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Climate Change and the Media

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• Published: 25 March 2015

Media power and climate change

• Julia B. Corbett 1  

Nature Climate Change volume  5 ,  pages 288–290 ( 2015 ) Cite this article

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Fingers are often pointed directly at the news media for their powerful influence and ineffective reporting of climate change. But is that the best place to point? And are there more effective ways to conceptualize the power of the media and to consider whom they serve?

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Corbett, J. Media power and climate change. Nature Clim Change 5 , 288–290 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2592

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Published : 25 March 2015

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DOI : https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2592

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Media Framing of Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation

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• First Online: 03 June 2022
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• Kristen Alley Swain 4  

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News media portrayals of climate change have strongly influenced personal and global efforts to mitigate it through news production, individual media consumption, and personal engagement. This chapter explores the media framing of climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies, including the effects of media routines, factors that drive news coverage, the influences of claims-makers, scientists, and other information sources, the role of scientific literacy in interpreting climate change stories, and specific messages that mobilize action or paralysis. It also examines how journalists often explain complex climate science and legitimize sources, how audiences process competing messages about scientific uncertainty, how climate stories compete with other issues for public attention, how large-scale economic and political factors shape news production, and how the media can engage public audiences in climate change issues.

The author received no financial or research assistance for preparing this chapter. The manuscript has not been presented or discussed elsewhere.

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Swain, K.A. (2022). Media Framing of Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation. In: Lackner, M., Sajjadi, B., Chen, WY. (eds) Handbook of Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72579-2_6

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Shifting public engagement: How media coverage of climate change conferences affects climate change audience segments

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Supplemental material, Supplementary_material for Shifting public engagement: How media coverage of climate change conferences affects climate change audience segments by Anke Wonneberger, Marijn H. C. Meijers and Andreas R. T. Schuck in Public Understanding of Science

While it is often assumed that media attention for events, such as international climate change conferences, can influence public opinion, research studying changes in public opinion concerning climate change is scarce. Research on climate change audience segments and the theory of motivated reasoning suggest that media effects depend on the level of audience engagement with climate change. We analyze how exposure to media coverage of the COP21 affected public opinion in the Netherlands. Based on a two-wave online panel survey ( N  = 876), we identified five audience segments that varied in their degree of climate change beliefs, involvement, policy preferences, and behavioral intentions. Different media effects across segments were found indicating (dis)confirmation bias, specifically, for medium levels of positive and negative engagement. The findings indicate that important events may cause limited changes in public opinion and emphasize the importance of studying segment-specific and content-specific media effects.

1. Introduction

Media coverage about climate change and, particularly, coverage of international climate change conferences has received plenty of scholarly attention ( Christensen and Wormbs, 2017 ; Gurwitt et al., 2017 ). An underlying assumption of these studies is that higher levels of media attention during such events can influence public opinion concerning the perceived relevance and threat of climate change or the necessity to engage in mitigation or adaptation efforts. An increasing body of research taps into public responses to climate change coverage (e.g. Nisbet et al., 2013 ; Stamm et al., 2000 ). Greater levels of exposure have been found, for instance, to be associated with increased policy support or belief in governmental responsibility to mitigate climate change ( Feldman et al., 2014 ). However, only limited attention has been paid to study how specific events, such as climate change conferences, influence public opinion or engagement ( Flora et al., 2014 ; Krosnick et al., 2000 ).

Media effects in contested media environments have been considered highly dependent on individual predispositions or motivations ( Nisbet et al., 2013 ). Hence, no general media effects can be expected, particularly, for a complex issue that is represented by conflicting information and contested viewpoints, such as climate change ( Stamm et al., 2000 ). Specifically, the contrast between those who are highly concerned or engaged in the issue and those who are less engaged or even skeptical toward it presents an important dilemma for climate change communication. Audience segmentation studies have revealed a nuanced picture of shared views and understandings related to climate change in subgroups of national populations ( Maibach et al., 2009 ; Metag et al., 2017 ). The analysis of climate change segments in the United States over several years indicates that these segments are to some extent volatile ( Roser-Renouf et al., 2016 ). Thus far, however, evidence is missing to what extent underlying changes in public opinion could be triggered by specific events.

This study investigates changes in public views and engagement over the course of the United Nations Climate Change Conference, COP21, held in Paris in 2015. The resulting Paris Agreement has—at the time—been widely applauded as important milestone toward more effective international action tackling climate change adaptation and mitigation. We, therefore, assumed that this positive context might have triggered changes in public opinion and engagement. We, first, identify and describe climate change audience segments in the Netherlands. Second, we analyze shifts in segment membership after the conference and relate these changes to sociodemographic characteristics, political attitudes, and exposure to COP21 media coverage.

2. Conceptual framework

Climate change audience segments.

A broad range of beliefs and attitudes affect how people perceive and respond to messages concerning climate change. Often, however, the public is presented as polarized concerning the issue, for instance, consistent with the political divide between Republicans and Democrats in the United States ( Krosnick et al., 2000 ; McCright and Dunlap, 2011 ). Ideological differences seem to coincide with differences in beliefs about climate change or perceived threat ( McCright and Dunlap, 2011 ). Such cognitions as well as more general value orientations have been found to determine skepticism but also engagement with climate change ( Corner et al., 2014 ; Poortinga et al., 2011 ). Moreover, previous studies have concluded that media effects related to climate change strongly depend on individual beliefs and attitudes concerning the issue ( Wiest et al., 2015 ). The belief that climate change is happening, for instance, can reinforce positive media effects on policy support ( Feldman et al., 2014 ). Climate change skepticism, in contrast, has been identified as a strong barrier for support of mitigation policies or for carbon-reducing activities ( Engels et al., 2013 ).

Audience segmentation studies combine different beliefs and attitudes toward climate change and, thereby, offer a more nuanced and comprehensive picture of shared views and understandings related to climate change in subgroups of national populations ( Maibach et al., 2009 ; Metag et al., 2017 ). This stream of research has been initiated by the Global Warming’s Six Americas studies conducted by the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication and the George Mason University Center for Climate Change Communication ( Maibach et al., 2009 ). The authors have introduced four categories of factors as relevant for classifying the US population with respect to their beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors related to climate change: (1) global warming beliefs, (2) issue involvement, (3) policy preferences, and (4) behaviors. The resulting six segments have been found to vary along these dimensions:

The Alarmed (18%) are fully convinced of the reality and seriousness of climate change and are already taking individual, consumer, and political action to address it. The Concerned (33%)—the largest of the six Americas—are also convinced that global warming is happening and a serious problem, but have not yet engaged the issue personally. Three other Americas—the Cautious (19%), the Disengaged (12%) and the Doubtful (11%)—represent different stages of understanding and acceptance of the problem, and none are actively involved. The final America—the Dismissive (7%)—are very sure it is not happening and are actively involved as opponents of a national effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. ( Maibach et al., 2009 : 1)

The initial survey from 2008 has been repeated multiple times in the United States revealing a considerable stability of the six segments but also fluctuations over time ( Roser-Renouf et al., 2016 ). In addition, the measurement instrument or adapted versions have been applied in countries, such as India ( Leiserowitz et al., 2013 ), Australia ( Hine et al., 2013 ; Morrison et al., 2013 ), Singapore ( Detenber et al., 2016 ), and Germany ( Metag et al., 2017 ) revealing that publics in different countries vary in their degree of engagement with global climate change, their perceptions of the severity of the issue, and the necessity and effectiveness of taking action. In India, for instance, engagement levels, specifically, in terms of behavioral changes seem to be lower compared to the United States. However, a segment of Experienced has been identified due to higher levels of personal experiences with direct consequences of climate change ( Leiserowitz et al., 2013 ). The German study, in contrast, identified a relatively large segment of Alarmed (24%) in addition to Concerned Activists (18%) indicating higher levels of political engagement but also private behavioral consequences ( Metag et al., 2017 ). In both countries, Germany and India, less concerned or disengaged segments were identified, while the group of Dismissive which rejects the existence of anthropogenic climate change was absent. The six climate change segments found in Australia seem to resemble the US ones most strongly—albeit with several subtle differences and a greater share of the less engaged segments ( Morrison et al., 2013 ). In sum, while the number of countries in which comparable segmentation studies have been conducted is relatively limited, these studies have revealed parallels but also cultural differences.

Context dependence and media effects

While particularly the longitudinal design of the Yale Project has revealed the stability of the six US segments but also a certain level of volatility ( Roser-Renouf et al., 2016 ), insights from other countries and, moreover, on underlying mechanisms explaining changes in climate change segments are scarce. Considering possible changes in audience segments in the context of important events, such as international climate change conferences, brings the media coverage about such events into play. More generally, climate change as a global, complex, and abstract phenomenon is presumed to elicit relative high levels of media dependency rendering the media as an important source of information and opinion formation ( Stamm et al., 2000 ). While overall, we may expect minimal media effects which are oftentimes explained by selective exposure and reinforcement of pre-existing attitudes ( Stroud, 2010 ; Westerwick et al., 2013 ), it can be argued that climate change audience segments are not equally susceptible to such processes and may thus differ in how they consume information about climate change conferences—or other events related to climate change—and in the extent to which they possibly change their attitudes or beliefs in such a context.

Audience segments and motivated reasoning

The theory of motivated reasoning ( Kunda, 1990 ) describes mechanisms underlying selective exposure or selective processing of information. Information selection and processing are assumed to be guided by individual predispositions, such as pre-existing attitudes or beliefs, and the prevalence of either defensive motivations or accuracy motivations ( Chaiken et al., 1989 ). While defensive motivations (sometimes labeled directional motivations) trigger a reinforcement of predispositions via selective exposure or (dis)confirmation bias, accuracy motivations can counter such selective or heuristic mechanisms and lead to more elaborated forms of reasoning with the goal of forming accurate opinions or beliefs about an issue.

The type and strength of motivations has been found to vary due to individual differences and contextual factors (e.g. Flynn et al., 2017 ). Strong attitudes but also high levels of knowledge and involvement can trigger defensive motivations to reinforce these predispositions ( Strickland et al., 2011 ; Westerwick et al., 2013 ). Also negative forms of issue engagement can trigger defensive motivations leading to a disconfirmation bias ( Kunda, 1990 ; Strickland et al., 2011 ). In addition, affect-laden contexts may increase defensive motivations ( Erisen et al., 2014 ; Flynn et al., 2017 ; Lodge and Taber, 2000 ). A specific context, such as a climate change conference, may be more affect-laden for people who are either strongly convinced that climate change is a severe problem that needs to be solved ( Leiserowitz, 2005 ) or highly skeptical about the nature and severity of the problem and strongly object to any related action ( Poortinga et al., 2011 ). Consequently, the most extreme audience segments, that is, the Alarmed and Dismissive, may show greater levels of defensive motivations compared to less engaged segments.

While less engaged segments might thus be less driven by defensive motivations, this does not necessarily lead to high-accuracy motivations. Specifically, for complex issues, such as climate change, low-accuracy motivation can help to balance resources and commitment ( Chaiken et al., 1989 ). Moreover, possible solutions to mitigate or adapt to climate change are seldom uncontested and oftentimes discussed in an ambiguous manner, again facilitating pathways of biased reasoning ( Lodge and Taber, 2000 ). Particularly, for low issue involvement, heuristic processing can be considered the default ( Petty and Cacioppo, 1990 ). Finally, situations of increased perceived accountability were found to lead to more accurate judgments ( Tetlock, 1985 ). Hence, perceiving a low accountability for mitigating the consequences of climate change may lower accuracy motivations.

Event-related opinion change

So far, only one study has assessed event-related effects on climate change audience segments ( Flora et al., 2014 ). The authors applied audience segmentation measures to study attitude change in students after participating in an entertainment-education high-school program. The two-wave panel study revealed that the engaging educative format led to positive changes in students’ knowledge, beliefs, involvement, and behavior with respect to climate change. Remarkably strong effects, specifically, among initially low-engaged students might be explained by the fact that the school setting could circumvent effects of selective exposure. Part of the less engaged students, however, did not change their beliefs, attitudes, or intentions or did so in a negative direction ( Flora et al., 2014 ) indicating a mix of indifference and reinforcement of pre-existing negative attitudes toward the issue. In their study on the effects of the public debate about the United States joining the Kyoto protocol on public opinion in 1997, Krosnick et al. (2000) have focused on the climate change issue public. Issue public is thereby used as a label for the segment of the general public that is highly engaged with an issue. Comparing two independent samples before and after the debate revealed a small increase in the issue public. Moreover, taking partisanship into account revealed increasing polarization between Democrats and Republicans after the debate. These findings thus indicate that prior attitudes were mainly reinforced during the debate about the Kyoto protocol ( Krosnick et al., 2000 ).

The reinforcement of political polarization in terms of climate change attitudes and beliefs, specifically in the US context, can partly be explained by selective exposure to either democratic or conservative media outlets that reinforces pre-existing certainty of climate change beliefs ( Feldman et al., 2014 ). Comparing information seeking behavior across climate change audience segments has revealed that more engaged segments were more actively looking for information about climate change ( Metag et al., 2017 ; Roser-Renouf et al., 2015 ). Consequently, patterns of reinforcement can be expected to prevail, specifically, for members of highly engaged segments due to higher levels of media exposure in addition to defensive motivations. Less engaged segments, in contrast, may have lower defensive motivations potentially eliciting changes toward higher engagement. But the less engaged may also be less inclined to pay attention to media coverage about the issue rendering potentially effective situations of high exposure to climate change information less likely.

Study context and research questions

The UN Climate Change Conference held in Paris, France, in 2015 (COP21) from 30 November to 12 December 2015 served as a context for this study—ensuring a sufficient amount of media attention for the issue of climate change ( Schäfer et al., 2013 ). With a relatively high level of climate skepticism ( TNS Opinion & Social, 2015 ), the Netherlands form a relevant case for the study of climate change–related mobilization effects. Since so far, climate change audience segments have not yet been identified in the Netherlands, this study has an explorative nature, first, aiming at identifying and describing audience segments and, second, analyzing changes of these segments in the context of the COP21:

• RQ1: Which climate change audience segments can be observed in the Netherlands and how do their members differ in terms of individual characteristics and media exposure?
• RQ2: To what extent can changes in segment membership be observed in the context of the COP21?
• RQ3: To what extent are segment changes related to individual characteristics?
• RQ4: To what extent do media effects differ between audience segments?

A two-wave online panel survey and a content analysis of national media coverage on climate change were conducted in the Netherlands. The respondents were part of a Dutch online panel of the market research company Survey Sampling International. The first survey wave was conducted 2 weeks prior to the Paris conference, and the second wave followed in the week succeeding the conference; 72.3% of all respondents of wave 1 ( N  = 1.539) participated in wave 2; 61.1% of these fully completed the survey. Response times of less than 5 min were deemed unrealistic, and such cases omitted yielding a final sample of N  = 876 for both waves. While no substantial differences in terms of sample demographics were detected between the initial sample and completed wave 2, the omitted speeders consisted of slightly more men and had a lower average age. The final sample roughly reflected the Dutch adult population in terms of age (18–74 years, M  = 46.40 years; SD  = 13.04 years), gender (53.0% female), and education (7 levels, M  = 4.36; SD  = 1.48). Proportional demographic weighting was applied based on the Dutch population values for age, gender, and education.

We combined the survey data with content analytic data of the media coverage about the COP21. An initial selection of media outlets was made based on market shares and later adapted based on the news media use reported by the survey respondents (see in the following). The final selection included nine offline newspapers (retrieved via LexisNexis ), three major national television news programs (one public and two private broadcasters) and 13 online news websites consisting of the online offers of the offline newspapers and TV news programs in addition to the most popular news website Nu.nl . With this selection, the media sample included the most prominent news sources used by Dutch citizens, quality and popular sources, and reflected the ideological spectrum of Dutch news media with more left, liberal, conservative, and more balanced outlets.

All articles containing at least two references to the term “climate” published between 16 November 2015 and 13 December 2015 were coded by three coders ( N  = 572; online: 36.2%, offline newspaper: 58.0%, TV news: 5.8%). A pretest ( n  = 45) yielded sufficient levels of intercoder reliability for all variables used for the present study (standardized Lotus coefficients for recognition of the news outlet: 1.00 (online), .96 (offline), and relevance of COP21 coded as main versus secondary topic: .82).

While typically climate change–related segmentation studies and, specifically, the global warming’s six Americas have relied on single-item measures ( Maibach et al., 2011 ), we measured a range of concepts based on previously established multi-item scales. The selection of concepts was, however, based on the 36 items used for the US segmentation studies (see also Metag et al., 2017 ) and reflected the four categories global warming beliefs, issue involvement, policy preferences, and behaviors ( Maibach et al., 2011 ; see Table 1 ). This approach allowed us to use measures that have partly been tested and used in a European context. Although it has been shown that a valid segmentation can be obtained based on short scales of 15 or even four items ( Chryst et al., 2018 ), we opted for a more inclusive approach for two reasons. First, since no comparable segmentation study has been conducted with Dutch audiences, we could not determine up front which discriminating concepts would yield an optimal segmentation solution. Second, using a wider range of concepts would allow us to give a more comprehensive description of the obtained segments. This is why, for instance, environmental concern and issue-specific knowledge were added as involvement factors based on other climate change audience segmentation studies ( Hine et al., 2013 ; Metag et al., 2017 ). A full list of items, reliability coefficients, and descriptives per scale can be found in the online Supplemental Material .

Concepts included in the cluster analysis.

PCE: perceived consumer effectiveness.

Based on the manual content analysis of the national media coverage on the climate change conference, the amount of media attention for the COP21 was determined on the outlet level. To account for the difference between articles with a main focus on COP21 versus those that mentioned the conference in another context, we determined the relative amount of COP21 coverage per outlet by weighting the total number of news items mentioning the conference by the percentage of items with the conference as main topic (64.7%). These data were combined with detailed survey measures of media exposure in wave 2 to obtain a proxy for individual media exposure to the COP21 coverage. Respondents were asked to report how many days per week they were using each of the 25 news outlets (all outlets combined: M  = 0.85, SD  = 0.88). Following the approach of linkage studies ( De Vreese et al., 2017 ), individual exposure was calculated by summing all outlet exposure scores weighted by their scores of the relative amount of COP21 coverage.

Identification of audience segments

The audience segments were determined via multiple steps ensuring the robustness of the final solution. Single-linkage clustering based on the segmentation factors measured for wave 1 revealed four outliers. All remaining cases were included in a hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s method (see Metag et al., 2017 ). Five segments were identified based on the dendrogram and interpretability in comparison to neighboring solutions. To further enhance the robustness of the cluster solution and the comparability of segment membership across the two waves, we compared two approaches. First, the cluster means of the segmentation variables were used as seeds for k-means clustering to derive audience segments for both survey waves ( Milligan and Sokol, 1980 ). Second, segment membership was determined based on discriminant analysis for both waves (see Maibach et al., 2011 ). In comparison to the k-means solution, an acceptable rate of 94.3% of all cases was classified correctly by the discriminant analysis. Comparing the changes in segment membership between wave 1 and wave 2 for both approaches revealed slightly fewer segment changes based on the discriminant analysis ( M  = −0.03, SD  = 0.95) compared to the k-means solution ( M  = 0.19, SD  = 0.99). Therefore, we selected the more conservative approach based on the discriminant analysis to further analyze, first, the segment characteristics and, second, changes of segment membership over time.

Climate change segments

The five resulting audience segments varied in their degree of climate change beliefs, involvement, policy preferences, and relevant behavioral intentions ( Table 2 , Figure A1 in Supplemental Material ). The following overview presents a brief description of each cluster.

Segmentation characteristics per audience segment in wave 1 (means and standard deviations).

Of the respondents, 16.2% were most convinced of the existence and severity of global climate change and consequently the least skeptic. In addition, this group scored highest on perceived threat and all involvement factors, that is, issue importance, attitude strength, environmental concern, and knowledge. They were more confident in the effectiveness of individual compared to political solutions. Nonetheless, perceptions of mitigation responsibility and support for mitigation policies were higher compared to other segments. In terms of behavioral intentions, the Alarmed were more inclined to take private actions and opinion leadership compared to others but also scored relatively high on activist behaviors.

Of the respondents, 11.1% constituted the smallest segment. The Concerned scored similar or slightly lower than the Alarmed on climate change belief, perceived threat, and the involvement factors issue importance, attitude strength, and environmental concern. At the same time, the Concerned were most skeptical concerning the actual impact of climate change and, thus, the most ambivalent in terms of climate change attitudes. Interestingly, issue-specific knowledge of this group was relatively low. While they considered their own actions (perceived consumer effectiveness (PCE)) less effective compared to the Alarmed, the government was perceived as most effective. Correspondingly, perceptions of mitigation responsibility and support were relatively high—albeit on lower levels compared to the Alarmed. Their behavioral intentions spanned all three dimensions: private behaviors, activism, and opinion leadership.

The third and largest segment comprised 30.3% of the respondents. There was a considerable decrease in climate change belief, perceived threat, and the involvement factors issue importance, attitude strength, and environmental concern compared to the two more engaged segments. The Cautious scored relatively high on perceived mitigation responsibility. However, in line with individual efficacy beliefs (PCE) outweighing government efficacy, their intended behavioral response clearly focused on private actions, however, on a substantially lower level compared to the Concerned and Alarmed.

For 26.1% of the sample, skepticism regarding the existence and relevance of climate change was almost on the same level as climate change belief and issue importance. In spite of this ambivalence, there were reasonable levels of perceived effectiveness, perceived mitigation responsibility, and support for corresponding policies. Knowledge, however, was as low as in the Concerned segment. The Disengaged were inclined to take private actions and even scored considerably higher on activism and opinion leadership intentions compared to the Cautious segment.

Finally, 16.3% of the respondents were similarly skeptical as the Disengaged but at the same time also the least convinced and the least involved with the issue of climate change. The Doubtful were not convinced that they could make a difference individually but also not that the government could change much. Still, they were not opposed political action and showed the strongest confidence in science and technology. Their behavioral intentions were considerably lower compared to all other segments.

A range of sociodemographic differences could be observed across segments ( Table 3 ). The Concerned and Disengaged were on average slightly younger, while the two most extreme segments, the Alarmed and Doubtful, had on average slightly older members. The Disengaged and Doubtful were the segments with the lowest levels of average education followed by the Concerned. The level of political interest gradually decreased with the level of climate change engagement. While the Alarmed positioned themselves more on the left of the political spectrum, the Doubtful showed the strongest tendencies toward the right. The other three segments were closer to the most right than to the most left position. Considerable differences could be observed for the level of exposure to media coverage about the COP21. Specifically, the Concerned were significantly more exposed to Conference of Parties (COP) coverage than all other segments.

Sociodemographics and political attitudes per climate change segment.

COP: Conference of Parties.

N  = 872. Values are represented as means (and standard deviations). Superscripts denote significant post hoc comparisons ( p  < .05, Scheffé).

Changes in segment membership

To get a first impression about the extent of changes in segment membership between the two waves, we subtracted the number of each respondents’ segment in wave 2 from his or her segment in wave 1. Comparing segment membership before and after the conference revealed that 16.3% of the respondents changed to a more engaged segment, while 19.4% changed to a segment with lower levels of engagement. 1 The majority of changes concerned one level either to a more engaged (8.8%) or less engaged segment (11.5%). Slightly fewer respondents moved two levels (positive: 7.8%, negative: 7.5%) while less than 1% of changes of three levels could be observed. To analyze to what extent these changes were associated with individual characteristics and media exposure, individual change scores ranging from −1 to 1 were calculated ( M  = −0.03, SD  = 0.60). Inspection of mean plots revealed non-linear relationships between change scores and the predictor variables gender, education, political orientation, and media exposure, thus indicating differential relationships for positive and negative changes. Therefore, separate logistic regression models for positive and negative change were estimated. Positive change was analyzed excluding the most engaged segment, the Alarmed. Negative change was analyzed excluding the least engaged segment, the Doubtful. All predictors except for gender and dummy-coded segment membership were mean centered (see Tables A2 and A3 in Supplemental Material ).

Explaining changes to more engaged segments

Respondents who were classified as more engaged in wave 2 compared to wave 1 were on average older (Exp( B ) = 1.016, 95% CI = (1.001, 1.032)) and more likely to position themselves on the left side of the political spectrum (Exp( B ) = 0.903, 95% CI = (0.832, 0.980)). Compared to the Doubtful, positive change was significantly less likely among the other three included segments ( Table A2 in Supplemental Material , model 1.1). No main effect for media exposure was found. However, looking at segment-specific media effects by including interaction terms ( Table A2 in Supplemental Material , model 1.2) revealed a negative exposure effect for the Doubtful (Exp( B ) = 0.888, 95% CI = (0.800, 0.986)). In addition, a significant interaction (Exp( B ) = 1.173, 95% CI = (1.034, 1.330)) for the Cautious indicated a more positive effect for this group compared to the reference group of the Doubtful. Further illustrating these interactions, Figure 1 depicts the predicted probabilities of changing to a more engaged segment for different levels of media exposure for the four included audience segments. Based on the regions of non-overlapping confidence intervals ( Figure A2 in Supplemental Material ), significant differences were found between the Doubtful and the two segments Concerned and Cautious for below average levels of media exposure. Hence, while overall positive changes were most likely for the Doubtful, this difference declined with increasing levels of media exposure. This declining difference may indicate that for the Doubtful, higher levels of exposure to climate change coverage could trigger stronger defensive motivations contributing to a disconfirmation bias. Incidental exposure, in contrast, seemed to be associated more often with shifts toward greater engagement.

Predicted probabilities of changes to more engaged segments for different levels of exposure to COP21 coverage per audience segment (based on model 1.2 in Table A2 in Supplemental Material , n  = 731, excluding the alarmed segment).

Explaining changes to less engaged segments

In contrast to positive changes, younger respondents were more likely to change to less engaged segments (Exp( B ) = 0.982, 95% CI = (0.967, 0.997)). Negative changes were more likely for men (Exp( B ) = 0.588, 95% CI = (0.401, 0.863)) and less educated respondents (Exp( B ) = 0.798, 95% CI = (0.699, 0.912)), whereas political attitudes did not contribute to less engagement. Specifically, the Disengaged were less likely to change to a lower segment compared to the Alarmed and Concerned ( Table A3 in Supplemental Material , models 3.1 and 4.1). Again, we did not find a main effect for media exposure but a conditional negative effect for the Concerned (Exp( B ) = 0.937, 95% CI = (0.888, 0.989); model 4.2). Moreover, significant interactions indicated more positive exposure effects for the Alarmed (Exp( B ) = 1.110, 95% CI = (1.034, 1.192)) and for the Cautious (Exp( B ) = 1.103, 95% CI = (1.012, 1.202)) compared to the Concerned. Figure 2 depicts the predicted probabilities of changing to a less engaged segment for different exposure levels for the four included audience segments. Negative changes were less likely for the Disengaged compared to all three other segments over all levels of media exposure ( Figure A3 in Supplemental Material ). In addition, a minor difference for very low exposure levels could be observed between the Concerned and the Cautious. The Concerned were most likely to change to less engaged segments at the lowest exposure levels ( M  = 0.51, 95% CI = (0.35, 0.66)) but decreasingly so when they were more exposed to the COP21 coverage ( M  = 0.32, 95% CI = (0.21, 0.44)).

Predicted probabilities of changes to less engaged segments for different levels of exposure to COP21 coverage per audience segment (based on model 4.2 in Table A3 in Supplemental Material , n  = 730, excluding the doubtful segment).

5. Discussion and conclusion

This study aimed to analyze changes in climate change audience segments in the context of the COP21 held in Paris in 2015 and the role of media coverage for changes in public engagement. Based on the theory of motivated reasoning, we have argued that the extent of such media effects may differ for more or less engaged audience segments. In line with previous research, we did not find any general effects of media exposure to the COP21 coverage (e.g. Nisbet et al., 2013 ). Our findings indicate, first, that media effects are segment-specific and, second, that exposure to event-specific media coverage mainly evokes defensive motivations. These can trigger a confirmation bias for those with higher—albeit not extreme—engagement levels (the Concerned), while higher exposure levels seem to contribute to a disconfirmation bias for the least engaged segment (the Doubtful). These tendencies confirm the view that media coverage mainly reinforces pre-existing attitudes (e.g. Stroud, 2010 ). But more importantly, the finding that, specifically, segments with a medium level of positive or negative engagement were prone to reinforcement effects indicates that assumptions about linear relationships between engagement factors and media effects may not hold. Considering alternatives, such as the bimodal relationship that is reflected by our findings, might help to better understand how media coverage or other messages can affect public opinion and engagement concerning climate change.

To what extent might these findings be specific to the Dutch context? The five identified Dutch climate change segments showed high similarities to the segments identified in Germany ( Metag et al., 2017 ). 2 Specifically, the absence of a clear opposition of climate change deniers as identified in the United States ( Leiserowitz et al., 2015 ) and Australia ( Hine et al., 2013 ) might be typical for Western European countries. As the most striking difference to other countries, we found that the middle segments were particularly strong in the Netherlands while relatively fewer citizens were assigned to the two most engaged segments on either end of the spectrum. Since, particularly, the two groups with medium positive and medium negative engagement levels and the most pronounced reinforcement effects—the Concerned and the Doubtful—were considerably smaller compared to similar segments in other countries, generalizability might be limited and points to the need for more internationally comparative approaches.

Our data revealed that Dutch citizens ascribed higher levels of individual responsibility for tackling climate change (also see TNS Opinion & Social, 2015 ). This is as well reflected by the strong focus on individual as opposed to political action and higher levels of consumer as opposed to government efficacy in the present study, specifically, among the Alarmed. The Dutch Concerned, in contrast, were highly comparable to the “Concerned Activists” identified in Germany but with even higher levels of political activism, while the Concerned in the United States were characterized by relatively low levels of political activism. This could explain, for instance, why the Dutch Concerned were more interested in and also more affected by the political event studied here compared, for instance, to the Alarmed.

However, also similarities to other countries should be emphasized. Across countries, specifically, the Disengaged segments have been characterized by the lowest level of education indicating the importance of formal education and knowledge for climate change engagement ( Detenber et al., 2016 ; Metag et al., 2017 ). Moreover, in line with previous findings from Germany and the United States ( Metag et al., 2017 ; Roser-Renouf et al., 2015 ), we find that lower levels of engagement are associated with lower levels of media exposure rendering it plausible that even effects of incidental news exposure would be the least likely among these segments across countries. An exception to this might be Singapore where the least engaged paid most attention to climate change in the news media ( Detenber et al., 2016 ).

Our results confirm, first, that public opinion change concerning climate change, possible actions, and responsibilities is a challenge and, second, precisely targeted messages are necessary to reach different audience segments ( Roser-Renouf et al., 2015 ). As opposed to more specifically targeted communication programs ( Flora et al., 2014 ), this study focused on possible effects of national public debates about climate change on public opinion. While such discourses are vital for democratic decision making and might facilitate public support for mitigation or adaptation strategies, our findings indicate that audience segments vary in how selectively they select and process information from such a debate. While consequences of climate change or responsibilities to engage in mitigation are not confined to certain segments of national populations, with the most engaged segments most strongly exposed to the corresponding media coverage, an inclusive public debate seems not yet in reach.

While the success of the Paris Agreement has created a scenario of hope ( Christensen and Wormbs, 2017 ), our study indicates that effects on the general public were limited. With an increasing number and diversity of societal participants, climate change conferences have developed beyond a place for political negotiations. Investing in accompanying communication programs, particularly, targeted at lower engagement segments could foster a broader societal impact. This may raise awareness and interest in the issue among the Cautious, Disengaged, and Doubtful who showed the lowest level of attention to the COP21 coverage. Greater exposure to the mainstream debate seems to be the least mobilizing for the Doubtful. Since this segment is most conservative and also least politically interested, alternative moral arguments could be offered to counter the stronger defensive motivations this group seems to develop with greater exposure to the debate ( Brown et al., 2019 ).

But also tendencies of the Cautious or Alarmed to lower their engagement with increasing media exposure could be attenuated by more specific information about possible solutions reinforcing their individual and governmental efficacy beliefs. Moreover, further encouraging their opinion leadership could contribute to greater efficacy beliefs ( Roser-Renouf et al., 2015 ). Our findings indicate that, specifically, the least engaged segments are the hardest to reach by media coverage about climate change. For a greater inclusion of these segments, it has been suggested to rely less on factual information but more on engaging messages, such as narratives, facilitating effortless, heuristic forms of processing ( Roser-Renouf et al., 2015 ).

Limitations and outlook

In this study, we have estimated individual levels of exposure to the COP21 coverage by linking self-reported media use and outlet-specific attention to the conference. Considering the multifaceted character of climate change coverage consisting of conflicting information and positions, members of the various audience segments may differ in their response to different message characteristics. While the Alarmed or Concerned may be receptive to threat or efficacy appeals, the Doubtful might respond more strongly to factual information concerning the evidence of climate change ( Roser-Renouf et al., 2015 ). Accompanying experimental studies could allow to simultaneously test such contrasting effects and offer more insights concerning the content characteristics triggering differentiated media effects. Moreover, our theoretical argument regarding segment-specific media effects is not restricted to climate change conferences and should be studied in the context of other events related to climate change.

Although two waves allow us to track changes over time, conclusions concerning, first, causal explanations and, second, the stability and duration of such changes are limited. In addition, online panels have their limitations in terms of generalizability. However, high levels of Internet penetration in the Netherlands (92%, Mediamonitor, 2015 ) allowed us to reach all segments of the population online, in contrast to countries with considerably lower penetration rates, such as India, where typically different sampling strategies and survey modes are employed ( Leiserowitz et al., 2013 ).

The reinforcing tendencies of media coverage once again point to clear limits of public information or campaigns. While this study shows that audience segments can help to explain differentiated media effects, this approach could also be used to study more engaging activities, such as interactive simulation programs ( Rooney-Varga et al., 2018 ). Moreover, the limited relationships we found between people’s news exposure and climate change-related attitudes and behaviors might be explained by other relevant information sources, such as direct social contacts or social media. Specifically, social media have been found to increase trust in science in general ( Huber et al., 2019 ) and may be more successful in reaching younger generations with scientific information compared to traditional media ( Metag et al., 2018 ).

Overall, our study finds small media effects. Certainly, no large and sudden changes should be expected from a single event that is competing for attention with other events or ongoing problems and debates. Nonetheless, more specifically targeting audience segments might be a step toward intensifying surrounding public debates that might help to increase public concern and support for climate change action. This is a call directed at climate change campaigners, journalists and educators. We as researchers should further study how different climate change segments respond in various contexts and also over longer periods of time to better understand the differentiated underlying mechanisms and factors contributing to public opinion change.

Supplemental Material

Author biographies.

Anke Wonneberger is an assistant professor of Corporate Communication at the Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR) at the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Her research interests include environmental and climate change communication and strategic communication of non-profit organizations.

Marijn H. C. Meijers is an assistant professor of Persuasive Communication at the Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR), University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Her research focuses on stimulating environmentally friendly behavior by means of environmental communication.

Andreas R. T. Schuck is an associate professor of Political Communication and Journalism at the Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR) at the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. His research focuses on media effects on political opinions, attitudes, and behavior. Current projects deal with the role of emotions and journalistic quality in climate change communication.

1. A comparable study that has applied a panel design to track segment changes in the context of a specific event has yielded a change rate of 51% which was considerably higher compared to our findings ( Flora et al., 2014 ).

2. It should be noted that the comparisons made here are limited due to different methodological approaches including sampling procedures, measurement of segmentation variables, and the different types of segmentation approaches applied including hierarchical cluster analysis, discriminant analysis, and latent class analysis.

Funding: The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Supplemental material: Supplemental material for this article is available online.

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• Toward 2035: Forging a High-Ambition U.S. Climate Pathway
• Publications

To achieve net-zero emissions before 2050 requires that the United States takes a comprehensive, all-of-society commitment to climate action. We must set ambitious targets and engage in society-wide approaches to lowering greenhouse gas emissions, transitioning to clean energy sources, and the like, embedding those commitments in the U.S. 2035 NDC (nationally determined commitments). 

A new report titled “Toward 2035: Forging a High-Ambition U.S. Climate Pathway,” by the Center for Global Sustainability shows that with coordinated action from federal and non-federal entities (such as states, cities, and businesses), the United States could cut emissions by 65% from 2005 levels by 2035. Following ambitious pathways through 2035, the United States can meet its climate goals and remain aligned with the Paris Agreement’s global 1.5°C temperature rise target.

Using an all-of-society approach—mobilizing and integrating action by federal, state, city, industry, business, and other sectors—the United States can pursue a high-ambition policy pathway under its third round of NDCs. This approach will provide the ambition for 2035 and set the stage for 2050. 

Zhao, A., K. O’Keefe, S. Kennedy, M. Binsted, C. Dahl, C. Squire, K. Ordonez Olazabal, A. Bryant, J. Snarski, D. Churlyaev, S. J. Smith, G.Chalef, N. Hultman, and R. Cui (September 2024). “Toward 2035: Forging a High-Ambition U.S. Climate Pathway.” Center for Global Sustainability, University of Maryland. 68 pp.

• In our analysis of plausible, all-of-society actions to deliver a high-ambition 2035 NDC, we find that the United States can achieve a 65% GHG emissions reduction by 2035, down from 2005 levels, under our core scenario.
• Achieving additional sectoral targets, including 100% clean electricity and 0.2% oil and gas methane intensity, requires additional efforts beyond the specific policies modeled in the core scenario, and can further drive overall emissions reductions to 67% by 2035.
• The average annual decarbonization rate from 2020 to 2035 increases by nearly 70% from 2.2% per year with current policies to 3.7% in the core scenario. Delivering this ambitious 2035 NDC, which also achieves the current U.S. 2030 NDC, will require specific actions from all of society – federal, state, city, businesses, and other actors – with guidance for implementation that is supported by robust analysis. This approach is critical to setting and achieving an ambitious U.S. national climate target in line with Paris Agreement goals, keeping a 1.5-degree pathway within reach.
• Methane has a critical role to play in reducing near-term warming. Using the EPA baseline which will govern the NDC process, methane emissions decrease by 35% from 2020 levels by 2035 through an extended methane fee that covers oil and gas, coal, and waste sectors, and incentives for reducing agricultural methane in the core scenario. With the use of an alternative baseline for oil and gas methane and the addition of an internationally agreed-upon standard to achieve a 0.2% methane emissions intensity for oil and gas production and transmission – a measure of how much methane is released into the atmosphere relative to the amount of oil and gas production – and a 50% reduction target for landfill methane, methane emissions can be reduced by 48% by 2035.
• In the electricity sector, a generation mix that is 91% powered by clean technologies is achieved under the core scenario, with unabated coal power phased out by 2030, solar generation increasing ninefold, and wind generation nearly sixfold between 2020 and 2035. By achieving the 100% clean electricity target, unabated gas power is phased down and replaced by additional solar and wind deployment.
• In the transport sector, 82% of light-duty vehicle sales and 42% of freight truck sales under our core scenario are electric by 2035. Passenger vehicle miles traveled fall by 65% compared to current policies as a result of switching from single-occupancy vehicles to alternative modes of transportation.
• In the buildings sector, 38% of water and space heating are electrified by 2035, and overall energy demand decreases by 16% compared to 2020 levels as a result of energy efficiency measures and increased electrification. In the industrial sector, progress is made in carbon capture and storage (CCS), with annual industrial carbon sequestration increasing to 154 MtCO2e by 2035.
• Land sink carbon sequestration increases by 96 MtCO2 from 2021 levels through enhanced carbon sequestration from forests and climate-smart livestock management.
• Critical to achieving emissions reductions is the full implementation and expansion of key federal policies, including over $1 trillion in investments under the Inflation Reduction Act and Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and the recently finalized EPA rules on vehicle emissions and fossil fuel power plants, underscoring the importance of supporting actions from non-federal actors.
• In addition to implementing federal policies, non-federal actors also play a key role in driving emissions reductions through expanding and delivering on their own policies. State and local leadership can unlock federal and industry decarbonization with initiatives in accelerating renewable energy targets, methane intensity standards, EV sales mandates, vehicle miles traveled reduction policies, building appliance electrification targets, and more.
• An initial analysis shows that even without federal support, continued, high-ambition actions from non-federal actors can achieve a 48–60% reduction by 2035. This highlights the impact that non-federal actors can still have despite uncertainties at the federal level.

Check out the full report to learn how various U.S. sectors can contribute to a high-ambition scenario for 2035 and beyond.

Meet the authors:

• Alicia Zhao , Center for Global Sustainability at the University of Maryland
• Kowan O’Keefe , Center for Global Sustainability at the University of Maryland
• Shannon Kennedy, Center for Global Sustainability at the University of Maryland 
• Matthew Binsted , Center for Global Sustainability at the University of Maryland 
• Camryn Dahl , Center for Global Sustainability at the University of Maryland
• Claire Squire , Center for Global Sustainability at the University of Maryland
• Kiara Ordonez Olazabal, Center for Global Sustainability at the University of Maryland
• Adriana Bryant, Center for Global Sustainability at the University of Maryland
• Jordan Snarski, Center for Global Sustainability at the University of Maryland
• Dmitry Churlyaev, Center for Global Sustainability at the University of Maryland
• Steven J. Smith , Pacific Northwest National Laboratory's Joint Global Change Research Institute
• Nate Hultman , Center for Global Sustainability at the University of Maryland
• Ryna Cui , Center for Global Sustainability at the University of Maryland
• Center for Global Sustainability
• Sustainability

Related Publications

School Authors: Kowan O’Keefe , Gokul Iyer , Kathleen Kennedy , Alicia Zhao , Haewon McJeon , Yiyun 'Ryna' Cui , Nathan Hultman

Other Authors: Yang Ou

School Authors: Bradley Phelps , Kathleen Kennedy , Camryn Dahl

Other Authors: Shannon Kennedy, Jocelyn Lewis-Johnson

School Authors: Christoph Bertram , Yiyun 'Ryna' Cui , Nathan Hultman , Gokul Iyer

Other Authors: Elina Brutschin, Laurent Drouet , Gunnar Luderer , Bas van Ruijven, Lara Aleluia Reis , Luiz Bernardo Baptista, Harmen-Sytze de Boer, Vassilis Daioglou, Florian Fosse , Dimitris Fragkiadakis 8 , Oliver Fricko, Shinichiro Fujimori , Kimon Keramidas, Volker Krey, Elmar Kriegler, Robin D Lamboll, Rahel Mandaroux , Pedro Rochedo, Joeri Rogelj, Roberto Schaeffer, Diego Silva, Isabela Tagomori, Detlef van Vuuren, Zoi Vrontisi, Keywan Riahi

School Authors: Yueming 'Lucy' Qiu , Nathan Hultman

Other Authors: Nana Deng, Bo Wang, Xingchi Shen, Zhaohua Wang, Han Shi, Jie Liu, Yi David Wang

School Authors: Alicia Zhao , Matthew Binsted , Haewon McJeon , Claire Squire , Steven J. Smith , Yiyun 'Ryna' Cui , Gokul Iyer , Nathan Hultman

Other Authors: Kowan T.V. O’Keefe, Adriana Bryant, Mengqi Zhang, Yang Ou

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• The Guardian |
• Nipashe Jumapili

• Entertainment
• The Guardian

Limited funding, expertise hinder climate change research

COUNTRIES including Tanzania face significant economic risks linked to climate change. The risks may lead to labour productivity losses due to high temperatures that could reach 4-6 percent leading to total economic losses of 1.2 percent of Gross Value Added (GVA) by 2030 and 1.5 percent by 2050.

Following the extreme weather events including floods, droughts, and rising sea levels, governments are advised to take urgent action to adapt to climate change.

Tanzania is urrently ranked 145 out of 185 countries on the ND-GAIN Index for climate readiness. The index measures a country's current vulnerability to climate disruptions and its readiness to improve resilience

Dr Jamal Msami is the Principal Researcher and Director of Strategic Research at REPOA, is of the view that successful climate resilience will require integrating climate change mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable development through coordinated efforts across governance, politics, and institutional practices.

The economic toll is already evident. Tanzania’s agricultural sector is losing approximately $200 million yearly from climate-related risks, compounded by energy and water stress.

“With projections that flood damage alone could cost $60 million per year by 2050, the stakes for climate resilience are high,” said Dr Msami when addressing delegates at Policy Forum breakfast debate that brought together key stakeholders from the government, academia, civil society and the private sector.

Sponsored by the Irish Embassy in Tanzania, the debate was themed —‘Shaping Tanzania’s future navigating climate resilient development (CRD) challenges and choices’ 

CRD is an outcome and a process consisting of actions and social choices made by multiple actors performed over different dimensions of governance, politics, institutions, practices and bounded by ethics, values and worldviews that successfully integrate climate change mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development.

According to Msami Ethics, values, and worldviews must deeply inform these actions. He said CRD is not just an endpoint but an on-going process involving multiple actors and dimensions.

At the heart of CRD is the balance between ensuring climate justice and equity, particularly for Tanzania’s most vulnerable populations, and meeting the country’s international commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 30-35 per cent by 2030, as per the National Determined Contributions (NDCs).

Although financial investment is vital in mitigating climate change impacts, the researcher suggests that there should be a balance between mitigation and adaptation.

While mitigation moderates climate risks, it can also limit adaptation options, particularly in energy-intensive sectors. At the same time, adaptation measures could inadvertently increase greenhouse gas emissions if not carefully planned.

Between 2015 and 2022, Tanzania received over $5 billion in climate-related development finance, with more than half directed towards adaptation.

Dr Msami suggested that more financial support is needed, particularly for building local capacity, fostering innovation, and developing context-specific resilience strategies.

He mentioned some of the challenges that hinder government efforts in achieving CRD as unsustainable development practices, combined with rapid urbanization and population growth, are increasing Green House Gas (GHG) emissions while straining Tanzania’s existing infrastructure.

Governance and institutional frameworks remain insufficient to address the scope of the climate crisis, with many national development plans failing to fully consider current and future climate risks.

Despite the existence of a National Disaster Risk Management Strategy (2022-2027), its integration into broader development policies has been slow. And the coordination among implementing agencies remains fragmented.

However, despite external financing opportunities being identified, there is no domestic budget allocation for climate adaptation, leaving Tanzania vulnerable to future funding gaps.

There are still growing interest in impact investment and private sector participation in CRD, as well as the recent adoption of carbon trading regulations, which could generate significant financial resources for climate adaptation and mitigation.

Msami also cited the National Disaster Management Strategy and Tanzania’s strong network of stakeholders—from government bodies to academic institutions and civil society—as critical enablers for achieving climate resilience.

He stressed that with the right mix of political will, innovation, and evidence-based policymaking, Tanzania can overcome these challenges and build a sustainable, resilient future.

Rehema Ulimboka, Assistant Lecturer at the University of Dodoma (UDOM) was concerned that destruction of the environment is in a high speed, highlighting the need for continued environmental conservation awareness education to the people.

Ulimboka noted that community-based adoption is vital for building resilience to climate change.

“By engaging local communities solutions become more tailored, sustainable and adaptable to the unique environmental and social challenges they face.”

Forest Officer from the President's Office (Regional Administration and Local Governments), Felister Kagembe said to mitigate climate change impacts the government has now entered into contracts with various companies for carbon trading.

She underscored the need for more awareness education to increase the public understanding on climate change, its impacts as well as how to address them.

“A well-informed public is crucial to driving the success of CRD initiatives, as many communities and individuals lack awareness of climate change risks and the importance of resilience building actions.”

The Irish Embassy in Tanzania, who sponsored the event, has continued to show its commitment to supporting climate resilience initiatives in the country, taking into consideration the importance of international collaboration in addressing climate change, particularly in vulnerable nations like Tanzania.

The Irish government pledged to continue working with local partners to ensure that Tanzania can access the financial, technological, and policy tools it needs to achieve climate resilience.

Studies have shown that navigating a complex path towards climate resilience involves a multifaceted approach that integrates various strategies and stakeholders.

Some of these key steps among others include, evaluating the specific climate risks faced by communities, ecosystems, and economies. Use climate models, historical data, and local knowledge to understand vulnerabilities.

Engage local populations in decision-making processes to ensure their needs and knowledge are incorporated. Foster partnerships between government, businesses, NGOs, and academia.

Creating plans that address economic, social, and environmental dimensions of resilience and focusing on actions that provide the greatest benefit for the least cost.

Protect and restore natural habitats that can buffer against climate impacts, such as wetlands and forests. Implement solutions like green roofs, permeable pavements, and urban forestry.

Upgrade existing infrastructure to withstand extreme weather events and rising sea levels, transition to renewable energy to reduce dependency on fossil fuels, encourage sustainable agriculture, water management, and waste reduction practices and support systems that minimize waste and promote recycling and reuse.

By following these steps, communities and organizations can navigate the complexities of climate resilience effectively, adapting to challenges while building a sustainable future.

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Poop core records 4,300 years of bat diet and environment

Deep in a Jamaican cave is a treasure trove of bat poop, deposited in sequential layers by generations of bats over 4,300 years.

Analogous to records of the past found in layers of lake mud and Antarctic ice, the guano pile is roughly the height of a tall man (2 meters), largely undisturbed, and holds information about changes in climate and how the bats’ food sources shifted over the millennia, according to a new study.

“We study natural archives and reconstruct natural histories, mostly from lake sediments. This is the first time scientists have interpreted past bat diets, to our knowledge,” said Jules Blais, a limnologist at the University of Ottawa and an author of the new study in the Journal of Geophysical Research: Biogeosciences , AGU’s journal for research on the interactions among biological, geological and chemical processes across Earth’s ecosystems.

Blais and his colleagues applied the same techniques used for lake sediments to a guano deposit found in Home Away From Home, Jamaica, extracting a vertical “core” extending from the top of the pile to the oldest deposits at the bottom and taking it to the lab for biochemical analysis.

About 5,000 bats from five species currently use the cave as daytime shelter, according to the researchers.

“Like we see worldwide in lake sediments, the guano deposit was recording history in clear layers. It wasn’t all mixed up,” Blais said. “It’s a huge, continuous deposit, with radiocarbon dates going back 4,300 years in the oldest bottom layers.”

The new study looked at biochemical markers of diet called sterols, a family of sturdy chemicals made by plant and animal cells that are part of the food bats and other animals eat. Cholesterol, for example, is a well-known sterol made by animals. Plants make their own distinctive sterols. These sterol markers pass though the digestive system into excrement and can be preserved for thousands of years.

“As a piece of work showing what you can do with poo, this study breaks new ground,” said Michael Bird, a researcher in environmental change in the tropics at James Cook University in Queensland, Australia, who was not involved in the new study. “They really extended the toolkit that can be used on guano deposits around the world.”

Past climates, past diets

Like sediment and ice core records, the guano core extracted from the Jamaican cave recorded the chemical signatures of human activities like nuclear testing and leaded gasoline combustion, which, along with radiocarbon dating, helped the researchers to correlate the history seen in the guano with other events in Earth’s climate history.

Bats pollinate plants, suppress insects and spread seeds while foraging for food. Shifts in bat diet or species representation in response to climate can have reverberating effects on ecosystems and agricultural systems.

“We inferred from our results that past climate has had an effect on the bats. Given the current changes in climate, we expect to see changes in how bats interact with the environment,” said Lauren Gallant, a researcher at the University of Ottawa and an author of the new study. “That could have consequences for ecosystems.”

The new study compared the relative amounts of plant and animal sterols in the guano core moving back in time though the layers of guano to learn about how bat species as a group shifted their exploitation of different food sources in the past.

The research team, which included bat biologists and a local caving expert, also followed living bats in Belize, tracking their food consumption and elimination to gain a baseline for the kinds of sterols that pass through to the poop when bats dine on different food groups.

Plant sterols spiked compared to animal sterols about 1,000 years ago during the Medieval Warm Period (900-1,300 CE), the new study found, a time when cores of lakebed sediments in Central America suggest the climate in the Americas was unusually dry. A similar spike occurred 3,000 years ago, at a time known as the Minoan Warm Period (1350 BCE).

“Drier conditions tend to be bad for insects,” Blais said. “We surmised that fruit diets were favored during dry periods.”

The study also found changes in the carbon composition of the guano that likely reflect the arrival of sugarcane in Jamaica in the fifteenth century.

“It’s remarkable they can find biochemical markers that still contain information 4,000 years later,” Bird said. “In the tropics, everything breaks down fast.”

The approach demonstrated in the new study could be used to glean ecological information from guano deposits around the world, even those only a few hundred years old, Bird said.

“Quite often there are no lakes around, and the guano provides a good option for information about the past. It also contains biological information that lakes don’t.” Bird said. “There’s a lot more work to do and a lot more caves out there.”

Notes for Journalists

This research study “ A 4,300 ‐ year history of dietary changes in a bat colony determined from a tropical guano deposit ” will be free and available for 30 days. Download a PDF copy of the paper here . Neither the paper nor this press release is under embargo. This press release and accompanying multimedia are available online at: https://news.agu.org/press-release/poop-core-records-4300-years-of-bat-diet-and-environment . 

• Lauren Gallant (University of Ottawa, Canada)
• MB Fenton (University of Western Ontario, Canada)
• Chris Grooms (Queens University, Canada)
• Wieslaw Bogdanowicz (Museum and Institute of Zoology, Poland)
• RS Stewart (Jamaican Caves Organization, Ewarton, Jamaica)
• Elizabeth Clare (Queen Mary University of London, United Kingdom)
• John Smol (Queens University, Canada) 
• Jules Blais, corresponding author (University of Ottawa, Canada)

AGU press contact: Liza Lester, +1 (202) 777-7494, [email protected]

University of Ottawa press contact: Justine Boutet Media Relations Officer Cell: 613.762.2908 [email protected]

Social Media & News Data Analysis Shows Urgent Need To Better Communicate the Health Impact of Climate Change

Stefanie Friedhoff, Professor of Practice and co-founder of the Information Futures Lab at the Brown University School of Public Health speaking on the Climate Group panel “Climate and Health: The New Narrative” alongside Adam Lake, Head of Communications, North America at Climate Group and Rory Smith, Research Manager at the IFL and co-author of the new report.

People and organizations talk a lot about climate change online, but only 3.1 percent of content mentions connections to health, a new analysis reveals

PROVIDENCE, R.I. | September 24, 2024 ― New data analysis from the Information Futures Lab (IFL) at Brown University’s School of Public Health, in partnership with Climate Week NYC and supported by The Rockefeller Foundation, reveals that only 3.1 percent of online content which mentions climate change makes any connection to health-related impacts. Research shows that communicating the health impacts of climate change can strengthen public engagement with climate issues and generate support for climate policies and action. Yet, analysis of more than 2.4 million English-language social media posts and news data demonstrates a significant gap of when this connection is being made in online public discourse and news headlines. The findings and recommendations are now available in a new report titled, “ The Untapped Potential of Climate Communication: Harnessing Health to Drive Action . ”

“The scale of this finding is striking: 96.9 percent of news headlines and social media posts that mention climate change currently do not touch on health. We are missing a major opportunity to engage people in climate conversations and solutions”, said Stefanie Friedhoff, Professor of the Practice and co-founder of the Information Futures Lab at the Brown University School of Public Health. “Evidence shows that health-framed messaging can strengthen support for climate action, even across the political spectrum and including those who tend to be less concerned about climate change.”

A critical blind spot

“This is a critical blind spot in our current approach,” said Adam Lake, Head of Communications, North America at Climate Group . “At a time of need to galvanize public and political actions that can minimize the harm of climate change on people and the planet, this study underscores the urgent need for a shift in how we communicate about climate change.”

Presented today at Climate Week NYC, the new research analyzed climate change-related content across Facebook, YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, Twitter/X and within news headlines from January 2023 – July 2024. In total, just over 2.4 million climate change-related social media posts and news headlines were gathered and analyzed for mentions of health topics. The team also looked more closely at the top 100 most-engaged-with posts on each social media platform that made a connection between climate and health, to understand the sources of these posts and what techniques they were applying to communicate about the health impact of climate change.

Moving past “Doom-and-gloom”-only messaging

Among the 3.1 percent of all climate change-related content that mentioned health impacts, news accounted for the greatest percentage (4.9 percent), followed closely by Instagram (3.9 percent) and Facebook (3.7 percent). The analysis of the 100 top posts on each platform also shows that a majority of the messaging that connected climate and health was negative: 58 percent of popular posts highlighted the negative consequences of climate change on health without providing actionable advice or solutions.

“This finding shows a challenging dynamic: The ways in which social media platforms prioritize and reward negative content incentivizes “doom and gloom” messaging and may discourage the creation and sharing of hopeful, solution-based messages – even though such content is more effective in inspiring action,” said Rory Smith, Research Manager at the IFL and a co-author of the new report . “While it is vital to acknowledge the challenges we face, we should at least be pairing problems with clear, actionable solutions that can motivate meaningful change.”

Among the most popular posts that mention the health effects of climate change, the researchers also found that 11 percent of this content was either climate denialist, contrarian, or downplayed the effects and severity of the climate crisis.

The new report urges organizations, leaders and activists to tap into the powerful, but underutilized, approach of connecting climate change and health by communicating the health impacts often and on all platforms, in ways that people can make sense of and with information people can act on.

Recommendations to strengthen climate and health communications include:

• Avoid general messaging and mention the specific health threat caused or exacerbated by climate change.
• Tell personal stories of people impacted or working on solutions, and connect solutions to health benefits.
• Move past negative messaging only and instead offer encouragement and actionable solutions.
• To reach more conservative audiences, apply more conservative framings.

“These findings illuminate a clear path forward for climate and health communicators,” said Estelle Willie, Director of Health Policy and Communications at The Rockefeller Foundation. “By talking about the connections between climate and health, by making the climate crisis more personal, we can strengthen engagement and, hopefully, empower people to take action.”

This research was made possible with support from The Rockefeller Foundation. Click this link to access the full report.

About the IFL

Founded in 2022, the Information Futures Lab (IFL) at Brown University is a new type of university hub. Interdisciplinary researchers work alongside organizations, journalists, civic society leaders, and other sources of trusted information to respond to the information crisis as a civic and public health threat. Recognizing information as a social determinant of health, we create an evidence base and work with our partners to improve information ecosystems and strengthen the capacity of citizens to effectively access, create, and make sense of information that is crucial to their wellbeing. For more information, visit sites.brown.edu/informationfutures and follow us on X @IFL_Brown and LI @information-futures-lab .

About The Rockefeller Foundation

The Rockefeller Foundation is a pioneering philanthropy built on collaborative partnerships at the frontiers of science, technology, and innovation that enable individuals, families, and communities to flourish. We make big bets to promote the well-being of humanity. Today, we are focused on advancing human opportunity and reversing the climate crisis by transforming systems in food, health, energy, and finance. For more information, sign up for our newsletter at www.rockefellerfoundation.org/subscribe   and follow us on X  @RockefellerFdn  and LI  @the-rockefeller-foundation .

About the Climate Week NYC

Climate Week NYC is the largest annual climate event of its kind, bringing together over 600 events and activities across the City of New York – in person, hybrid and online. Each year, business leaders, political change makers, local decision takers and civil society representatives of all ages and backgrounds, from all over the world, gather to drive the transition, speed up progress, and champion change that is already happening. Climate Week NYC is hosted by Climate Group , an international non-profit whose purpose is to drive climate action, fast. Learn more at www.climateweeknyc.org .

Media Contacts

Information Futures Lab

[email protected]

Katie Lanegran

Climate Group

[email protected]

Shivani Ekkanath

The Rockefeller Foundation

[email protected]

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Urban climate-health action: a new approach to protecting health in the era of climate change

• The Rockefeller Foundation

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The Rockefeller Foundation Identifies Critical Gaps in City Responses to Climate-Induced Health Threats

Outlines a three-step action plan for action and commits more than $1 million to helping cities save lives

NEW YORK | September 26, 2024 — During New York City Climate Week, The Rockefeller Foundation released a three-step roadmap to help cities around the world more effectively plan for, and respond to the global health emergency caused by climate change. With more than half of the world’s population living in urban areas, Urban Climate-Health Action: A New Approach to Protecting Health in the Era of Climate Change , identifies the critical gaps in city-level responses to climate-induced health threats. The Rockefeller Foundation announced today that it will invest more than $1 million to support the plan’s implementation through grants, including to C40 Cities and Resilient Cities Network.

“From New York to Nairobi, Bogotá to Bangalore, cities worldwide are facing rising health risks and increased stress from climate change,” said Elizabeth Yee, Executive Vice President of Programs at The Rockefeller Foundation. “This report highlights immediate, actionable steps mayors, health officials, and residents can take to protect lives and improve well-being.”

While the health implications of climate change are global, cities, which are home to an estimated 5 billion people, are already bearing the brunt of the crisis. By 2050, nearly 70% of the world’s population is expected to live in a city, each facing unique health risks caused by climate change. The features that define cities—dense populations, concrete landscapes, limited greenspace, and proximity to water—intensify heat, increase pollution, and spread disease. Cities like New Delhi and Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso are experiencing unprecedented heatwaves, while Dhaka, Miami, and Dubai face more frequent and severe flooding. Rio de Janeiro and Ho Chi Minh City have seen increased cases of dengue fever due to expanding mosquito habitats.

The Urban Climate-Health Action report was informed by data from the Urban Pulse: Identifying Resilience Solutions at the Intersection of Climate, Health and Equity survey that was also released today. Conducted by Yale School of Public Health and the Resilient Cities Network, with support from The Rockefeller Foundation, the survey reveals that of nearly 200 city leaders in 118 cities in 52 countries, 70% of city leaders recognize these climate-related health threats, and over 90% report economic losses from such events. Despite this, few cities have emergency response plans that use reliable climate data, and only 20% have strong inter-departmental coordination.

In response, The Rockefeller Foundation outlines its three-step action plan for cities:

• Connect health and meteorological agencies to translate climate risks into forecasts that show the impact on the health of vulnerable populations.
• Build multisectoral teams that include leaders and experts across climate, health, urban planning, transportation, education, and civil society who will use climate insights to develop local prevention and response plans.
• Budget for future climate-related health threats by positioning resources where they are needed most and ensuring timely, effective communications reach those most at risk.

The Foundation’s roadmap for cities also includes seven case studies demonstrating successful programs across three continents, including:

• Rio de Janeiro, Brazil , a multidisciplinary team including Rio’s Municipal Health Secretariat under the Health Surveillance Superintendence, set up the Dengue Emergency Operations Center to forecast dengue hotspots and predict spikes in early 2024. By bringing together the Operations and Resilience Center and other local partners to predict a spike two months earlier than forecasted by traditional epidemiological models, Rio improved timely notifications and deployment of resources enough to ensure the lowest death rate among the last four dengue epidemics.
• Dhaka, Bangladesh , the Red Crescent Society engaged a multisectoral team to develop an Early Action Protocol to minimize health risks during intense heatwaves. By using heat forecasting and street-by-street vulnerability data, response partners in Dhaka have alerted a million people of their increased risk and deployed live-saving resources like safe drinking water and umbrellas at critical locations. If scaled to 57 countries, this sort of warning system could save almost 100,000 lives a year, according to the World Health Organization and World Meteorological Organization.
• Lusaka, Zambia , the El Niño climate phenomenon has led to severe drought and water insecurity, increasing the incidence and severity of cholera outbreaks. A risk communication and community engagement response led by the Collective Service has improved localized understanding of health-seeking behaviors and key concerns, propelling a 100% uptake of the cholera vaccine and increased uptake of oral rehydration salts, stemming the outbreak and preventing deaths.

As these cases make clear, city-led action can save lives. If the action plan championed by this report were implemented for just one heatwave in Dhaka, preliminary estimates by Mathematica, a leading policy research firm, commissioned for this report, finds a $1 to $7 return on investment in terms of lives saved among the most vulnerable — illustrating the tremendous economic value at stake.

“Cities are flying blind to the impact climate change is having on human health, and people are needlessly suffering as a result,” said Dr. Naveen Rao, Senior Vice President of Health at The Rockefeller Foundation. “Integration across sectors is vital to respond to the unfolding climate-health crises.”

To put this roadmap into action, The Rockefeller Foundation is supporting C40 Cities and Resilient Cities Network in separate grants to implement recommendations laid out in this report. A grant to the Resilient Cities Network, made up of over 100 cities advancing urban resilience globally, will support the Urban Pulse: Climate, Health, and Equity in Action program by creating a city-led Community of Practice and integrating health priorities into climate adaptation and mitigation efforts. Another grant to C40 Cities, a network of nearly 100 mayors of the world’s leading cities working to confront the climate crisis, will support heat-health pilot initiatives to assist city officials and other stakeholders to better respond to health impacts on vulnerable communities during extreme heat events. These investments are part of the Foundation’s $100 million commitment to test and scale climate and health solutions, announced at the inaugural COP28 Health Day in December 2023.

Statements of Support:

• Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of the World Health Organization: “As the effects of climate change intensify, the world is coming increasingly to the realization that the climate crisis is a health crisis. Health is one of the most compelling reasons for climate action, demanding collaboration between health, meteorology, and other sectors to deliver effective solutions to promote and protect the health of people and the planet on which all life depends.”
• Professor Celeste Saulo, Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization said: “Widespread, intense and extended heatwaves have hit communities and cities on every continent. At least ten countries have recorded temperatures of more than 50° C in more than one location this year. Many dozens of locations have seen daytime maximum temperatures of more than 40°C and dangerously high minimum overnight temperatures. The so-called urban heat island effect means that people in cities are particularly vulnerable. Integration across sectors is key to ensuring that city leaders have the right information at the right time to respond effectively to the unfolding climate-health crises.”
• Sadiq Khan, Mayor of London and Co-Chair of C40 Cities said: “London is at the forefront of addressing climate health challenges. From expanding our Clean Air Zone, now the largest in the world, to deploying zero-emission buses and installing more electric vehicle chargers than the rest of the UK combined, we’ve significantly improved air quality. Given London’s progress in tackling issues like cleaning up our air, it’s clear that there is an opportunity for global discussions, like those at the Summit of the Future, to place greater emphasis on the vital link between climate action and public health. I look forward to working with global leaders to further the conversation on building resilient, healthy cities for the future. Together we can build a greener, safer and healthier world for all.”
• Yvonne Aki-Sawyerr, OBE, Mayor of Freetown, Sierra Leone and Co-Chair of C40 Cities: “The climate crisis disproportionately impacts our most vulnerable populations, including women, who often face heightened risks due to entrenched gender inequalities. In Freetown we’re working to combat these threats and reduce inequalities through initiatives like #FreetowntheTreetown, where we’ve planted over a million trees to mitigate heat and prevent flooding. While we recognize these measures as major steps, the reality is that we must drive more robust, comprehensive actions to address these issues. It is therefore essential for global leaders to unite and develop strategies that truly protect all communities and build resilient, equitable cities for the future.”
• Lauren Sorkin, Executive Director of the Resilient Cities Network: “Cities are acutely aware that climate change poses serious health risks, which disproportionately affect populations that face vulnerabilities. The R-Cities network of Chief Resilience Officers is at the forefront of addressing these challenges, driving cross-sector collaboration to pilot and scale equitable, innovative solutions. This Urban Pulse report, produced in partnership with Yale University, captures both the scale of the challenge and pioneering actions already underway in cities. We look forward to supporting more cities in the next phase of the Urban Pulse program to advance climate, health, and equity solutions where they are needed most.”
• Mark Watts, Executive Director of C40 Cities: “The Rockefeller Foundation’s new roadmap underscores the critical need for visionary leadership and cross-sector collaboration to tackle the climate emergency. From New York to Nairobi cities are not just sites of climate change impact but also arenas of innovative solutions. This $1 million commitment will make a tangible impact for the cities confronting the escalating health impacts of climate change. Addressing these threats requires united action and forward-thinking strategies. United, we can turn the tide and safeguard the health and resilience of our urban communities.”
• Jeannette Ickovics, Professor at the Yale School of Public Health and lead author of the 2024 Urban Pulse Survey: “Our Urban Pulse report highlights that city leaders recognize the impact of climate change on residents’ health and mental health, though resources, infrastructure, and collaboration to address these profound threats have been limited. We call on the global community to put health at the heart of the urban climate change agenda, to amplify and scale-up evidence-based solutions, and to invest in new financing models that prioritize rapid disbursement to cities so that they can build and sustain resilience. We must leverage this research to unite in a vision of urban resilience – harnessing our collective wisdom and strength to build a healthier, more equitable and sustainable urban environment for all.”

About Resilient Cities Network

Resilient Cities Network is the world’s leading urban resilience network. It brings together global knowledge, practice, partnerships, and funding to empower its members to build safe and equitable cities for all. Its unique city-led approach ensures cities drive the agenda to benefit the communities they serve. At work in over 100 cities worldwide, the Resilient Cities Network supports on-the-ground projects and solutions to build climate resilient, circular and equitable cities while also facilitating connections and information-sharing between communities and local leaders. For more information, please visit https://resilientcitiesnetwork.org .

About C40 Cities

C40 is a network of nearly 100 mayors of the world’s leading cities working to deliver the urgent action needed right now to confront the climate crisis and create a future where everyone, everywhere, can thrive. Mayors of C40 cities are committed to using a science-based and people-focused approach to help the world limit global heating to 1.5°C and build healthy, equitable and resilient communities. We work alongside a broad coalition of representatives from labour, business, the youth climate movement and civil society to support mayors to halve emissions by 2030 and help phase out fossil use while increasing urban climate resilience and equity.

The current co-chairs of C40 are Mayor Sadiq Khan of London, United Kingdom, and Mayor Yvonne Aki-Sawyerr of Freetown, Sierra Leone; three-term Mayor of New York City Michael R. Bloomberg serves as President of the Board. C40’s work is made possible by our three strategic funders: Bloomberg Philanthropies, Children’s Investment Fund Foundation and Realdania.

To learn more about the work of C40 and our cities, please visit our website or follow us on X , Instagram , Facebook and LinkedIn .

About The Rockefeller Foundation

The Rockefeller Foundation is a pioneering philanthropy built on collaborative partnerships at the frontiers of science, technology, and innovation that enable individuals, families, and communities to flourish. We make big bets to promote the well-being of humanity. Today, we are focused on advancing human opportunity and reversing the climate crisis by transforming systems in food, health, energy, and finance. For more information, sign up for our newsletter at www.rockefellerfoundation.org/subscribe and follow us on X @RockefellerFdn and LI @the-rockefeller-foundation .

Media Contacts

Ashley Chang The Rockefeller Foundation [email protected]

Lynette Lim Resilient Cities Network [email protected]

Richard Main C40 Cities [email protected]

Colin Poitras Yale School of Public Health [email protected]

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