical commitment to advance gender equity in all professional practice, education, and research activities. The National Association of Social Workers (NASW) Code of Ethics ( 2017 / 1996 ) includes gender identity and gender expression as specific categories to include when confronting discrimination. The Code of Ethics ( 2017 / 1996 , p. 21) states that “social workers should not practice, condone, facilitate, or collaborate with any form of discrimination on the basis of ... sexual orientation, gender identity or expression.”

In order to meet CSWE’s Competency 2—that social workers must understand diversity and difference in the context of privilege, power, oppression, and marginalization to eliminate biases—it is important that the profession broadens its analysis from individual and interpersonal acts of discrimination to include social systems and institutions that permit individual and interpersonal acts of discrimination. In other words, the role of structural discrimination in the oppression of people based on their gender identity and/or gender expression must be addressed. Structural discrimination can be understood as “the policies of dominant race/ethnic/gender institutions and the behavior of the individuals who implement these policies and control these institutions, which are race/ethnic/gender neutral in intent but which have a differential and/or harmful effect on minority race/ethnic/gender groups” ( Pincus, 1996 , p. 186).

To engage from within a structural framework would require social workers to address the structural conditions that marginalize people on the basis of their gender identity and/or gender expression. For example, rather than working with people to cope with the gender identity and expression based marginalization they face, social workers would also address the systems and structures that produce and reinforce marginalization. This may include challenging policies and practices within institutions of social work practice and education that rely on a binary classification of gender as a way to organize and categorize people. It may include insisting that all gender restrooms are accessible to all clients in one’s agency, or becoming involved in advocacy efforts aimed at removing gender identity based diagnoses from the DSM.

Social workers can begin to move beyond the gender binary by taking an inventory of the policies and practices within their organizations, critically examining the ways in which they may be inadvertently marginalizing clients and communities based on gender identity and gender expression. By centering transgender and nonbinary people in their examinations of policy and practice, social workers can intentionally assess their inclusion of and impact on transgender, nonbinary, and gender-expansive people. Because societal systems and services were built on the premise of binary sex and gender, they are rooted in the presumption that every individual who comes into contact with them can be categorized within these binary constructions. Public restrooms provide a concrete example. Social norms around restroom use necessitate that males and females are separated in different rooms, even with the physical separation of locked and partitioned stalls. In instances when public restrooms are single occupancy, they are most often still labeled male and female. The rationale for this separation is often safety and privacy. As Davis (2014 , p. 53) asserts, “If privacy and safety are the main reasons for sex-segregated restrooms, then might alternative physical designs such as floor-to-ceiling stall partitions do an even better job of meeting that goal than the current design of most American public restrooms?”

With regard to social work education, Shelton and Dodd (2020 ) outline key strategies for challenging cisnormativity and moving beyond the gender binary, including:

Use all gender pronouns (they and them) when speaking and writing rather than only including she and he or his and hers, an example of binarizing ( Blumer et al., 2013 ).

Examine and review course syllabi for implicit cisnormativity. Include your name and pronouns, ensure gender identity and expression are a part of classroom nondiscrimination standards, avoid binarizing language, and identify any all-gender restrooms available in the building.

Examine and review content on course syllabi. Ensure readings by and about transgender people are included. Transgender topics and authors should appear in a unit on gender identity. When planning a session about parenting, for instance, include a reading about transgender, gender-expansive, genderqueer, or nonbinary parents.

Be intentional when planning classroom introductions. Some students may not use the names indicated on your class roster or on school records. Plan introductions in such a way that enables students to introduce themselves first (before reading names from the provided class roster).

Model the sharing of pronouns and give students the option to include their pronouns when introducing themselves. For example, you could say, “Please share your name and your pronouns if you would like to do so.”

When utilizing case examples in the classroom, make sure transgender people are included/represented.

When including transgender people in case examples, make sure they are included in a way that does not perpetuate negative stereotypes and misinformation. For instance, a case example including a transgender person does not need to be focused solely on gender dysphoria and does not need to be related to their transgender identity.

Engage students in nuanced discussions about the history of the pathologization of gender and sexual minorities and the role of social work in this history.

Social work researchers can concretely work toward gender equity throughout the research process, helping to ensure all gender identities and gender expressions are acknowledged as valid. From the design of demographic questions to the reporting of results, researchers can intentionally include participants with a range of gender identities and expressions. Demographic questions can include additional options for sex and gender beyond the binary categorizations of female/male, woman/man, or girl/boy. When analyzing quantitative data, researchers can opt out of collapsing sex and/or gender into a dichotomous variable. Though this may make the process of analysis less simple, making these variables dichotomous erases the lived experiences of participants. When reporting results, researchers can include the experiences of participants across a range of gender identities and gender expressions. In reporting only statistically significant findings, critical data about frequently marginalized and underrepresented populations is lost. Recruitment strategies should include specific outreach to individuals and communities of diverse gender identities and gender expressions. This will require community engaged research and a willingness to extend recruitment timelines to ensure adequate representation. A 2021 study from the Williams Institute reported that 1.2 million adults in the United States are nonbinary ( Wilson & Meyer, 2021 ). Expanding beyond binary conceptualizations of gender within social work research is imperative in order to address the health and well-being of nonbinary individuals and communities.

In summary, gender identity and gender expression are dimensions of identity that are relevant to and impact all people. Thus, it is important for social workers to understand the ways in which gender identity and gender expression impact the individuals and communities with whom they work, as well as the ways that systems and institutions may perpetuate bias and marginalization based on gender identity and gender expression. Although the profession of social work has a fraught history with regard to policing and pathologizing individuals whose gender identities and expressions exist outside of or in between the gender binary, contemporary practice charges social workers with confronting injustice, including dimensions of diversity such as gender identity and gender expression.

Further Reading

• Bilodeau, B. , & Renn, K. (2005). Analysis of LGBT identity development models and implications for practice. New Directions for Student Services , 111 , 25–39.
• Burdge, B. (2007). Bending gender, ending gender: Theoretical foundations for social work practice with the transgender community. Social Work , 52 (3), 243–250.
• Butler, J. (2004). Undoing gender . Routledge.
• James, S. E. , Herman, J. L. , Rankin, S. , Keisling, M. , Mottet, L. , & Anafi, M. (2016). The report of the 2015 U.S. transgender survey . National Center for Transgender Equality.
• Kroehle, K. , Shelton, J. , Clark, E. , & Seelman, K. (2020). Mainstreaming dissidence: Confronting binary gender in social work’s grand challenges. Social Work , 65 (4), 368–377.
• Sanger, T. (2008). Queer(y)ing gender and sexuality: Transgender people’s lived experiences and intimate partnerships. In L. Moon (Ed.), Feeling queer or queer feelings? Radical approaches to counselling sex, sexualities and genders (pp. 72–88). Routledge.
• Action Canada for Sexual Health and Rights . (n.d.). Gender galaxy .
• Ansara, Y. , & Hegarty, P. (2012). Cisgenderism in psychology: Pathologising and misgendering children from 1999 to 2008. Psychology & Sexuality , 3 (2), 137–160.
• Blumer, M. L. C. , Ansara, Y. G. , & Watson, C. M. (2013). Cisgenderism in family therapy: How everyday clinical practices can delegitimize people’s gender self-designations. Special Section: Essays in Family Therapy. Journal of Family Psychotherapy , 24 (4), 267–285.
• Bowles, D. D. , & Hopps, J. G. (2014). The profession’s role in meeting its historical mission to serve vulnerable populations. Advances in Social Work , 15 (1), 1–20.
• Council on Social Work Education . (2015). Educational policy and accreditation standards .
• Coleman, E. , Radix, A. E. , Bouman, W. P. , Brown, G. R. , de Vries, A. L. C. , Deutsch, M. B. , Ettner, R. , Fraser, L. , Goodman, M. , Green, J. , Hancock, A. B. , Johnson, T. W. , Karasic, D. H. , Knudson, G. A. , Leibowitz, S. F. , Meyer-Bahlburg, H. F. L. , Monstrey, S. J. , Motmans, J. , Nahata, L. , Nieder, T. O. , … Arcelus, J. (2022). Standards of Care for the Health of Transgender and Gender Diverse People, Version 8 . International journal of transgender health, 23(Suppl 1), S1–S259.
• Davis, H. (2014). Sex-classification policies as transgender discrimination: An intersectional critique. Perspectives on Politics , 12 (1), 45–60.
• Drescher, J. (2009). Queer diagnoses: Parallels and contrasts in the history of homosexuality, gender variance, and the diagnostic and statistical manual. Archives of Sexual Behavior , 39 , 427–460.
• Fausto-Sterling, A. (2018, October 15). Why sex is not binary. The New York Times .
• Grady, D. (2018, October 2). Anatomy does not determine gender, experts say . The New York Times , 10A.
• National Association of Social Workers . (2017). The NASW code of ethics (Rev. ed.). (Original work published 1996)
• Olson, K. R. , Key, A. C. , & Eaton, N. R. (2015). Gender cognition in transgender children. Psychological Science , 26 (4), 467–474.
• Pincus, F. (1996). Discrimination comes in many forms: Individual, institutional, and structural. The American Behavioral Scientist , 40 (2), 186–194.
• Shelton, J. , & Dodd, S. J. (2020). Beyond the binary: Addressing cisnormativity in the social work classroom. Journal of Social Work Education , 56 (1), 179–185.
• Shelton, J. , Kroehle, K. , & Andia, M. (2019). The trans person is not the problem: Brave spaces and structural competence as educative tools for trans justice in social work. Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare , 46 (4), 97–123.
• World Professional Association for Transgender Health . (2012). Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender Nonconforming People [7 th Version].
• Wilson, B. D. M. , & Meyer, I. (2021). Nonbinary LGBTQ adults in the United States . The Williams Institute.

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Gender and Sexuality

Other essays.

Sexuality refers to God’s anthropological design and pattern for the procreative relationship between male and female and to the experience of erotic desire within that design. Gender refers to biological differences in male and female embodiment and the different cultural ways in which the creational distinctions between male and female are manifested.

Sexuality refers to God’s anthropological design and pattern for the procreative relationship between male and female and to the experience of erotic desire within that design. Gender refers to biological differences in male and female embodiment and the different cultural ways in which the creational distinctions between male and female are manifested. The creational narrative of Genesis 1–2 provides the Christian with the foundational truths behind these distinctions: God created humanity, male and female, in his image for one another. To deny any part of this teaching is to subject God’s purposeful design to the desires of humanity. While much of modern culture desires to deny these distinctions and to untether gender from sexuality, the New Testament reaffirms the Old Testament’s teaching on this topic and brings the male-female distinction to its culmination in the Christ-Church relationship.

A Christian framework for gender and sexuality begins with understanding that each find their origin, structure, and purpose within God’s will for creation. Gender and sexuality, from a Christian perspective, are enchanted realities imbued with divine meaning and purpose. But as the drama of Scripture unfolds, gender and sexuality become impacted by sin. Yet, in light of redemption, the original design and purpose of gender and sexuality are reaffirmed and heightened as the New Testament explains their ultimate telos —to reflect the Christ-Church union. The assumption that gender and sexuality are ordered by God, and for God, stands in stark contrast to modernity’s view that divinizes gender and sexuality, understanding both to be ordered to, and determined by, consent and human will alone.

Sexuality and Gender in God’s Design

When speaking of sexuality and gender, what is meant by these terms?

Sexuality can have broad and narrow meanings. In a broad rendering, sexuality refers to God’s anthropological design and pattern for the procreative relationship between male and female. In a narrower scope, sexuality refers to the experience of erotic desire. Accordingly, in Scripture, sexuality is a constitutive part of human nature and human experience shaped by God’s will for creation; it is not the singular defining aspect of human identity itself.

Gender can also have broad and narrow connotations. More broadly, gender refers to biological differences in male and female embodiment. Narrowly speaking, gender refers to the creational distinctions between male and female manifested in culture (e.g., baby girls adorned in pink; baby boys adorned in blue). Gender should be understood as the cultural reality resulting from God making men and women biologically sexed and distinct. Christians need to understand that as partakers of God’s good creation, we are to acknowledge and participate in culturally-appropriate gender distinctions. This is because each culture discovers culturally-defined ways to reflect the biological and created difference of men and women. This means Christians should abide by the gender norms set by their culture insofar as what the culture dictates does not transgress God’s moral law for upholding the sex distinction between male and female (Deut. 22:5; 1 Cor. 11:3–16). For example, cross-dressing is sinful because it violates the creational boundaries between male and female that come to be expressed in culturally-appropriate gender norms. We ought to care about the gender distinctions our culture holds up since gender distinctions are a common grace mechanism for acknowledging the innate differences of males from females.

Sexuality and gender are first made known in the creational accounts of Scripture. In Genesis 1:26–28, we read of God creating man and woman in His image. Equal in their dignity, but different in their design and calling, the man and woman are then commissioned to “be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth and subdue it, and have dominion.” Genesis 1 communicates both the identity of male and female, and that this identity is oriented toward a procreative union meant to populate the earth. Seen through this light, gender and sexuality are substantive pillars in fulfilling what theologians refer to as the cultural mandate.

In another rendering of humanity’s origins, we read in Genesis 2 that it is not good for man to be alone; that a helper was needed. This helper is both similar and dissimilar; similar in her humanity, yet dissimilar in her design. The man and woman—as counterparts—are intended to form a complementary union. In 2:24, it is written that “Then a man shall leave his father and mother and hold fast to his wife, and they shall become one flesh.” This language is at once both figurative and literal; figurative in that it describes the establishing of a distinct family unit; literal in that it testifies to the bodily union for which male and female anatomy are designed. This sexual pattern is the archetype for the Bible’s expectation for human sexual arrangements.

Several axiomatic truths related to gender and sexuality are found in the Genesis 1–2 narrative.

• God created . A Christian understanding for gender and sexuality begins with a foundational assumption about the universe itself. The Triune God is a God of order, not chaos, and random combination. Christians believe that the Triune God alone brings reality into existence. Reality and human experience are not self-creating or self-constituting. Christians confess that the God who creates the cosmos is the holy, sovereign, and just God who orders all aspects of reality—including sexuality and gender. Gender and sexuality are not evolutionary quirks; both find their origin in the creative will of God.
• God created humanity. A Christian understanding for gender and sexuality also begins with a foundational assumption about human nature. God is the creator of humanity, and as such, has the right to speak authoritatively over our lives. We are his subjects, and sexuality and gender are constitutive aspects of God’s rule over humanity. We are not self-creating or self-constituting. Sexuality and gender, then, are not plastic and endlessly malleable to fit human preference. Rather like the body, Christians believe that gender and sexuality are purposefully ordered to fit God’s will for humanity (1 Cor. 6:13). This means obedience and a commitment to living in line with God’s creative will is where holiness and human flourishing form an intersection.
• God created humanity in His image. Genesis speaks of God making man and woman in His image. Theologians debate all that being made in God’s image entails, but in general, we can say that we image God in our relational dimension, our structural design, and our functional capacity. While exercising caution to not reduce sexuality and gender as the defining marks of bearing God’s image, it is appropriate to assume that they contribute to the entirety of what it means to bear God’s image. Humanity existing in male and female iterations implies that our sexual design and gendered existence are participants in the fundamental nobility and dignity that human beings are said to possess because of being made in God’s image. To be made in God’s image means that no part of our humanity is purposeless or irrelevant to God’s creative intention.
• God created humanity male and female. When God created humanity, He did not make us sexless monads. He made humanity in male and female forms. This means that gender, and gender identity—if such a construct is at all intelligible—is an embodied reality. Male and female self-conception are not constructed from psychology alone. Male and female, according to the biblical portrait, are fixed, bodily realities; meaning they are not interchangeable or eradicable. They are objectively known; such that the identity of who we are as sexed humans is not a mystery. Lastly, male and female imply substantive differentiation. This differentiation is observed down to the chromosomal, anatomical, reproductive, physiological, and emotive levels. This physical difference starkly manifests itself in the anatomical design of male and female, which makes procreation possible and the fulfillment of the cultural mandate actionable.
• God created male and female for one another. God commands sexual activity to be experienced exclusively within the marital relationship of one man and one woman. The sexual distinction in Scripture bears witness to the sexual and procreative union that male and female bodies are capable of engaging in. In Scripture, sexual union ratifies the marriage covenant, signifying the existence of the marriage union intended to be permanent, monogamous, and exclusive (Gen. 2:24; 1 Cor. 6:16). Notice in Genesis 1:26–28 that the creation of man and woman in Genesis both is structural and dynamic. As male and female beings made in God’s image, their design is ordered toward a particular purpose—filling the earth, subduing it, exercising dominion. More specifically, that purpose is accomplished by male and female design—that the act of being fruitful and multiplying hinges on, and springs from, their respective sex distinction. In this account, general revelation parallels with special revelation. As each of us knows, sexual intercourse is capable of producing children, and this reality is exclusive to only one reality, male-female complementarity.

The Bible and Creation’s Manifold Witness of Gender and Sexuality

At least in contemporary debates on these issues, Christians are often tempted to treat our vision for sexuality and gender as ethical matters relevant and pertaining to Christians only. This is not a biblical way to approach such subjects. Such a view is a truncated account for explaining why Christians’s convictions on such matters are not only Christian, but universally applicable. The Bible casts a vision for sexuality and gender that is true on both special and general revelation grounds. As biblical scholar Richard Bauckham writes, “biblical commands are not arbitrary decrees but correspond to the way the world is and will be” (see God and the Crisis of Freedom: Biblical and Contemporary Perspectives , 70). When Christians discuss gender and sexuality, they must understand that the design for gender and sexuality in Scripture is the design that all humans are obligated to live within, even if they do not appear most the natural or easiest in light of sin. What Christians believe about sexuality and gender is not an “in-house” argument for debate among Christians only. The Bible understands gender and sexuality as creational realities that determine whether a society will organize itself in subjection to God’s authority or in rejection to God’s authority.

As ethicist Bernd Wannenwetsch writes, “The Christian doctrine of creation is precisely such a way of explaining why there are aspects of reality that are invested with normative moral significance” (see “Creation and Ethics: On the Legitimacy and Limitation of Appeals to ‘Nature’ in Christian Moral Reasoning,” in Within the Love of God: Essays on the Doctrine of God in Honour of Paul S. Fiddes , 209). This means that the Bible’s teaching on gender and sexuality are not sectarian. These teachings are not built on fideistic decrees or fiat. Instead, the Bible speaks to created reality in both a sinful and redeemed state—because the Lord Jesus reigns over creation and unites both creation and redemption in His gospel (see see Oliver O’Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics ) . Gender and sexuality do not require an exclusively Christian epistemology for their authority or intelligibility, but insofar as sin warps human perception, the Bible’s teaching do require explanation in line with the full drama of Christian doctrine. A vision for gender and sexuality that fails to satisfy the demands set forth in Genesis will be subject to endless redefinition, which is why revisionist accounts of gender and sexuality—such as same-sex marriage and gender fluidity—retain no coherent limiting principle.

Sexuality and Gender in Revolt

The five axioms above are the backdrop that explain Scripture’s prohibition on sexual practices and gender displays that transgress God-ordained creational distinctions and creational boundaries. Sin’s impact demonstrates how each of the axioms are assaulted.

• Concerning axiom one, a culture of unbelief either rejects God’s existence or God’s authority. Man’s agency, in this paradigm, is the measure of all that is. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the never-ending redefinition of sexual morality and ensuing gender confusion. Since there are no binding rules, sexuality and gender are a matter of personal will and preference. Sexuality and gender are self-chosen, issuing from the autonomous self. Since humanity is not bound by a code of objective and universal morality, what Christians consider sexually immoral or out of step with God’s intent for gender expression, is shorn of all taboo and prohibition— whether pornography (Ps. 101:3; Matt. 5:28; Col. 3:5) , bestiality (Lev. 18:23, 20:15–16; Exod. 22:19), polygamy (Gen. 2:24), lust (Matt. 5:28; Mark 7:20–23) , adultery (1 Cor. 6:9–11), orgies (Gal. 5:19–21), non-monogamy (Matt. 19:1–10), rape (Deut. 22:23–29; Ezek. 45:9; Mark 12:31), pedophilia (Matt. 18:5–6), homosexuality (Rom. 1:26–27; 1 Cor. 6:9–11), fornication (Gen. 2:24; Deut. 22:28–29; Eph. 5:3; 1 Thess. 4:1–8), incest (Lev 18:8–18; 1 Cor. 5:1–5), prostitution (Hos. 4:14) cross-dressing (Deut. 22:5; 1 Cor. 11:3–16), effeminacy (1 Cor 6:9–10), androgyny (Gen 1:27–28;), illicit seduction (Gen. 34; Prov. 7:6–23), transgenderism (Gen. 1:27–28), and sexual abuse (Deut. 22:25–27; Mark 12:31).
• In axiom two, humanity denies that it is a divine creation born of an intelligent and divine will, or inscribed with any inherent, fixed meaning. Any sexual arrangement is thus allowable insofar as consent is present; and any gender expression is permissible insofar as it comports with a person’s self-perception. Since humanity may or may not be the creation of a divine being, saying that a particular sexual arrangement or gender expression is prohibited is simply a product of social convention.
• With axiom three, humanity divests itself of any particular calling in light of being made in God’s image. Since we are not special creations endowed with a mission to exercise dominion, we subsist by vain expressions of human autonomy and self-seeking justification. Our liberation from God’s constraints becomes our abolition.
• In axiom four, humanity denies that male and female are objective and fixed realities. Instead, gender fluidity and suppression of sexed realities paint a portrait of gender and sexuality that is endlessly malleable and psychologically grounded. This allows such sins as transgenderism.
• In axiom five, the beauty of male-female complementarity is denied, meaning that the creational guardrails for sexuality are nullified. This licenses such sexual sins as homosexuality. It is not that homosexuality is worse than all other sins; but that it narrates through vivid and graphic portrayal an expulsive rejection of God’s authority concerning creational design and boundaries.

In all five axioms, what is at the root of humanity’s assault on God-defined expressions of sexuality and gender? God’s authority over sexual desire and sexual relationships, and God’s design for how gender is conceived and expressed, is cast off. As it is with every issue of ethics and morality, the idea that any objective standard exists and is binding begins and ends with whether God exists and whether He intends to hold individuals accountable for their actions.

Sexuality and Gender in Redemption

While this essay has strived to present an argument for the Bible’s teaching on gender and sexuality that is true on both general and revelation grounds, it would be incomplete if it failed to examine how sexuality and gender are understood within the horizon of the gospel.

• The New Testament reaffirms the vision for gender and sexuality taught in Genes is. The gospel offers the promise of the Holy Spirit’s guidance to live lives of holiness; the gospel does not create a radically new or disjunctive expectation for sexual morality and appropriate gender expression. In Matthew 19, Jesus affirms that the creational pattern for male and female set forth in Genesis 1–2 remains authoritative and binding for humanity. In Acts 15, the earliest church leaders confirmed that obedience to Old Testament law was not expected for Gentle Christians, but Christians were expected to uphold the same standard of Old Testament sexual morality inaugurated at creation. The pattern for sexual relationship and gender expression laid out for the early Christians thus validates the pattern begun in Genesis. Furthermore, New Testament prohibitions on sexual practices (e.g., homosexuality, incest) are echoes of the Old Testament’s sexual ethic. This ethic is grounded in God’s moral law and cannot be discarded or excused as pertaining only to Israel. The New Testament makes clear that sexual rebellion and rejection of appropriate gender boundaries renders culpable before God’s judgement (1 Cor. 6:9–11).
• The gospel brings fulfilling clarity to the vision for gender and sexuality taught in Genesis. The storyline and arc of the Bible’s teaching on gender and sexuality is one that relies upon narrative climax. In Ephesians 5:22–23, Paul explains that the union of husband and wife is meant to foreshadow the most visceral union in the cosmos—the Christ-Church union. Nowhere is the explanation of the Christ-Church union meant to overwhelm, supplant, or eradicate the underlying validity of male-female complementarity set forth in Genesis. The story of the gospel’s relationship to created nature—which includes our sexuality and gender—is that created nature would be led in the direction it was always intended (see Wannenwetsch, “Creation and Ethics,” 210). Though sexuality and gender remain creationally intelligible despite the fall, as Christians, we believe that both are ultimately designed to reflect the union of Christ and the church.
• The gospel empowers Christians to live in accord with the biblical vision for gender and sexuality taught in Genesis. The gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ calls us to glorify God with our bodies because they were purchased by Him (1 Cor. 6:20). This purchase comprises the whole man (2 Cor. 5:17). We are called to honor the Lord Jesus and to submit to Him our sexual desires as well as our conduct (Matt. 5:28; Gal. 5:19–21; Eph. 4:22–24; Col. 3:5; 1 Thess. 4:1–8). We are to flee all forms of sexual morality (1 Cor. 6:18; Eph. 5:3–5; 1 Thess. 4:1–8). We embrace appropriate gender norms so as not to scandalize or give offense with impropriety of gender expression (Deut. 22:5; 1 Cor. 6:9; 11:3–16; 1 Tim. 2:9). Christians believe that we are not our own, and that we owe every facet of our existence—our gender expression and our sexuality—to Jesus Christ (Col. 1:15–20).

Further Reading

• Andreas Köstenberger, God, Marriage, and Family: Rebuilding the Biblical Foundation
• Andrew T. Walker, God and the Transgender Debate . See this author interview .
• Andrew T. Walker and Eric Teetsel, Marriage Is: How Marriage Transforms Society and Cultivates Human Flourishing
• Andrew T. Walker, “ On Creation, Revelation, and the Meaning of Male and Female ”
• Christopher C. Roberts, Creation & Covenant: The Significance of Sexual Difference in the Moral Theology of Marriage
• Daniel Heimbach, True Sexual Morality: Recovering Biblical Standards for a Culture in Crisis
• Dennis Hollinger, The Meaning of Sex: Christian Ethics and the Moral Life
• Denny Burk, What is the Meaning of Sex?
• John Piper and Wayne Grudem, Recovering Biblical Manhood and Womanhood: A Response to Evangelical Feminism
• Ryan T. Anderson, When Harry Became Sally: Responding to the Transgender Moment
• Sherif Girgis, Ryan T. Anderson, and Robert P. George, What is Marriage? Man and Woman: A Defense
• Stanley Grenz, Sexual Ethics: An Evangelical Perspective
• The Council on Biblical Manhood and Womanhood , The Nashville Statement ,
• Todd Wilson, Mere Sexuality: Rediscovering the Christian Vision of Sexuality

This essay is part of the Concise Theology series. All views expressed in this essay are those of the author. This essay is freely available under Creative Commons License with Attribution-ShareAlike, allowing users to share it in other mediums/formats and adapt/translate the content as long as an attribution link, indication of changes, and the same Creative Commons License applies to that material. If you are interested in translating our content or are interested in joining our community of translators,  please reach out to us .

Heteronormativity: a Critical Look at Societal Norms

This essay about heteronormativity explains the concept as an assumption that heterosexuality is the default or preferred state across societal, legal, and cultural contexts. It outlines how this normativity manifests subtly in media, education, and social roles, reinforcing traditional gender roles and marginalizing non-heterosexual identities. The essay discusses the impact of heteronormativity on laws and policies, particularly those governing marriage, adoption, and economic benefits, highlighting ongoing inequalities despite advances like the legalization of same-sex marriage. It argues for the importance of challenging these norms to foster a more inclusive society that benefits all by promoting diverse human experiences and reducing discrimination. The call to action suggests that change requires conscious efforts in education, policy-making, and media representation to dismantle ingrained perceptions and embrace a broader spectrum of identities.

How it works

The term “heteronormativity” is often used in discussions pertaining to gender and sexuality, but what does it truly mean? The widely held view that heterosexuality is the optimum or normal form of sexual orientation lies at the core of heteronormativity. In addition to individual preferences, it affects institutional structures, legal frameworks, societal conventions, and practices. This essay examines the definition, implications, and impacts of heteronormativity in order to highlight the extent to which it permeates our social system.

By combining the terms “hetero” (different) and “normativity” (believing in a norm), the phrase alludes to a society in which being attracted to someone of a different gender is accepted as normal.

This expectation shows up more quietly than one may think in day-to-day living. Heteronormative presumptions are ubiquitous in everything from the media we watch to the education we receive. Romantic narratives in television, movies, and literature usually center on male-female relationships. This normative position is reflected in even the most basic act of filling out forms that ask one to check either “male” or “female” without taking alternative identities into account.

Heteronormativity also shapes our understanding of roles within a society. Traditional roles that expect men to be the breadwinners and women to be caregivers are reinforced under a heteronormative framework. This not only limits individual expression and potential but also sidelines non-heterosexual relationships and families from the narrative, creating an environment where anything outside this norm may be viewed as abnormal or challenging.

The implications of heteronormativity extend to legal and economic contexts as well. Historically, laws governing marriage, adoption, and inheritance have been framed around heterosexual relationships. Economic benefits, social recognition, and legal rights have been predominantly accessible to heterosexual couples, evidencing how heteronormativity can reinforce inequalities. Although there have been significant strides towards inclusivity—such as the legalization of same-sex marriage in many parts of the world—the shadows of heteronormative practices linger, often subtly influencing policies and personal interactions.

Challenging heteronormativity requires a conscious effort to recognize and question our assumptions about gender and sexuality. It involves examining the language we use, the policies we support, and the media we endorse. Educators, policymakers, and individuals play crucial roles in this. For instance, incorporating discussions about the spectrum of sexual and gender identities in school curriculums can help foster a more inclusive environment. Media representation that includes diverse relationship dynamics can also shift public perceptions and challenge the status quo.

Moreover, dismantling heteronormativity isn’t just about promoting inclusivity for the LGBTQ+ community. It benefits society at large by encouraging a broader, more flexible understanding of human experience. Breaking down these barriers can lead to more freedom for individuals to express themselves and choose lives that truly fit their personal identities and desires without fear of social exclusion or discrimination.

In conclusion, heteronormativity is a deeply embedded societal norm that goes beyond mere prejudice against non-heterosexual people; it is an overarching system of attitudes and structures that dictate how we perceive and engage with the world. Recognizing and challenging these norms offers a pathway to a more equitable and diverse society where all individuals can thrive irrespective of their sexual orientation or gender identity. As we continue to question and redefine what is considered ‘normal’, we can pave the way for a society that truly embraces all facets of human diversity.

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Biden Administration Restores Health Protections for Gay and Transgender People

The Health and Human Services Department finalized a rule prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, reversing a Trump-era policy.

By Noah Weiland

Reporting from Washington

The Biden administration announced expansive new protections on Friday for gay and transgender medical patients, prohibiting federally funded health providers and insurers from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.

The new rule reverses a policy instituted by the Trump administration and helps to fulfill part of President Biden’s vow to restore civil rights protections for L.G.B.T.Q. people that were eliminated by his predecessor.

“Today’s rule is a giant step forward for this country toward a more equitable and inclusive health care system, and means that Americans across the country now have a clear way to act on their rights against discrimination when they go to the doctor, talk with their health plan or engage with health programs run by H.H.S.,” Xavier Becerra, the health and human services secretary, said in a statement.

The rule overhauls federal policy in an area that has become a political flashpoint, with more than 20 Republican-led states banning or restricting gender-affirming care for minors in recent years, and it is likely to draw legal challenges. Even the history of the rule illustrates the political sensitivities at play: It has now taken three different forms under three successive presidents.

The Affordable Care Act, passed in 2010, established a sweeping set of civil rights protections in the U.S. health system through what is known as Section 1557. It prohibits discrimination against patients based on race, color, national origin, sex, age or disability in “any health program or activity” that receives federal funds, covering a broad swath of the U.S. health system.

In 2016, the Obama administration issued a less expansive version of the rule the Biden administration finalized on Friday, requiring health providers to provide medically appropriate treatment for transgender patients. Officials at the time argued that the Affordable Care Act’s protections against discrimination included gender identity. The Obama rule became tied up in litigation, and the Trump administration declined to enforce it.

Conservative opponents of the rule have argued that the policy could effectively coerce doctors into performing medical services that they might have objected to, including on religious grounds. The Trump administration in 2020 formally narrowed the legal definition of sex discrimination to not include protections for transgender people.

The rule finalized by the Biden administration on Friday states that it preserves religious exemptions and “does not require or mandate the provision of any particular medical service.”

“Section 1557 prohibits discrimination on certain prohibited bases, and does not interfere with individualized clinical judgment about the appropriate course of care for a patient,” the rule says.

After the Supreme Court ruled in 2020 that the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s prohibition on discrimination based on sex also applied to discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, the Biden administration began to reverse the Trump administration policy.

Republican officials continued to work to preserve the Trump-era rule. In 2022, after the Biden administration issued a proposed version of the rule it finalized on Friday, a group of Republican attorneys general wrote to Mr. Becerra , suggesting they could sue if the Health and Human Services Department pursued the policy.

The rule proposal drew intense scrutiny from advocates and opponents. The Health and Human Services Department said on Friday that it had garnered more than 85,000 comments.

Groups that pushed for the reversal of the Trump-era rule hailed the Biden administration’s decision on Friday. “Countless Americans can now find solace in knowing that they cannot be turned away from health care they need just because of who they are or who they love,” said Kelley Robinson, the president of the Human Rights Campaign.

Noah Weiland writes about health care for The Times. More about Noah Weiland

Publications

Briefing paper - Addressing gender-based violence against women and people of diverse gender identity and expression who use drugs

Publication

Number of pages: 46

Publication date: 31 Dec 2023

Publisher: UNFPA, UNAIDS, UNODC, UN Women, WHO

UNFPA joins UNODC in endorsing this guide on addressing gender based violence against women who use drugs. Successful prevention of gender-based violence (GBV) requires political commitment, leadership and resource allocation. A variety of policy responses to reduce GBV can be enacted including: ensuring criminal penalties for GBV, laws to promote gender equality, and reform of laws that increase HIV transmission risk, increased access for women who use drugs to domestic violence shelters, crisis centres and SRH care services, improvements to social determinants of health such as education, employment, social protection and housing as well as ensuring social inclusion and non-discrimination, empowerment and strengthening of community networks of women and people of diverse gender identity, strengthening harm reduction services ensuring they are gender-responsive and rights-based, supporting multi-sectoral coordination between law enforcement, health, social services, justice institutions and gender equity platforms, and eliminating harassment and other forms of violence against women and people of diverse gender identity and expression.

This Briefing paper offers guidance to policy makers and service providers on setting up and strengthening holistic services for women and persons of diverse gender identity who use drugs.

Related topics

• Gender-based violence
• Sexual & reproductive health
• HIV & AIDS

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Updated federal workplace guidelines protect employee gender identity

In first change to the guidance in 25 years, federal agency says repeatedly misgendering employees or denying them access to a bathroom consistent with their gender identity amounts to workplace harassment

Employers who repeatedly misgender their employees or deny them access to a bathroom consistent with their gender identity are committing workplace harassment under federal anti-discrimination laws, according to a new guidance released Monday by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

The changes released Monday mark the first update to the guidelines in 25 years by the federal agency. They are based on legal standards protecting employees from harassment under a protected characteristic: race, religion, color, national origin, disability, age, genetic information and sex. That last category includes pregnancy, sexual orientation and gender identity.

The document reflects legal developments in recent years, including the 2020 Supreme Court ruling Bostock v. Clayton County , Ga., which found that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act — which prohibits discrimination “because of sex” — protects gay and transgender workers.

Per the new guidelines, an employer who repeatedly and intentionally misgenders an individual by using the “name or pronoun inconsistent with the individual’s known gender identity” or by denying an employee access “to a bathroom or other sex-segregated facility consistent with the individual’s gender identity” is committing unlawful workplace harassment. This, the guidance states, is considered sex-based discrimination under Title VII, which the EEOC says “includes harassment based on sexual orientation or gender identity, including how that identity is expressed.”

The guidance document released Monday consolidates and replaces five of the agency’s previous guidance documents issued between 1987 and 1999, which established guidelines on workplace harassment law. The document is the finalized version of a draft released at the end of last year by the EEOC that received “robust” public input, per the agency.

While the document is not legally binding, it serves as a standard for how the EEOC interprets and enforces anti-bias laws. The federal agency was created under the Civil Rights Act and is tasked with enforcing civil rights laws against workplace discrimination, investigating accusations and filing civil discrimination lawsuits on behalf of employees.

“The guidelines themselves don’t have the force of statute,” said Christopher Ho, the director of the National Origin and Immigrants’ Rights Program at Legal Aid at Work. “Unlike a law that Congress drafts and puts into writing, these don’t have the same effect — they are not legally binding. But that said, numerous courts, including the Supreme Court, have said: Because these guidelines are based on the expertise and careful reasoning of the agency that’s charged with enforcing anti-discrimination laws, they’re to be given deference by the courts.”

The guidelines, Ho noted, are “very carefully considered — they’re not out of thin air.” While the EEOC does not make policy, their guidance reflects “existing authority” applied to “the modern-day situation.”

“I think [an employer] would be very wise, taking the guidelines very seriously,” said Ho, who served on a 2016 EEOC task force on harassment.

The guidance also addresses unlawful harassment in situations involving older workers, immigrants and survivors of gender-based violence, as well as situations of harassment in virtual work environments — a result of the remote work era ushered in by the pandemic.

Charlotte A. Burrows, EEOC chair, said in a statement that the guidance “is a comprehensive resource that brings together best practices for preventing and remedying harassment and clarifies recent developments in the law.”

“As we commemorate this year’s 60th anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the guidance will help raise awareness about the serious problem of harassment in employment and the law’s protections for those who experience it,” Burrows said.

Some Republicans were unhappy with the guidance. Rep. Virginia Foxx (R-N.C.), who chairs the House Education and Workforce Committee, said in a statement that the EEOC “has detached itself from reality.”

“Today’s final guidance is nothing more than a homage to leftist activists who want Americans to conform to their warped political ideology,” Foxx said. “From the mandated use of pronouns to a denial of biological facts, the EEOC seems more interested in appeasing the mob than undertaking commonsense policymaking to protect workers.”

The agency said in a statement that the guidance was approved by a majority vote of the five-member commission and “reflects the EEOC’s commitment to protecting persons who are particularly vulnerable and persons from underserved communities from employment discrimination.”

EEOC Commissioner Andrea Lucas released a statement expressing her disagreement with the new guidance, saying it “effectively eliminates single-sex workplace facilities and impinges on women’s (and indeed, all employees’) rights to freedom of speech and belief.”

Subhashini Bollini, the co-chair of the National Employment Lawyers Association EEOC working group, said the EEOC’s guidance is on par with the precedent set by recent legal cases. Specifically in the case of the guidance including instances of harassment in the form of misgendering or barring a transgender employee from using a bathroom that matches their gender identity, Bollini said the EEOC is applying the precedent set by Bostock.

“What the guidelines provide is, in plain language, really what these categories of harassment mean in real life,” she said.

The guidance document includes several hypothetical scenarios in which an employer’s actions would amount to workplace harassment. In one scenario, a supervisor who mocks her pregnant employee by, among other things, tracking her use of the bathroom, calling her a “heifer” and berating her work as “shoddy” and “slow” is considered to be partaking in workplace harassment. In another scenario, a supervisor who repeatedly questions a transgender employee about her gender identity and expression and also refers to her using “he/him” pronouns is also considered to be harassing their employee.

Bollini said that, while the guidelines that deal with gender identity may draw more scrutiny than others, “transgender people are employees too, they’re in our workplaces and everybody — transgender people, people of different sexual orientations, people of different races and people of different sexes, are all trying to earn a living.”

“These laws enable people to support themselves, support their families and contribute to society,” Bollini added. “So to deny that … is really saying that certain classes of people should not have those fundamental rights.”

National Politics | Census Bureau soon will ask about sexual and…

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National politics | census bureau soon will ask about sexual and gender identity, long-running questions could become less vague, more direct. advocates and others welcome the shift..

“Any kind of inclusivity is welcome. Visibility is always good,” said Manny Muro, vice president of OC Pride, a group that works to build recognition and fight stigma for the LGBTQ+ community in Orange County.

“There hasn’t been an accurate count of our community for years, maybe ever,” Muro added.

“And having this, in the census, will help make sure that federal dollars aimed at fighting discrimination, and helping people in need, won’t ignore us.

“We’ll see where this takes us.”

It’s unclear exactly how sexual orientation and identity questions will be phrased or when they will be asked.

The Census Bureau said May 1 that it is seeking public comment aimed at shaping future questions about sexual orientation and gender identity, a formal step in what typically is a multi-year process before adding new questions to an upcoming census.

A woman holds a sign rading “Not too young to know i like girls” as people attend the 2023 LA Pride Parade on June 11, 2023 in Hollywood, California. The LA Pride Parade marks the last day of the three-day Los Angeles celebration of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) social and self-acceptance, achievements, legal rights, and pride. (Photo by Robyn Beck / AFP) (Photo by ROBYN BECK/AFP via Getty Images)

Pride flags are seen as people attend the 2023 LA Pride Parade on June 11, 2023 in Hollywood, California. The LA Pride Parade marks the last day of the three-day Los Angeles celebration of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) social and self-acceptance, achievements, legal rights, and pride. (Photo by Robyn Beck / AFP) (Photo by ROBYN BECK/AFP via Getty Images)

People attend the 2023 LA Pride Parade on June 11, 2023 in Hollywood, California. The LA Pride Parade marks the last day of the three-day Los Angeles celebration of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) social and self-acceptance, achievements, legal rights, and pride. (Photo by Robyn Beck / AFP) (Photo by ROBYN BECK/AFP via Getty Images)

The questions would appear first in the American Community Survey, a tracking of American life that the Census Bureau conducts every year. After that, orientation and identity questions could appear on the next census – a head count of every person living in the country – slated for 2030.

The Census Bureau said it wants the information to paint a more complete portrait of America’s population, and to help other federal agencies covering everything from health care and banking to the environment.

It won’t be the first time the federal government has asked about sexual identity and orientation.

Since 1990, the census has asked American residents if they live in same-sex relationships, a status that researchers say includes roughly 1 in 5 LGBTQ people at any particular time. Also, for many years, the Centers for Disease Control has asked more specific questions about orientation and identity. Answers from those questions have created a database that has been used to estimate the number of gay and gender-fluid Americans.

But researchers suggested new census data based on specific questions about orientation and identity could be valuable because it would be a fully national account. The data also could weave in other information – about income, race, education, health and living situations, among other things – that would offer details not easily available in current data.

“Having a top-line number from the census will help paint a more complete picture,” said Kerith Conron, director of the Blachford-Cooper Research Center at the Williams Institute, a non-profit at UCLA Law School that conducts research on sexual orientation and gender identity law and public policy.

But the Census Bureau’s move to count numbers connected to the LGBTQ+ community – and of people who express other gender identities, such as non-binary – comes at a time when the broader American public is sending mixed signals to those communities.

On the one hand, everything from mainstream TV commercials to national polling suggests straight America increasingly is accepting of gay life. And shifts in polling numbers, over time, also suggest that official recognition by the federal government has been part of that evolution.

Opinions about gay marriage, for example, changed dramatically before and after the Supreme Court’s 2015 ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges, which legalized same-sex unions. Prior to the ruling, about 41% of Americans told Gallup they “approved” of gay marriage. Six months later, public approval shot over 50%. By 2022, according to Gallup, approval stood at about 71% .

But acceptance of gay marriage, and other issues related to gay life, has come during a time when anti-gay sentiment has grown loud and often threatening.

And last year, when a conservative commentator told attendees of the 2023 Conservative Political Action Conference that “transgenderism must be eradicated from public life entirely” he drew a round of applause.

Still, Muro, of OC Pride, said he’s confident that new census data about gay America won’t be weaponized.

“That’s going to happen with or without the data we’re talking about,” Muro said. “We’ve always been a target.”

Instead, he suggested new census data could provide “data and evidence of prejudice” against gay and transgender people.

“There isn’t a downside,” he said.

A new census tracking of gay and gender-fluid Americans also could help answer a question that’s embedded in existing data about those groups: Why are young people so much more likely than older people to identify as LGBTQ?

Last year, using data from the Centers for Disease Control and other numbers, the Williams Institute estimated that about 13.9 million Americans ages 13 and older identify as LBGTQ, a number that represents about 5.5% of American adults.

That poll found California has the largest number of LGBTQ adults, nearly 1.5 million, but a slightly below-average ratio (just 5.1%) when compared with the state’s overall population.

That same survey also found young people, nationally, are much more likely to identify as LGBTQ than are older people. Some 15.2% of people ages 18 to 24 and 9.1% of people ages 25 to 34 identify in that group, compared with 2.7% of people ages 50 to 64 and 1.9% of people ages 65 and older.

Researcher Conron said such differences reflect acceptance within different age cohorts, not human behavior.

Muro of OC Pride agreed, adding that he believes the numbers expressed in younger groups are closer to reality than the response rates among older Americans.

“When the census takes its poll in the future, the numbers, overall, will look more like what you’re seeing with younger people now,” Muro said.

The same report found that gay and gender-fluid groups suffer economically – in employment, income and poverty – even though those groups are more likely to graduate high school, college and get advanced degrees, than are other groups.

That’s a puzzle, demographically. Other census data, tracking other minority groups, consistently link educational attainment to economic success. Conron said she hopes new census data will offer clarity on why that’s not true for the LGBTQ community.

The Williams Institute also is working on a new report – one that will track locals in Los Angeles, among other metro areas – asking a totally different set of questions of the LGBTQ community.

That report will focus on how different groups thrive in different communities, asking questions such as “what brings you joy?” and “how do you contribute to your community?”

“Demographic research so often is about finding a problem,” Conron said. “I think this goes in a different direction.”

That report is expected to be released in June.

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Census Bureau Invites Expert Feedback on New Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Questions

• By: Deborah Carr
• May 10, 2024

The U.S. Census Bureau seeks expert input on a proposed test of questions about sexual orientation and gender identity in the American Community Survey. View the federal register notice and submit feedback by May 30. 2024. 

The information collected in the 2024 ACS Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) test will be used to evaluate the quality of data from questions on sexual orientation and gender identity. The research will inform recommendations for potential production ACS implementation on question wording and response options, whether a confirmation question is asked of everyone or only of those people with discrepant responses for sex at birth and current gender identity, and the style of write-in boxes to use for internet respondents. The data will also be used to produce descriptive statistics on the test topics, assess the impact on other questions on the survey that have changed, and gain insight into terminology by analyzing write-in responses and responses to qualitative questions asked in the test. Data will be assessed by mode of response as well as type of respondent (proxy or self-reported data), in addition to other sub-groups of interest.

Because the questions being tested under this clearance have yet to be asked in the American Community Survey, the data gathered will not be considered official statistics of the Census Bureau or other Federal agencies. Test results will be included in research reports that will be published on the Census Bureau’s website. Results may also be prepared for presentations at professional meetings and conferences or for publication in professional journals. All published test results will be statistical products that contain only aggregated data that do not reveal individual responses.

Details of the questions being tested and test plans are available in Supporting Statements A and B and associated attachments. See directions below for how to find these documents online on www.reginfo.gov .

Written comments and recommendations for the proposed information collection should be submitted within 30 days of the publication of this notice on the following website www.reginfo.gov/​public/​do/​PRAMain . Find this particular information collection by selecting “Currently under 30-day Review—Open for Public Comments” or by using the search function and entering either the title of the collection or the OMB Control Number 0607-0936.

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