respect and dignity essay

Respect Essay for Students and Children

500+ words essay on respect.

Respect is a broad term. Experts interpret it in different ways. Generally speaking, it is a positive feeling or action expressed towards something. Furthermore, it could also refer to something held in high esteem or regard. Showing Respect is a sign of ethical behavior . Unfortunately, in the contemporary era, there has been undermining of the value of Respect. Most noteworthy, there are two essential aspects of Respect. These aspects are self-respect and respect for others.

Self-Respect

Self-Respect refers to loving oneself and behaving with honour and dignity. It reflects Respect for oneself. An individual who has Self-Respect would treat himself with honour. Furthermore, lacking Self-Respect is a matter of disgrace. An individual who does not respect himself, should certainly not expect Respect from others. This is because nobody likes to treat such an individual with Respect.

Self-Respect is the foundation of a healthy relationship . In relationships, it is important to respect your partner. Similarly, it is equally important to Respect yourself. A Self-Respecting person accepts himself with his flaws. This changes the way how others perceive the individual. An individual, who honours himself, would prevent others from disrespecting him. This certainly increases the value of the individual in the eyes of their partner.

Lacking Self-Respect brings negative consequences. An individual who lacks Self-Respect is treated like a doormat by others. Furthermore, such an individual may engage in bad habits . Also, there is a serious lack of self-confidence in such a person. Such a person is likely to suffer verbal or mental abuse. The lifestyle of such an individual also becomes sloppy and untidy.

Self-Respect is a reflection of toughness and confidence. Self-Respect makes a person accept more responsibility. Furthermore, the character of such a person would be strong. Also, such a person always stands for his rights, values, and opinions.

Self-Respect improves the morality of the individual. Such an individual has a good ethical nature. Hence, Self-Respect makes you a better person.

Self-Respect eliminates the need to make comparisons. This means that individuals don’t need to make comparisons with others. Some people certainly compare themselves with others on various attributes. Most noteworthy, they do this to seek validation of others. Gaining Self-Respect ends all that.

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Respect of Others

Everyone must Respect fellow human beings. This is an essential requirement of living in a society. We certainly owe a basic level of Respect to others. Furthermore, appropriate Respect must be shown to people who impact our lives. This includes our parents, relatives, teachers, friends, fellow workers, authority figures, etc.

One of the best ways of showing respect to others is listening. Listening to another person’s point of view is an excellent way of Respect. Most noteworthy, we must allow a person to express his views even if we disagree with them.

Another important aspect of respecting others is religious/political views. Religious and cultural beliefs of others should be given a lot of consideration. Respecting other people’s Religions is certainly a sign of showing mature Respect.

Everyone must Respect those who are in authority. Almost everyone deals with people in their lives that hold authority. So, a healthy amount of Respect should be given to such people. People of authority can be of various categories. These are boss, police officer, religious leader, teacher, etc.

In conclusion, Respect is a major aspect of human socialization. It is certainly a precious value that must be preserved. Respectful behaviour is vital for human survival.

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113 Respect Essay Titles & Prompts

If you are here, you probably need to write a respect essay. It is a very exciting topic for students of all levels. There are many good respect topics to write about: respect of people, respect of laws, military respect, respect and responsibility, etc. Check the complete list of respect essay titles below

🏆 Best Respect Topic Ideas & Essay Examples

⭐ simple & easy respect essay titles, 📌 most interesting respect topics to write about, 👍 good respect essay titles for students, ❓ questions about respect.

Respect is a term known to everyone since early years. But what it really means to respect? It is essential to separate this word from politeness, love, or other feelings. In simple terms, resect can be defined as a tribute honor and considerations of someone’s emotions, wills, rights, and goals.

In a respect essay, you can discuss mutual respect, forms of respect in different cultures, and other issues. We recommend you first define why it is important to respect each other. Having this question answered, it will be easier to analyze the role of respect in particular situations.

• Plato and Aristotle’s Views of Virtue in Respect to Education Arguably, Plato and Aristotle’s views of education differ in that Aristotle considers education as a ‘virtue by itself’ that every person must obtain in order to have ‘happiness and goodness in life’, while Plato advocates […]
• Tolerance and Respect for Cultural Differences The author concludes the essay in the third section by revisiting the thesis statement and highlighting the various approaches used to develop attitudes that promote respect and tolerance.
• The Importance of Respect in the Military This paper seeks to discuss the importance of respect in the military. Therefore, respect in the army ensures that the jobs of both the seniors and the subordinates are done.
• The Meaning of Respect Regardless of where exactly the person is – at a formal dinner, on a walk, at work, school or university – a certain degree of respect is required and expected from a person. The purpose […]
• Respect, Honor, & Love Children for Their Parents They should never disrespect them or talk to them rudely and calmly listen to whatever they say. Children must always accompany their parents to the temples and worship wholeheartedly in front of the Gods.
• Respect in Daily Lives The show of respect is very important especially to the adults, as they act as role models to the young children. Without respect, it would be hard to settle such differences, as no one would […]
• Trust and Respect: “The Effects of Hazing and Sexual Harassment” First, it destroys the public image of the U.S.military and leads to the situation when people associate military service with abuse, humiliation, and the inability to serve their country with dignity.
• Respect and Self-Respect: Impact on Interpersonal Relationships and Personal Identity It is fundamental to human nature to want to be heard and listened to.indicates that when you listen to what other people say, you show them respect at the basic level.
• Respect for Elder’s Wisdom Each of the two elders gave independent versions of socialisation in the Emirati society in the past, and how the society has transformed with the emergence of communication technologies.
• Jacques Louis David’s Art with Respect to Question of Gender The most “sound” in the context of “femininity” and “masculinity” are the pictures The Oath of the Horatii, The Death of Socrates and The Lictors Returning to Brutus the Bodies of His Songs and The […]
• Feminism and Respect for Culture A crucial gender aspect that continues to trouble the unity of the people across the world is gender bias, which seems to encourage the formation of the feminist campaigns.
• Respect in a Diverse Workplace This is because employees who lack respect are likely to involve themselves in behaviors that portray lack of respect to both the person and to the contribution made by other employees in an organization.
• Free Speech and Mutual Respect on Campus In case the notion of free speech on campus will be misinterpreted and evil ones will use their free speech policy to hurt others, what sad consequences this will lead to?
• Addressing the Disrespect in the Military It is important that every person in the military adhere to the conducts whether in uniform or not. Therefore, issues of disrespect tend to be very minimal in the military.
• Pharmacy: Advocacy, Integrity, and Respect A pharmacist that does not have integrity would easily give in and sell the drugs to a relative or a friend.
• Discussion: Law Enforcement and Respect In the case study, the situation highlights a situation in which Arnold, a homeless drug user, refuses to leave the entrance of a building in a low-income apartment complex without causing disturbances.
• Fostering Dignity and Respect in Caring To mitigate this situation, the management of the home care organization should strive to make sure that a patient’s decision is respected and valued.
• Diversity, Inclusion, and Respect for Human Dignity in America The purpose of this paper is to evaluate cultural acceptance in the US in connection to respect and provide means of increasing respect for other cultures.
• How the Courts Address or Respect Our Rights as Citizens The BOARD OF CONTROL OF FLORIDA, A body corporate, No.643. The case began in April 1948 The plaintiff was a black student who had applied to be admitted to the University of Florida’s College of […]
• Respect and Integrity of Company Employees On this note, economy of one’s country or state is bound to grow since new ideas will bring in more innovations that are key to the economic stability. The value of respect is strong and […]
• Business Obligations With Respect to Environment The analysis focuses on the ethical concerns faced by Virgin Blue Holdings which is one of the major airline company’s in Australia, and how the management deals with these issues within the environmental setup.
• No Respect Given to Military Family The purpose of this essay is to study the impact of the problem of insufficient respect for military families on society and individuals and to find solutions to this issue.
• Helping Business Behave Morally With Respect to Consumer Safety The organization should consider factors that affect marketability of the product, such as the costs involved, any warranties, which may be implied on the product and the quality of the product as customers are concerned […]
• Importance of Bible With Respect to Christian Ministry It also mentions the roles and responsibilities of Christian ministry in the society and in the church, basic requirements to become as a minister etc in the base of New Testament.
• Social Factors in the US History: Respect for Human Rights, Racial Equality, and Religious Freedom The very first years of the existence of the country were marked by the initiatives of people to provide as much freedom in all aspects of social life as possible.
• Why Comedy Gets No Respect The Golden Globe awards, on the other hand, divide the Best Motion Picture category into the sub-categories of drama and musical/comedy, and in that second category, many of the great comedies produced in the past […]
• Earning Respect From Employess and Superiors The manager can do this by earning the respect of both his staff and superiors. Moreover, a manager can earn respect from his staff if he listens and takes interest in the things happening to […]
• Partner Healthcare System INC Case: Competing Interests and Respect After the lapse of a certain period of time, in 1994, the Boards of BWH and MGH accorded their approval to designate the MGH/Brigham Health Care System Inc as to the sole member of the […]
• Concept in Understanding Contemporary Policy Processes in Europe with Respect to Government and Policies The emergence of MLG where on the one hand has created the need for collective decision making over complex problems which leads to a loss of control for nation-states, on the other have brought the […]
• Critical Evaluation of Organisational Learning With Respect to HP Research Labs By the change process HP is able to point out its flaws in the light of literature, various barriers like communication barrier, cultural barrier and the barrier of sharing knowledge among its various centres.
• Sweatshops and Respect for Persons One of the identified flaws in the logic of the authors is that while they focus on the ethical issues surrounding sweatshops and the responsibility of multinational corporations in providing decent working conditions, Arnold and […]
• Marketing Research with Respect to Modern Office Suppliers In this paper, the SWOT analysis of Staples and Amazon will be carried out as Modern Office Suppliers is planning to operate in the manner that these two companies operate.
• Respect and Its Significance Respect is thus imperative in any society since a great deal of the collectively desirable quality, virtues and morals which establish human dignity, and give the best out of a person and the society at […]
• New Respect Is Bestowed on Fiscal Policy The article also explores some of the fiscal policies that have been “used around the world since the 2008 economic crisis”.
• Communication of Respect in Interethnic Service Encounters The woman’s English is perfect, and she seems to be a loyal customer and the one who has developed a certain connection with the cashier.
• When a Multinational Corporation Should Violate or Respect Local Cultural Norms A multinational following these cultural norms would be respecting local culture because it considers the level of economic development in the country.
• Managing Cultural Diversity: Sustain and Respect Cultural Identities The report concentrates on the discussion on benefits and challenges of cultural diversity, the opportunity cultural diversity offers and provides practical recommendations that can help the management to deal with the multicultural diversity issues effectively.
• Saint Leo’s Core Value of Respect and Socio-Cultural Impacts on Tourism These factors result to changes in different aspects of the society such as religion, cultural practices and other influential factors like where the society emulate the aspects of the tourists.
• Responsibilities of Computer Professionals to Understanding and Protecting the Privacy Rights It is therefore the responsibility of computer professionals to take all the necessary steps that would help preserve the privacy of computer users, some of which have been mentioned in this essay.
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• The Importance of Respect and Responsibility Among Students in School
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• The Hindu Belief In Respect For All Living Creatures
• The Loyalty, Respect and Trust of Oedipus the King
• The Health Costs of Inaction with Respect to Air Pollution
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• Vulnerability and the Right to Respect for Private Life as an Autonomous Source of Protection
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• The Importance of the Government’s Respect of the Citizens for a Successful Democratic Nation
• Women’s Struggles to Gain Status, Respect and Rights in the Society
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• The Struggle for Equality and Respect in a Man’s World
• The Ideal Vision And Respect For The Human Body
• Vietnam War Veterans Deserve More Respect
• The Importance Of Integrity And Self Respect
• The Internet, Moral Judgment and Respect
• The Importance of Respect and Effort in the Course of Religion
• Understanding the Real Concept of Self-Respect
• The Principle Of Respect For Autonomy
• How Can Teachers Respect History in the Classroom?
• Why Should Our Veterans Be Given Respect?
• What Role Does Respect Play in Your Relationships With Friends and Family?
• Should Companies Treat Their Employees With Respect and Treat Each One of Them With Dignity?
• What Are the Benefits of People Treating Each Other With Respect?
• Why Should Professionalism, Respect, and Effective Communication Be Practiced in the Workplace?
• How Did Socrates Feel About the Leaders of Athens? Did He Respect Them?
• When Was the Last Time You Disrespected Someone?
• Why Do Teachers Deserve More Respect?
• Does More Respect From Leaders Postpone the Desire to Retire?
• How Did Joan Didion Define Respect?
• What Are Some Respectful Behaviors?
• Why Are Trust and Respect Crucial for a Relationship?
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• What Is the Difference Between Respecting a Person and Respecting Our Planet?
• Why Should You Respect a Person’s Religion Beliefs?
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• How Does Students’ Ethnicity Influence Their Respect for Teachers?
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• Who Deserves Respect?
• How the Maori People Earned Respect and Admiration From the English?
• Why Doesn’t Charles Bukowski Get Much Respect in the U.S. as a “Serious Author”?
• What Does It Feel Like to Be Respected?
• How Important Is Respect in Our Lives?
• Do You Consider Yourself to Be a Respectful Person? Why or Why Not?
• How Do You Show Respect to Others?
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Dignity is a complex concept. In academic and legal contexts, it is typically used in the couplet “human dignity” to denote a kind of basic worth or status that purportedly belongs to all persons equally, and which grounds fundamental moral or political duties or rights. In this sense, many believe that dignity is a defining ideal of the contemporary world, especially in western society. However, the concept of dignity has long been associated with many more meanings, some of which cut in distinctly different directions: rank, station, honor, uniqueness, beauty, poise, gravitas, integrity, self-respect, self-esteem, a sacred place in the order of things, supreme worth, and even the apex of astrological significance. Some of these connotations have faded with time. But most have enduring influence.

So, what exactly is dignity? Do its different connotations hang together in any principled way? Does dignity understood as “universal human worth”, for example, have any meaningful connection to “social rank” or “personal integrity”? Is dignity primarily a moral concept or a political and legal one? Even assuming we can make sense of its different meanings, what does dignity demand of us? What does it mean to recognize or respect it? Does it ground rights? If so, which ones? And where does the idea of dignity come from? What, in other words, is its history?

This entry will take up these questions, but without any pretense of being exhaustive. The goal is to provide a general guide to existing theory and debate, with a focus on philosophical approaches to human dignity, and mostly as it figures into the western tradition. The vast literature makes anything more ambitious than this unrealistic, even for an encyclopedic survey.

1.1 The legal history of dignity

1.2.1 the revolutionary platitude, 1.2.2 the kantian platitude, 1.2.3 the imago dei platitude, 1.2.4 the ciceronian platitude, 2.1 dignity’s defining properties vs. dignity’s grounds, 2.2 is a connection to rights a defining property of dignity, 2.3 are distinctiveness and fragility defining properties of dignity, 3.1 virtue, value, status, and the “distinctiveness” point reconsidered, 3.2 individuals vs. species, 3.3 inherent vs. constructed, 3.4 respect: an alternative lens on dignity, 4. skeptical worries, other internet resources, related entries, 1. a historical primer.

In the opening sentence of its preamble, the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights affirms the “inherent dignity” and “equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family” as the “foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” (UN 1948). This claim would surprise our modern ancestors. Until about 1830–1850, neither the English term “dignity,” nor its Latin root dignitas , nor the French counterpart dignité , had any stable currency as meaning “the unearned status or worth of all persons”, let alone the grounds of universal rights or equality. Instead, in everything from Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651) to Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary (1755) to Webster’s Compendious Dictionary (1806), “dignity” was primarily used with a conventional merit connotation—something like the “rank of elevation” that Johnson officially gave it.

How did this sea change in meaning come about? The UN Declaration makes clear that dignity’s moral-political meaning had become normalized by 1948. But what happened before 1948 that explains this transformation? These are not easy questions to answer. Although theorists often include historical remarks in their inquiries, they are just as often brief and subservient to some further, non-historical point. The result is a great many half-told stories about dignity’s past.

There are some notable exceptions. For some time, legal theorists have been etching out the details of dignity’s historical role in law and jurisprudence, especially in connection to rights. Second, theological inquiries into human dignity often engage an older history of ideas, especially the Renaissance thinker Pico della Mirandola or scholastic debates about the biblical doctrine of imago Dei . Third, there is a considerable body of literature on the Enlightenment luminaire, Immanuel Kant, and his famous claim that humans do not have a “price”, only a distinctive and incomparable worth or Würde —usually translated as “dignity” (see, e.g., Korsgaard 1986; Meyer 1987; Hill 1992; Kofman 1982 [1997]; Wood 1999; Kain 2009). Let us turn to these various exceptions, and their challenges.

The connection between law and dignity strikes many as socially and morally urgent. It is thus unsurprising that some serious history of this connection already exists, especially in relation to rights theory (see, e.g., Eberle 2002 or Barak 2015). Nevertheless, the bulk of this history does not look back very far.

For example, Lewis (2007) gives a wonderful overview of the idea of dignity in international law, but his focus is on the writing of, and reaction to, the 1945 UN Charter and 1948 Declaration of Human Rights. Or consider McCrudden’s impressive 2013 edited volume, Understanding Human Dignity. The historical chapters of this volume make important contributions, but again the focus is largely the twentieth century. Scott’s chapter (2013), for example, begins by observing that the 1848 French decree to abolish slavery motivates itself from the consideration “that slavery is an assault upon human dignity ( la dignité humaine )” (2013: 61). She then nicely explores the idea of dignity in the context of post-slavery Louisiana c.1862–96. However, the chapter then jumps forward to a comparison with Brazilian society c.1970–2012. Moyn’s chapter (2013) examines early and middle twentieth century constitutional debates to show that the concept of dignity labors under poorly appreciated debts to a specifically Christian conception of democracy, and for this reason, Moyn argues, we should be skeptical about the long-term utility of dignity for secular rights theory. And Goos’s chapter (2013) offers a close examination of the role of dignity in German thought, but the focus is on post-World War II interpretation of the German Grundgesetz (Basic Law). [ 1 ]

A longer legal history can be found in McCrudden (2008), whose concise review of dignity reaches back to classical Roman thought. McCrudden argues that we can trace the merit connotation of dignity as “elevated social rank” to the Roman idea of “ dignitas homini ” (2008: 656); but also, and crucially, he argues that we can trace our contemporary moral-political notion of the “basic worth or status of human persons” to this same period, when Cicero introduced the idea of “the dignity of the human race” (see also, Cancik 2002). This claim about Cicero is echoed in Michael Rosen’s 2012, Dignity: Its History and Meaning , which is another important entry into dedicated history that focuses on legal connections. Rosen’s history is mostly from a bird’s eye view, but, like McCrudden’s, Rosen’s history has the virtue of taking a long view that stretches back to antiquity. Moreover, Rosen offers some nuanced reflections on eighteenth and nineteenth century connections, including Kant’s influence on the writing of the German Grundgesetz .

Finally, when it comes to legal history, Darwall (2017) offers a sophisticated analysis of dignity’s connections to western Enlightenment conceptions of jurisprudence stretching back to the sixteenth century. Importantly, however, Darwall’s history challenges McCrudden’s and Rosen’s appeal to Cicero as a key source. We will return to this scholarly disagreement and Darwall’s competing proposal below ( §1.2.2 and §1.2.4 ).

1.2 Four Origin Stories

Given the present popularity of studying dignity, we should not only expect the historical contours of dignity to become clearer in coming years, but also for them to be occasionally redrawn. A few important platitudes have already been challenged.

The western creed of human dignity stems from the wisdom of eighteenth-century revolutionary thinkers such as Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, or Gilbert du Motier, the Marquis de Lafayette. At the founding of new liberal states like America, or the reformation of existing ones like England or France, political sages like these propounded the inviolable value of individual human beings.

In reality, one looks in vain for dignity in the founding documents of these new republics. The term appears a few times in the English Bill of Rights (1689), but not with our contemporary moral-political meaning. It appears once in the French Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen (1789), but the connotation is of the privileges that attend public or political office. And for all its fiery rhetoric about equality and the “inalienable” rights of man, the US Declaration of Independence does not mention human dignity at all. Nor does the US Constitution. In fact, it is not until the Mexican Constitution of 1917 and the 1919 Weimer Constitution, that the term appears in a constitutional context possibly with its moral-political connotation (McCrudden 2008; Debes 2009 and 2017b). To this corrective evidence, we should add the testimony of an entirely different set of historical voices—from Sojourner Truth, David Walker, Anna Wheeler, and William Thompson, to Susan B. Anthony, Frederick Douglass, James Rapier, and Ida B. Wells—who remind us that the revolutionary platitude was contradicted by the lived reality within these new republics. These voices decried the systematic oppression and often bloody inhumanity that stained the supposedly egalitarian societies in which they lived.

The early modern concept of dignity originates with Immanuel Kant, who in his 1785 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals , argued that all persons have an inherent value, or dignity, in virtue of their rational autonomy. This value commands a distinct kind of moral respect, which we express by abiding by certain limits in our treatment of others. Thus, Kant argued that we have a categorical duty to treat persons always “as an end” and “never merely as a means” ( Groundwork , 4:429).

This is the greatest dogma about dignity in philosophy. But there are good reasons to rethink it in favor of a more complicated history of ideas. First, although it is well known that Kant is indebted to Rousseau in various ways (see especially Beiser 1992), recent scholarship suggests that when it comes to his ideas about “humanity” and “dignity”, the debt runs deeper than is generally understood (James 2013; Hanley 2017; Sensen 2017). Sensen also argues that it is a longstanding interpretive mistake to think that Kant grounds the obligation to respect others on any “absolute inner value” that humans possess; and that “dignity” is not the name Kant gave to such a value anyway (Sensen 2011 & 2017; see also Meyer 1987). Relatedly, Debes (2021) argues that contemporary philosophers have greatly overestimated Kant’s influence on the historical development of our notion of moral respect for persons.

On top of these corrections, Darwall (2017) argues that the conceptual link between dignity and rights does not originate with Kant. According to Darwall, only certain conceptions of dignity will support the kind of inferences about respect that could justify using dignity to ground human rights. Namely, those conceptions that render dignity as a kind of authoritative standing to make “second-personal” claims—that is, claims by one person to another. However, the original insight for this crucial point, Darwall further argues, comes from the natural lawyer Samuel Pufendorf (see also Darwall 2012).

Writing a century before Kant, Pufendorf argued that human beings have perfect natural rights (rights owed to one another) in virtue of a certain moral “standing” that we assign to each other as a constitutive part of being sociable. Whenever we address another person directly—e.g., with a claim like “You must allow me to speak”—we implicitly treat them as an accountable, responsible being. Otherwise, why address them at all? And the same is true when they address us. In other words, according to Pufendorf, being sociable implicitly involves a reciprocal assumption of basic moral status—us of them, them of us—whenever we interact, and even if the address is one that offends the equal standing of the other. Indeed, this is precisely when “dignity” becomes most urgent. Thus, Pufendorf writes:

There seems to him to be somewhat of Dignity [ dignatio ] in the appellation of Man : so that the last and most efficacious Argument to curb the Arrogance of insulting Men, is usually, I am not a Dog but a Man as well as yourself . (1672: I.VII.I [2003]: 100)

The moralized concept of dignity does not originate in the early modern era. It was celebrated as early as the Renaissance, in Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s 1486 Oration on the Dignity of Man . Moreover, Pico’s oration is drawn from the older, medieval Christian doctrine of imago Dei (based on Genesis 1:26 and Wisdom 2:23), which tells us that we are made in “in the image of God”, and that this likeness grounds our distinctive moral worth or status.

This story about dignity is to Christian theology what the Kantian dogma is to philosophy. However, these claims are usually misleading if not false. For example, Copenhaver (2017) flatly contradicts the claim that Pico was talking about human dignity in a sense akin to our contemporary moral-political notion. First, Copenhaver notes that the title of the work, which draws our attention, postdates Pico (who never published it). More substantively, Copenhaver argues that Pico’s speech was a public failure in large part because it was entangled with Kabbalah mysteries for how humans can escape the body to increase their status by becoming angels. Finally, Copenhaver points out that Pico uses the Latin dignitas only twice; and

In neither case does dignitas belong to humans, except aspirationally, and neither justifies “dignity” as a translation, with all the Kantian baggage of the modern English word. (2017: 134–5)

Adding to this reversal of fortunes, Kent (2017) marshals extensive evidence from the scholastic tradition against the imago Dei platitude more generally. Although she confirms that both dignity and the doctrine of imago Dei were widely discussed by medieval Christian scholars in the Latin West, she convincingly demonstrates that these discussions did not intersect in a way that supports an inference to our contemporary moral-political notion of the “basic worth or status of humans”. This said, not all interpretations of the Christian tradition, including the doctrine of imago Dei , are beholden to this historical platitude. And the imago Dei line of inquiry on dignity has a somewhat different life in the Jewish tradition. [ 2 ]

“Dignity” derives from the Latin dignitas . And while most Romans used dignitas only in its merit sense, a few, and Cicero in particular, had a proleptic understanding of dignitas that anticipated today’s moral-political sense.

This historical view has attracted more attention lately, as evidenced by its earlier noted endorsement in McCrudden (2008) and Rosen (2012a) (see also, Englard 2000). However, it has been challenged on both philosophical and interpretive grounds. For example, Miriam Griffin (2017) carefully demonstrates that the textual support for this view is very thin. She argues that straightforward lexical analysis of Roman sources offers sparing evidence for connecting dignitas to our contemporary moral-political concept. Moreover, even if we branch out to other ancient Roman concepts to see if dignity might be hiding under different terminology, we run into a fundamental challenge: “Stoics and Roman moralists”, Griffin explains, “think in terms of officia , obligations or duties or functions that our nature, properly understood, imposes on us ”. Correspondingly, “[t]he entitlements and rights of those at the receiving end of our actions is not a prominent aspect of their thinking” (2017: 49).

Admittedly, Griffin allows that in some cases these obligations or duties entail a kind of treatment of others that accords with our contemporary notion of human dignity. Still, this result does not depend on any right that persons have in virtue of “the worth of a human being per se” (2017: 64; see also Meyer 1987; and Lebech 2009, especially p. 46 n. 22.)

To these challenges, Darwall (2017) adds another problem for the Ciceronian platitude. Borrowing from the exact quotations that McCrudden and Rosen use to defend attributing a moral-political notion of human dignity to Cicero, Darwall argues:

Human dignity for Cicero is nothing that could be established by conventional patterns of deference. It is the idea, rooted in the ancient notion of a great chain of being, that distinctive capacities for self-development “by study and reflection” give human beings a “nature” “superior” to that of “cattle and other animals”. Other species are motivated only by sensory instincts, whereas human beings can “learn that sensual pleasure is wholly unworthy of the dignity of the human race”, and be guided by this understanding. [Consequently] nothing in the Ciceronian notion of human dignity requires, or even leads naturally to, basic human rights. The proposition, for example, that “sensual pleasure” is “unworthy” of human dignity is less a thesis about what human beings are in a position to claim from one another by virtue of their dignity than it is an ethical standard to which we are to live up. (2017: 182–3; Cicero quotations cited in McCrudden 2008: 657, and Rosen 2012a: 12)

To be fair, Darwall’s critique hangs on two assumptions about the concept of dignity: (1) that a satisfactory account of dignity will involve a connection to, if not a grounding for, rights claims; and (2) that dignity is in no way an achievement. Both assumptions resonate strongly with contemporary moral-political talk of dignity. Nevertheless, identifying these assumptions should remind us that we have not yet clearly formulated a concept of dignity. So, let us turn to that task. [ 3 ]

2. Formulating Dignity

There is no single, incontestable meaning of dignity. In fact, there are so many possible meanings that it has become commonplace in the literature to worry about the expansive variety of conceptions, and in turn to worry whether dignity is or has become essentially ambiguous. And while its defenders find ways to mitigate or explain away this ambiguity, the concept of dignity has its share of detractors. But we will return to skeptical worries at the end of this entry. For now, and granting the prima facie force of the ambiguity worry, four broad categories of meaning stand out across context and history:

• Dignity as Gravitas: a poise or grace associated with behavioral comportment; e.g., the sophisticated manners or elegant speech of nobility, or outward composure in the face of insult or duress.
• Dignity as Integrity: the family of ideas associated with living up to personal or social standards of character and conduct, either in one’s own eyes or the eyes of others.
• Dignity as Status : noble or elevated social position or rank.
• Dignity as Human dignity : the unearned worth or status that all humans share equally (either inherent or constructed).

This “general schema” is rough and ready. Scholars divide the conceptual space in different ways, often advocating intersections between the foregoing four categories, making elaborations on them, or noting wrinkles within them.

For example, Kolnai (1976) argues that the primary function of the concept is descriptive, not evaluative. Dignity is a quality of persons, which is the fitting object of a set of pro-attitudes related to both moral appreciation and aesthetic appreciation. Thus, to be dignified is to comport oneself in a way that is not simply a reflection of authority, rank, moral uprightness, or a regimented or serious adherence to codes of conduct, but instead reflects something of “the beautiful”. As Kolnai puts it, our response to dignity is characterized, at least in part, by “our devoted and admiring appreciation for beauty” (1976: 252). Hence the distinction between (1) and (2) above (see also Brady 2007).

By contrast, although Rosen (2012a) notes that the Latin term dignitas was once part of a critical vocabulary of classical art and rhetoric, used “to characterize speech that was weighty and majestic, in contrast to discourse that was light and charming” (2012a: 13), Rosen largely blends categories (1) and (2) into a single strand of meaning, which he identifies as “dignity as behavior, character or bearing that is dignified” (2012a: 54). Rosen then accepts (3) and (4) but adds his own further category, which he calls “dignity as treatment”: “To treat someone with dignity is…to respect their dignity” (2012a: 58). As we will see more fully in a moment, this addition reflects a common observation by scholars about a tight connection between dignity and its recognition (although, it is not common to claim that the proper recognition of dignity is a separate category of dignity).

Meanwhile, Kateb (2011) stresses the need to distinguish between human dignity qua individual humans, and human dignity qua human species. According to Kateb, both have dignity. But whereas the dignity of individuals can be described as a special kind of “status”—as in category (4) above—the dignity of the human species requires a further concept, namely, of “stature”. He writes, “In comparison to other species, humanity has a stature beyond comparison” (2011: 6). To be clear, Kateb does not think that the human species has an existence above and beyond its members: it is not a natural kind. However, he argues that the interdependence of humans is,

so extensive, so deep, and so entangled…that for certain purposes we might just as well make the human species a unified entity or agency, even though we know it isn’t. (2011: 6)

Correspondingly, we can sensibly talk about the “dignity” of the species. This conclusion cuts against some positions that maintain dignity “proper” can only belong to individuals (Stern 1975; Gaylin 1984; Egonsson 1998).

A more recent schema is offered by Killmister (2020). Killmister proposes three “strands” of dignity: personal, social, and status. To have personal dignity, Killmister argues, is to take oneself to be subject to personal “dignitarian” norms. And to have social dignity is to be subject to social “dignitarian” norms. What are dignitarian norms? Dignitarian norms are norms that either the person themself, or society at large, take to be “ennobling” to uphold, or whose transgression the person or society consider to be “disgraceful or debasing” (2020: 25, 29). Like Rosen, then, Killmister effectively blends categories (1) and (2) , while at the same time drawing attention to a different organizational distinction one might make, namely, between the personal and the social. As for “status dignity”, Killmister argues that explaining this category of dignity requires a distinctive concept of respect. And her argument is worth elaborating because it exemplifies and fleshes out two closely related points shared by many existing theories:

• that any satisfactory theory of dignity must explain what it means to recognize dignity; and
• that this recognition is best described as a kind of respect .

So, consider: Dignitarian norms, according to Killmister, can typically be redescribed as articulating the grounds of respect—either self-respect (in the case of personal dignity) or respect from others (in the case of social dignity). Moreover, the kind of respect relevant to personal and social dignity, she argues, is what Stephen Darwall (1977) influentially named “appraisal respect”. This kind of respect is a positive evaluative attitude or feeling , which we express towards ourselves or others, for some merit of character. In this sense, respect is akin to esteem. Killmister writes:

to be highly personally dignified is to be such that, by our own lights, we ought to hold ourselves in high esteem…to be highly socially dignified is to be such that, by the light of our community, they ought to hold us in high esteem. (2020: 23)

By contrast, Killmister connects status dignity to what Darwall called, “recognition respect”. Recognition respect is a way of thinking about oneself or others. To recognize-respect someone (at least as Darwall first explained it) is to give appropriate weight to some fact about them in our practical deliberations, and to restrict our choices or actions accordingly.

Killmister thus argues,

We come to have status dignity, when we fall within a particular [social] category, membership in which commands respectful treatment from others in our community. (2020: 22)

She elaborates,

status dignity does not call on others to esteem us, but rather to treat us in ways appropriate to the kind of thing we are. (2020: 23, emphasis added)

Correspondingly, human dignity ends up as “an especially important instance” of status dignity. And all humans deserve recognition respect in virtue of the “fact” of their membership in the category “human” (2020: 129–30).

This said, Killmister’s conclusion diverges from Darwall’s own account of human dignity, which is tied to a revision he made to his theory of recognition respect, which connected recognition respect to the reciprocal “authority” of second-personal address, as discussed in the earlier historical reflection on Pufendorf (see §1.2.3 above; and Darwall 2006, esp. p. 14). Note also that Killmister, like Kateb, eschews thinking of “human” as a natural kind, in favor of understanding it as a social kind.

The previous section offered examples of how the general schema of dignity’s meaning gets modified in existing theory, as well as how each category of meaning might be fleshed out. More examples could be given. But to decide between any of them, it seems crucial to ask, how should we formulate the concept of dignity? In other words, instead of simply cataloging first-order views about its meaning, we need to introduce some second-order criteria.

On the one hand, we need to determine the defining properties of dignity: the distinguishing characteristics or explanatory demands that are supposed to apply to any contentful account of dignity. Such criteria might include, for example, that dignity is “inherent”; that it is “incommensurable” with other values; that it has a “distinctive normative function”; that it has an essential connection to rights; and so on.

On the other hand, we need to determine what grounds dignity: we need to say what it is about humans, or any being with dignity, that satisfies the defining properties. In other words, we need to answer the question: In virtue of what do we have dignity? The most common answer to this question, historically speaking, especially when it comes to human dignity, involves a claim about autonomy. Or if not autonomy tout court, then the “capabilities” for such autonomy (see, e.g., Nussbaum 1995, 2006a, and 2006b). Thus, one finds many variations of the claim that humans have dignity in virtue of their capacity for (or exercise of) “choice” or “rational agency”—claims that are often tethered to the earlier discussed historical platitude about Kant. This said, alternatives to the grounding question about human dignity include brute species membership, sentience, the creative power of humanity, creation “in the image of God”, a politically conferred status as “rights bearer”, the capacity for empathy and caring relationships, the earlier mentioned “personality”, the concrete “particularity” of an individual person, and the possession of “perspective”.

Sorting these views is not easy for a few reasons. First, some of the operative concepts, such as “autonomy”, are themselves hotly disputed. Second, there is no pre-theoretical reason to deny multiple ways of satisfying any given definitional criteria. That is, any given proposal for the defining properties of dignity might be satisfied by more than one ground. For example, depending on the criteria, humans might “have” dignity in virtue of both autonomy and sentience, or both divine creation and our capacity for empathy, and so on. Third, twentieth century theorists rarely took a second-order view on their subject and methods. In turn, they often confused or at least failed to clarify which of the two foregoing challenges they were trying to tackle, articulating dignity’s defining properties or articulating dignity’s grounds.

Thankfully, twenty-first century formulations of dignity are marked by increasingly conscientious attempts to articulate the defining properties of dignity, and to do so in a way that might guide discussion about dignity’s grounds. For example, in “Bedrock Truths and the Dignity of the Individual”, Iglesias (2001) distinguishes between historically older, “restricted” meanings of dignity associated with general schema (1) , (2) , and (3) ; and, on the other hand, what she calls “universal” meanings associated with schema (4) , “human dignity”. She further argues that any satisfactory universalist account must render human dignity as (4a) in some sense “inherent” or “intrinsic”; and (4b) the “grounds” of basic rights. Regarding the latter, Iglesias writes:

The connection is essential. It is rooted in the concept of the human person, in human self-understanding as constituted by the bedrock truths about what and who we are…The universal meaning of the concept of dignity, as inherent to every human being, expresses the intrinsic good that the human being is. The distinct human rights articulate those basic intrinsic goods proper to, and expressive of, each one’s dignity, individually and in community relationships—as dimensions of our very being. These basic goods—guaranteed as rights—must be recognized, respected, and promoted so that the intrinsic good that the human being is himself or herself, personally and as an individual, may be preserved and assured. Thus, the ground for advocacy and defense of human rights resides on what and who the human being is, as a human being, namely on his or her dignity. (2001: 130)

By comparison, Shultziner (2007) adopts a “philosophical-linguistic” method to distinguish moral-philosophical uses of dignity from political and legal “functions” of the concept, especially the use of dignity to ground specific rights and enforceable duties. Regarding the latter, Shultziner stresses that in real world contexts, the rights which the concept of dignity is used to ground vary considerably:

There is no fixed and universal content that spouts out of human dignity and, hence, its content and meanings are determined separately in each legal document in accordance with the political agreement achieved at the time. (2007: 78)

This might seem to express skepticism about the possibility of any general, stable concept of dignity. In fact, it underlines the point of Iglesias’s final criterion (4b) ; namely, that a defining property of dignity is the grounding connection to rights. In other words, strictly speaking, Shultziner agrees with Iglesias that at least one defining property of human dignity—in political contexts—is that dignity grounds rights, even though the content of these rights vary greatly because the grounds of dignity itself vary greatly. [ 4 ]

Another example of second-order thinking can be found in Debes (2009), who argues that any satisfactory “formal” account of human dignity—by which he means an account of its defining properties—must pick out a “distinctive” value or status belonging to humans. And it must be distinctive in the sense that it (a) is not merit based, but instead unearned; (b) is in some sense “incommensurable” with other values; and (c) makes sense of the basic “normative function” of the concept. Regarding (c), Debes argues that the concept of dignity does not purport to be only or even mainly descriptive. Instead, it has a normative purpose or role, namely, “to set off in our practical deliberations whatever ‘dignity’ is applied to—to guard or protect what has dignity” (2009: 61–2).

Or consider Waldron (2012), who tracks a confusion in legal discussions of dignity between (on the one hand) definitional claims about dignity’s defining properties and (on the other hand) claims about dignity’s practical conditions; that is, the conditions of its moral, social, or political recognition. Thus, Waldron notes the way that various human rights charters claim that dignity is “inherent” in the human person; but also “command us to make heroic efforts to establish everyone’s dignity” (2012: 16, emphasis added). Such claims, he writes, may look like an equivocation akin to claiming, as Rousseau once did, that “Man is born free but everywhere is in chains”—a claim that Jeremy Bentham later called “miserable nonsense”. However, Waldron argues that Bentham missed an easy explanation of Rousseau:

[A person] might be identified as a free man in a juridical sense—that is his legal status—even though he is found in conditions of slavery…So, similarly, one might say that every human person is free as a matter of status—the status accorded to him by his creator—even though it is the case that some humans are actually in chains and need to have their freedom represented as the content of a normative demand. (2012: 16–17)

To be clear, Waldron quickly adds that one might shy away from the specific premise of divine creation as a way of grounding human freedom. That metaphysical premise is only an example. His overarching point is that it is not incoherent to make this kind of claim. Because the operative claim about the status of human persons—namely, that they are free—is a claim about a defining property of the concept of “man” (in a juridical sense), it follows that we can distinguish this claim from any further claim about what grounds this “free” status, as well any claim about the worldly conditions that are required for this status to be expressed, realized, or recognized.

Keeping this in mind, we can now understand why Waldron thinks that we are not necessarily equivocating if we claim that dignity is inherent , but nevertheless enjoin others to establish it in practice. He writes,

On the one hand, the term [“dignity”] may be used to convey something about the inherent rank or status of human beings; on the other hand, it may be used concomitantly to convey the demand that rank or status should actually be recognized. (2012: 17)

Importantly Waldron further argues that dignity finds its proper conceptual home not in morality, but in the legal context of rights. He writes, “law is its natural habitat” (2012: 13). This is because, he argues, rights articulate, or flesh out, the kind of status that modern conceptions of dignity typically include or allude to; but also, which his own theory depends on. Thus, for Waldron, it is historically mistaken and theoretically confused to ground our contemporary concept of human dignity on thick metaphysical bases—some inviolable value that “inheres” in humans, whether by dint of divine creation or otherwise. Instead, on Waldron’s view, the contemporary notion of human dignity is essentially Samuel Johnson’s old idea of “elevated rank”, albeit refashioned in the modern consciousness to apply to all humans.

In other words, Waldron explains the historical revolution in our concept of dignity as turning on a leveling up of all people to the kind of social status once reserved only for the noble elite. We simply reappropriated the term “dignity” to describe this high status, ditching its original “sortal” connotation for a new egalitarian one (2012: 57–61). Furthermore, he claims that all this happened through (or mainly through) the paradigm of rights. Oversimplifying for sake of argument: Waldron thinks that people of lower social rank successfully annexed the rights reserved to those of higher ranks, by reinterpreting those rights as human rights. Hence why rights remain the critical apparatus for fleshing out the kind of status relevant to “dignity”, and why the proper home of dignity is law, not morality.

Waldron’s view on dignity has been influential, so a few more notes about it are fitting. First, in making these claims about dignity-as-elevated-rank, Waldron partly aligns himself with Appiah (2010), although Waldron does not seem to notice this. Second, Waldron’s claim about the “home” of dignity is contentious. It is prima facie hard to square with everyday claims about human dignity, which seem evenly spread over moral, political, and legal contexts. And it contradicts Shultziner (2007), discussed above. Moreover, Dimock (2012), Herzog (2012), and Rosen (2012b) challenge it directly, among others (see, e.g., Bird 2013).

Most important, however, in the greater context of discussing the defining prosperities of dignity, it is to register Waldron’s underlying suggestion about an “essential” connection between dignity and rights. As we have seen, this claim finds wide traction in the literature, even in accounts of dignity that are at odds with the Appiah-Waldron view of “dignity-as-elevated-rank”. For example, considering only accounts reviewed so far, Iglesias (2001) made the same claim; Darwall (2017) implies it; and both Kateb (2011) and Killmister (2020) endorse it in different ways. This raises an obvious question: What exactly is the connection between dignity and rights?

It is beyond the scope of this entry to answer this question in anything close to a comprehensive way. (Good starting points include Meyer and Parent 1992; Gewirth 1992, Carozza 2008 and 2013; and Tasioulas 2013). Instead, let us draw out a few points about the connection between dignity and rights as it bears specifically on attempts to make it a defining property of dignity itself. To get at these points, consider a final proposal about the definitional criteria of dignity, from Fitzpatrick (2013):

The primary notion of dignity is the idea of a certain moral status involving possession of an inherent, unearned form of worth or standing —a basic worth or standing that is neither dependent on one’s being of use or interest to others nor based on one’s merits, and which essentially calls for certain forms of respect. (2013: 5546)

Fitzpatrick presents this definition within the context of an encyclopedic effort to capture its meaning. As such, he is understandably aiming at something generic. However, in the light of our analysis so far, the tensions in his attempt are manifest, albeit instructive.

First, describing dignity as primarily a “status” instead of a “value” aligns with those like Waldron, who make a principled distinction between their accounts and all kinds of “worth” or “value” conceptions of human dignity (see, e.g., Killmister 2020, who emphasizes this distinction; and Dan-Cohen 2012, for analysis on its import to Waldron). However, Fitzpatrick immediately equivocates on this point, redefining status as, “worth or standing”. Similarly, consider that those like Appiah-Waldron who think human dignity depends on a refashioned idea of high social rank, must, strictly speaking, reject the property of “inherentness” that Fitzpatrick appeals to. But they might allow for the alternative description of “unearned”, especially if this is interpreted as historically indexed to the refashioned conception of status.

More important for the question about rights is to consider Fitzpatrick’s final remark that dignity, “calls for certain forms of respect”. At first blush, this appeal might seem to be merely a refinement of Debes’s (2009) claim that dignity has a distinctive “normative function”. If so, it would be a refinement that is common to many theorists, as we already noted in §2.1 . However, Fitzpatrick immediately connects this generic claim about respect to two specific elaborations of dignity’s normative function. He writes:

It is in this sense [of an inherent worth or standing that calls for respect] that many hold that all persons possess a fundamental, inalienable dignity, which grounds [1] basic rights…or [2] the authority to make claims and demands of others. (2013: 5546)

Both claims merit elaboration.

The first claim [1] gives voice to the strongest, or at least the most direct way to make the connection to rights a defining property of dignity, by making dignity the normative basis of rights. Thus, suppose one asks of any given right x , what justifies the claim that “ x is a human right”? The answer for those who take this line is, “dignity”. Or at least, “human dignity”.

Now, in one sense, claim [1] is unsurprising given that it has legal reality. For example, although the claim is only implicit in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) as well as the original Charter of the United Nations (1945), a 1966 amendment to the Charter made it explicit, declaring that rights “derived from the inherent dignity of persons”. Moreover, claims like this have become increasingly common in state constitutions, especially in the west, as well as other international charters and humanitarian declarations (see, e.g., Schachter 1983, Iglesias 2001, Shultziner 2007, and McCrudden 2008, for summaries and analysis).

And yet, it is important to note that such legal claims are almost always brute assertions. They are not conscientious attempts at theory. More exactly, they do not claim that any adequate theory of dignity (as a concept) must account for the grounding relationship between dignity and rights. This is important because, pace FitzPatrick, or those like James Griffin (2008) who adamantly stress dignity as the foundation of rights, some theorists challenge or avoid or even reject claim [1] . This includes skeptics who challenge the viability of any existing substantive accounts of dignity to ground rights (discussed later). But it also includes some theorists who defend dignity (in one form or other). For example, Waldron skirts around the kind of commitment at issue in claim [1]. He allows that dignity involves each person thinking of themselves, “as a self-originating source of legal and moral claims” (2012: 60), but the overarching implication of his argument is that rights articulate the nature of the “high” status humans have been elevated to. Dignity is thus not the normative basis of rights on his view. Instead, legal systems, and rights in particular, “constitute and vindicate human dignity, both in their explicit provisions and in their overall modus operandi” (2012: 67).

Killmister (2020) follows Waldron’s lead, but she is more explicit. “[H]uman rights”, she argues, “form part of our articulation of how members of the human kind ought to be treated” (2020: 143). And, like Shultziner (2007), she warns against attempts to derive the content of rights directly from dignity, a warning that further tells against making claim [1] part of the definitional criteria. Relatedly, Meyer (1989) concludes that insofar as we aim to explain rights, we can never successfully explain dignity: “While having and exercising certain rights is important to our dignity as human beings”, Meyer argues,

what we commonly regard as essential to human dignity would not be explained even if we were able to delineate all of the relevant rights and the particular ways in which each of them expresses or protects human dignity. (1989: 521)

Meyer’s point is enhanced (perhaps even preempted) by Donnelly’s (1982) sociological claim that in cultures where “rights” are or once were a relatively foreign concept, human dignity is not. If Donnelly is correct, then excepting motivational purposes, rights theory is arguably a non-starter for a proper account of dignity’s defining properties (see also, Howard 1992, who partly recapitulates Donnelly’s point).

Piling onto this, Schroeder (2012) and Moyn (2013) warn that the “normative basis” version of the connection claim between rights and dignity—i.e., claim [1] —leaves dignity vulnerable, because our contemporary concept of human dignity carries underappreciated debts to non-secular, theological traditions (see also Addis 2013). And Valentini (2017) argues that the plausibility of claim [1] depends on which other defining properties of dignity we want to defend. Specifically, if dignity is taken to be inherent, she argues, then claim [1] becomes not only “uninformative” because “the notion of inherent dignity is opaque”; it also becomes counterproductive to the aims of most rights theories. This is because, she continues, the inherentness claim pushes rights debates, “into deep metaphysical waters”, and distracts us from the main political function of rights (especially, human rights), namely, to constrain, “the conduct of powerful actors” (2017: 862–3).

Now consider connection claim [2] : dignity grounds the authority to make claims in general. Some have argued that the first connection claim [1] , which makes dignity the normative basis of rights, is ultimately just a special case of the second claim [2], about authority. Perhaps most well-known in this respect is Feinberg (1970 [1980]), who, in the course of arguing that the act or practice of making interpersonal claims is what “gives rights their special moral significance”, adds this passing remark about dignity: “what is called ‘human dignity’ may simply be the recognizable capacity to assert claims” (1970 [1980: 151]). Admittedly, Feinberg does not unpack the point. And it is not perfectly clear if authority per se is part of his conception of this “capacity”. Still, the point seems to resonate with claim [2], especially if we pair Feinberg’s point with Darwall’s views about second-personal authority, considered earlier. Indeed, Meyer (1989) tries to unpack Feinberg in a way that seems to anticipate Darwall’s view. (See also, Forst 2011, who offers a similar line of argument to Darwall, which he credits partly to Ernst Bloch. But see Sangiovanni 2017, who objects to both Darwall and Forst, esp. pp. 50–60).

It is possible to take an even wider view on the defining criteria of dignity. For example, consider Etinson (2020), who represents another case of conscientious second-order theorizing. Etinson argues that a complete theory of dignity should explain not only what “grounds” dignity—“that is, how and why one comes to possess or lose it”—but also its “proper” method—that is, “how inquiry into all of this should proceed and be understood” (2020: 356). The latter demand is akin to calling for an articulation of the defining properties of dignity, in the sense that we have been discussing. However, Etinson adds an important substantive claim about this method: He agrees that dignity is partly distinguished by something like a distinctive “normative function”, but sharpens this claim by suggesting that to explain this function, we should focus specifically on the conditions of dignity’s violation. This refinement is important for two broad reasons.

First, over its long history, inquiry into human dignity has often been conjoined with considerations of what it means to harm dignity: What constitutes disrespect of dignity? Can we lose it? Can it be destroyed? And so on. Call this, the question of dignity’s “fragility”. Sometimes, this question is taken up within a direct examination of dignity (see, e.g., Kaplan 1999 or Dussel 2003). At other times, the motivation is pragmatic. For example, in his reflection on legal appeals to dignity, Schacter (1983) writes:

When [dignity] has been invoked in concrete situations, it has been generally assumed that a violation of human dignity can be recognized even if the abstract term cannot be defined. “I know it when I see it even if I cannot tell you what it is”. (1983: 849)

And in some cases, these reflections go the other way around; that is, from an analysis of a specific kind of dehumanizing harm (slavery, torture, rape, genocide; alienation, humiliation, embarrassment) to dignity, or one of its close cognates like “humanity” (see especially, Neuhäuser 2011; Morawa 2013; Haslam 2014; Frick 2021; Mikkola 2021). [ 5 ]

But whatever the context, it is crucial to distinguish between first-order encounters with dignity’s fragility, and second-order efforts that try to draw a connection between a negative methodology centered on the question of fragility and the positive effort to articulate the defining properties of dignity. It is the latter claim that Etinson makes, illustrated in the following incisive point:

Not all moral wrongs convincingly register as violations of human dignity…And this suggests that dignity is normatively special—that its violation represents a particular type of wrong. (2020: 357)

Essentially, Etinson is arguing that (1) we should add to the defining properties of dignity, that the value or status “dignity” picks out is in some sense “normatively distinctive”; and (2) in order to articulate (positively) what makes it distinctive, we must investigate (negatively) what it means to harm it. Thus, for Etinson, dignity does not simply have the normative function to “set off” the special status of humans in our practical deliberations; it sets off humans in a special way. And this “way” can only be understood through a consideration of dignity’s fragility.

The second reason for underlining this kind of negative methodology comes from Killmister (2020), who also makes second-order claims about the proper method for theorizing dignity. On her view, all the primary senses of dignity in the general schema can be harmed in some way or other. Each can be injured, lowered, embarrassed, humiliated, threatened, frustrated, even destroyed. Correspondingly, it is a criterion of any satisfactory theory, that it explains the nature and conditions of dignity’s fragility in all its primary senses ( categories 1–4 in the general schema).

The emphasis on “all” is important. Killmister’s theory stands out for being an attempt to use the criterion of fragility to offer a unified theory of dignity. And this raises a question beyond whether fragility is a defining property of dignity. Namely, for any given theory of dignity, does it purport to theorize dignity in general, or human dignity in particular? Most literature bearing the term “dignity” in its title will say at some point that it is really or mostly about human dignity. But if so, then are such theories in some sense incomplete? Must a complete theory of human dignity ( category 4 in the general schema) reconcile itself with the other primary senses of the term ( categories 1–3 ), as Killmister implores?

The next section attempts to offer some footholds for answering these new questions. But there is one more point to make here, because it is pertinent to second-order questions about how to formulate dignity. Part of what motivates Killmister’s effort at a unified theory is an attending argument that theories of dignity should fit with everyday ways of speaking about dignity. And everyday talk of dignity, she argues, often refers to the other primary senses of dignity in the general schema. Moreover, she claims that all these ways of talking are connected by the fragility criterion, as well as some of the other defining criteria we have discussed, especially (A) the idea of a normative function and (B) an essential connection to respect. Finally, she treats this “fit” between her account of the defining properties of dignity and everyday talk about dignity as important evidence for the correctness of her own criteria. Nor is she alone in staking evidentiary value on fitness to everyday language. For example, Bird (2013) and Etinson (2020) make similar arguments. [ 6 ] Do we agree? Surely, a good theory of dignity will not run roughshod over everyday usage. Still, exactly how beholden should a theory be?

3. Human Dignity: Touchstones of Analysis

The conclusion of the last section raised the following question about the conceptual landscape of dignity research: Which of the many points being made are relevant to theorizing dignity in general, and which pertain specifically to human dignity? To answer this question, it will help to distill a few enduring themes that characterize the debate over specifically human dignity. These are hardly all the themes that could be identified. Also, because each theme has been introduced in one way or other already, the following is intentionally condensed, with the understanding that any of these leads could be followed into a forest of nuance.

One could take all the existing literature on human dignity and arrange it into three groups, depending on whether any given argument renders dignity as a kind of (i) virtue or quality of character; (ii) value or worth; or (iii) status or standing. Our analysis already laid out the most important aspects in deciding between these classifications. We also noted that the trend in secular accounts is to articulate dignity as a kind of status rather than as a virtue or value. To this it should be added that virtue accounts make up the minority of all modern positions, no doubt because most contemporary positions eschew the hierarchical drift that comes with tying dignity to virtue.

Perhaps less obvious in the literature, is the agreement to articulate what is distinctive about dignity, regardless of which way it is rendered: virtue, value, or status. This “distinctiveness” point is pressing, given Etinson’s (2020) argument that a negative analysis of dignity’s fragility is crucial to understanding what is “special” about dignity as a normative concept. On his view, a good theory of dignity will pick out a “meaningful distinct set of concerns” (2020: 354), if it is to justify using the term at all. The force of this point extends beyond the question of whether fragility is a defining property of dignity. But to appreciate fully why, we need to contextualize it. So, consider the following:

The idea that human beings are morally special or distinctive has found expression in the religion, philosophy, literature, and art of all societies, modern and ancient. And connected to that idea and those expressions is an enduring struggle to understand what this peculiar “value” is. Since antiquity many have leveraged this idea about human distinctiveness into the idea that humans are supremely valuable. The chorus in Sophocles’ Antigone (c. 441 BCE), for example, lauds man as the most “wondrous” of all things in the world, a prodigy who cuts through the natural world the way a sailor cuts through the “perilous” surging seas that threaten to engulf him (verses 332 ff., cited in Debes 2009 at p. 52). Similarly, the Judeo-Christian doctrine of imago Dei trumpets human dominion over the earth and the distinctive value of humanity. Excluding God and angels, the doctrine implies that humankind is preeminently valuable.

Admittedly, these are not references to theory, strictly speaking. However, the historical development of dignity has long been tangled up with this kind of widespread attempt to explain human distinctiveness, even if only implicitly or under cognate terms like “uniqueness” (e.g., Muray 2007 and Rolston 2008). Indeed, one might say that the most basic point of the concept of dignity, especially as it was molded into the category of “human dignity”, just is to describe the distinctive virtue, value, or status of humans. From Cicero’s ancient claim about the special worth of the “human race”; to Schacter’s (1983) anti-Waldron argument that dignity’s importance outside of legal contexts highlights the need “to treat it as a distinct subject” (1983: 854); to Iglesias’s (2001) attempt to explain our “distinctiveness” as human beings; to Kateb’s (2011) claim that human dignity involves the unique role humans have as “stewards” of the earth—in all these arguments the distinctiveness point is in play. Or consider Simone Weil, writing in the shadow of World War II, and who inspired Iglesias:

There is something sacred in every man, but it is not his person. Nor yet is it the human personality. It is this man; no more nor less… The whole of him. The arms, the eyes, the thoughts, everything. Not without infinite scruple would I touch anything of this. (first published 1957 [1986: 50–51])

Similarly, Malpas (2007) explicitly argues that insofar as we are investigating human dignity, it seems we are inquiring into what is distinctively valuable about “being” human, by which he means something like the experience of being human.

This said, we must understand Etinson as arguing that it is not enough to claim that what explains the moral distinctiveness of humans is their “dignity”. We have to say what about human dignity itself is distinctive. And we must do so in a way that would substantiate (in part or in whole) the more general claim of human distinctiveness. After all, Etinson argues, not all kinds of harms to humans count as harms to their human dignity. Not even all harms to their status are obviously harms to their human dignity. Slapping someone in the face is certainly an affront to their status in some sense, and perhaps even necessarily to their social-status dignity ( (3) in the general schema), but not necessarily to their human dignity ( (4) in the general schema). (See also, Valentini 2017.)

So, what is distinctive about human dignity itself? There is more than one way to answer this question. Etinson’s own suggestion, as we have seen, is to use a negative normative lens to articulate what kinds of harms to humans count distinctively as harms against their dignity. But rather than tracing out further particular answers to this question, let us note a few final general observations about the distinctiveness point.

First, most theorists of dignity do not explicitly parse out the need to explain the distinctiveness of dignity itself, as contrasted with human distinctiveness in general. However, I submit that explaining the distinctiveness of dignity (itself) is often part of what many theorists take themselves to be doing, however indirectly. In other words, explaining dignity’s “distinct set of concerns”, to use Etinson’s phrase, seems to be constitutive of many theories of dignity. There is no space to substantiate this contention here, but we risk losing valuable insights about dignity’s distinctiveness if we don’t take this charitable approach.

Second, it is important not to run together the normative upshot of any claim about the grounds of dignity, with a definitional point about dignity’s distinctiveness. For example, if one thinks humans have dignity in virtue of their rational agency, then in one sense, this will entail a kind of distinctiveness. For, it will necessarily inform the substance of whatever rights or duties we think dignity justifies. In other words, the content of such rights and duties will need to be “distinctively” tied to rational agency, and what it means to protect, harm, or nurture this agency. Likewise for any other candidate account of dignity’s grounds. Nevertheless, this is different than talking about distinctiveness as a defining property of human dignity. Scholars like Etinson and Killmister are trying to articulate the distinctive normative function that defines dignity, regardless of its grounds—indeed, which any satisfactory account of dignity’s grounds must be able to explain.

Finally, Debes (2009) adds the following qualification to the “distinctiveness” point:

A proper account of dignity must pick out a distinctive value belonging to humans. This is not equivalent to demanding a value that belongs distinctively to humans.

The latter demand (which some theorists do insist on), not only arbitrarily rules out a shared space of dignity between different entities but also risks ruling out the best options for dignity’s grounds:

For example, if rationality should after all turn out to be the most defensible basis for a theory of human dignity, we [humans] wouldn’t want to yield it simply because we discovered that chimps and whales were rational or that Martians really have been trying to communicate with us for millennia. (2009: 61).

The conclusion of the last section brings to mind another theoretical dividing line in the literature, between those arguing for human dignity qua human individual, and those arguing for human dignity qua species. Which is it?

Some say, both. For example, Kateb (2011) argues that we must explain the uniqueness of persons and the species: “I am what no one else is, while not existentially superior to anyone else; we human beings belong to a species that is what no other species is” (2011: 17). According to Kateb (echoing Cicero), humans are partly divorced from the natural order both individually and collectively, in virtue of possessing unparalleled and morally special capacities for self-creation. Moreover, Kateb is clear that the distinctiveness of human dignity also grounds human normative supremacy. Indeed, on his view, human supremacy is one of the defining properties of dignity: “The core idea of human dignity is that on earth, humanity is the greatest type of being” (2011: 3–4); we are “the highest species on earth—so far” (2011: 17).

Of course, such claims are contentious. But if we want to engage them, it is important to be clear about whether we are doing so at the definitional level, or at the level of dignity’s grounds. For example, recall Cicero’s claim that it is in virtue of our distinctive capacities for self-development “by study and reflection”, that human beings have a “superior” “nature” to that of “cattle and other animals”. This Ciceronian idea about the grounds of dignity shares affinities with many other extant views, including Kant, Pico, and obviously Kateb. And we have considered reasons for rejecting this line of argument. But even if one accepts it, the present point is that one might not endorse Kateb’s claim about the “core idea” of dignity being essentially about the human species. That is, one could agree with Kateb about what grounds dignity but disagree that part of what defines dignity, is the property of species superiority. Stern (1975) and Gaylin (1984), for example, agree that the concept of dignity is most essentially about human worth or status, but argue that this does not imply that the human species possesses dignity. It only implies that each individual human has dignity.

Finally, any claim about the dignity of the species or collective humanity must confront worries about speciesism, and in turn all the objections of those who think that non-human animals have a purchase on the normative space of dignity (see, e.g., Rachels 1990; Pluhar 1995; LaFollette & Shanks 1996; Bekoff 1998; Meyer 2001; Rolston 2008; Singer 2009; and especially Gruen 2003 [2010], who explores the idea of “wild dignity”.)

It is common to talk of human dignity as “inherent”. What this means, however, is often unclear. Sometimes it is redescribed to mean “intrinsic”, other times “inalienable”. It is also often conjoined with claims that dignity is “inviolable”—although this is dubious if inviolability is supposed to be entailed by inherentness. After all, one might agree that human dignity cannot be entirely destroyed because dignity is inherent, but nevertheless allow that human dignity can be harmed, insulted, frustrated, and humiliated.

This is not to suggest that all that is inherent is indestructible. Whether human dignity can really be destroyed depends entirely on why one thinks human dignity is inherent. If one thinks that human dignity is inherent because we have dignity in virtue of possessing a soul, then they probably do not think dignity can be truly destroyed (although they may think it can be degraded; or even, if they subscribe to Christian dogma, that it was in fact degraded by the “fall” from grace). On the other hand, if one thinks that human dignity is inherent because we have dignity in virtue of our capacities for rational agency, then they probably do think dignity can be lost or destroyed, whether by extreme psychological trauma or a sharp blow to the head.

It must also be reiterated that secular theorists of dignity have increasingly turned away from “inherentness” as a defining property of dignity (see, e.g., Darwall 2006; Debes 2009; Kateb 2011; Rosen 2012a; Waldron 2012; Valentini 2017; Killmister 2020). The reasons for doing so vary. Most reflect suspicion about the metaphysical baggage, especially of the theological kind, that historically has gone hand in hand with inherentness claims. But there are often other reasons. For example, for those that think human dignity is defined by the authority or standing to hold others responsible with second-personal claims, dignity only comes into existence within actual second-personal encounters (see, e.g., Meyer 1989, Darwall 2006, Forst 2011, and perhaps Feinberg 1970 [1980]). Or recall Valentini, who argues that the problem with the metaphysical claims needed to back up inherentness is not simply that they are “heavy”, but that they distract us from the core political function of rights. Meanwhile, for those committed to a negative methodology, like Killmister or Etinson, the starting assumption is that dignity can be destroyed. And while this does not entail that dignity is not inherent, Killmister persuasively argues that such fragility strongly tells against inherentness.

All this raises the question: If not inherent, then what? The simple answer is that on many theories dignity is socially constructed. Of course, there are many theories about what it means for something to be socially constructed, with many important differences between them. There is, for example, a chasm of difference between claiming that dignity is constructed as a constitutive part of second-personal relationships ( à la Darwall or Forst) and claiming that it is constructed through the transformation of an old idea about “elevated rank” ( à la Appiah or Waldron). So, the simple answer must be turned into a complicated one, which we cannot do here.

A complete theory of human dignity must articulate the demands that dignity places on us, morally and politically. Some theories, as we have seen, build this expectation into the defining properties of dignity. But even when they do not, there is almost always some appeal, positive or negative, to some claim about what it means to recognize dignity, and most often to some claim about respect —which, furthermore, is usually claimed to be both what dignity demands and what it means to recognize dignity. The subject of respect, however, is its own labyrinth. It boasts an array of meanings, diverse applications, and extensive commentary. This said, two very general points about respect stand out in connection to human dignity.

First, the connection between dignity and respect has been made concrete in various political contexts. For example, Schachter (1983) notes that Article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that,

all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. (1983: 848)

He marks a similar provision in Article 5 of the American Convention on Human Rights (Ibid). And this connection generates distinct challenges in the political context that reach beyond the human rights discourse. Schachter explains:

In the political context, respect for the dignity and worth of all persons, and for their individual choices, leads, broadly speaking, to a strong emphasis on the will and consent of the governed. It means that the coercive rule of one or the few over the many is incompatible with a due respect for the dignity of the person. (1983: 850)

However, Schachter further points out, many political theories contend,

that substantial equality is a necessary condition of respect for the intrinsic worth of the human person…In particular, relations of dominance and subordination would be viewed as antithetical to the basic ideal [of human dignity]. If this is so, great discrepancies in wealth and power need to be eliminated to avoid such relations. (ibid)

The question thus becomes, how can we achieve such egalitarian objectives, without the kind of “excessive curtailment of individual liberty and the use of coercion” that human dignity is also thought to eschew (1983: 850)? This question figures into some of history’s most influential political theories, from Hegel to Rawls. (For an inroad to understanding the Hegelian line, see Honneth 2007; for the Rawlsian line, see Bird 2021.)

Second, as already hinted, the introduction of respect raises its own distinctive challenge, namely, to explain what respect is. To do this, many theorists appeal, explicitly or implicitly, to what we earlier called “recognition respect”. When we make plans or choose to act, we recognize-respect others when we appropriately take account of some fact about them, by adapting, revising, or even foregoing our plans and choices in the light of that fact. So, which “fact”? Well, if we are talking about respecting persons as persons, in a moral sense, many theorists have answered that human dignity is the operative fact. Or, if they drill down further, then whatever they end up defending as the grounds of human dignity—whether rational autonomy, species membership, an immortal soul, etc.—is the relevant fact. [ 7 ]

However, the last few decades have witnessed a wave of new theorizing about respect. And this has consequences for theorizing about human dignity. The most notable consequence stems from the field of care ethics, where empathy, compassion, and caring have been conceived as distinct kinds of respect. Thus, although human dignity did not figure explicitly into early formulations of care ethics, as conceived by those like Noddings (1984) or Held (2006), care ethics has increasingly been developed in ways that does bring dignity to the fore, e.g., by those like Dillon (1992), Kittay (2005 and 2011), and Miller (2012). Dillon, in particular, gives voice to a profound alternative to rationalist paradigms of human dignity, noted frequently in this entry, and associated especially with Kant. She writes:

[Care respect] grounds respect for persons in something which, considered in the abstract, nearly all human beings have and can be said to have equally - the characteristic of being an individual human “me” - a characteristic which each of us values and thinks is both morally important and profoundly morally problematic not only in others but in ourselves as well, and which pulls our attention to the concrete particularities of each human individual. We are, on the care respect approach, to pay attention not only to the fact that someone is a “me” but also to which particular “me” she is. (Dillon 1992: 118)

The core idea Dillon expresses here about the grounds of dignity qua the concrete “particularity” of an individual person (as she puts it on 1992: 115), traces to Iris Murdoch (1970) and Elizabeth Spelman (1978). It also resonates with the thinking of Simon Weil, noted above in §3.2 . More generally, Dillon’s argument illustrates how taking the concept of respect as our starting point might lead to very different views about human dignity.

The conceptual complexity surrounding dignity has sparked a long history of disagreement about the utility of the concept, with some concluding that it is hopelessly messy or essentially ambiguous. One of the more cited versions comes from the Yale bioethicist Ruth Macklin, who made this complaint in a widely read 2003 editorial. “Dignity”, she asserted, “is a useless concept. It means no more than respect for persons or their autonomy” (2003: 1419).

Macklin’s claim was not backed by much argument. And judging by the literature, her complaint did nothing to slow down the application of dignity in bioethics, where it is now discussed in the context of everything from disability studies, elderly care, human research, cloning, “chimeras”, enhancement, transhumanism, and euthanasia (see the bibliography for leads to each of these). Still, one does not have to look hard to find Macklin’s allies.

For example, Rosen (2012a) claims that “animus against dignity is widely shared among philosophers, in my experience, and goes back a long way” (2012a: 143). He buttresses his claim by recounting the encouragement of a colleague to give the concept “a good kicking”, and by quoting his favorite historical challenges by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, the former of whom called dignity, “the shibboleth of all the perplexed and empty-headed moralists” (1840 [1965: 100] cited in Rosen 2013: 143). Importantly, however, for Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, the problem wasn’t simply the ambiguity of the concept. They thought that the moralized notion of inherent or distinctive human worth garners widespread credence only because it flatters our pride and allows us to slip into self-deceptive moral complacency. This deflationary hypothesis strikes at the heart of our modern dignitarian ethos.

So, exactly how widespread is skepticism of dignity? There is no simple answer to this question because it depends greatly on what one takes dignity to be. Even defenders of one conception of dignity often express skepticism about other conceptions. For example, we already noted the trend away from thick metaphysical claims about dignity, which make dignity depend on anything like a divinely implanted “soul” or Kant’s “noumenal” idea of the self. Rosen calls such views, “internal kernel” theories, and further notes that reservations about these views are often both metaphysical (no such thing exists) and epistemological (we cannot justify our belief in such things). The present point, however, is that if one’s skepticism about human dignity in general turns on the specific reservation about internal kernel theories, then one should stay open minded. For, as we have seen, there are many alternatives for theorizing dignity that do not depend on such metaphysical commitments.

Still, because there is more than one way to interpret Schopenhauer’s claim that dignity is a “shibboleth”, it may prove helpful to trace out a little further a few possible skeptical lines of argument, albeit briefly. So, here are four ways skepticism tends to play out in the existing literature:

Rosen suggests that Schopenhauer’s main complaint is that “dignity” is an impressive “façade” obscuring the harsh reality behind the idea, namely, that the concept lacks the substance to do the work we assign to it. More exactly, dignity cannot serve as a foundation for morality, including, serving as the normative basis of rights (Rosen 2012a: 143). We encountered this line of thinking already in the earlier discussion of the connection between dignity and rights. Essentially, the complaint is that no extant account of the grounds of dignity (e.g., Kantian rationalist arguments, Judeo-Christian imago Dei arguments, etc.) can satisfactorily explain and justify the kind of normative work dignity is supposed to do. See especially, Sangiovanni 2017, who rejects Aristotelian, Kantian, and imago Dei accounts of dignity as insufficient for the tasks dignity is typically set to, including grounding rights.

A related but distinctively different way of taking Schopenhauer’s objection, is the worry that dignity has been politically manipulated to capitalize on its deceptive potential. As Rosen notes, the general point here is not new. “The idea that illusions are essential to the political order”, he writes, “runs through the Western tradition of political thought from Plato” (2012a: 144). However, Rosen suggests that Nietzsche gets the credit for understanding how powerful an illusion human dignity, specifically, can be, for such political purpose. “Such phantoms as the dignity of man”, Nietzsche writes,

are the needy products of slavedom hiding itself from itself. Woeful time, in which the slave requires such conceptions, in which he is incited to think about and beyond himself! (from “The Greek State”, 1871; quoted in Rosen 2012a: 144)

In fact, this skeptical line goes back further than Rosen seems to appreciate. Thus, in his 1714, Fable of the Bees , Bernard Mandeville essentially made the same argument. Speaking conjecturally about the origins of morality, Mandeville writes:

Making use of this bewitching Engine [of flattery], [the Politicians] extoll’d the excellency of our Nature above other Animals…Which being done, they laid before them how unbecoming it was the Dignity of such sublime Creatures to be solicitous about gratifying those Appetites, which they had in common with Brutes, and at the same time unmindful of those higher Qualities that gave them the preeminence over all visible Beings. (1714 [1988: 43])

Dignity is vacuous. Bracketing any worries about how any given political institution manipulates the idea of dignity to achieve its ends, or how human pride might capitalize on the idea of dignity to facilitate self-deception about our personal moral failings, perhaps the idea of dignity is simply unnecessary. For example, consider the first sentence of Article One of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights : “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”. What would be lost, Rosen asks, “if one were just to say, ‘All human beings are born free and equal in rights’?” (2012a: 149). A slightly different version of this complaint is that, because of its vacuousness, dignity has become mere dogma. For example, in the legal context, Theoder Heuss, called dignity a “non-interpreted thesis” in law. And Costas Douzinas argued dignity was an empty placeholder in a “hegemonic battle” of competing legal ideologies (see also, McCrudden 2013a for some analysis of both; also, Bargaric & Allan 2006).

Dignity is ambiguous. The thrust of this frequent complaint is that dignity has become a useless concept, not so much because it is empty, but because it has too many meanings. (A few have even claimed that the concept is “essentially” ambiguous, though it is not clear what this is supposed to mean; see, e.g., Shultziner 2007 or Rotenstreich 1983.) When focused, this worry comes in three forms:

• the ambiguity of meaning makes “dignity” incomprehensible;
• the ambiguity of meaning makes “dignity” susceptible to abuse;
• the ambiguity of meaning conceals objectionable subjective opinion or substantive baggage in the concept of “dignity”.

Examples of all these positions can easily be found. But perhaps the best illustrations once again come from the legal context. Regarding (1) : see, e.g., Bates (2005), who acknowledges the problem but then tries to defend dignity. Regarding (2) : see, e.g., Gearty (2014) and Moyn (2013), who argue that the continuing ambiguity of dignity make it too easily abused in courtroom deliberation and democratic theories of rights. Regarding (3) : see Pinker (2008), who argues that dignity is a subjective phenomenon, “relative, fungible, and often harmful”; also Rosen (2012a) and Moyn (2013), both of whom argue that our modern concept labors under underappreciated debts to Christian theology;

These are not all the possible reasons for skepticism about dignity, only the most prevalent. And each is usually sharpened in various ways that make the argument cut deeper than what this summary suggests. This said, the merits of these critiques are disputable. Indeed, much of the foregoing analysis in this entry suggests strategies of response to each.

But perhaps the most fitting way to conclude is with a different kind of question entirely. Namely, how ought we respond to such skeptical attacks, if at all? Thus, it is hard not to think of Frederick Douglass’s warning, delivered in his 1852 “Fourth of July” speech, about the dangers of demanding of anyone, that they argue for their equal and basic human worth or status—especially when so many people remain not simply oppressed, but exposed to vitriolic hate in a world that constantly proclaims its faith and commitment in the ideal of human dignity. “At a time like this”, Douglass said, “scorching irony, not convincing argument, is needed” (1852: 20).

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Council of Europe, 1997, “ Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine ” (ETS No. 164), Oviedo.
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animals, moral status of | cognitive disability and moral status | ethics, biomedical: chimeras, human/non-human | Kant, Immanuel: moral philosophy | moral status, grounds of | recognition | respect | rights: human

Acknowledgments

I am deeply grateful to my anonymous referees, who provided careful, generous, and thorough feedback on initial drafts of this entry. For research assistance on various elements of this article I am grateful to Zachary Neemah, Samuel Munroe, Reese Faust, and Alejandro Toledo. The history section draws on my own introduction to Dignity: A History (2017a), by permission of Oxford University Press.

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May 4, 2023

Essays on Respect: Delving into the Core Values and Implications for Society

Respect is not just a word, it's a powerful force that can change the world. Struggling to write an essay on respect? These examples are here to guide you!

Have you ever noticed how a simple act of respect, like holding the door open for someone or saying 'thank you,' can brighten someone's day and make the world feel a little kinder? Respect is a fundamental value that we all need to thrive, yet it can sometimes feel in short supply in our fast-paced, competitive world. 

That's why in this series of essays, we're diving deep into the topic of respect: what it means, why it matters, and how we can cultivate it in our daily lives. We'll explore the power of reverence, examining how showing respect can be a transformative act that creates connection, understanding, and empathy. We'll also delve into the role of respect in relationships, discussing how treating others with dignity and kindness can be a foundation for healthy connections and flourishing communities. And, of course, we'll discuss the practical applications of respect, including how it can enhance communication and lead to more productive, satisfying interactions. 

By the end of this blog post, we hope you'll come away with a renewed appreciation for the value of respect and a host of tools and strategies for practicing it in your daily life. Join us on Jenni.ai to learn more and gain access to a wealth of resources for essay writing and more. Let's dive in!

Examples of Essays on Respect

The Importance of Respect in Building Healthy Relationships

Respect is an essential ingredient for any healthy relationship to thrive. When two people treat each other with respect, they can build a strong and lasting bond that withstands the test of time. Respect is not just about being polite or courteous to one another, but it's also about acknowledging and appreciating each other's unique qualities and differences. In this article, we'll explore the importance of respect in building healthy relationships and how it can help you maintain a happy and fulfilling connection with your partner.

What is respect?

Respect is a feeling of deep admiration for someone or something elicited by their abilities, qualities, or achievements. In the context of relationships, respect means treating your partner with dignity, recognizing their worth, and valuing their opinions and feelings. It involves listening to them, being considerate of their needs, and acknowledging their boundaries.

Why is respect important in relationships?

Respect is the foundation on which healthy relationships are built. Without respect, a relationship can quickly deteriorate into a toxic and unhealthy dynamic where one partner dominates the other or both partners constantly belittle each other. Respect is what allows two people to trust each other, communicate effectively, and build a strong emotional connection. Here are some reasons why respect is crucial in building healthy relationships:

It fosters trust and intimacy

When two people respect each other, they can trust each other to be honest and transparent. This trust allows them to open up and be vulnerable with each other, leading to a deeper emotional connection and intimacy. Trust and intimacy are essential for any healthy relationship to thrive, and respect is the foundation on which they are built.

It promotes effective communication

Respectful communication involves listening actively, being mindful of each other's feelings, and avoiding hurtful language or behaviors. When two people communicate respectfully, they can resolve conflicts in a constructive and healthy manner, leading to a stronger and more fulfilling relationship.

It builds a sense of safety and security

When two people respect each other, they feel safe and secure in each other's company. They know that they can rely on each other and that their partner will always have their back. This sense of safety and security is essential for building a healthy and long-lasting relationship.

It helps to maintain individuality

Respect is not just about acknowledging your partner's worth, but also about respecting their individuality and unique qualities. When two people respect each other, they can appreciate each other's differences and allow each other to grow and develop as individuals. This helps to maintain a healthy balance between dependence and independence in the relationship.

How to show respect in a relationship?

Showing respect in a relationship involves a combination of behaviors and attitudes. Here are some ways you can show respect to your partner:

Listen actively

One of the most important ways to show respect is to listen actively to your partner. This means paying attention to what they are saying, asking questions, and responding with empathy and understanding.

Be considerate of their feelings

Respect also means being considerate of your partner's feelings. Avoid saying or doing things that might hurt them or make them feel uncomfortable.

Acknowledge their achievements

Respect involves acknowledging and appreciating your partner's achievements and successes. Celebrate their accomplishments and encourage them to pursue their goals and dreams.

Respect their boundaries

Respect also means respecting your partner's boundaries. Avoid pressuring them to do things they are uncomfortable with and always seek their consent before engaging in any intimate activities.

Avoid criticizing or belittling them

Respectful communication also involves avoiding hurtful language or behaviors. Avoid criticizing or belittling your partner, and instead focus on expressing your concerns in a constructive and respectful manner.

Show appreciation and gratitude

Showing appreciation and gratitude is another important way to demonstrate respect in a relationship. Let your partner know that you value and appreciate them, and express your gratitude for the things they do for you.

Be honest and transparent

Honesty and transparency are crucial components of respectful communication. Be truthful with your partner, and avoid hiding things from them or being deceitful in any way.

Take responsibility for your actions

Respect also means taking responsibility for your actions and acknowledging when you make mistakes. Apologize when you've done something wrong, and work together with your partner to find a solution.

How to handle disrespect in a relationship?

Disrespectful behavior can have a significant impact on a relationship and can quickly lead to conflict and tension. Here are some ways to handle disrespect in a relationship:

Communicate your concerns

The first step in addressing disrespect in a relationship is to communicate your concerns to your partner. Let them know how their behavior is making you feel, and work together to find a solution.

Set boundaries

Setting boundaries is an important part of respecting yourself in a relationship. Let your partner know what you will and won't tolerate, and be prepared to enforce these boundaries if necessary.

Seek outside help

If you're struggling to handle disrespect in your relationship, consider seeking outside help from a therapist or counselor. They can provide you with the tools and support you need to navigate the situation.

Respect is an essential ingredient for building healthy and fulfilling relationships. When two people treat each other with respect, they can develop a strong emotional connection based on trust, intimacy, and mutual appreciation. By listening actively, being considerate of each other's feelings, and communicating respectfully, you can show your partner that you value and respect them. Remember that respect is a two-way street, and it's essential to treat your partner the way you would like to be treated.

Cultivating Respect: Strategies for Fostering a Culture of Civility

Respect is a fundamental aspect of human interactions. It is essential to creating a positive and productive workplace culture. Unfortunately, respect is often in short supply in many organizations, leading to negative outcomes such as high turnover rates, low employee engagement, and poor job satisfaction. In this article, we will explore strategies for cultivating respect in the workplace to foster a culture of civility.

Introduction

The workplace is a complex environment that involves the interaction of various individuals with diverse backgrounds and personalities. This diversity often results in conflicts that can negatively impact the work environment. Therefore, fostering a culture of civility is critical to ensuring a healthy and productive workplace. Civility refers to respectful behavior and polite communication, even in situations where there is disagreement or conflict.

The Importance of Respect in the Workplace

Respect is vital to creating a positive and productive work environment. It promotes employee engagement, job satisfaction, and overall well-being. Respectful interactions also encourage collaboration, creativity, and innovation. When employees feel respected, they are more likely to share ideas, provide feedback, and take risks.

Strategies for Fostering a Culture of Civility

Lead by Example: The behavior of leaders sets the tone for the entire organization. Leaders should model respectful behavior and communicate clear expectations for civility in the workplace.

Communication: Encourage open and honest communication by creating a safe and supportive environment. Ensure that all employees have an opportunity to share their thoughts and ideas.

Education: Provide training on conflict resolution, effective communication, and cultural awareness. This will equip employees with the necessary skills to navigate difficult conversations and work collaboratively with diverse individuals.

Policies and Procedures: Establish clear policies and procedures for addressing conflicts and promoting respectful behavior. Ensure that all employees are aware of these policies and understand the consequences of violating them.

Recognition: Recognize and reward employees who demonstrate respectful behavior and contribute to a positive work environment. This will encourage others to follow suit and foster a culture of civility.

Challenges and Solutions

Cultivating respect and promoting civility in the workplace is not always easy. There are several challenges that organizations may face, including resistance to change, lack of resources, and differing perspectives. However, these challenges can be overcome by implementing the following solutions:

Address Resistance: Address resistance to change by communicating the benefits of cultivating respect and promoting civility. Explain how it will benefit the organization, employees, and customers.

Allocate Resources: Allocate the necessary resources to promote respectful behavior, such as training programs, policies and procedures, and recognition programs.

Understand Differences: Encourage employees to understand and respect cultural and individual differences. This will help to foster an environment of inclusivity and respect.

Cultivating respect and promoting civility in the workplace is essential to creating a positive and productive work environment. It requires leadership, communication, education, policies, and recognition. Organizations that prioritize respect and civility will benefit from increased employee engagement, job satisfaction, and overall well-being. By implementing the strategies discussed in this article, organizations can create a culture of civility that fosters respect, collaboration, and innovation.

In conclusion, cultivating respect and promoting civility in the workplace is critical to creating a positive and productive work environment. It requires the commitment and effort of all employees, starting with leadership. By implementing the strategies discussed in this article, organizations can create a culture of civility that fosters respect, collaboration, and innovation. By doing so, they will benefit from increased employee engagement, job satisfaction, and overall well-being, leading to greater success and growth.

Understanding Empathy: The Key to Building Respectful Connections

Empathy is the ability to understand and share the feelings of others. It is a powerful tool that helps us connect with people and build healthy relationships. In this article, we will explore the meaning of empathy, its importance in building respectful connections, and how to cultivate empathy in our daily lives.

What is Empathy?

Empathy is the ability to understand and share the feelings of others. It involves putting yourself in someone else's shoes and seeing the world from their perspective. Empathy helps us connect with people and build healthy relationships by creating a sense of mutual understanding and respect.

The Different Types of Empathy

There are three different types of empathy: cognitive empathy, emotional empathy, and compassionate empathy.

Cognitive Empathy

Cognitive empathy is the ability to understand someone's thoughts and feelings intellectually. It involves seeing the world from their perspective and understanding their needs and concerns.

Emotional Empathy

Emotional empathy is the ability to share someone's feelings and emotions. It involves feeling what they feel and experiencing their emotions alongside them.

Compassionate Empathy

Compassionate empathy is the ability to feel someone's emotions and take action to help them. It involves understanding their needs and concerns and taking steps to address them.

How to Cultivate Empathy

Cultivating empathy requires practice and effort. Here are some strategies you can use to cultivate empathy in your daily life:

Active Listening

Active listening involves fully concentrating on what someone is saying and actively engaging with them. It involves asking questions, providing feedback, and demonstrating that you are fully present and engaged.

Putting Yourself in Someone Else's Shoes

Putting yourself in someone else's shoes involves imagining how they are feeling and seeing the world from their perspective. It involves suspending judgment and taking the time to understand their needs and concerns.

Practicing Self-Reflection

Practicing self-reflection involves taking the time to reflect on your own thoughts and feelings. It involves being honest with yourself about your biases and assumptions and actively working to challenge them.

Practicing Empathy Exercises

Practicing empathy exercises involves actively seeking out opportunities to practice empathy. These exercises may involve volunteering, practicing active listening, or engaging in role-playing activities.

Empathy is a crucial tool for building respectful connections with others. It allows us to understand and share the feelings of others, creating a sense of mutual understanding and respect. By practicing empathy in our daily lives, we can build stronger relationships, enhance our communication skills, and improve our overall well-being.

Respect and Communication: How Listening and Dialogue Can Build Bridges

Communication is the foundation of any relationship, be it personal or professional. However, communication isn't just about talking; it also involves listening actively and with respect. In this article, we will explore how respect and communication can build bridges and help create strong relationships.

Definition of communication

Importance of communication

Communication challenges

Building Bridges through Communication

Communication is a powerful tool that can be used to create and maintain bridges between people. By communicating effectively, we can connect with others on a deeper level and build trust and respect. Here are some ways to build bridges through communication:

Active listening is the key to effective communication. When we listen actively, we give the other person our undivided attention, and we try to understand their perspective without interrupting or judging them.

Empathy is the ability to understand and share the feelings of another person. When we empathize with others, we put ourselves in their shoes, and we try to see things from their perspective. This helps us to communicate more effectively and build stronger relationships.

Respect is essential in any relationship. When we respect others, we treat them with dignity and honor their views and opinions, even if we disagree with them. This creates a safe space for communication and encourages people to share their thoughts and feelings openly.

Open Communication

Open communication is critical for building bridges. When we communicate openly, we share our thoughts and feelings honestly and transparently, and we encourage others to do the same. This helps to build trust and creates a deeper connection between people.

Communication Challenges

Effective communication isn't always easy, and there are many challenges that can arise. Here are some of the most common communication challenges:

Language Barriers

Language barriers can make communication difficult, especially when there are cultural differences. It's essential to be patient and to try to understand the other person's perspective, even if there are language barriers.

Emotional Triggers

Emotions can often get in the way of effective communication. When we feel triggered, we may become defensive or angry, which can create a barrier to communication. 

Power Imbalances

Power imbalances can make communication difficult, especially in a professional setting. When one person has more power or authority than the other, it can be challenging to communicate effectively. 

Effective communication is critical for building bridges and creating strong relationships. By listening actively, empathizing, showing respect, and communicating openly, we can overcome communication challenges and build bridges that last. Remember to be patient, kind, and understanding, and always approach communication with an open mind and heart.

The Power of Reverence: How Respect Can Shape Our Lives

Respect is an essential aspect of our lives that plays a crucial role in shaping our personalities and building meaningful relationships. When we show respect to others, we create a positive environment that allows everyone to thrive. The power of reverence goes beyond basic etiquette; it influences our behavior, decisions, and outlook on life. In this article, we will explore the importance of respect and how it can shape our lives.

Understanding Respect

Respect is defined as a feeling of deep admiration for someone or something elicited by their abilities, qualities, or achievements. It is an attitude that acknowledges the worth of another person or thing. Respect is a fundamental aspect of human interaction that creates a positive environment for everyone. It is essential in building trust, maintaining healthy relationships, and promoting cooperation.

Respect in Personal Relationships

Respect is an essential ingredient in creating meaningful personal relationships. It is the foundation on which all relationships are built. When we show respect to our partners, friends, and family members, we create an environment of trust, empathy, and mutual understanding. Respect allows us to communicate effectively, express our opinions, and solve conflicts in a healthy manner. It is also the key to maintaining healthy boundaries and creating a safe space for everyone involved.

Respect in Professional Relationships

Respect is equally important in professional relationships. It is the key to building trust, fostering collaboration, and creating a positive work environment. When we show respect to our colleagues, supervisors, and subordinates, we promote teamwork, productivity, and job satisfaction. Respectful communication allows for the sharing of ideas, constructive feedback, and the creation of a supportive work culture.

The Benefits of Respect

The power of reverence has numerous benefits that can positively impact our lives. Respect promotes empathy, understanding, and cooperation, allowing us to build healthy relationships with others. It creates a positive environment that fosters personal and professional growth, leading to increased productivity, job satisfaction, and overall well-being. Showing respect also improves our self-esteem, allowing us to feel more confident and empowered.

The Consequences of Disrespect

On the other hand, disrespect can have severe consequences that negatively impact our lives. Disrespectful behavior can damage relationships, erode trust, and create a hostile work environment. It can lead to misunderstandings, conflicts, and even legal issues in extreme cases. Disrespectful behavior can also damage our self-esteem, leading to feelings of inadequacy and insecurity.

Cultivating Respect

Cultivating respect is an ongoing process that requires mindfulness and conscious effort. It involves acknowledging the worth of others, recognizing their contributions, and treating them with dignity and kindness. Cultivating respect also means recognizing our own worth and treating ourselves with kindness and compassion. When we cultivate respect, we create a positive environment that allows everyone to thrive.

In conclusion, the power of reverence is an essential aspect of our lives that can positively impact our personal and professional relationships. Respect allows us to build healthy relationships, promotes empathy and understanding, and fosters personal and professional growth. It is the key to creating a positive environment that allows everyone to thrive. Cultivating respect is an ongoing process that requires mindfulness and conscious effort, but the benefits are worth it.

In conclusion, these essays have explored the multifaceted concept of respect, examining its core values and societal implications. We have seen how respect can foster healthy relationships, promote empathy and understanding, and facilitate productive communication. Through examples from literature, history, and contemporary events, we have gained insights into the power of reverence and the importance of cultivating a culture of civility.

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Respect Essay: The Cornerstone of Human Interaction

Respect essay: Explore the importance of respect in relationships, communities, and daily interactions for a harmonious life.

Respect is a fundamental human value, a cornerstone of our interactions, and a critical element for a harmonious society. It’s something we all want, yet it’s often challenging to define and even harder to practice consistently. In this respect essay, we’ll explore what respect means, its importance, how to cultivate it, and answer some frequently asked questions about respect.

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What is Respect?

Respect, at its core, is about recognizing the inherent worth and dignity of every individual. It means treating others with consideration, valuing their feelings, opinions, and rights. Respect goes beyond mere politeness; it’s an attitude of valuing and honoring the humanity of others.

Why is Respect Important?

Respect is essential for several reasons:

• Building Trust and Relationships: Trust is the foundation of any healthy relationship, be it personal or professional. Respect fosters trust, allowing relationships to thrive.
• Promoting Understanding and Empathy: When we respect others, we’re more likely to listen to their perspectives and understand their feelings, leading to greater empathy and less conflict.
• Enhancing Cooperation: Respectful environments promote collaboration and teamwork, essential for achieving common goals.
• Strengthening Communities: Communities built on respect are more cohesive, diverse, and resilient.

The Impact of Respect in Various Settings

• In Families: Respect in family relationships fosters a nurturing environment where each member feels valued and supported.
• In Schools: Students who feel respected by their teachers and peers are more likely to engage, participate, and succeed academically.
• In Workplaces: Respectful workplaces see higher employee satisfaction, productivity, and retention. According to a study by Harvard Business Review, employees who feel respected by their leaders are 55% more engaged at work.
• In Society: Societies that value respect are more likely to enjoy peace, tolerance, and cooperation among diverse groups.

How to Cultivate Respect

• Lead by Example: Demonstrate respect in your daily interactions. Simple acts like listening, acknowledging others’ opinions, and showing appreciation can have a significant impact.
• Educate and Raise Awareness: Teach the importance of respect to younger generations and promote awareness in communities and workplaces.
• Address Disrespect: Stand up against disrespectful behavior calmly and assertively, promoting a culture of respect.

Respect and Mental Health

Respect plays a crucial role in mental health. Feeling respected boosts self-esteem, reduces stress, and contributes to overall well-being. Conversely, a lack of respect can lead to feelings of worthlessness and depression. According to a survey by the American Psychological Association , 61% of adults who report high levels of respect in their relationships also report excellent mental health.

Respect in the Digital Age

In today’s digital age, respect extends to online interactions. Cyberbullying and disrespectful behavior on social media platforms are significant issues. Practicing digital etiquette, such as being kind in comments, respecting privacy, and avoiding harmful content, is vital for maintaining respect in online communities.

The Role of Respect in Conflict Resolution

Respect is crucial in resolving conflicts. It allows parties to communicate openly and honestly, listen to each other’s perspectives, and find mutually agreeable solutions. According to research from the Conflict Resolution Institute, conflicts resolved with respect are more likely to result in lasting agreements and improved relationships.

Respect Essay: A Personal Reflection

Writing this respect essay has reminded me of the countless ways respect influences our lives. From the trust it builds in our relationships to the understanding it fosters in our communities, respect is indeed a cornerstone of human interaction. Reflecting on my own experiences, I realize that the moments when I felt most respected were also the times I felt most valued and understood.

Conclusion: The Lasting Impact of Respect

Respect is more than just a social nicety; it’s a fundamental human value that shapes our interactions, relationships, and communities. By cultivating respect in our daily lives, we create environments where trust, empathy, and cooperation can flourish. As we strive to live with respect, we not only honour others but also enrich our own lives.

Integrating Respect in Everyday Life

• At Home: Foster a culture of respect within your family by valuing each member's opinions and feelings. Hold family meetings where everyone can speak and be heard.
• At Work: Promote respect in the workplace by recognizing the contributions of colleagues, celebrating diversity, and addressing any disrespectful behavior promptly.
• In the Community: Get involved in community activities that promote understanding and cooperation among diverse groups. Volunteer for organizations that advocate for respect and equality.

By making respect a priority, we can transform our interactions and build a more compassionate and harmonious world. Let’s make respect the cornerstone of our lives and witness the positive changes it brings.

Statistics and Facts about Respect

• According to a survey by the Pew Research Center, 78% of adults believe that respect and courtesy have deteriorated in recent years.
• A study by the University of California found that students who feel respected by their teachers are 2.5 times more likely to be engaged in their studies.
• The American Psychological Association reports that 70% of adults who feel respected in their relationships have lower stress levels.

Final Thoughts

Respect is an invaluable asset that enriches our lives and communities. By understanding its importance, practicing it daily, and teaching it to others, we can create a world where everyone feels valued and appreciated. This respect essay serves as a reminder of the power of respect and its lasting impact on our interactions and society as a whole.

FAQs Revisited

Q: How does respect influence leadership?

A: Respectful leaders inspire loyalty and dedication among their followers. They create an environment where team members feel valued and motivated to contribute their best.

Q: Is self-respect important?

A: Absolutely. Self-respect is the foundation of how we treat ourselves and others. It involves recognizing our own worth and setting boundaries that ensure we are treated with dignity.

Q: How can respect improve communication?

A: Respectful communication involves active listening, acknowledging others' viewpoints, and responding thoughtfully. This leads to clearer, more effective exchanges and reduces misunderstandings

What Is the Real Meaning of Dignity?

Few people realize its extraordinary impact on our lives..

Posted April 10, 2013 | Reviewed by Matt Huston

At about the same time that I realized the powerful role dignity played in resolving conflict, I also became aware of something else. Regardless of where in the world my work takes me, few people understand the true meaning of dignity, and even fewer realize the extraordinary impact it has on our lives and relationships.

That’s not to say that people don’t react when I use the word “dignity.” There is always an immediate recognition of the word and its importance, but when I ask people to define it, or tell me what it looks like to have their dignity honored, the conversation falters.

The most common response people offer is that dignity is about respect. To the contrary, dignity is not the same as respect. Dignity is our inherent value and worth as human beings; everyone is born with it. Respect, on the other hand, is earned through one’s actions.

The general lack of awareness about all matters relating to dignity (including my own) inspired me to learn more, write my book, and speak professionally to help organizations, businesses, and associations build a culture of dignity. I changed the way I helped people resolve their conflicts by starting a dialogue with a “Dignity 101” seminar. Before diving into any conflict, I would sit with both sides and teach them lessons in dignity. When people truly understood what they were discussing, it shattered limits on healing their emotional wounds.

After people learn about dignity, a remarkable thing happens. Everyone recognizes that we all have a deep, human desire to be treated as something of value.

Our shared desire for dignity transcends all of our differences, putting our common human identity above all else. While our uniqueness is important, history has shown us that if we don’t take the next step toward recognizing our shared identity, conflicts in our workplace, our personal lives, and between nations will continue to abound.

The glue that holds all of our relationships together is the mutual recognition of the desire to be seen, heard, listened to, and treated fairly; to be recognized, understood, and to feel safe in the world. When our identity is accepted and we feel included, we are granted a sense of freedom and independence and a life filled with hope and possibility. And when are given an apology when someone does us harm, we recognize that even when we fall short of being our best selves, there is always a way to reconnect. “I’m sorry” are two of the most powerful words anyone can utter.

Dignity has the potential to change the world, but only if people like you help to spread its profound message. Sign the Declaration of Dignity ! Take time every day to remind yourself and those around you the truth about how valuable we all are. In fact, we are born invaluable, priceless, and irreplaceable. Simultaneously, never lose sight of your inherent vulnerability. We all know the gut feeling that results from being mistreated or neglected – it’s up to you to honor other people's dignity. In the process, you’ll strengthen your own.

Donna Hicks, Ph.D. , is the author of Dignity: The Essential Role It Plays in Resolving Conflict and an Associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.

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11 Kant on Respect, Dignity, and the Duty of Respect

• Published: October 2013
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It is a familiar theme that Kant bequeathed to modern moral thought the doctrine that all rational beings or persons have a dignity that makes them equally worthy of respect. Frequently this characterization is put forward based on Kant's most familiar ethical writings, Groundwork and The Critique of Practical Reason . However, when one looks carefully at these and the rest of Kant's corpus, a much more complicated and puzzling picture emerges. Kant often treats the dignity of persons as a species of merit rather than anything persons have regardless of merit. This chapter discusses the fascinating details of Kant's writings on respect and dignity. Although Kant sometimes conceives of dignity as involving a standing every person has to demand or ‘exact’ respect, Kant also treats dignity as a value we can all achieve, but only when we properly exercise our capacity for moral choice.

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• Five Pillars , Human Dignity , Public Discourse

Respect for the Dignity of Every Human Person: The First Pillar of a Decent Society

• October 16, 2018

For the past ten years, Public Discourse has been a consistent, unwavering advocate for the dignity of every human person. Throughout this essay, you’ll find hyperlinks to essays we have published on various topics related to human dignity over the past ten years. As these essays demonstrate, our editorial vision is built upon the truth that dignity is not determined by talent or ability, by size or state of development.

People matter even if they are not wanted, including the poor and marginalized, the elderly, the disabled, and unborn children. The answer to the question “who counts?” is “everyone.”

Beginning-of-Life Issues

Human dignity begins when human life begins, with the fusion of an egg and sperm in fertilization to create a new human being. Debates about human dignity begin with whether embryonic and fetal life is worthy of the same protections as more mature human life.

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In Public Discourse’s early years, this was manifest in arguments over stem-cell research . George W. Bush’s compromise position neither prohibited nor promoted embryo-destructive research. Barack Obama changed this course, funding and advocating such research, even as alternative sources of human of stem cells continued to develop. But it’s not only embryos, children at the very earliest stages of development, whose bodies have been used for research. At the end of the Obama presidency, the Center for Medical Progress challenged the profit that organizations such as Planned Parenthood make from the sale of fetal parts for research. These revelations led to nationwide calls for Congress to defund the organization. The debate has continued into the Trump administration, whose Department of Health and Human Services recently announced that it will review all medical research involving fetal tissue.

American ethical debates depend primarily on empathy with others and preventing them from suffering harm. The more an embryo or fetus appears recognizably human and the more it is shown to suffer harm, the more likely we are to recognize it as human and prevent such harm. This explains why a woman casually discussing the sale of fetal limbs and organs would provoke more outrage than the quiet destruction of embryonic humans.

In the past decade, improvements in ultrasound technology have made the humanity of life in the womb more obvious and worthier of our empathy. The horrors of Kermit Gosnell exposed the lurid side of abortion clinics and the dangers abortion poses to women. Abortion rates have reached their lowest point since Roe v. Wade . Even pro-choice authors note the consequences of sex-selective abortion , which has led to a conspicuous dearth of girls in societies where women are less valued than men, especially under China’s one-child policy. And the rise of groups like the New Wave Feminists have led many to note that the pro-life movement is getting younger and more female—exactly the opposite of what its critics expected. The more the harms of abortion become visible, the more a consensus grows against unrestricted abortion, especially later in pregnancy.

Abortion and stem-cell research concern unwanted human life, but the desires for particular human life and particular medical treatments also drive contemporary concerns about human dignity. Popular infertility treatments involve the creation of many embryos for the sake of a desired child, leaving the embryos not chosen destroyed or in a frozen limbo. In the coming years, we are likely to see more attempts to use genetic modification to design children according to parents’ desires, not to mention new techniques for human cloning , with little pause for reflection on their ethics. The harms of the fertility industry are becoming more evident in other ways, too. Children conceived by anonymous reproductive donors have begun to speak out against the disconnect they feel from their biological parents. Others argue that third-party reproduction violates the rights of children to have a connection with their biological parents. Still more across the ideological spectrum have begun to expose the violence to women and children endemic in the surrogacy industry .

Euthanasia, Parental Rights, and the Role of Conscience in Healthcare

The injustices of the fertility industry point to deeper questions for medicine and bioethics that will only become more important in the coming years. Is medicine a service provided to consumers who have an unquestioned right to have their desires met, or is it an art aimed at the good of the health of the person?

This is a vital question in the debate over assisted suicide, which we can expect to see become more prevalent. That debate also asks whether human dignity depends on capacity and feelings. Can one be disabled and have dignity, or in pain and have dignity? European nations such as Belgium show how restrictions on assisted suicide loosen over time, or are simply not followed. This August, for instance, two children became the world’s youngest to be euthanized, at ages nine and eleven. Euthanasia endangers the disabled, those with mental illness, and other vulnerable members of society whose lives are deemed less worth living. It attacks the heart of the medical profession , which is the health and human flourishing of patients. In the coming years, we should expect advocates to press for its legalization in more states , and for its social consequences to become more evident where it has been adopted.

In a related vein, another trend to watch is the refusal of hospitals, backed by states, to provide treatment for patients over the objections of their caregivers. Notable examples include the cases of Alfie Evans and Charlie Gard in the UK. In light of this, scholars like Melissa Moschella have begun to advocate for rights of parental authority over children that the state must respect , since parents by nature have the responsibility of caring for their children.

We also see the converse happening when states demand that healthcare providers offer treatments that they cannot in good conscience perform. Many claim that medical providers’ conscientious objection should have no role to play in their willingness to perform medical procedures. They argue that doctors who refuse to perform surgeries or prescribe treatments that they deem unethical or ineffective should be forced to comply with a patient’s wishes. This began with objections to abortion and has become more prevalent in cases of sex-reassignment surgeries and hormonal therapies for teenagers and adults experiencing gender dysphoria. Here at Public Discourse , scholars have argued that a pluralistic society should seek alternative routes to public goods that do not violate conscientious beliefs, and that legislation is required to ensure that rights of conscience are not violated.

Religion and Public Life

Conscience protections have become contested in matters of religious liberty as well. We used to see more debate over the freedoms of religion and conscience in terms of statues of the Ten Commandments, prayers in civic settings, and what religious liberty looked like at the time of the Founding. Recent court cases over the HHS contraception mandate and Jack Phillips’s refusal to bake a same-sex wedding cake are a taste of conscience-protection and religious-liberty debates in the years to come.

The clash between dignitary harms and religious rights will become more intense as the “nones” continue to rise and religious convictions become less intelligible as deep-seated beliefs that must be respected. Yet religious convictions shape our understanding of who we are, the purpose and destiny of our lives, and how we ought to treat those around us. They guide our pursuit of the truth and our adherence to it when we find it. The freedom of religion and the freedom of conscience are therefore fundamental to the dignity of the human person.

Though not a confessional journal, Public Discourse has published a variety of thoughtful and important religious arguments, and we will continue to do so in the years to come. Two topics in this vein particularly stand out. The first is the nature of Islam, the place of Muslims in liberal western societies, and the place of Jews and other religious minorities in societies that are increasingly Islamic. Can we have an Islam that is respectful of rights and friendly to Jews and Christians, yet not eroded by cultural assimilation and progressive politics? How can other religious believers clarify misperceptions about Islam in their own communities and work together with Muslims toward common goals ? Second, should religious believers, especially Catholics, work toward confessional states ? Or should they support liberal regimes? As arguments about the benefits and viability of liberal society are likely to continue, as will arguments for and against integralism.

This makes the work we do at Public Discourse all the more vital. As our public debate coarsens and weakens, we will continue to publish respectful, rigorous arguments. We will continue to stand up for the rights and dignity of the most vulnerable members of society. We will continue to fight for the freedom of conscience and the freedom of religion, and to host debates on the place of religion in contemporary society. We hope you join us for them in the years ahead.

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Essay on Human Dignity

Students are often asked to write an essay on Human Dignity in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Human Dignity

What is human dignity.

Human dignity means treating every person with respect because they are valuable. It’s like saying every person is important, no matter who they are or where they come from. This idea is like a rule that helps us live together in peace.

Human Rights and Dignity

Human dignity is the heart of human rights. Rights like freedom and equality come from the belief that all people deserve respect. It’s like giving everyone a shield to protect them from being treated badly.

Respecting Others

To show human dignity, we should be kind and fair to others. It’s not just about not hurting people, but also about helping them feel good about themselves. When we respect others, we make the world a friendlier place.

Challenges to Dignity

Sometimes, people face bullying or unfair treatment, which attacks their dignity. Standing up against such wrongs is important. By doing so, we defend the value of each person and support a world where everyone is respected.

250 Words Essay on Human Dignity

Why human dignity is important.

Human dignity is like the golden rule: treat others as you want to be treated. When we respect each other’s dignity, we create a world where everyone can feel safe and happy. This helps us get along better, make friends, and live peacefully. Without dignity, people might feel sad, scared, or alone.

Human Dignity in Our Lives

In school, human dignity shows up when teachers listen to students’ ideas and when students are kind to each other. At home, it’s when family members support one another. In the world, it means making sure everyone has food, a home, and a chance to learn.

Standing Up for Dignity

Sometimes, people’s dignity is not respected. When this happens, it’s important to stand up for them. This could be helping a friend who is being bullied or telling an adult when something is wrong. By doing this, you protect dignity and show that you care about others.

Human dignity is a simple yet powerful idea. It’s about seeing the worth in every person and acting with kindness. Remember, when you respect others, you help make the world a better place for everyone.

500 Words Essay on Human Dignity

Human dignity is a powerful idea that means every person is valuable and deserves respect. This idea is like a golden rule that tells us to treat others as we would like to be treated. It doesn’t matter where someone is from, what they look like, or what they believe in—every person has dignity just because they are human.

Human Dignity in Everyday Life

Human dignity and equality.

Human dignity also means that all people should be treated as equals. No one is better or more important than anyone else. This is why there are rules and laws in countries around the world that try to make sure everyone is treated fairly. For example, when a girl and a boy are given the same chance to learn and play, it shows we value their dignity equally.

Human Dignity and Making Choices

Another part of human dignity is being able to make your own choices. This means that people should be able to decide things for themselves, like what they want to do when they grow up or what they believe is right and wrong. When we let others make choices for their own lives, we are showing respect for their dignity.

Challenges to Human Dignity

Our role in upholding dignity.

We all have a part to play in making sure we and the people around us are treated with dignity. This can be as simple as being kind, standing up for someone who is being picked on, or learning about different cultures to understand others better. When we do these things, we help create a world where everyone’s dignity is respected.

Human dignity is a special idea that touches every part of our lives. It reminds us that every person is important and deserves to be treated with kindness and respect. By understanding and upholding human dignity, we can make sure that we, and the people around us, live in a world that is fair and kind to everyone. Remember, it starts with you and the small acts of respect you show to others every day.

Apart from these, you can look at all the essays by clicking here .

Happy studying!

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Human Dignity in an Ethical Sense: Basic Considerations

The idea of human dignity is an ancient one. It has been the object of reflection with different approaches, during the various periods in the history of philosophical, theological, and ethical thought. This essay focuses on the most relevant approaches to the idea of human dignity in this cultural evolution, proposing a look at the ontological paradigm and its limits, the ethical paradigm and its values, and the theological paradigm and its resources. An anthropological reading concludes this essay, bringing out the relational value of the idea of human dignity. Based on this particular focus, the idea of human dignity assumes a form of critical thinking that makes us sensitive to the real inequalities between human beings and opens the possibility of ethical and political practices of recognition and emancipation.

• 1 Introductory Considerations

No other concept has had so much resonance in the history of ethical thought than that of the dignity of the person. Defining the concept, however, has caused acrimonious scholarly debates in various areas of moral reflection. 1

In the context of the themes that emerge in the field of bioethics, human dignity and its definition are foundational, both for the issues surrounding clinical ethics and also the field of biomedical research. To cite one example among many, we may consider the recent document of the Deutscher Ethikrat of 9 May 2019, concerning interventions on the human germ line. In this document, among the standards for ethical evaluation there is a list of eight factors, the first of which is human dignity ( Menschenwürde ). It is recognized that human dignity requires a priority of consideration, even before freedom, responsibility, solidarity, and other factors. Indeed, it can be said that human dignity is the foundation for all other ethical factors. 2

The recourse to the category of human dignity is very common also in other documents, such as strictly religious, moral-theological documents. Consider the declaration by the Second Vatican Council on religious freedom, Dignitatis Humanae (1965), or more recently the declaration by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith on some questions of bioethics, Dignitas Personae (2008).

In addition, against the background of anthropological, ethical, legal, and political reflections stands the thorny and dramatic problem of violence against women. The concept of human dignity must engage this issue with sensitivity to considerations and contributions that revolve around gender. 3

And yet, no other concept is so difficult to define, especially when we consider its implications for specific ethical issues. For this reason, careful reflection and analysis are required both on human dignity’s historical and systematic development, and on the need to contextualize its importance and meaning.

We know well that the idea of human dignity is very ancient and has its roots already in classical culture. 4 The dignitas romana that Cicero writes about reflects a concept already known to Greek philosophy, although in these writings the emphasis is placed mainly on the socio-political aspects of personal action within the community. The dignity with which a person establishes and lives out his life in society constitutes the substance of his dignity.

Against this historical background, Christianity looks in depth at another dimension of human dignity, introducing a consideration that is more distinctly anthropological. 5 In fact, the Fathers of the ancient church, Justin and Irenaeus for example, focus on the anthropological vision of the First Testament, emphasizing the wonder of God’s creative work and the goodness of all creation, especially the goodness of human beings. The reference to the theme of the imago Dei becomes indispensable for a theological definition of human dignity. Although it moves the discourse in a typically religious-theological direction, it also contributes to an analysis directly linked to the essence of the person and therefore to anthropology. 6

The following reflection intends to contribute to the ongoing definition of human dignity, embracing a gender sensitive perspective that leads us to emphasize the substantial and concrete character with which we should approach the theme of human dignity.

• 2 The Foundational Value of the Dignity of the Person

While in the past the concept of human dignity was the sole focus in defining the person, today it is understood as a foundational value and used to explain other ethical concepts, such as freedom, responsibility, and solidarity. If we observe the development of applied ethics in biology, medicine, social life, economic reality, family life, etc., the concept of human dignity always appears when we address the question of the foundation and formulation of norms. Human dignity becomes more and more a formal reality, subject to an aporia that is not easily solved; in itself, it says little, and yet it is expected to be a strong foundation for the formulation and justification of norms. This aporia is evident in a striking manner, when considering the concept of human dignity in relation to the theme of human rights. This is the most striking example of the disconnect between the foundational and comprehensive expectations of the concept of human dignity and its actual lack of content.

This is not the place to trace a history of human rights, however. The decades that separate us from the 1948 UDHR have certainly provided many occasions for reflection and analysis concerning both the problem of the theoretical foundation for these rights and the historical conditions in which they are in fact recognized, cultivated, and practiced or where, instead, they are trampled underfoot and violated. 7

In the network of considerations emerging from various ideological and cultural perspectives, there is a surprising consistency in that the only exhaustive foundation for human rights is precisely the dignity of the person. This choice for human dignity overcomes a centuries-old history of fragile references to extrinsic values, where the foundation was represented by elements rooted, not directly in the nature of the person, but rather in some of his individual, social, or collective dimensions. Agreement on the point that human dignity is the sole foundation for the rights of the person is a turning point of epochal value and brings with it a new concreteness and stability in the interpretation of human rights and in their morally binding value.

And yet, the concreteness and stability crumble when we try to define the concept of human dignity. The initial universal agreement on human dignity as a foundation for human rights becomes a point of disagreement due to particular definitions of human dignity, to such a degree that the solidarity that occurs in advocating human rights breaks up into fragmentary ideological barriers in light of those definitions. In particular, the abstractness with which one approaches the theme of human dignity and rights is alarming. It is not only the result of a disproportionate focus on the essentialist, metaphysical, ontological definition of human dignity, but it is also the tragic consequence of a neglected existential contextualization of this dignity, in the history of people, in people as subjects who have a gender identity that makes them specific and unique.

This is why the appeal that comes from much of feminist theology or queer theology today must be taken seriously. When – as for example Linn Marie Tonstad writes – the importance of “anti-essentialism and denaturalization” are recognized as starting points for a contextualized perspective, respectful of the subject specificity of every human being, then the theme of dignity enters into an area of substantial, consistent, and concrete understanding. 8 But this sensitivity requires a process of rethinking that evolves through different philosophical and theological approaches and perspectives.

3 How Can We Understand Human Dignity?

• 3.1 The Ontological Approach and Its Limits

The first perspective we consider is an “ontological” approach (which can also be defined as “natural law”). Here, it is the nature of the person, with his or her concreteness of being, that functions as a fundamental point of disagreement on the definition of human dignity.

The qualitative leap in the ontology of the person, with respect to the being of other beings, demands the recognition of a particular dignity, which is of a higher degree than the dignity of other beings. A philosophical-metaphysical angle plays the greatest role here in deciphering the ontological and essential characteristics of the person, to emphasize the person’s superiority, intangibility, in other words, her dignity. Within this ontological approach there are different nuances, deriving mainly from the way the person’s essence is related to her historical, interpersonal, and social existence. One can and must speak, therefore, of an ontology that is more or less essentialist, more or less individualistic, more or less relational, etc. The essence of the person is mainly expressed in the fundamental law that is incumbent upon it, a law that derives from its nature as a person. The natural law, therefore, becomes the proper location of the dignity of the person. The need to respect human dignity runs parallel to the need to respect the natural law in which the person is situated. And the same dynamic is also valid on the part of the human subject: she cannot escape from respect for the natural law, because otherwise she offends and destroys her own dignity as a person.

From this perspective, human dignity is nothing other than the fullness of being; the telos of the person that is already written within her, through natural law. The perception of this fullness does not happen, however, in abstract and generically deductive terms, but is combined with the growth of the person’s sensitivity, with her reaction to a scale of objective values, in a context of experience that is a viable route for raising awareness and personalizing the value of her personal dignity. In this sense, the ontological approach of some authors is completed and more accurately identified as an “inductive-ontological” approach (for example, for J. Messner), 9 with due consideration for a positive and relevant meaning of experience, historicity, and the space-time, cultural-environmental conditioning. However, the metaphysical level remains predominant, and regarding what directly concerns human rights, there is a strong focus on their juridical aspect, as a particular representation of the natural law. The substantial gender identity of the person appears irrelevant in this ontological approach. More specifically, this absence of reference to the specific gender of people affects the female subject, who is, so to speak, incorporated into the generically “human”, that is, male.

• 3.2 Ethical Approach and Its Values

A second perspective to define human dignity is the transcendental philosophical approach, as formulated by I. Kant. 10 He sees the reason for human dignity as based on the moral self-determination of the human being, on his moral autonomy. This autonomy is “the reason for the dignity of human nature and of any rational nature”. 11 In fact, a being who is able to become a law to himself cannot be without dignity. Moral autonomy entails an immediate consequence: the person, in his actions, must abide by the dictates of a categorical imperative which concerns and grounds his dignity. This imperative is formulated by Kant as follows: “Act in such a way as to use the humanity that is in you and in every other person always as an end and never as a pure means.” 12 The categorical nature of this ethical requirement is in turn based on the rationality of the person. The person is truly capable of giving herself direction and moral directives, and this is her dignity.

The foundation of this dignity is not an empirical datum. It does not belong to the fluctuation of contingent experiences, but is firmly anchored in the rational nature of the human person and is expressed in the ability to translate the depth of reason into ethical terms. However, dignity does not depend on the concrete realization of the moral imperative. It can be predicated of every human being, as a subject endowed with ethical autonomy and antecedently to seeing how this ethical autonomy is exercised in the concrete. In a sense, the Kantian formulation of human dignity is also essentialist and relates to the nature of the person. This is done, however, not in relation to ontology, but rather in relation to the substantial morality of the person.

With this shift initiated by Kant, from the terrain of metaphysics to the terrain of morality, a new and relevant element for the foundation of human rights and for a more adequate understanding of their nature is introduced. Kant recovers the close relationship between the idea of law and that of duty. On the basis of a person’s due dignity, the human being is the subject of inalienable rights, and their transgression would immediately lead to the human being’s reduction from an end to a pure means. But on the basis of the ability to orient herself to the good and to follow the categorical imperative in her moral life, the human being is also the active subject of moral duties concerning herself and other persons.

In this predominantly ethical approach, the suspicion could easily emerge that at the root is a sort of moral optimism, of enthusiastic faith in the human ability to perceive and to follow the categorical imperative and therefore to express her dignity always and in any case. Kant overcomes the risk of this misunderstanding by emphasizing that in the person, in her historical condition, evil acts constitute a real attack on the human being, on her will and her dignity. It is only the predisposition and the inclination towards the good that establishes the dignity of the person, not the realization of good acts. With this qualification, Kant thereby salvages the possibility that the rights as a human person will be recognized and attributed even to one who is unjust and dishonest.

Human dignity consists, then, in an ontological openness of being to the good and is the responsibility of the subject, beyond the moral evaluation of her behavior. Human rights are ultimately founded on this human quality of being and becoming a subject open to the good.

However, the danger of abstractness in this vision of dignity must not be overlooked. This abstractness is connected above all with the formal character of the anthropological reference on which dignity is based. The minimal concrete specification, the insufficient level in considering the material scale of values in their genesis and in placing them as motivational instances for life practices, make the idea of human dignity ultimately evanescent, unable to affect the transformative processes of its own history and that of other people.

• 3.3 Theological Approach and Its Resources

The third perspective on human dignity is immediately related to the basic lines of a theological anthropological approach. Human dignity has its roots in the fundamental reality of the creation and salvation of the human being by God. God imprints on the human being his image and his likeness, thereby making the human being superior to all other beings who are creatures, but not creatures created in the image of the Creator. Only the human being has this original characteristic, and she alone has a specific and proper dignity, the summit of all other forms of dignity.

The theological emphasis that we see here has produced over the centuries a diversified history of the interpretation and utilization of the theme of the human being as an image of God. Recently, an ecumenical working group of Catholics and Protestants in Germany produced the text Gott und die Würde des Menschen , recognizing the imago Dei category as the fundamental article of Christian theological anthropology and the basis for every ethical evaluation. 13

The appeal to dignity in the patristic era had its own background and a directly parenetic and ethical use. The Christian who had to “recognize his own dignity” 14 had to assume different styles of judgment and behavior than other citizens. But this limitation of the theme of the image to the ethical field is certainly not the most original contribution we find in Christianity.

Especially in theological and philosophical writings in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the theme of dignity is incorporated into a broader vision and leads to the formulation of different and correlative theses, which intend to answer the question of how and in what respect the character of the human being is manifested as an image of God. In other words: what is the dignity of the human person? 15

The age of scholastic philosophy was characterized by a deliberate choice for the intellectual-rational value of the image of God, imprinted on the human being. The formulation of the imago in speculo rationis contains this truth. Here, we focus on the human ability to know herself and God, and this is her dignity.

But such a partial interpretation, though worthy of theoretical and systematic attention, reduced the transparency of the divine imprint, present in the human creature and concealed the nobility of the whole person, reducing her to a broken system of intelligence and will, of reason, of heart and body. To this theological anthropology is also added the belief that only the human being as man – not as woman – was the image of God. 16

It is urgent to overcome this reductive vision through the recovery of a holistic anthropology that is clearly present in the Bible, even if overshadowed by the dualistic tendencies of Greek philosophy, which penetrated primitive Christianity and still remains in some circles. The dignity of the person does not concern his capacity for knowledge and conscience. Rather, it embraces the unitary and total good of his reality, of his will, of his existence in and as a body, in his capacity for intersubjective relations and in his imperfect relationship with the divine, God, without losing contact with the contingency of historical situations, which are precarious and threatened by the risk of negativity and evil.

The dignity of the person is the dignity of the whole being, because in the totality of this being God’s presence lives and exists and is expressed through the imprint of his image. The human being is thus ennobled in his nature and in his history as a human subject and is as such a recipient of fundamental rights and capable of corresponding duties.

As a result of the intimate unity between the plan of creation and the plan of salvation, every human being carries within himself the image of God and derives from this identity the foundation of his own dignity, which is expressed in the right to have rights, in the claim to see them recognized and in the capacity to assume duties, exercised in responsibility.

• 4 Anthropology of Human Dignity

The philosophy of humanism and of the Renaissance was able to focus on the theme of human dignity in effective terms and to create a literary genre, with works collected under the title De dignitate hominis , among which we must certainly mention the Oratio de hominis dignitate of Pico della Mirandola (1486).

The effort of Renaissance humanism was to penetrate more deeply the anthropological vision, to obtain elements useful to define the category of human dignity. The path of anthropology remains the only practicable path today, if we are to reach a concept of human dignity that does not leave this an empty concept, but charges it with real meaning. Obviously, this path is also exposed to a risk: today anthropology is no longer a homogeneous reality, and there is no one single anthropology. The reality of pluralism, in the basic vision of the human being, of the world and of history, must first be assumed as a cultural horizon in which an anthropological reflection takes place. In connection with this, the art of dialogue on knowledge about the human being, and therefore on the understanding of the concept of human dignity in a pluralist context, must be developed.

Under these conditions, a composite reconstruction of the category of human dignity and the corresponding value of the human rights that are based on it becomes possible. The voices in this dialogue between persons and institutions that are sensitive to the human good and take care to stay clear of a fundamentalist vision, must have all the sufficient space they need in order to express themselves, but also the wisdom and competence to make themselves credible. In this proposal, which undoubtedly has an emancipatory potential within it, gender sensitivity plays an important role, for only thus is it possible to redeem the category of dignity both from abstractness, and from its confinement in an ideal of non-inclusive man.

On this basis, and in order to promote a constructive dialogue, we can indicate those areas where anthropology should focus. Those areas are central elements for the understanding and self-understanding of the person as a “subject”, who is present and alive in history as “corporeity” and is open to “transcendence”. Although an analytic explanation of these intrinsic and substantial dimensions of the person is beyond the scope of this essay, we can say that the various rights that can be predicated about the person directly concern what we have set out above.

In the dignity of the person as an individual subject, as a reality in herself, as an end in herself and not as a pure means, fundamental rights to self-determination are anchored with regard to the way of organizing and structuring her life, to freedom of opinion, and to the choice of where and how to practice her profession.

In the dignity of the person, as a holistic being, far from the soul-body duality and reconciled with her own corporeality, assumed as the formal reality of her being present in the world, the inalienable rights to life, bodily integrity, and health are rooted. At the same time, rights to conditions worthy of humanity also have their location here, to guarantee well-being and safety for a person’s own life: the right to housing, work, a healthy environment and a habitable planet.

And finally, in the dignity of the person as a self-transcending being that is substantially constituted as capable of relationality, of founding confrontation with the “you”, there emerges in the person’s various relationships the fundamental rights to socialization, to forms of love, marriage and family relationships, as well as to participation in social life. Here we also have the fundamental right to religious freedom and to the cultural expressions of one’s faith.

• 5 Conclusion

The theme of human dignity and human rights is a permanent challenge for everyone. We are all involved on a double front: that of growing in the personal awareness of being subjects of dignity and rights, and that of participating in the recognition of the dignity of the other and in the realization of the rights of others. Delegations or limitations of responsibility are not allowed in these two areas, precisely because rights are not an optional good, but the structural and structuring necessity for the person’s dignity.

Those who refuse to grow in the careful and relevant awareness of their rights, expose their dignity as a person to the risk of frustration, and make themselves vulnerable. Those who do not share in solidarity with the destiny of individuals and peoples who fight for their rights, equally endanger the human dignity that is present in those who share their own humanity.

From this point of view, it is significant to note the shift in perspective that can be seen in the enumerations of human rights that have progressively been made over the centuries, and in the 1948 UDHR . The unambiguous solidarity, which corrected the privatized and individualistic approach of the past and which made the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Peoples in 1976 possible, must be taken as a basic guideline for reflecting on, and fighting for, human rights, but also in understanding, articulating, and critiquing concepts of human dignity.

Ultimately, human dignity runs on two tracks of understanding that can and must complement each other. On the one hand, there is the substantive track, which goes back to the totality of the human person as subject, without leading to an individualistic isolation of the human being. On the other hand, there is the relational path, which opens the subject into a network of belonging and cultivates in the person an inclusive and participatory lifestyle. 17 In the relational nature of human dignity is the intrinsic link between the right to one’s dignity and the duty to respect the dignity of others. Today, we are particularly attentive to this relational nature of human dignity, also through the gender sensitivity and the gender culture that is expressed in the recognition and in the dynamic of caring for the dignity of the other. These factors result from the matrix of an emancipation project that is typical of modernity and that from time to time takes on political values and generates the real assumption of responsibility. 18

Only the balanced balance between these two paths ensures a possible future for the theme of human dignity.

Antonio Autiero (born in Naples/Italy 1948) received his doctoral degree in moral theology at the Accademia Alfonsiana in Rome and in Philosophy at the University of Naples. 1983–1985 he was a fellow of the Foundation Alexander von Humboldt at the University of Bonn (Germany). There he was working together with Franz Böckle. In 1991 he became professor of moral theology at the University of Münster, until his retirement in 2013. In the time 1997–2011 he directed the Center for Religious Studies of Trento (Italy). Antonio Autiero has authored or edited books and articles (about 250) on fundamental moral theology, theories of the moral subject and in the field of applied ethics. Autiero is a member of the German Academy of Ethics in Medicine, the StemCell Research governmental commission in Berlin and the Planning Committee of Catholic Theological Ethics in the World Church. He is also coordinator of the ethics group by COMECE (Commission of European Episcopal Conferences) in Brussels.

• Bibliography

Bayertz , Kurt : “ Die Idee der Menschenwürde: Probleme und Paradoxien ”, in: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 81 ( 4 / 1995 ), p. 465 – 481 .

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Bilaterale Arbeitsgruppe der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz und der Vereinigten Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche Deutschlands : Gott und die Würde des Menschen . Paderborn/Leipzig : Evangelische Verlagsanstalt/Bonifatius , 2017 .

Børresen , Kari Elisabeth : The Image of God. Gender Models in Judaeo-Christian Tradition . Minneapolis, MN : Fortress , 1995 .

Børresen , Kari Elisabeth : Subordination and Equivalence. The Nature and Role of Woman in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. A Reprint of a Pioneering Classic , Kampen : Kok Pharos , 1995 .

Centi , Beatrice : “ Il tema della dignità della ragione nel rapporto che Kant instaura tra morale critica e antropologia filosofica ”, in: Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Classe di Lettere e Filosofia , Serie III 12 ( 2 / 1982 ), p. 707 – 747 .

Dean , Richard : The Value of Humanity in Kant’s Moral Theory . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 2006 .

Deutscher Ethikrat : Eingriffe in die menschliche Keimbahn. Stellungnahme , Berlin : Deutscher Ethikrat , 2019 .

Honneth , Axel : The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts , Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press , 1995 .

Honneth , Axel : Anerkennung: Eine europäische Ideengeschichte . Berlin : Suhrkamp , 2018 .

International Theological Commission : Communion and Stewardship. Human Person Created in the Image of God . Rome : LEV , 2004 .

Kant , Immanuel : Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785), Fondazione della metafisica dei costumi, in Scritti morali , trans. by Pietro Chiodi . Torino : UTET , 1995 .

Łuków , Pawel : “ A Difficult Legacy: Human Dignity as the Founding Value of Human Rights ”, in: Human Rights Review 19 ( 2018 ), p. 313 – 329 .

Magli , Ida : Sulla dignità della donna. La violenza sulle donne: il pensiero di Wojtyla . Parma : Guanda , 1993 .

Messner , Johannes : Das Naturrecht. Handbuch der Gesellschaftsethik, Staatsethik und Wirtschaftsethik . Berlin : Duncker & Humblot GmbH , 8 2018 .

Nussbaum , Martha : The Therapy of Desire. Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics . Princeton, NJ & Oxford : Princeton University Press , 3 2009 .

Quante , Michael : Menschenwürde und personale Autonomie. Demokratische Werte im Kontext der Lebenswissenschaften . Hamburg : Meiner , 2010 .

Rosen , Michael : Dignity. Its History and Meaning . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press , 2012 .

Schlag , Martin : La dignità dell’uomo come principio sociale. Il contributo della fede cristiana allo Stato secolare . Roma : EDUSC , 2013 .

Schmidt am Busch , Hans-Christoph / Zurn , Christopher (ed.): The Philosophy of Recognition. Historical and Contemporary Perspectives . Lanham, MD : Lexington Books , 2009 .

Siep , Ludwig : Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie. Untersuchungen zu Hegels Jenaer Philosophie des Geistes . Hamburg : Meiner , 2014 .

Tonstad , Linn Marie : Queer Theology. Beyond Apologetics . Eugene, OR : Cascade Companions , 2018 .

von der Pfordten , Dietmar : “ Zur Würde des Menschen bei Kant ”, in: Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik ( 2006 ), p. 501 – 517 .

Zylberman , Ariel : “ The Relational Structure of Human Dignity ”, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 ( 4 / 2018 ), p. 738 – 752 .

Cf. Bayertz, Die Idee der Menschenwürde ; Quante, Menschenwürde und personale Autonomie .

Deutscher Ethikrat, Eingriffe in die menschliche Keimbahn , p. 89–96.

The juxtaposition of the theme of dignity and that of violence against women has also been made for a long time in the various pronouncements of the popes from John Paul II to Pope Francis. For John Paul, cf. Magli, Sulla dignità della donna . In the case of Francis, the homily at the Mass on January 1, 2020 will be particularly remembered, with its incisive expression: “every violence inflicted on women is a violation of God.”

( http://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/it/bollettino/pubblico/2020/01/01/0001/00001.html ).

For a good historical reconstruction of the concept, see Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning . On the specific contribution of Hellenistic culture, see Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire .

Cf. Schlag, La dignità dell’uomo come principio sociale .

International Theological Commission, Communion and Stewardship .

The relationship between dignity and human rights is not easy to understand. Tension points are well expressed and systematically analysed by P. Łuków, A Difficult Legacy .

Tonstad, Queer Theology , p. 70–72.

Messner, Das Naturrecht .

Useful references are: Centi, Il tema della dignità della ragione ; Dean, The Value of Humanity ; von der Pfordten, Zur Würde des Menschen .

Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten , p. 95.

Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten , p. 88.

Bilaterale Arbeitsgruppe der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz und der Vereinigten Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche Deutschlands, Gott und die Würde des Menschen , no. 50.

Famous is the exhortation “Agnosce, Christiane, dignitatem tuam” of St. Leo the Great (Homilia in Nativitate Domini, 21, 3).

The Prologue to I , II of the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas articulates a reflection on the theme of the image of God in the human being as the foundation of his or her profile as a free, autonomous subject, a bearer of dignity.

We read in the Decretum Gratiani (1140), q. 5, c. 33: “Mulier debet velare caput, quia non est imago Dei.” To understand this nodal point, the researchs of K.E. Børresen remain fundamental, in particular The Image of God , and Subordination and Equivalence .

Zylberman, The Relational Structure of Human Dignity .

For the implications of this concept, see Siep, Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie ; Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition ; Id., Anerkennung. Eine europäische Ideengeschichte ; Schmidt am Busch/Zurn, The Philosophy of Recognition .

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What is Human Dignity? Common Definitions.

You’ll hear the term “human dignity” a lot these days. Human dignity is at the heart of human rights. What is human dignity exactly? What’s the history of this concept and why does it matter? In this article, we’ll discuss the history of the term, its meaning, and its place in both a human rights framework and a religious framework.

What is human dignity?

At its most basic, the concept of human dignity is the belief that all people hold a special value that’s tied solely to their humanity. It has nothing to do with their class, race, gender, religion, abilities, or any other factor other than them being human.

The term “dignity” has evolved over the years. Originally, the Latin, English, and French words for “dignity” did not have anything to do with a person’s inherent value. It aligned much closer with someone’s “merit.” If someone was “dignified,” it meant they had a high status. They belonged to royalty or the church, or, at the very least, they had money. For this reason, “human dignity” does not appear in the US Declaration of Independence or the Constitution . The phrase as we understand it today wasn’t recognized until 1948. The United Nations ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights .

Human dignity: the human rights framework

The original meaning of the word “dignity” established that someone deserved respect because of their status. In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that concept was turned on its head. Article 1 states: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” Suddenly, dignity wasn’t something that people earned because of their class, race, or another advantage. It is something all humans are born with. Simply by being human, all people deserve respect. Human rights naturally spring from that dignity.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights , adopted in 1966, continued this understanding. The preamble reads that “…these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.” This belief goes hand in hand with the universality of human rights. In the past, only people made dignified by their status were given respect and rights. By redefining dignity as something inherent to everyone, it also establishes universal rights.

Human dignity: the religious framework

The concept of human dignity isn’t limited to human rights. In fact, for centuries, religions around the world have recognized a form of human dignity as we now understand it. Most (if not all) religions teach that humans are essentially equal for one reason or another. In Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, it’s because humans were created in the image of God, becoming children of God. Dignity is something that a divine being gives to people. In Catholic social teaching, the phrase “Human Dignity” is used specifically to support the church’s belief that every human life is sacred. This defines the denomination’s dedication to social issues like ending the death penalty.

In Hinduism and Buddhism, respectively, dignity is inherent because humans are manifestations of the Divine or on a universal journey to happiness. In the Shvetasvatara Upanishad, an ancient Sanskrit text, it reads “We are all begotten of the immortal,” or “We are children of immortality.” Buddhism begins with the understanding that humans are “rare” because they can make choices that lead to enlightenment. Our dignity arises from this responsibility and ability, uniting all humans in their quest.

When everyone is equal, they are all equally deserving of basic respect and rights, at least in theory. Countless people have had their dignity disrespected over the years by religious institutions and others using religion as justification.

Why recognizing human dignity is so important

Why is human dignity so important when it comes to human rights? Human dignity justifies human rights. When people are divided and given a value based on characteristics like class, gender, religion, and so on, it creates unequal societies where discrimination runs rampant. People assigned a higher value get preferential treatment. Anyone who doesn’t fit into the privileged category is abandoned or oppressed. We’ve seen what happens in places where human dignity isn’t seen as inherent and human rights aren’t universal. While the privileged few in these societies flourish, society as a whole suffers significantly. Inevitably, violence erupts. If a new group takes power and also fails to recognize human dignity, the cycle of destruction continues, only with different participants.

Recognizing human dignity and the universality of human rights isn’t just so individuals can be protected and respected. It’s for the good of the entire world. If everyone’s rights were respected and everyone got equal opportunities to thrive, the world would be a much happier, more peaceful place.

Learn more how you can defend and protect human dignity in a free online course .

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About the author, emmaline soken-huberty.

Emmaline Soken-Huberty is a freelance writer based in Portland, Oregon. She started to become interested in human rights while attending college, eventually getting a concentration in human rights and humanitarianism. LGBTQ+ rights, women’s rights, and climate change are of special concern to her. In her spare time, she can be found reading or enjoying Oregon’s natural beauty with her husband and dog.

Home — Essay Samples — Life — Respect — 250-Word on Respect

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• Are manufacturing jobs really that good?

The nostalgia of politicians is misplaced

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I f there is one thing politicians agree on these days, it is that manufacturing jobs are “good” jobs. Joe Biden is betting that huge subsidies for new factories will transform the outlook for America’s workers—and November’s election. His acting labour secretary recently embarked on a jolly-sounding “Good Jobs Summer Tour” to trumpet the president’s plans. Donald Trump, Mr Biden’s rival, is just as eager to get more wrenches into the hands of American workers, mostly by slapping tariffs on foreign goods. Politicians across the rich world believe that reversing the decades-long decline in manufacturing employment would leave workers better off.

Your guest Bartleby is not convinced. He has, admittedly, never worked in a factory, and thus feels no nostalgia for hard hats and high-vis vests. Still, the idea that deindustrialisation has made work worse is hard to square with the fact that data on worker satisfaction have been steadily improving for years.

The argument that manufacturing jobs are better than other sorts has a long pedigree. Adam Smith believed that manufacturing was “productive”, unlike services such as banking, retail or hospitality. The factories of the Industrial Revolution transformed living standards in Europe and America in the 19th century. Yet they were also awful places for workers, managing to be both horribly dangerous and tremendously boring. Things did not get much better with the rise of mass-production in the early 20th century. Workers in Henry Ford’s carmaking plants, though relatively well paid, complained that work was stultifying. As one Ford worker noted, “If I keep putting on Nut Number 86 for about 86 more days, I will be Nut Number 86 in the Pontiac bughouse.”

Even during the post-war period—paradise lost, in the eyes of many Western politicians—people were hardly thrilled about working in factories. In 1970 Fortune magazine coined the phrase the “blue-collar blues” to describe the alienation many manufacturing workers felt in an impersonal industrial system. One pundit noted that such a worker would be “easy prey for demagogues who appeal to his resentment and his desire for revenge”, which sounds familiar.

Manufacturing enthusiasts will no doubt counter that jobs in the sector are much better today. Workplace accidents occur a fraction as often as they once did. Most factories are air-conditioned. Robots do many of the heaviest and most repetitive tasks. And around a third of those who work in manufacturing never go near a rivet, performing white-collar roles such as design and engineering.

All that may be so, but compare workers of a similar education level and there is little evidence they would gain by moving from services to manufacturing. One paper by statisticians at America’s Bureau of Labour Statistics found that, across a variety of measures including pay, benefits, job security and safety, “many industries within services equal or exceed manufacturing.” This Bartleby’s analysis of British data similarly shows that job quality in the manufacturing sector is no better than average.

For decades economists observed that manufacturing workers enjoyed a wage premium over comparable workers in other industries. A recent paper published by the Federal Reserve, however, shows that this premium has “disappeared” in recent years. Those who point to the insecurity of gig jobs, such as delivering takeaway meals, would do well to remember that manufacturing jobs are often more cyclical than those in services. They are also more likely to be automated away. It is not immediately obvious that a job tending to an industrial robot is more satisfying than one operating an espresso machine at Starbucks, especially for workers who enjoy some human interaction.

According to Mr Biden, “A job is about a lot more than a pay cheque. It’s about your dignity. It’s about respect.” That is true. Yet dignity and respect should be available for workers wherever they are employed. If not, politicians should focus their attention on ensuring the right regulations are in place, instead of spending billions of dollars trying to recreate a past that was far less rosy than they imagine.

Companies, of course, have a role to play as well, with plenty of evidence demonstrating that bosses who treat their employees well reap the rewards. And workers themselves need to face the fact that nostalgia misleads. Yes, work can be a drag. But it is probably the best it has ever been. ■

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This article appeared in the Business section of the print edition under the headline “From factories to frappés”

Business June 22nd 2024

• China’s giant solar industry is in turmoil

Floating solar has a bright future

India’s electronics industry is surging, the cautionary tale of huy fong’s hot sauce, european airlines are on a shopping spree, nvidia is now the world’s most valuable company.

• Palmer Luckey and Anduril want to shake up armsmaking

From the June 22nd 2024 edition

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