synthesis essay on feminism

Introduction

Background on the Course

CO300 as a University Core Course

Short Description of the Course

Course Objectives

General Overview

Alternative Approaches and Assignments

(Possible) Differences between COCC150 and CO300

What CO300 Students Are Like

And You Thought...

Beginning with Critical Reading

Opportunities for Innovation

Portfolio Grading as an Option

Teaching in the computer classroom

Finally. . .

Classroom materials

Audience awareness and rhetorical contexts

Critical thinking and reading

Focusing and narrowing topics

Mid-course, group, and supplemental evaluations

More detailed explanation of Rogerian argument and Toulmin analysis

Policy statements and syllabi

Portfolio explanations, checklists, and postscripts

Presenting evidence and organizing arguments/counter-arguments

Research and documentation

Writing assignment sheets

Assignments for portfolio 1

Assignments for portfolio 2

Assignments for portfolio 3

Workshopping and workshop sheets

On workshopping generally

Workshop sheets for portfolio 1

Workshop sheets for portfolio 2

Workshop sheets for portfolio 3

Workshop sheets for general purposes

Sample materials grouped by instructor

Synthesis/Response Essay (Harper)

For this essay you will be collecting sources on a media topic of your choice, analyzing and evaluating these references for topics/issues/themes they have in common, and writing an essay on how each one of the authors of the sources you have chosen approaches this common topic. This is what is meant by "synthesizing." Sound simple? It is! Synthesis, like summary, is primarily objective--no opinion. You are reflecting, as accurately as you can, how each author approaches the common topic you've chosen to focus on. Here's an example:

Let's say you've chosen three articles: one by Rush Limbaugh, the second by Gloria Steinem, and the third Katie Roiphe. The common point you've decided you want to focus on is feminism. All three of these authors come from a completely different angle on feminism and have their own opinions about what this multifaceted term means today. You would want to introduce the topic you'll be addressing and explain that you'll be looking at how three authors view this topic. Obviously, you would go on to do this, and at the end of your synthesis, you would respond--hence, Part Two of the essay.

Now you get to respond to the information (ideas, topic, authors, etc.) that you have synthesized. Once again, you can take many approaches in the response portion of this essay. Most important, you are taking a position in relation to the sources you have collected. You may respond to one author's argument or all of them; you may respond to the topic in general, using personal experience and/or outside sources which present yet another argument; you may agree/disagree with the logic and premises one or more of the authors used in defending their conclusions...the list goes on. The important thing to remember is that your response must be reasoned, developed (backed-up), logical, coherent, clear in terms of what it is exactly that you're responding to, and focused (no rambling, padding, beating around the bush, touching on an idea but not developing it, trying to cover everything in a short space, etc.).

To synthesize the claims of 3-5 authors/articles based on a common topic, showing how each of the authors relate to the common topic as well as to each other's argument or viewpoint. You will also be responding, using any one of the approaches we have discussed in class.

Your choice. The audience you choose will impact, primarily, only your response because the synthesis portion of the essay is largely objective.

You will research and locate five articles or book chapters on a "Media and 'American' Culture" topic of your choice. At least three of these texts must be arguments, and these three arguments will be the articles you will synthesize and respond to. (You may collect five arguments and use all of them in your paper, but be careful: synthesizing this many articles can get complicated). You should consult at least three different indexes or databases in your search for sources. Make sure to photocopy all your sources!

Key Features:

See handout titled, "Key Features/Grading Guide for Synthesis and Response."

Around 4-6 pages, but this is not set in stone.

Final Draft Format:

--double-spaced

--spell-checked

--proper MLA documentation (we will discuss this in class)

--name in one of the upper corners of first page

Important Dates:

--Electronic Information Lab Orientation: To be announced

--Sources collected by Thurs., 2-16

--Rough Draft and Workshop on Thurs., 2-23

(Annotated bibliography of your five sources also due on this date).

--Synthesis/Response (or Explanatory) Essay due: Tues., 2-28. You may turn in an Intervention Draft on this date, although it is not mandatory.

--In class writing/debate assignments to be handed in w/ Portfolio: Thurs., 3-2

--Portfolio #1 due: Tues., 3-7

--All summaries should be typed and "cleaned up" for submission.

--Revised summary/response essay

--Revised synthesis/response (or explanatory) essay

--All rough drafts, workshop sheets, homework assignments, freewriting, pre-reading log assignments, annotated articles, postscripts, copies of sources, etc.

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Dynamics of Women’s Studies and English Studies- A Synthesis Essay

2021, Academia Letters

Related Papers

The Handbook of Magazine Studies

Nithila Kanagasabai

The institutionalization of women’s studies as a discipline and the consequent development of women’s studies centers in universities across India have led to arguments that the increasing significance of professional and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to women’s studies have enabled men and women who lack a serious commitment to feminist politics to practice it as a profession (Menon 2004). These occurrences have also fueled fears of loss of academic rigor (Pappu 2002) and weakening of feminist theorization (Anandhi and Swaminathan 2006). It is in this context that this research explores the formulations of feminisms in non‐metropolitan locations in Tamil Nadu, India’s southernmost state, and the role of little magazines and popular culture weeklies in facilitating spaces of feminist engagement within academia and outside of it. The research posits that these magazines enable first‐generation learners to create a new language of feminism, one that speaks to their location and against hegemonic knowledge flows. Employing in‐depth interviews and non‐participant observation, this case study explores the ways in which these magazines facilitate bridging the gap between academics and the public sphere within a postcolonial framework.

Peace Prints

Kerala is renowned for its high performance in terms of development and gender indices. Yet, an examination of courses on gender in Kerala reveals many contradictions. The paper will begin with an exploration of misconceptions in Kerala related to women's empowerment and feminism. The paper will examine the foundational aims of courses on gender and how they may clash with existing patriarchal structures especially during syllabus formation and classroom transactions. The paper will do so in a reflexive, inter-subjective manner. Next, the paper will focus on the role of question papers in the present exam-centric system of higher education. The paper will critically analyze questions papers from ten postgraduate-level courses on/related to gender from different institutions in Kerala in light of the Revised Bloom's Taxonomy. The paper will call for mainstreaming courses on gender and will provide some practical suggestions regarding question papers and pedagogic practices that can raise the standards of the discipline and revitalize gender studies courses in Kerala.

Sharmila Rege

Sameena Dalwai

Ariel a Review of International English Literature

Louise Yelin

Sushila Vijaykumar

In keeping with the clarion call of drama/theatre scholar and critic Tutun Mukherjee who urges the necessity of attending to regional literatures to comprehend missing women’s voices, aspirations and experiences in India, this paper undertakes a close reading of Thirst translated from the telugu original Daaham by the well-known feminist social worker and activist Vinodini. Daaham was originally written as a street play for raising public consciousness. As it shall be illustrated, Thirst delineates the lived realities of caste hierarchies for the Dalits in rural India and depicts the power of collective action. Keywords: Caste, Consciousness-Raising, Dalit, Vinodini

Mourning, especially melancholic mourning, has recently emerged as a significant site of expressing and addressing loss in feminism. While feminism’s hard-won successes in achieving institutional power globally have brought exuberance over achievement, they have also come with an acute sense of despondency and loss; one that is not easily mourned or relinquished. The institutionalization of feminism in governmental, non-governmental and academic sites has precipitated this sense of loss in India, wherein the discussion of this article is located. In exploring the politics of loss in contemporary feminist discourse in India, feminist melancholia is seen to condition a fetishized attachment to the past, and to past modes of knowledge, action and consciousness in ways that demand the generational reproduction of feminism rather than its renewal in times of perceived crisis. Present-day anxieties over the ‘co-option’ and resultant depoliticization of the Indian women’s movement constitute a narrative of loss in which a politically more ‘authentic’ past functions as a normative standard for feminist politics in the present, and as a prescriptive model of feminism’s future. Advancements in Women’s Studies and activist (now ‘NGOized’) practice that are seen to be deviating from the redemption of such an idealized past are thus deemed apolitical. In interrogating contemporary anxieties about feminism’s present and impending future (that resonate beyond the bounds of India), the article demonstrates how melancholic loss can inform a potentially conservative politics that seeks to contain feminism in a once loved but now lost ‘home’.

Vanashree Tripathi

Dharmendra Chatur

South Asia Journal of South Asian Studies

Mytheli Sreenivas , Anjali Bhardwaj Datta

This Introduction frames a collection of papers that explore the roles played by women—as volunteers, organisers, bureaucrats, politicians and citizens—in shaping the emerging ideologies and structures of independent India. Although women’s participation is both understudied and inadequately theorised in existing scholarship, the papers in this collection demonstrate that the decades following India’s Independence witnessed the participation of women in every sphere of politics and nation-building. The introductory essay tracks the limits and possibilities of women’s agency and gendered citizenship in these spheres to historicise the women’s movement during the post-Independence decades, and to examine its fraught relationship with feminism, patriarchal society and state politics.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Introduction to feminism, topics: what is feminism.

Introduction
What is Feminism?
Historical Context
Normative and Descriptive Components
Feminism and the Diversity of Women
Feminism as Anti-Sexism
Topics in Feminism: Overview of the Sub-Entries

Bibliography

Works cited.

General Bibliography [under construction]
Topical Bibliographies [under construction]

Other Internet Resources

Related entries, i. introduction, ii. what is feminism, a. historical context, b. normative and descriptive components.

i) (Normative) Men and women are entitled to equal rights and respect. ii) (Descriptive) Women are currently disadvantaged with respect to rights and respect, compared with men.

Feminism is grounded on the belief that women are oppressed or disadvantaged by comparison with men, and that their oppression is in some way illegitimate or unjustified. Under the umbrella of this general characterization there are, however, many interpretations of women and their oppression, so that it is a mistake to think of feminism as a single philosophical doctrine, or as implying an agreed political program. (James 2000, 576)

C. Feminism and the Diversity of Women

Feminism, as liberation struggle, must exist apart from and as a part of the larger struggle to eradicate domination in all its forms. We must understand that patriarchal domination shares an ideological foundation with racism and other forms of group oppression, and that there is no hope that it can be eradicated while these systems remain intact. This knowledge should consistently inform the direction of feminist theory and practice. (hooks 1989, 22)

Unlike many feminist comrades, I believe women and men must share a common understanding--a basic knowledge of what feminism is--if it is ever to be a powerful mass-based political movement. In Feminist Theory: from margin to center, I suggest that defining feminism broadly as "a movement to end sexism and sexist oppression" would enable us to have a common political goal…Sharing a common goal does not imply that women and men will not have radically divergent perspectives on how that goal might be reached. (hooks 1989, 23)

…no woman is subject to any form of oppression simply because she is a woman; which forms of oppression she is subject to depend on what "kind" of woman she is. In a world in which a woman might be subject to racism, classism, homophobia, anti-Semitism, if she is not so subject it is because of her race, class, religion, sexual orientation. So it can never be the case that the treatment of a woman has only to do with her gender and nothing to do with her class or race. (Spelman 1988, 52-3)

D. Feminism as Anti-Sexism

i) (Descriptive claim) Women, and those who appear to be women, are subjected to wrongs and/or injustice at least in part because they are or appear to be women. ii) (Normative claim) The wrongs/injustices in question in (i) ought not to occur and should be stopped when and where they do.

III. Topics in Feminism: Overview of the Sub-Entries

Alexander, M. Jacqui and Lisa Albrecht, eds. 1998. The Third Wave: Feminist Perspectives on Racism. New York: Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press.
Anderson, Elizabeth. 1999a. “What is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109(2): 287-337.
______. 1999b. "Reply” Brown Electronic Article Review Service, Jamie Dreier and David Estlund, editors, World Wide Web, (http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/homepage.html), Posted 12/22/99.
Anzaldúa, Gloria, ed. 1990. Making Face, Making Soul: Haciendo Caras. San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books.
Baier, Annette C. 1994. Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Barrett, Michèle. 1991. The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Bartky, Sandra. 1990. “Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power.” In her Femininity and Domination. New York: Routledge, 63-82.
Basu, Amrita. 1995. The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women's Movements in Global Perspective. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Baumgardner, Jennifer and Amy Richards. 2000. Manifesta: Young Women, Feminism, and the Future. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
Beauvoir, Simone de. 1974 (1952). The Second Sex. Trans. and Ed. H. M. Parshley. New York: Vintage Books.
Benhabib, Seyla. 1992. Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics. New York: Routledge.
Calhoun, Cheshire. 2000. Feminism, the Family, and the Politics of the Closet: Lesbian and Gay Displacement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
______. 1989. “Responsibility and Reproach.” Ethics 99(2): 389-406.
Collins, Patricia Hill. 1990. Black Feminist Thought. Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman.
Cott, Nancy. 1987. The Grounding of Modern Feminism. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Crenshaw, Kimberlé. 1991. “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color.“ Stanford Law Review , 43(6): 1241-1299.
Crenshaw, Kimberlé, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller and Kendall Thomas. 1995. “Introduction.” In Critical Race Theory, ed., Kimberle Crenshaw, et al. New York: The New Press, xiii-xxxii.Davis, Angela. 1983. Women, Race and Class. New York: Random House.
Crow, Barbara. 2000. Radical Feminism: A Documentary Reader. New York: New York University Press.
Delmar, Rosalind. 2001. "What is Feminism?” In Theorizing Feminism, ed., Anne C. Hermann and Abigail J. Stewart. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 5-28.
Duplessis, Rachel Blau, and Ann Snitow, eds. 1998. The Feminist Memoir Project: Voices from Women's Liberation. New York: Random House (Crown Publishing).
Dutt, M. 1998. "Reclaiming a Human Rights Culture: Feminism of Difference and Alliance." In Talking Visions: Multicultural Feminism in a Transnational Age , ed., Ella Shohat. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 225-246.
Echols, Alice. 1990. Daring to Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America, 1967-75. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Engels, Friedrich. 1972 (1845). The Origin of The Family, Private Property, and the State. New York: International Publishers.
Findlen, Barbara. 2001. Listen Up: Voices from the Next Feminist Generation, 2nd edition. Seattle, WA: Seal Press.
Fine, Michelle and Adrienne Asch, eds. 1988. Women with Disabilities: Essays in Psychology, Culture, and Politics. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Fraser, Nancy and Linda Nicholson. 1990. "Social Criticism Without Philosophy: An Encounter Between Feminism and Postmodernism." In Feminism/Postmodernism, ed., Linda Nicholson. New York: Routledge.
Friedan, Betty. 1963. The Feminine Mystique. New York: Norton.
Frye, Marilyn. 1983. The Politics of Reality. Freedom, CA: The Crossing Press.
Garland-Thomson, Rosemarie. 1997. Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in American Culture and Literature. New York: Columbia University Press.
Grewal, I. 1998. "On the New Global Feminism and the Family of Nations: Dilemmas of Transnational Feminist Practice." In Talking Visions: Multicultural Feminism in a Transnational Age, ed., Ella Shohat. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 501-530.
Hampton, Jean. 1993. “Feminist Contractarianism,” in Louise M. Antony and Charlotte Witt, eds. A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Haslanger, Sally. Forthcoming. “Oppressions: Racial and Other.” In Racism, Philosophy and Mind: Philosophical Explanations of Racism and Its Implications, ed., Michael Levine and Tamas Pataki. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Held, Virginia. 1993. Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, Society, and Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Herrman, Anne C. and Abigail J. Stewart, eds. 1994. Theorizing Feminism: Parallel Trends in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Heywood, Leslie and Jennifer Drake, eds. 1997. Third Wave Agenda: Being Feminist, Doing Feminism.
Hillyer, Barbara. 1993. Feminism and Disability. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
Hoagland, Sarah L. 1989. Lesbian Ethics: Toward New Values. Palo Alto, CA: Institute for Lesbian Studies.
Hooks, bell. 1989. Talking Back: Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black. Boston: South End Press.
______. 1984. Feminist Theory from Margin to Center. Boston: South End Press.
______. 1981. Ain't I A Woman: Black Women and Feminism. Boston: South End Press.
Hurtado, Aída. 1996. The Color of Privilege: Three Blasphemies on Race and Feminism. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Jagger, Alison M. 1983. Feminist Politics and Human Nature. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
James, Susan. 2000. “Feminism in Philosophy of Mind: The Question of Personal Identity.” In The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy, ed., Miranda Fricker and Jennifer Hornsby. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kiss, Elizabeth. 1995. "Feminism and Rights." Dissent 42(3): 342-347
Kittay, Eva Feder. 1999. Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality and Dependency. New York: Routledge.
Kymlicka, Will. 1989. Liberalism, Community and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mackenzie, Catriona and Natalie Stoljar, eds. 2000. Relational Autonomy: Feminist perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
MacKinnon, Catharine. 1989. Towards a Feminist Theory of the State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
______. 1987. Feminism Unmodified. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mohanty, Chandra, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres, eds. 1991. Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Molyneux, Maxine and Nikki Craske, eds. 2001. Gender and the Politics of Rights and Democracy in Latin America. Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan.
Moody-Adams, Michele. 1997. Fieldwork in Familiar Places: Morality, Culture and Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Moraga, Cherrie. 2000. "From a Long Line of Vendidas: Chicanas and Feminism." In her Loving in the War Years, 2nd edition. Boston: South End Press.
Moraga, Cherrie and Gloria Anzaldúa, eds. 1981. This Bridge Called My Back: Writings of Radical Women of Color. Watertown, MA: Persephone Press.
Narayan, Uma. 1997. Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions, and Third World Feminism. New York: Routledge.
Nussbaum, Martha. 1995. "Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings." In Women, Culture and Development : A Study of Human Capabilities, ed., Martha Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 61-104.
_______. 1999. Sex and Social Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
O’Brien, Mary. 1979. “Reproducing Marxist Man.” In The Sexism of Social and Political Theory: Women and Reproduction from Plato to Nietzsche, ed., Lorenne M. G. Clark and Lynda Lange. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 99-116. Reprinted in (Tuana and Tong 1995: 91-103).
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Okin, Susan Moller. 1989. Justice, Gender, and the Family. New York: Basic Books.
______. 1979. Women in Western Political Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Pateman, Carole. 1988. The Sexual Contract. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
Reagon, Bernice Johnson. 1983. "Coalition Politics: Turning the Century." In: Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology, ed. Barbara Smith. New York: Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press, 356-368.
Robinson, Fiona. 1999. Globalizing Care: Ethics, Feminist Theory, and International Affairs. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Rubin, Gayle. 1975. “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the “Political Economy” of Sex.” In Towards an Anthropology of Women , ed., Rayna Rapp Reiter. New York: Monthly Review Press, 157-210.
Ruddick, Sara. 1989. Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace. Boston: Beacon Press.
Schneir, Miriam, ed. 1994. Feminism in Our Time: The Essential Writings, World War II to the Present. New York: Vintage Books.
______. 1972. Feminism: The Essential Historical Writings. New York: Vintage Books.
Scott, Joan W. 1988. “Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: or The Uses of Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism.” Feminist Studies 14 (1): 33-50.
Silvers, Anita, David Wasserman, Mary Mahowald. 1999. Disability, Difference, Discrimination: Perspectives on Justice in Bioethics and Public Policy . Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
Simpson, J. A. and E. S. C. Weiner, ed., 1989. Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. OED Online. Oxford University Press. “feminism, n1” (1851).
Snitow, Ann. 1990. “A Gender Diary.” In Conflicts in Feminism, ed. M. Hirsch and E. Fox Keller. New York: Routledge, 9-43.
Spelman, Elizabeth. 1988. The Inessential Woman. Boston: Beacon Press.
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Taylor, Vesta and Leila J. Rupp. 1996. "Lesbian Existence and the Women's Movement: Researching the 'Lavender Herring'." In Feminism and Social Change , ed. Heidi Gottfried. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Tong, Rosemarie. 1993. Feminine and Feminist Ethics. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Tuana, Nancy and Rosemarie Tong, eds. 1995. Feminism and Philosophy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Walker, Alice. 1990. “Definition of Womanist,” In Making Face, Making Soul: Haciendo Caras , ed., Gloria Anzaldúa. San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 370.
Walker, Margaret Urban. 1998. Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in Ethics. New York: Routledge.
______, ed. 1999. Mother Time: Women, Aging, and Ethics. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Walker, Rebecca, ed. 1995. To Be Real: Telling the Truth and Changing the Face of Feminism. New York: Random House (Anchor Books).
Ware, Cellestine. 1970. Woman Power: The Movement for Women’s Liberation . New York: Tower Publications.
Weisberg, D. Kelly, ed. 1993. Feminist Legal Theory: Foundations. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Wendell, Susan. 1996. The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Disability. New York and London: Routledge.
Young, Iris. 1990a. "Humanism, Gynocentrism and Feminist Politics." In Throwing Like A Girl. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 73-91.
Young, Iris. 1990b. “Socialist Feminism and the Limits of Dual Systems Theory.” In her Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory . Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
______. 1990c. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Zophy, Angela Howard. 1990. "Feminism." In The Handbook of American Women's History , ed., Angela Howard Zophy and Frances M. Kavenik. New York: Routledge (Garland Reference Library of the Humanities).

General Bibliography

Topical bibliographies.

Feminist Theory Website
Race, Gender, and Affirmative Action Resource Page
Documents from the Women's Liberation Movement (Duke Univ. Archives)
Core Reading Lists in Women's Studies (Assn of College and Research Libraries, WS Section)
Feminist and Women's Journals
Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy
Feminist Internet Search Utilities
National Council for Research on Women (including links to centers for research on women and affiliate organizations, organized by research specialties)
Feminism and Class
Marxist, Socialist, and Materialist Feminisms
M-Fem (information page, discussion group, links, etc.)
WMST-L discussion of how to define “marxist feminism” Aug 1994)
Marxist/Materialist Feminism (Feminist Theory Website)
MatFem (Information page, discussion group)
Feminist Economics
Feminist Economics (Feminist Theory Website)
International Association for Feminist Economics
Feminist Political Economy and the Law (2001 Conference Proceedings, York Univ.)
Journal for the International Association for Feminist Economics
Feminism and Disability
World Wide Web Review: Women and Disabilities Websites
Disability and Feminism Resource Page
Center for Research on Women with Disabilities (CROWD)
Interdisciplinary Bibliography on Disability in the Humanities (Part of the American Studies Crossroads Project)
Feminism and Human Rights, Global Feminism
World Wide Web Review: Websites on Women and Human Rights
International Gender Studies Resources (U.C. Berkeley)
Global Feminisms Research Resources (Vassar Library)
Global Feminism (Feminist Majority Foundation)
NOW and Global Feminism
United Nations Development Fund for Women
Global Issues Resources
Sisterhood is Global Institute (SIGI)
Feminism and Race/Ethnicity
General Resources
WMST-L discussion on “Women of Color and the Women’s Movement” (5 Parts) Sept/Oct 2000)
Women of Color Resources (Princeton U. Library)
Core Readings in Women's Studies: Women of Color (Assn. of College and Research Libraries, WS Section)
Women of Color Resource Sites
African-American/Black Feminisms and Womanism
African-American/Black/Womanist Feminism on the Web
Black Feminist and Womanist Identity Bibliography (Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Library)
The Womanist Studies Consortium (Univ. of Georgia)
Black Feminist/Womanist Works: A Beginning List (WMST-L)
African-American Women Online Archival Collection (Duke U.)
Asian-American and Asian Feminisms
Asian American Feminism (Feminist Theory Website)
Asian-American Women Bibliography (Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe)
American Women's History: A Research Guide (Asian-American Women)
South Asian Women's Studies Bibliography (U.C. Berkeley)
Journal of South Asia Women's Studies
Chicana/Latina Feminisms
Bibliography on Chicana Feminism (Cal State, Long Beach Library)
Making Face, Making Soul: A Chicana Feminist Website
Defining Chicana Feminisms, In Their Own Words
CLNet's Chicana Studies Homepage (UCLA)
Chicana Related Bibliographies (CLNet)
American Indian, Native, Indigenous Feminisms
Native American Feminism (Feminist Theory Website)
Bibliography on American Indian Gender Roles and Relations
Bibliography on American Indian Feminism
Bibliography on American Indian Gay/Lesbian Topics
Links on Aboriginal Women and Feminism
Feminism, Sex, and Sexuality
1970's Lesbian Feminism (Ohio State Univ., Women's Studies)
The Lesbian History Project
History of Sexuality Resources (Duke Special Collections)
Lesbian Studies Bibliography (Assn. of College and Research Libraries)
Lesbian Feminism/Lesbian Philosophy
Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy Internet Resources
QueerTheory.com
World Wide Web Review: Webs of Transgender

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The Oxford Handbook of U.S. Women's Social Movement Activism

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16 The Dynamics and Causes of Gender and Feminist Consciousness and Feminist Identities

Pamela Aronson is an Associate Professor at the University of Michigan-Dearborn, where she conducts research on young women’s identities and attitudes toward feminism, career development, the experiences of non-traditional college students, and the challenges facing college students who graduated during the recession. She has published in Gender & Society and Journal of Youth Studies .

Published: 10 May 2017
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The development of consciousness or an activist identity is a precursor to activism on behalf of women’s issues. This chapter examines the dynamics and causes of women’s gender consciousness, feminist consciousness and feminist identities and argues that they should be understood on a continuum. Gender consciousness (awareness of women’s political and social interests as women) includes a wide range of activism. Feminist consciousness (awareness and critique of gender inequalities) sits in the middle of the continuum. It accounts for perspectives that are implicitly feminist while rejecting feminist identity, including those of contemporary young women, working class, or women of color who critique the women’s movement while simultaneously supporting feminist ideologies. Feminist identities are adopted when women develop alternative visions for gender relations based on a collective identity. Consciousness and identity are influenced by age, class, race and ethnicity, and sexual orientation and are thus diverse and changing historically.

This chapter attempts to untangle the complexities of gender consciousness, feminist consciousness, and feminist identities by viewing them on a continuum, with gender consciousness (awareness of women’s political and social interests as women) at one end, feminist consciousness (awareness and critique of gender inequalities) in the middle, and feminist identities (alternative visions for gender relations based on a collective identity) at the other end. 1 Although these terms are often used interchangeably, they actually represent differences in how women view themselves and the world around them.

At one end of the continuum, gender consciousness is defined as an awareness of women’s political and social interests as women. This awareness of women’s interests can take a variety of forms, from conservative women’s activism that affirms women’s traditional roles to activists who draw on gender-traditional frames for strategic purposes to activists who blend traditional and non-traditional consciousness.

In the middle of the continuum lies feminist consciousness, which I define as an awareness and critique of gender inequalities and patriarchy. This perspective differs from gender consciousness in its critique of power differences between men and women. Feminist consciousness is also distinct from feminist identity because not all women take on the identity of “feminist”; there are many who are critical of gender inequalities and aware of patriarchy but who reject the label of feminist or are critical of feminism. As we will see, previous research suggests that women of color, working-class women, and lesbians were historically excluded from the women’s movement, and some critiqued feminism for failing to address their concerns. In this definition, feminist consciousness includes activism that scholars have recently sought to classify as implicitly, but not explicitly, feminist; that is, feminist consciousness includes activists who themselves do not embrace feminism but are working to advance feminist goals. Additionally, in the “I’m not a feminist, but …” perspective, contemporary young women are infamous for embracing aspects of feminist ideology while rejecting a feminist identity. Thus, the concept of feminist consciousness as existing on a continuum between gender consciousness and feminist identity helps to account for awareness and activism on feminist issues that do not explicitly embrace a feminist label. This is an important category for scholars, as a great deal of women’s activism would fall into this classification.

At the other end of the continuum is feminist identity, which is undertaken when women explicitly identify with feminism as an ideology and/or social movement. When taking on feminist identities, women not only recognize and critique gender inequalities, but develop alternative visions for gender relations. Feminist identities are often, although not always, connected with activism. Women who take on feminist identities are willing to define themselves in relation to an articulated social movement agenda. In doing so, they orient themselves in terms of a collective identity, a “we,” rather than the more individualized approach of feminist consciousness. Although those who express a feminist consciousness and those who embrace a feminist identity might actually have very similar perspectives, they differ in their collective orientation. All the same, feminist identities are not monolithic: there are multiple ways that women identify as feminists and multiple definitions of feminism.

Rather than rigid categories of classification, viewing gender consciousness, feminist consciousness, and feminist identities on a continuum helps to capture the diversity in women’s viewpoints and the complexity in their activism. This approach accounts for activism that is gender-identified but not explicitly feminist, as well as the multiple ways that women identify as feminists. Although not all women who develop gender-related consciousness or identities become activists, the development of these perspectives is a precursor to activism on behalf of women’s issues.

The Dynamics of Gender Consciousness

Previous research has used a wide range of definitions to describe women’s gender and feminist consciousness (e.g., Gerson and Peiss 1985 ; Green 1979 ; Gurin 1985 , 1987 ; Henderson-King and Stewart 1994 ; Klein 1984 ; Reingold and Foust 1998 ; Taylor, Whittier, and Pelak 2007 ; Tolleson Rinehart 1992 ). For example, Feree and Hess (1994: 131) define gender consciousness as “politicized consciousness of identification of women as a group with common interests and a collective identity as women.” Building on this, Gurin ( 1985 , 1987 ) distinguished between four components of gender consciousness: identification (recognizing women’s shared interests), discontent (recognizing women’s lack of power), assessment of legitimacy (seeing gender disparities as illegitimate), and collective orientation (believing in collective action). Klein (1984 : 2) argues that consciousness is “a critical precondition to political action.” Although these definitions and classifications are related, they are not uniform.

To make sense of the myriad types of consciousness and identities that exist, I follow Feree and Hess (1994) in defining women’s gender consciousness as an awareness of women’s political and social interests as women. Gender consciousness thus makes salient the status of women as women. Awareness of women’s interests can take a wide variety of forms. For example, some women develop a gender consciousness based on an affirmation of women’s traditional roles. Schreiber (2002 : 333) argues that conservative women’s organizations exhibit “distinctively gender conscious policy preferences.” Organizations that express this view make such arguments as abortion “hurts women” (by harming them emotionally and physically, as well as increasing their risks of later health problems) and that Title IX “demeans” women’s athletic achievements (by minimizing women’s accomplishments based on merit; Schreiber 2002 : 338–339). Like feminists, conservative women activists express concerns about the difficulties facing working mothers, yet they frame their concerns in terms of women’s “natural” desires to care for children ( Schreiber 2008 ). Thus, gender consciousness can be based on an awareness that women have traditional interests as women.

Social movements often take on specific discursive tactics for strategic reasons, including advancing views that focus on traditional hegemonic gender roles ( McCammon et al. 2007 ). These tactics can be especially effective at achieving a social movement’s goals when they align with popular societal views ( McCammon et al. 2007 ). For example, anti-war activism in Women’s Strike for Peace in the early 1960s emphasized women’s traditional maternal roles during a time when these views predominated ( Swerdlow 1993 ). Similarly, anti-war activism during the first decade of the 2000s simultaneously embraced and subverted women’s traditional roles ( Kutz-Flamenbaum 2007 ). When activists draw on gender-traditional frames for strategic purposes, it may be difficult to classify their gender consciousness. However, this approach may reflect an “implicitly” feminist strategy, in which feminist activism and identities are concealed during an anti-feminist historical period ( Giffort 2011 ).

Some activists exhibit gender consciousness by blending traditional and non-traditional self-conceptions or social movement frames. For example, the Mexican-American community activists in Pardo’s (1995) study did not identify as feminists, and both reinforced and altered traditional self-definitions of what it means to be a woman through their activism. In addition, some activists within the breast cancer movement distance themselves from an activist and feminist label and emphasize a “heteronormative construction of gender,” which reifies differences between women and men and emphasizes heterosexuality as normative ( Blackstone 2004 ). At the same time, the movement empowers survivors by “bringing discussions about women’s health and bodies out into the public” ( Blackstone 2004 : 365–366; see also Klawiter 1999 and Moffett 2003 ). Similarly, women community workers in low-income neighborhoods in the 1960s did not see their work as “political” because it occurred outside the formal political system, which they viewed as serving the elite ( Naples 1991 ). For these women, much of their activism grew out of their experiences as mothers, yet their paid work contradicted traditional definitions of motherhood ( Naples 1992 ). Thus, these activists show “the contradictions between women’s performance of traditional female roles and the revolutionary actions they take on behalf of their families and communities” ( Naples 1991 : 490). In these examples, the labels “activist,” “political,” and “feminist” may be rejected in favor of traditional conceptions of gender by those who are, in fact, engaged in activism that simultaneously challenges women’s traditional roles.

Thus, gender consciousness represents one end of a continuum, in which women are aware of their social and political interests as women and may draw on it as a source of activism without adopting a feminist identity. Gender consciousness takes many forms and intersects with activism in a variety of ways. Gender consciousness may be based on traditional understandings of gender. Alternatively, we have seen examples of gender consciousness that simultaneously embrace and subvert traditional gender norms. The consciousness of individual activists may differ from the expressed social movement goals and frames.

The Development of Feminist Consciousness

On the continuum between gender consciousness and embracing a feminist identity lays the development of feminist consciousness. In a general sense, Taylor and Whittier (1992) define consciousness as an “interpretative framework” that emerges when a group becomes aware of its interests in opposition to a dominant group. While gender consciousness includes an awareness of women’s political and social interests as women, I define feminist consciousness as an awareness and critique of gender inequalities and patriarchy. This definition builds on Gurin’s ( 1985 , 1987 ) view that discontent about women’s lack of power is an important part of consciousness. Feminist consciousness thus differs from gender consciousness in its critique of power differences between men and women. While some scholars have conceptualized feminist consciousness as a subtype of gender consciousness (e.g., Reingold and Foust 1998 ; Tolleson Rinehart 1992 ), I argue that seeing it along a continuum (see also Gerson and Peiss 1985 ) is more useful because it is theoretically distinct from both gender consciousness and feminist identity.

Feminist consciousness differs from feminist identity, as there are women who reject gender inequality but do not identify themselves as feminists. As Hercus (2005 : 10) argues, consciousness represents a way of knowing about the world, including “an awareness of and rejection of gender inequality.” In contrast, embracing a feminist identity includes “the ‘we’ feeling of sharing a collective identity with others in the movement” ( Hercus 2005 : 10) and an impetus toward activism. Feminist consciousness thus does not include the “we” collective feminist identity. Women who exhibit feminist consciousness but not a feminist identity do not see themselves as part of a larger feminist project or movement. They reject gender inequality, but do so in a more individualized way, as they do not align themselves with other groups of women who articulate a feminist identity.

In its place on a continuum, feminist consciousness lies between gender consciousness and feminist identity: it contains a critique of inequalities and patriarchy that would not be characteristic of someone with gender consciousness, yet it does not move into fully embracing a feminist identity. Making these distinctions allows a category for women who express perspectives that outsiders would consider to be feminist, although they reject feminist identities themselves. Thus, this approach helps to account for awareness of inequalities but a rejection or critique of the identity “feminist.” As we will see, this category includes many activists who view their activism as fitting outside of the second wave women’s movement, whether as a result of exclusion or a focus on other goals. In addition, this category includes contemporary women who embrace feminist ideology but reject the feminist label.

The development of feminist consciousness, including the conditions that both promote and impede its development, are complex. Consciousness-raising groups were vital in the second wave movement in helping women to recognize oppression as a social pattern, rather than seeing it as an individual problem ( Frye 1996 ; Hercus 2005 ). Moments of feminist consciousness were dubbed “clicks” in women’s thinking, and consciousness-raising resulted when women shared these realizations with each other (O’Reilly 1972). Women have often come to feminist consciousness as a result of their subordinate standpoint, especially their experiences with discrimination and harassment ( Martin, Reynolds, and Keith 2002 ). The development of feminist consciousness greatly affects women’s lives ( Taylor, Whittier, and Pelak 2007 ).

Although some scholars have assumed that a feminist identity results from consciousness-raising, this relationship is not always present. In particular, Downing and Roush (1985) outlined a five-stage model of feminist identity development that scholars have critiqued in more recent research. The model begins with someone who is unaware of, and passively accepts, gender discrimination. Consciousness-raising moves women to the “revelation” stage, where they reject traditional gender roles. In the third stage, women begin to adopt feminist ideologies and become embedded in women’s subculture. In the fourth stage, women synthesize feminist perspectives with their own views and experiences. Finally, women become activists on behalf of women’s issues. Recent research has pointed out that this model is based more on attitudes than on developing a feminist identity ( Zucker and Bay-Cheng 2010 ). In addition, scholars have pointed out that because feminism is now diffusely spread throughout our culture, contemporary young women may be classified in the (fourth) synthesis stage without moving through previous stages ( Erchull et al. 2009 ; Liss, Crawford, and Popp 2004 ). Other criticisms are that the model does not address diversity in social location, variability of the historical period (Moradi, Subich, and Phillips 2002), or how feminist identification can change over the life course ( Hansen 2002 ). These debates suggest the importance of distinguishing between feminist consciousness and identity: although women may be aware of, and object to, gender inequalities, they may not take on a feminist identity per se.

Scholarship suggests that there are two primary reasons that women exhibit feminist consciousness but reject a feminist identity. Historically, women of color, working-class women, and lesbians were excluded from the second wave women’s movement and have argued at times that the movement does not address their concerns (e.g., Collins 1991 ; Davis 1999 ; Ferree and Hess 1994 ; hooks 1981 ; Reger 2012 ). As a result, some activists, especially women of color and working-class women, have critiqued feminism and have rejected a feminist identity while still exhibiting feminist consciousness. Second, research suggests that contemporary young women often exhibit an awareness of inequalities while rejecting a feminist identity (e.g., Aronson 2003 ; Henderson-King and Stewart 1994 ; Morgan 1995 ; Percy and Kremer 1995 ; Renzetti 1987 ; Rupp 1988; Stacey 1991 ). Both of these issues will be considered in turn.

Critiques of Feminism

Historically, some women of color, working-class women, and lesbians have critiqued the feminist movement for exclusion. For example, women of color have not been “full participants in white feminist organizations,” despite these organizations’ claims that their concerns are universal to all women ( Collins 1991 , 7). The second wave women’s movement has also been criticized for homophobia and heterosexism ( Reger 2012 ). In 1969, Friedan called the presence of lesbians in NOW the “lavender menace,” as she thought that their presence would hurt the public perception of the women’s movement ( Davis 1999 ). The contemporary feminist movement has attempted to expand its base to include previously marginalized groups ( Reger 2012 ). However, historically exclusionary practices have resulted in some second wave and contemporary women exhibiting feminist consciousness but rejecting feminist identity.

In addition, women of color and working-class women have argued that the feminist movement, especially during the second wave, was not relevant to their concerns. Critiques of the mainstream women’s movement led to the creation of alternative organizations and parallel movements, such as those that focused on issues that affected poor women or women of color. For example, while White women often focused on the issue of paid employment, African American women were often more concerned about single parenthood as a gendered issue ( Ferree and Hess 1994 ). As hooks (1981) points out, while middle-class White feminists looked to meaningful paid employment for liberation, African-American women had a long history of labor force participation centered on exploitation. Although women of color and working-class women were represented in the second wave leadership, others were concerned with “a struggle for daily existence” that made feminist activism less likely ( Ferree and Hess 1994 : 93). Studies suggest that consciousness differs among White and African American women, and an awareness of gender barriers is more likely to translate into a commitment to feminist activism in the case of the former but not the latter ( Hraba and Yarbrough 1983 ). As a result, many women moved away from a feminist identity despite exhibiting a feminist consciousness.

In fact, Walker (1983) developed the term “womanist” to represent the broader perspective of women of color. Although one definition of womanist is “feminist of color,” Walker (1983) also stated that “womanist is to feminist as purple is to lavender.” In this statement, Walker simultaneously supported feminism while offering a critique that feminism is too narrow to encompass the concerns of women of color. Boisnier’s recent (2003) study suggests that White women are more likely to embrace a feminist identity than African-American women, who are more likely to develop a “womanist” identity that emphasizes an appreciation of women’s culture, power, and roles.

As a result of the lack of relevance of second wave movement goals, some activists engaged in activism that centered not only on gender, but also on racial and class issues (e.g., Hurtado 1998 ; Marbley 2005 ; Nadasen 2002 ; Naples 2005 ; Simien and Clawson 2004 ; Springer 2002 ; Thompson 2002 ). Thompson (2002 : 341) points out that multiracial feminists were actively confronting sexism, yet often rejected single-issue organizations and did not always embrace the identity “ ‘feminist’ because of its association with hegemonic feminism.” Similarly, working-class women may avoid the feminist label because of the narrow goals of the women’s movement while at the same time having a “strongly politicized gender consciousness” ( Ferree and Hess 1994 : 98; see also Naples 2005 ). Although poor women of color were active in organizations that connected race, class, and gender, such as the National Welfare Rights Movement, their activism was often not included as a part of the history of the women’s movement ( Naples 2005 ). The same can be said for Black women’s movement organizations in the 1950s, which exhibited “feminist values, practices, and outcomes” despite not claiming to be feminist organizations ( Barnett 1995 : 202). Thus, this activism often expresses feminist consciousness while rejecting feminist identity.

Going a step further, some research has pointed out that there are obstacles to the development of a feminist consciousness among women of color. As a result of racial segregation and economic exploitation, women of color may emphasize racial and class oppression over gender oppression ( Chow 1987 ); that is, for women of color, racial consciousness might be more salient and politicized than feminist consciousness ( Hunter and Sellers 1998 ). For example, for Asian-American women, the obstacles to feminist consciousness development include their ethnic diversity, foreign-born status, focus on economic survival, and racism, as well as cultural values and socialization that may predispose them to accept female devaluation ( Chow 1987 ).

In sum, exclusion in the second wave women’s movement led some women to exhibit feminist consciousness without embracing a feminist identity. In addition, the narrow focus on gender issues during this period led some activists to reject feminism in favor of organizations that addressed racial and class issues as well. Recent scholarship has documented the role of parallel organizations, where working-class women and women of color often engaged in activism that was not explicitly feminist but supported feminist goals (e.g., Marbley 2005 ; Nadasen 2002 ; Naples 2005 ; Thompson 2002 ). Viewing the attitudes, behavior, and identities of these activists in terms of feminist consciousness helps to account for those who reject a feminist label while still exhibiting an awareness of gender inequalities and patriarchy.

Rejection or Fear of the “F Word”

While some women reject a feminist identity because of exclusion or lack of relevance of feminist goals to their own lives, others reject a feminist identity because the historical period discourages its acceptance. The women’s movement is located within a broader cycle of protest (including other social movements and past women’s movements) and movement stage, which may contribute to, or discourage, activism, consciousness, and identity development (e.g., Schneider 1988 ; Tarrow 1989 ; Taylor 1989 ). Scholars have drawn on the political generations model ( Mannheim 1952 ) to explore how a generation (or even “micro-cohort;” Whittier 1995 ) develops a common worldview, consciousness, and identity based on the particular historical period in which they come of age. In this model, each political generation experiences its most formative developmental period during youth or young adulthood ( Stewart 1994 ), and coming of age during “off” times is less likely to result in feminist identification ( Peltola, Milkie, and Presser 2004 ). The political generations model suggests that coming of age in a time without an active, vibrant feminist movement discouraged feminist identities from developing. Feminist identification was more common for the second wave generation than either older or younger women ( Schnittker, Freese, and Powell 2003 ).

It is often only with the presence of an active social movement that women come to see themselves as feminists. For example, elsewhere ( Aronson 2000 : 86), I quote an interviewee who was active in a traditional women’s organization (the League of Women Voters) in the early 1950s, before the second wave women’s movement made viable the possible identity of “feminist”: “I was always a feminist but didn’t know it. I was raised by feminists. They didn’t know it either.” It is only through the lens of the second wave women’s movement that this woman comes to reinterpret her identity as “feminist.” Thus, the social and political context is important in understanding why some women are able to see their identities reflected in feminism while others do not. In fact, historical changes in the women’s movement have led to generational differences in feminist consciousness and identity. For example, in the “post-feminist” era, the term “feminism” is associated with negative stereotypes, and young women are ambivalent about embracing a “feminist” identity ( Aronson 2003 ; Henderson-King and Stewart 1994 ; Morgan 1995 ; Percy and Kremer 1995 ; Renzetti 1987 ; Rupp 1988; Stacey 1991 ).

However, some research suggests that many young women do exhibit at least a partial feminist consciousness, as they express an awareness of gender inequalities and discrimination, even as they qualify how they view feminism ( Aronson 2003 ). Researchers have found a continuum of feminist identification ( Kamen 1991 ; Sigel 1996 ; Taylor 1996 ), with more positive views of feminism among young women expressed by those with more privileged racial and class backgrounds (especially those who had taken women’s studies courses; Aronson 2003 ; Stake 2007 ). For example, one interviewee in my study of young women illustrated an “I am a feminist, but” perspective when she said, “I consider myself a feminist, definitely. I consider myself a strong feminist, but I’m not someone who is always needing to assert it” ( Aronson 2003 : 915). In general, women distanced themselves from the identity “feminist” because they negatively associated it with activism, lesbianism, and/or a rejection of men ( Aronson 2003 ). This qualified feminist identification suggests that feminist consciousness is distinct from feminist identity, which may be embraced only reluctantly. Similarly, “fence sitters” on the issue of feminism often recognize inequalities while at the same time refusing to classify themselves in relation to a feminist identity ( Aronson 2003 ). For example, one interviewee in my study did not call herself a feminist (as she put it, “I would still be reserved about some things”; Aronson 2003 : 917), while simultaneously expressing a feminist consciousness in her concern about violence against women, gendered stereotypes, equal pay, and sexual harassment. Although these approaches do not fully embrace a feminist identity, they do represent feminist consciousness in their awareness of inequalities and patriarchy.

Further suggesting the value of seeing gender consciousness, feminist consciousness, and feminist identity on a continuum, the now-classic “I’m not a feminist, but” approach of many contemporary young women lies closer toward gender consciousness on the continuum. Typically, these women reject a feminist identity while expressing at least a partial feminist consciousness. Zucker (2004) calls these women “egalitarians” and found that their levels of feminist consciousness lay somewhere between feminists and non-feminists. For example, the following quote from an interviewee illustrates this approach: “I’m not a feminist, I would say. Probably a lot of feminists wouldn’t like me. But, well, I mean I guess it depends on what feminism…. I think everybody should be treated equally at the base” ( Aronson 2003 : 915). Although distancing from the identity “feminist,” which they see in terms of activists or women who dislike men, these young women often accept basic principles of equality ( Aronson 2003 ). This perspective may represent a “reframing” of the label “feminist” ( Olson et al. 2008 ). However, Zucker and Bay-Cheng (2010) caution us to distinguish partial feminist perspectives from other “non-labelers,” as non-labelers were similar to non-feminists in their acceptance of inequalities and support for a neoliberal ideology emphasizing personal responsibility and self-determination.

Further complicating this picture, feminist consciousness has been influenced by the simultaneous diffusion and depoliticization of feminism. Despite ambivalence about the term “feminism,” themes of women’s independence and self-development have infused nearly every aspect of our culture (Stacy 1991). As a result of the way that feminism has become diffused into our cultural norms, it is paradoxically “everywhere and nowhere”: feminism has profoundly influenced women’s lives while simultaneously appearing to be apolitical ( Reger 2012 ). The “semiconscious” (Stacy 1991) and “unconscious” ( Reger 2012 ) adoption of feminist ideologies impacts women’s lives. In fact, young women are “living feminism” by incorporating feminist ideologies and attitudes in their life course plans and expectations ( Aronson 2008 ); that is, women conceptualize their future lives in ways that defy traditional gender expectations ( Gerson 2010 ), such as expecting to have fulfilling jobs and supporting themselves financially ( Aronson 2008 ). Feminism, in this context, is lived through women’s everyday experiences, rather than being an ideology that one either embraces or rejects. These perspectives may sometimes approach explicit consciousness, although they may remain unconscious as well.

In sum, some women exhibit a feminist consciousness without embracing a feminist identity. These women critique patriarchy and gender inequalities, but do not ultimately define themselves as feminists. These women differ from those who embrace a feminist identity in that they do not take on a collective identity that articulates an alternative vision to inequality. These women may be active in other social movements, or they may simply express a feminist consciousness. If they are activists, these women typically reject a feminist identity because they feel more aligned with another social movement. If they are not activists, they often are ambivalent about the identity “feminist” while simultaneously embracing and enacting feminist principles. The latter group is not linked to a larger social movement or community, but is instead operating in a more individualized, and perhaps less goal-oriented, way than those who identify as feminists. Thus, although they express a feminist consciousness, they do not connect it to a larger social movement.

It is tempting to erase these perspectives as unfeminist. However, Enke (2007 : 5, 4) points out that the second wave women’s movement “regularly exceeded its own self-definition,” as it “took place outside and alongside as well as within the institutions and actors bearing the name ‘feminist.’ ” Whether resulting from the importance of other social movement identities or the result of the diffusion of feminism, feminist consciousness without a feminist identity can still advance the cause of feminism.

The Development of Feminist Identities

At the other side of the continuum from gender consciousness lies feminist identity. Taking on feminist identities includes not only an awareness and critique of gender inequalities, but also an alternative vision for gender relations. Women who take on feminist identities define themselves in relation to an articulated social movement agenda and an existing collective identity. Feminist identity is a predictor to activism ( Zucker 2004 ), although it can be present without activism. In fact, feminists exhibit higher levels of activism on women’s issues than both non-feminists and those who embrace feminist attitudes but not a feminist identity ( Yoder, Tobias, and Snell 2011 ; Zucker 2004 ). Feminists are also more likely to believe in collective action ( Liss, O’Connor, Morosky, and Crawford 2001 ).

National polls between 1989 and 1999 revealed that between one-quarter and one-third of women embraced a feminist identity ( Huddy, Neely, and Lafay 2000 ). With the vast majority of women supporting gender equality and feminist goals, such as equal pay, there is a large gap between feminist attitudes and identities ( Huddy, Neely, and Lafay 2000 ). This finding provides further evidence about the importance of viewing consciousness and identity on a continuum. More recent polls suggest that 23% of women identify as feminists ( Swanson 2013 ). To put this in perspective, although these figures are always in flux, 25% of Americans identify as Republicans and 36% identify as Democrats (Jones 2013; see also Ferree and Hess 1994 ).

Previous studies have found that ideological predispositions (that is, basic values and beliefs; Reingold and Foust 1998 ), meso-level organizational dynamics (such as geographic location and membership diversity; Reger 2002 ), increases in women’s education levels and labor force participation, social networks, and changes in family life often promote the development of a feminist identity ( Ferree and Hess 1994 ; Klein 1984 ; Taylor, Whittier, and Pelak 2007 ). Family environments when one is growing up, especially those that emphasize gender equality ( Aronson 2003 ; Reger 2012 ; Wolff and Munley 2012 ), or having a feminist mother ( Liss, Crawford, and Popp 2004 ), are important precursors to a feminist identity. Feminist self-labeling is also more likely when one has experienced gender discrimination ( Liss, Crawford, and Popp 2004 ). Research shows that consciousness is more likely to lead to activism when one has past activism, high efficacy, and personal resources, such as education, time, money, and links with existing organizations ( Ferree and Hess 1994 ; McGuire, Stewart, and Curtin 2010 ).

It is important to note that feminist identities are not monolithic; they differ based on such factors as age or generation, and ethnic, racial, or class background. In addition, feminist identities may be complex, ambiguous, and contested: there is no uniform definition of “feminism” or single way to be a “feminist.” Feminist identities have also changed over time, and have meant different things to different groups. For example, during the second wave, liberal feminists emphasized women’s rights in national hierarchical organizations, while radical feminists were active in decentralized networks focusing on the transformation of patriarchal structures ( Evans 1979 ; Freeman 1975 ).

As previously discussed, age or political generation play a role in feminist identification. However, although the political generations model is useful, it does not explain all aspects of feminist identification. First, feminism has been a historically contested identity, including during the height of the women’s movement. As Henry (2004) argues, cohesive generational perspectives have always been overstated. Second, transformations that lead to a feminist identity can take place at later times in the life course, particularly when “turning points” ( Strauss 1959 ) in individuals’ lives, such as divorce or experiences with discrimination, intersect with a rapidly changing social context ( Aronson 2000 ). As Rupp (2001) explains, considering women’s movements more broadly than just the contemporary period, it was often middle-aged women, rather than young women, who took up feminist causes. This activism may emerge later in the life course because older women are more likely to have experienced discrimination ( Rupp 2001 ). They are also more likely to possess important resources, such as time and money ( Rupp 2001 ). Additionally, the political generations approach does not account for the development or maintenance of feminist identity during periods of women’s movement “abeyance” ( Rupp 2001 ; Taylor 1989 ), an issue that has become especially important when considering contemporary feminist activism (e.g., Reger 2005 , 2012 ). As Whittier (1995) documents, although a generational divide emerged in the radical women’s movement during the 1980s and 1990s, feminists from the 1960s and 1970s helped to sustain the movement over time.

Although some women of color and working-class women reject a feminist identity, seeing it as less relevant than other oppressions, racial or class oppression may also contribute to the development of a feminist identity. Prior studies suggest that both male and female African Americans are more likely than Whites to support feminist positions, to have egalitarian gender role attitudes, and to engage in collective action ( Hunter and Sellers 1998 ). Simien and Clawson (2004 : 793) found that in Black feminist consciousness, which recognizes the “simultaneity of oppression,” gender and racial consciousness may reinforce each other. Although they also exhibited complex and nuanced definitions of feminism, Manago et al. (2009) suggest that two-thirds of Latina adolescents who define feminism in terms of equality and female empowerment endorsed a feminist identity.

Feminism may have different meanings to those from different social locations. As a result of a “matrix of domination” in which gender, race, ethnicity, class, and sexuality are interlocking systems of oppression ( Collins 1991 ), women with different backgrounds may develop varying types of feminist identity (see also Mueller 1995 ). For women of color, feminism often involves “negotiating multiple worlds” and identities ( Hernandez and Rehman 2002 : xiii). Likewise, feminist activists may develop different feminist identities as a result of their social class backgrounds ( Reger 2002 ).

Scholars have found that the feminist identities of women of color have taken a variety of forms (e.g., such as challenging stereotypes; Oesterreich 2007 ; Rapp et al. 2010 ). Springer (2005) found that Black women during the second wave movement were active in a range of Black feminist organizations that focused on eliminating both sexism and racism. In doing so, these women “broadened the scope of the women’s movement” to concern racial and class issues alongside gender issues ( Springer 2005 : 3). Likewise, Roth (2003) argues that feminists of color viewed themselves as belonging to a different social movement, as they identified with organizations that were outside of White, mainstream feminism. As Roth (2003) points out, the identity “feminist” does not require that gender is viewed as the sole form of oppression, but can include as its basis women who are also oppressed in their racial and class backgrounds. The intersectional nature of gender, race, class, and sexuality is a key feature of mutracial feminism ( Zinn and Dill 1996 ) and Third World feminism ( Mohanty 2002 ). Thus, feminists of color have argued that their feminist identities are intertwined with their racial identities, and sometimes sexual orientation ( Anzaldua 1987 ; Combahee River Collective 1979 ; Lorde 1984 ).

Lesbian feminist consciousness, while not monolithic, often connects sexuality with a feminist identity and views sexism and heterosexism as linked ( Taylor and Whittier 1992 ; Valk 2002 ; Whittier 1995 ). Lesbianism has been viewed as a means of subverting patriarchy and its “collective oppositional consciousness … emphasizes personal, social, and political change” ( Taylor and Whittier 1992 : 109; see also Echols 1989 and Whittier 1995 ). Despite tensions over sexuality, Enke (2007) argues that lesbianism was formative for the feminist movement in the 1960s and 1970s. Over time, lesbian issues have become increasingly central to definitions of feminist identities for some movement activists ( Whittier 1995 ). Reger’s (2012) study found that contemporary feminism in some communities emphasizes the connection between lesbianism and feminism, while other communities focus on the deconstruction of gender and the fluidity of sexuality. While studies provide support for the interconnections between lesbianism and feminist identity ( Friedman and Ayres 2013 ), these connections may be complicated by race, as some lesbians of color reject a feminist identity and work instead to develop their own communities ( Moore 2006 ; see also Tijerina-Revilla 2009 ).

Scholars have been documenting the existence of a “third wave” of the women’s movement, although debates exist about what to call this activism (Reger 2005 , 2012 ). From activists who seek to represent a diversity of young women’s experiences ( Walker 1995 ), to the Riot Grrrl movement in music ( Rosenberg and Garofalo 1998 ; Wald 1998), to menstrual product activists ( Bobel 2006 ), third wave feminism explicitly embraces hybridity, contradiction, and multiple identities ( Heywood and Drake 1997 ). Embracing hybridity draws on the tradition of Black feminism and the need to recognize intersectionality ( Collins 1991 ). In addition, outlining movement goals that are institutional (e.g., reproductive rights), cultural, and personal (e.g., freedom in making life choices; Baumgardner and Richards 2000 ), this approach sees “the everyday” as “the site of feminist activism” ( Reger 2005 : xx). Although typically focused on the cultural arena, contemporary feminist identity takes multiple forms, varies by community context, and is sometimes submerged into other social movements and issues ( Reger 2012 ). In a context in which feminism is culturally diffuse, coming to identify as a feminist may occur during “a process of gradual, and sometimes unconscious, transformation” rather than a dramatic realization of consciousness-raising “clicks” ( Reger 2012 : 56).

Thus, feminist identities represent one end of a consciousness continuum, where someone is not only aware of gender inequalities but actively embraces an identity that articulates an alternative vision to those inequalities. Still, feminist identities are diverse, complex, and ambiguous. Those who identify as feminists in the contemporary period do so in a context that recognizes and celebrates diversity in feminist identity.

Conclusions and Directions for Future Research

This chapter has argued that gender consciousness, feminist consciousness, and feminist identity lie on a continuum. While gender consciousness is an awareness of women’s social and political interests as women, feminist consciousness recognizes the existence of inequalities and patriarchy. These types of consciousness take a variety of forms. The two are similar in their rejection of feminist identity, whether because of the importance of other more salient identities or because of a fear of the label “feminist.” Scholars of women’s activism should recognize that the strategies and tactics used by a social movement may not always correspond with activists’ identities or awareness of women’s political and social interests as women. Feminist identity lies at the other side of the continuum from gender consciousness and is not undertaken by everyone who expresses feminist consciousness. Embracing a feminist identity means seeing oneself in relation to a larger social movement that articulates an alternative to gender inequalities. It involves aligning oneself with a collective identity, a “we,” although these identities take many forms. It often, but not always, includes activism. The complexity of these terms and the ambiguity of women’s self-definitions mean that future researchers should take care when defining and differentiating between consciousness and identity. Conceptualizing these perspectives on a continuum helps to clarify how these terms are different and yet related to each other.

Future research should continue to investigate the processes that facilitate the development of gender consciousness, feminist consciousness, and feminist identities, as well as how they overlap and differ from each other. In particular, while gender consciousness is based on organizing on the basis of similarities, contemporary feminism is often based on organizing on the basis of differences and intersectionality. Insights into how social movements build momentum on the basis of similarity or differences will be important going forward. For example, we need more research on how feminist consciousness develops in conjunction with other types of consciousness. Similarly, previous studies have found that the institutionalization of the women’s movement via women’s and gender studies programs contributes toward moving a semiconscious feminist identity to a conscious one ( Aronson 2003 ; Reger 2012 ), yet we know little about the conditions under which this process occurs among those who are not college educated. Furthermore, more research is needed on the relationship between consciousness and activism, especially the conditions under which consciousness leads to different types of activism. These important, yet complex, issues are vital for understanding the contours of women’s activism today.

I would like to thank the following people for providing insights and challenging my thinking on this topic: Ronald Aronson, Georgina Hickey, Carolyn Kraus, Maureen Linker, Jo Reger, Patricia Smith, and Jacqueline Vansant.

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Essay on Feminism

500 words essay on feminism.

Feminism is a social and political movement that advocates for the rights of women on the grounds of equality of sexes. It does not deny the biological differences between the sexes but demands equality in opportunities. It covers everything from social and political to economic arenas. In fact, feminist campaigns have been a crucial part of history in women empowerment. The feminist campaigns of the twentieth century made the right to vote, public property, work and education possible. Thus, an essay on feminism will discuss its importance and impact.

Importance of Feminism

Feminism is not just important for women but for every sex, gender, caste, creed and more. It empowers the people and society as a whole. A very common misconception is that only women can be feminists.

It is absolutely wrong but feminism does not just benefit women. It strives for equality of the sexes, not the superiority of women. Feminism takes the gender roles which have been around for many years and tries to deconstruct them.

This allows people to live freely and empower lives without getting tied down by traditional restrictions. In other words, it benefits women as well as men. For instance, while it advocates that women must be free to earn it also advocates that why should men be the sole breadwinner of the family? It tries to give freedom to all.

Most importantly, it is essential for young people to get involved in the feminist movement. This way, we can achieve faster results. It is no less than a dream to live in a world full of equality.

Thus, we must all look at our own cultures and communities for making this dream a reality. We have not yet reached the result but we are on the journey, so we must continue on this mission to achieve successful results.

Impact of Feminism

Feminism has had a life-changing impact on everyone, especially women. If we look at history, we see that it is what gave women the right to vote. It was no small feat but was achieved successfully by women.

Further, if we look at modern feminism, we see how feminism involves in life-altering campaigns. For instance, campaigns that support the abortion of unwanted pregnancy and reproductive rights allow women to have freedom of choice.

Moreover, feminism constantly questions patriarchy and strives to renounce gender roles. It allows men to be whoever they wish to be without getting judged. It is not taboo for men to cry anymore because they must be allowed to express themselves freely.

Similarly, it also helps the LGBTQ community greatly as it advocates for their right too. Feminism gives a place for everyone and it is best to practice intersectional feminism to understand everyone’s struggle.

Get the huge list of more than 500 Essay Topics and Ideas

Conclusion of the Essay on Feminism

The key message of feminism must be to highlight the choice in bringing personal meaning to feminism. It is to recognize other’s right for doing the same thing. The sad part is that despite feminism being a strong movement, there are still parts of the world where inequality and exploitation of women take places. Thus, we must all try to practice intersectional feminism.

FAQ of Essay on Feminism

Question 1: What are feminist beliefs?

Answer 1: Feminist beliefs are the desire for equality between the sexes. It is the belief that men and women must have equal rights and opportunities. Thus, it covers everything from social and political to economic equality.

Question 2: What started feminism?

Answer 2: The first wave of feminism occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It emerged out of an environment of urban industrialism and liberal, socialist politics. This wave aimed to open up new doors for women with a focus on suffrage.

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Writing an article for ‘Research Made Simple’ on feminist research may at first appear slightly oxymoronic, given that there is no agreed definition of feminist research, let alone a single definition of feminism. The literature that examines the historical and philosophical roots of feminism(s) and feminist research is vast, extends over several decades and reaches across an expanse of varying disciplines. Trying to navigate the literature can be daunting and may, at first, appear impenetrable to those new to feminist research.

There is no ‘How To’ in feminist research. Although feminists tend to share the same common goals, their interests, values and perspectives can be quite disparate. Depending on the philosophical position they hold, feminist researchers will draw on differing epistemologies (ways of knowing), ask different questions, be guided by different methodologies and employ different methods. Within the confines of space, this article will briefly outline some of the principles of feminist research. It will then turn to discuss three established epistemologies that can guide feminist research (although there are many others): feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint and feminist postmodernism.

What makes feminist research feminist?

Feminist research is grounded in a commitment to equality and social justice, and is cognisant of the gendered, historical and political processes involved in the production of knowledge. 1 It also strives to explore and illuminate the diversity of the experiences of women and other marginalised groups, thereby creating opportunities that increase awareness of how social hierarchies impact on and influence oppression. 2 Commenting on the differentiation between feminist and non-feminist research, Skeggs asserts that ‘feminist research begins from the premise that the nature of reality in western society is unequal and hierarchical’ Skeggs 3 p77; therefore, feminist research may also be viewed as having both academic and political concerns.

Reflexivity

The practice of reflexivity is considered a hallmark of feminist research. It invites the researcher to engage in a ‘disciplined self-reflection’ Wilkinson 9 p93. This includes consideration of the extent to which their research fulfils feminist principles. Reflexivity can be divided into three discrete forms: personal, functional and disciplinary. 9 Personal reflexivity invites the researcher to contemplate their role in the research and construction of knowledge by examining the ways in which their own values, beliefs, interests, emotions, biography and social location, have influenced the research process and the outcomes (personal reflexivity). 10 By stating their position rather than concealing it, feminist researchers use reflexivity to add context to their claims. Functional reflexivity pays attention to the influence that the chosen research tools and processes may have had on the research. Disciplinary reflexivity is about analysing the influence of approaching a topic from a specific disciplinary field.

Feminist empiricism

Feminist empiricism is underpinned by foundationalist principles that believes in a single true social reality with truth existing entirely independent of the knower (researcher). 8 Building on the premise that feminist researchers pay attention to how methods are used, feminist empiricist researchers set out to use androcentric positivist scientific methods ‘more appropriately’. 8 They argue that feminist principles can legitimately be applied to empirical inquiry if the masculine bias inherent in scientific research is removed. This is achieved through application of rigorous, objective, value-free scientific methods. Methods used include experimental, quasi-experimental and survey. Feminist empiricists employ traditional positivist methodology while being cognisant of the sex and gender biases. What makes the research endeavour feminist is the attentiveness in identifying potential sources of gendered bias. 11

Feminist standpoint

In a similar way to feminist empiricism, standpoint feminism—also known as ‘women’s experience epistemology’ Letherby 8 p44—holds firm the position that traditional science is androcentric and is therefore bad science. This is predicated on the belief that traditional science only produces masculine forms of knowledge thus excluding women’s perspectives and experiences. Feminist standpoint epistemology takes issue with the masculinised definition of women’s experience and argue it holds little relevance for women. Feminist standpoint epistemology therefore operates on the assumption that knowledge emanates from social position and foregrounds the voices of women and their experiences of oppression to generate knowledge about their lives that would otherwise have remained hidden. 12 Feminist standpoint epistemology maintains that women, as the oppressed or disadvantaged, may have an epistemological advantage over the dominant groups by virtue of their ability to understand their own experience and struggles against oppression, while also by being attuned to the experience and culture of their oppressors. 11 This gives women’s experience a valid basis for knowledge production that both reflects women’s oppression and resistance. 13

Feminist standpoint epistemology works on the premise that there is no single reality, 11 thus disrupting the empiricist notion that research must be objective and value-free. 12 To shed light on the experiences of the oppressed, feminist standpoint researchers use both quantitative and qualitative approaches to see the world through the eyes of their research participants and understand how their positions shape their experiences within the social world. In addition, the researchers are expected to engage in strong reflexivity and reflect on, and acknowledge in their writing, how their own attributes and social location may impact on interpretation of their data. 14

Feminist postmodernism

Feminist postmodernism is a branch of feminism that embraces feminist and postmodernist thought. Feminist postmodernists reject the notion of an objective truth and a single reality. They maintain that truths are relative, multiple, and dependent on social contexts. 15 The theory is marked by the rejection of the feminist ideology that seeks a single explanation for oppression of women. Feminist postmodernists argue that women experience oppression because of social and political marginalisation rather than their biological difference to men, concluding that gender is a social construct. 16

Feminist postmodernists eschew phallogocentric masculine thought (expressed through words and language) that leads to by binary opposition. They are particularly concerned with the man/woman dyad, but also other binary oppositions of race, gender and class. 17 Feminist postmodernist scholars believe that knowledge is constructed by language and that language gives meaning to everything—it does not portray reality, rather it constructs it. 11 A key feature of feminist postmodernist research is the attempt to deconstruct the binary opposition through reflecting on existing assumptions, questioning how ways of thinking have been socially constructed and challenging the taken-for-granted. 17

This article has provided a brief overview of feminist research. It should be considered more of a taster that introduces readers to the complex but fascinating world of feminist research. Readers who have developed an appetite for a more comprehensive examination are guided to a useful and accessible text on feminist theories and concepts in healthcare written by Kay Aranda. 1

Western D ,
Giacomini M
Margaret Fonow M ,
Wilkinson S
Campbell R ,
Wigginton B ,
Lafrance MN
Naples NA ,
Hesse-Biber S

Funding The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

Competing interests None declared.

Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; internally peer reviewed.

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Feminist Perspectives on Argumentation

The noun “argument” and verb “to argue” can describe various things in ordinary language and in different academic disciplines (O’Keefe 1982; Wenzel 1980 [1992]). “Argument” may identify a logical premise-conclusion complex, a speech act, or a dialogical exchange. Arguments may play off other arguments or support each other; smaller arguments can serve as sub-arguments inside larger arguments to which they contribute. Following the practice of Anglophone philosophers, this entry uses the term “argument” only to indicate a premise-conclusion complex that may involve sub-arguments. “Argumentation” also includes the larger context belonging to the activity of “arguing”, understood as the offering of reasons.

Feminist philosophical work on argumentation takes a number of different directions. Some feminists note a general association of arguing with aggression, competition, and masculinity, and they question the necessity of these connections. Also, because many view arguing as a central method of philosophical reasoning, if arguing involves gendered assumptions and standards then that would pose special problems for the discipline. In particular, the goal of winning might get in the way of the other purposes for arguing. So, some feminists ask: Can allegedly “feminine” modes of arguing provide an alternative or supplement to allegedly “masculine” modes? Can overarching epistemological standards account for the benefits of different approaches to arguing? These are some of the prospects for argumentation inside and outside of philosophy that feminists consider.

Some feminists charge, moreover, that the academic study of argumentation—by philosophers and other scholars—has failed to account for the type of reasoning required to provide social justice. Ordinary politeness or even a more robust conception of civility can be inadequate to counteract the influence on argumentation of inequalities based on social identity. What resources can informal logic and interdisciplinary argumentation studies provide to help arguing practices avoid the reinforcement of social injustices? Are informal logic and the study of rhetoric any more helpful than deductive logic? Feminist scholars suggest certain strategies for reasoning and for argument pedagogy, especially looking at ways to address the personal nature that arguing often has.

Other feminists find problems with argumentation standards fairly specific to the discipline of philosophy. It emerges that philosophers often invoke claims about arguments and arguing contrary to accepted argumentation scholarship. Feminists especially note this problem in the way that philosophers employ fallacy labels and how they teach argument in critical thinking courses. Even though argumentation scholarship stands in need of further feminist development, it provides some resources to help philosophy better address social justice concerns.

1.1 Metaphors and norms of masculine aggression

1.2 the adversary paradigm and the discipline of philosophy, 2.1 gendered reasoning, 2.2 caring and coalescent argumentation, 2.3 knowledge and criticism, 2.4 politeness and civility, 3.1 formal logic, 3.2 rhetorical approaches and power differences, 4. credibility and argumentative injustice, 5. the fallacies approach to argument evaluation, 6. critical thinking and argument pedagogy, 7. feminism, the discipline of philosophy, and argumentation scholarship, other internet resources, related entries, 1. arguing to win.

Theories about arguing generally assume that arguers disagree, and sometimes arguing operates as a type of battle among ideas that may be preferred over physical combat among people. Adversarial orientation among people arguing may, however, marginalize women’s patterns of communication and discount social norms of “femininity” (that regularly attach to women and girls but vary across time and culture). The connection between “masculinity” (understood also as a social norm, ideal, or role) and adversarial processes for reasoning may be heightened and even become stylized as a disciplinary method in contemporary Euro-American philosophy (Moulton 1983; Burrow 2010; Rooney 2010; Alcoff 2013). [ 1 ] When reasoners treat arguing as a contest, each aiming to win by defeating the other’s claim, it can become “eristic”, which is to say that the goal of winning takes over from other purposes that arguing serves. In the same way as adversarial reasoning and eristics, other discursive norms can complicate the ways that women may be marginalized and marginalize other groups of people, including men. Little attention has been given in Euro-American philosophy to the gendered dimensions of arguing in other cultures. However, feminists regularly suggest that where adversarial arguing dominates, non-dominant styles of reasoning can provide productive alternatives or complements to it, and this often involves styles gendered as “feminine”.

Some feminist philosophers suggest that an aggressive culture associated with masculinity poorly serves processes of reasoning and hinders the discipline of philosophy insofar as it sidelines, downgrades, and even excludes people’s non-adversarial engagement with each other and with each other’s reasoning. Evidence for this problem emerges in various places, beginning with the prevalence of military and aggressive language to describe philosophical discourse and rational arguing more generally (Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Ayim 1988; Cohen 1995).

Janice Moulton (1983) argues that a particular style she calls “the Adversary Method” dominates the discipline of philosophy, and this goes beyond a set of attitudes or styles of interaction to include prioritizing a particular discursive logic. Further evidence for Moulton’s characterization of disciplinary practices in philosophy comes from Phyllis Rooney (2012) and Catherine Hundleby (2010).

The metaphor of argument-as-war provides a central example for George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s landmark book, Metaphors We Live By (1980). War can operate as “structural metaphor” for arguing:

Though there is no physical battle, there is a verbal battle, and the structure of an argument—attack, defense, counterattack, etc.—reflects this. (1980: 4)

Without that structure, Lakoff and Johnson suggest that we could not even recognize a piece of discourse as an argument.

Moulton (1983) observes that prioritizing aggression in the practice of arguing and the association of aggression with certain forms of masculinity is problematic. If people assume that success requires aggression, then discussants must appear aggressive in order to appear competent at arguing. Not only may the assumption be false, but it may entail a distinct disadvantage for women. Cultures that treat aggression as a natural quality in men encourage and advantage men in eristic modes of engagement. When success demands aggression, contributions to an exchange of reasons made in other styles—including those that read as feminine—will not measure up; and they may not even be noticed. At the same time, a woman can seem to be aggressive merely by asserting her own viewpoint or by showing competence in some other fashion. She may tend to stand out in many contexts as behaving inappropriately, even as her actions become acknowledged, because of her feminine social identity (Moulton 1983: 150; Rancer & Stewart 1985; Hample et al. 2005; Kukla 2014; Olberding 2014).

Moulton calls attention to ways in which philosophical approaches to arguing and reasoning in Euro-American culture take on a pronounced adversarial dynamic that reflects aggressive expectations. Her concern about the discipline and about models for argumentation is shared by many feminist philosophers (Ayim 1988; Burrow 2010; Gilbert 1994, 1997; Hundleby 2010, 2013b, Rooney 2003, 2010) and some who are not specifically feminist (Cohen 1995). Maryann Ayim observes that a culture of hostility can be viewed in the militaristic, violent, subjugating, and controlling language used to describe philosophical arguing, especially the metaphor of argument-as-war:

Philosophers tend to value their “sharper” students, whom they may openly praise for their “penetrating” insights. Occasionally they find students of “piercing” intelligence, one or two perhaps with minds like “steel traps”. Philosophers regard such students as important: They require “tough-minded” opponents with whom they can “parry” in the classroom, so they can exhibit to the others what the “thrust” of philosophical argumentation is all about. This “battle of wits” is somewhat risky, however, and a “combatant” must take care always to “have the upper hand”, to “win thumbs down”, to “avoid being hoist by your own petard”. If you find yourself pressed for time at the end of a lecture, with your “back to the wall”, or as it is occasionally even more colorfully expressed, “between a rock and a hard place”, you may have to resort to “strong arm tactics”, to “barbed” comments, to “go for the jugular”, to “cut an opponent’s argument to pieces”, or to “bring out the big guns or heavy artillery”. If caught in the throes of a real dilemma, you many even have to “take the bull by the horns” or rebut the dilemma by advancing a “counter” dilemma. (Ayim 1988: 188)

Martial metaphors and competitive evaluation foster the eristic goal of defeating others and their views (Cohen 1995), even perhaps, Ayim suggests, for instructors in regard to their students. While this attitude may seem obviously inappropriate for instructors to take with students over whom they have authority, the available range of such language suggests a general disciplinary culture that enforces aggression through conflating it with success (Moulton 1983).

Admittedly, aggressive interaction may be comfortable for many women and uncomfortable for some men, and it may be inflected with class and race biases with similarly variable effect. Yet these may be merely exceptions to the “masculine” homosocial culture of hostility that many feminists maintain prevails in philosophical arguing. Rooney argues that culture reinforces male status in the discipline and resonates with narratives of opposition against not just ideas but also against people who present them, especially women (Rooney 2010: 229). Common ideals of masculinity and rationality coincide with the association of aggression with success, power, effectiveness, and vitality; they contrast with emotion, unreason, body, sexuality, instinct, nature, and rhetoric, [ 2 ] all notions that Euro-American cultures regularly associate with femininity.

In the history of Euro-American philosophy, Rooney (2010) observes, masculine reason regularly appears in battle against feminine elements of unreason, a battle that occurs both within the knower and among aspects of thought. “Embattled reason” constantly struggles to subordinate feminine elements of unreason, and the suppression of perceived negative qualities that are gendered as “feminine” provides a central means for achieving the ideals of reason and rationality central to the discipline. That the discipline functions this way can discourage women’s participation. So, Rooney argues

that a full feminist accounting of the general cultural problem with gender, adversariality, and authority must include consideration of philosophy’s history and its lingering effects. (2010: 209, 217–219)

Otherwise the discipline may continue to perpetuate sexist standards of reason from the larger culture and its history.

Daniel Cohen (1995) suggests that antagonistic attitudes may not actually enhance competition and the knowledge it is supposed to serve, and that imposing the goal of agreement can silence rational discourse and undermine the goal of philosophy to further inquiry. The value of information that challenges our own beliefs can always be hard to recognize, a difficulty described as “confirmation bias”, and this problem can be exacerbated when the focus of arguing is winning rather than learning or ascertaining truth (Makau & Marty 2013: 39–40, 167; Linker 2015).

Norms of masculine aggression may help a particular reasoning method to dominate the discipline of philosophy, Janice Moulton argues in an early article (1983). She describes the process of competitive reasoning through deductive refutation—typically by counter-example—as the “Adversary Method”. [ 3 ] According to Moulton, the Method employs opposing views on a topic as tests for each other—the more severe the opposition, the better, and surviving the confrontation grants “objectivity” to a view. Winning at arguing in this fashion depends on defeating competing positions based on faults identified in them. Defeat of the opposite position becomes more decisive when the claims are very specific, as specificity aids deductive refutation.

Philosophy, at least in Moulton’s (1983) context of late twentieth century Anglo-American or “analytic” philosophy, may be so permeated by the combination of adversarial arguing and deductive logic that the Adversary Method operates as a disciplinary “paradigm”. Moulton argues that this “paradigm” for philosophy demands aggressive opposition to other people’s opinions, in the same way that Thomas Kuhn observed that mature scientific disciplines demand adherence to an overarching theory, an ideal, and a practice that together constitute a cultural paradigm. Philosophers’ technique of aiming to falsify each other’s claims reflects Karl Popper’s epistemology but adversarial reasoning in philosophy has taken many different forms and traces back at least to Aristotle. Descartes and Kant shifted the normative focus of the study of logic from dialogue to individual cognition, and the logic of opposition became internalized (Dutilh Novaes 2011, 2015). Yet, arguing as a dialogical form of reasoning retains the oppositional dynamic.

Moulton criticizes how the operation of the Adversary Method as a paradigm can hobble the progress of philosophical reasoning by narrowing the possibilities for discussion. Isolating claims maximizes their vulnerability and prepares them for Adversarial testing, forcing proponents to rely on ad hoc revisions, and prohibiting the systematic reconsiderations that encourage theories to evolve. For instance, ad hoc concessions “for the sake of argument” create common ground for discussion only by restricting the basis for disagreement; and so, Moulton maintains, they slow the development of philosophical thought (1983: 154–155).

Moulton (1983) argues that the narrow discourse of the Adversary Method seriously limits the relevance of philosophy to feminist concerns. She takes the example of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s classic philosophical defense of the moral permissibility of abortion that concedes a great deal (that the fetus is a full-fledged person with a right to life) to show that the right to life does not supersede the right to bodily autonomy. Moulton’s concern is that even though Thomson’s position supports feminist theoretical views, it employs reasoning so remote from the circumstances of pregnancy that it provides no guidance for people seeking to make decisions about actual abortions. Taking the purpose of arguing to be the defeat of a view limits the practical relevance of the argumentative exchange.

Moulton makes a further related point that forcing narrow theories to compete can make philosophy look quite absurd. Moral arguments are directed at egoists and epistemology is offered to skeptics. Debates over the existence of the external world and the existence of God occupy philosophers at the expense of attention to the character of the world we live in or the role of God in our religions. Philosophers rarely question the assumption that there must be a supreme moral principle, Moulton explains, because otherwise there would be little sense to making different theories compete for recognized supremacy (1983: 157–158). Losing sight of other reasons for arguing may have even resulted in the misinterpretation of key figures in the history of philosophy. Moulton suggests that interpreters often miss various purposes for which Socrates argued because they assume that his only goal was refutation (1983: 155–157). The assumption that the Adversary Method drives philosophical progress may distort philosophers’ understanding of the value of their own discipline.

The Adversary Method’s prevalence and constitution of a Kuhnian paradigm may be recognized in Rooney’s observation that philosophers tend to engage each other from a “default skeptical stance”. The skeptical stance challenges the quality of the components of another’s arguments, including the basis for premises, the support premises provide for the conclusion, and the possibility of counterexamples. The skeptical stance operates as a default without consideration of the appropriateness of the challenges for the topic under discussion. Rooney notes in particular,

skeptical argumentative responses that take necessary truths and valid arguments as the ideal poorly serve the variety of arguments and forms of argumentation that important philosophical works have presented and will continue to present. (2012: 321)

Inappropriate standards undermine the general epistemic aims of truth and understanding. They create specific problems for discussion of social justice issues which depends extensively on testimony and therefore on deft employment of the epistemology of testimony and sensitivity to the danger of testimonial injustice (see Section 4 on Credibility and argument interpretation ). The unsuitability of the Adversary Method for discussions of social justice will stall social justice projects, Rooney concludes, including those within the discipline of philosophy.

Hundleby presents as evidence for the paradigmatic operation of the Adversary Method an analysis of critical thinking textbooks in philosophy. Twenty-four textbooks of the thirty examined—four-fifths—revealed in their presentation of fallacies the norms of the Adversary Method: narrow discourse and decisive refutation. Most of these textbooks exhibiting the Adversary Paradigm have authors with no research expertise in argumentation more specific than doctoral training in philosophy, whereas the much smaller number of textbooks (six out of thirty) authored by scholars of argumentation do not show the same signs of the Adversary Method. Given this evidence that argumentation scholarship differently orients argument pedagogy, the prevalence of the Adversary Method in so many other textbooks seems to derive simply from the disciplinary culture of philosophy (Hundleby 2010).

Some empirical educational studies suggest, too, that while students learn a great deal from learning eristic practices of argument, it undermines their progress as learners by emphasizing winning over gaining understanding (Makau & Marty 2013: 13). People—including feminists—Moulton (1983) suggests, might expect more relevant advice from the discipline of philosophy. More practical philosophies addressing mundane problems also may be found outside Euro-American cultures (Olberding 2015).

2. Other Goals for and Styles of Arguing

Feminist philosophical models of arguing aim either to replace or to complement arguing practices and norms defined in terms of a contest between people or reasons. In addition to the goal of defeating an interlocutor or their reasons, arguments can serve many purposes. Explanation and explanatory argument (sometimes considered to be the same thing) already receive attention from argumentation theorists and philosophers of science. Other functions of arguing, such as educating the uninitiated or the undecided and discussing matters with like-minded people, remain neglected by theorists (Goodwin & Innocenti 2019). None of the alternatives need to take over as a new “paradigm”, but exploring various purposes, methods, and styles of arguing may help to scrutinize accepted procedures and purposes (Moulton 1983). Such questioning of methods deters their dogmatic acceptance.

According to Cohen, more important for the role of arguing in philosophy and education than to praise or condemn any particular norms of arguing may be the exploration of multiple approaches. Philosophers and arguers more generally might find means for innovation and constructive questioning in many new models and metaphors. Cohen finds that traffic metaphors seem to work especially well:

We can say that arguments are (i) conversational traffic jams—(ii) gridlock with a lot of honking and little movement; (iii) conversational traffic accidents; (iv) wrong turns, or (v) detours, or (vi) dead ends or (vii) roundabouts on the streets of discourse; or should we have said that they are (viii) short cuts to the truth at the end of the road; maybe (ix) they are long and winding roads to nowhere; or, instead, we can conceive of arguments as (x) intellectual one way roads to their conclusions although maybe they are really (xi) one-lane roads but with two-way traffic. More positively, they can be thought of as a case of (xii) a merging traffic of ideas or even better as (xiii) conceptual roads under construction. (Cohen 1995: 184)

The availability of so many traffic metaphors suggests something appropriate about this analogy. Another option identified by Keith Lloyd (2014) lies in perceptual metaphors, especially regarding what arguers can see. However, visual metaphors have a fraught history in feminist philosophy because ideal vision tends to be associated with abstraction, and to lean on a hierarchy of the senses (Keller & Grontkowski 1983). In any case it is likely that no metaphor or analogy can capture all the shapes that arguments take and the purposes they serve (Cohen 1995: 187).

Metaphors, models, and methods that tend to be “gendered” as feminine may carry connotations of subordination—and so they may seem inferior, yet they may be also especially useful for women and hence powerful for feminists. These approaches can provide a potent basis for generating alternatives to eristic standards and an understanding of the processes that may go alongside or support arguing as a contest. Metaphors and models based on collaboration fit with the work of physical and emotional care that regularly constitutes women’s roles and responsibilities. Yet collaboration also proves quite apt for many other contexts and functions of arguing such as explanation and deliberation. Rooney suggests that because people converse with rather than against each other, and because arguing is a species of conversation, we should speak of arguing with rather than against people and their views (2010: 221). This possibility suggests that the argument-as-war metaphor may not be so overwhelming as to make alternatives unimaginable in the way Lakoff and Johnson suggest (1980: 4). Alternative structures for argument can be found in our ordinary language.

Patterns that might seem to distinguish how women argue may not express deep cognitive differences between the genders. A range of communicative styles including gendered norms of polite discourse that have people constrain their public reasoning may equally serve cognitive functions common to men and women. Gendered roles may even complement each other’s epistemological operation. The most aggressive and disruptive behavior will not endure norms of politeness. However, some feminists consider that politeness can require conformity to structures of social authority that marginalize women, people of color, and others belonging to subordinated social categories.

The gendered associations of different styles of reasoning suggest that a source for alternative models of arguing might be found in what have been seen as “feminine” styles of reasoning. Whether or not women reason differently from men depends on what we count as reasoning (Verbiest 1995), and the evidence from psychology and sociology reveals no significantly gendered differences in the mental processes of inference and cognition (Fine 2010). Yet women’s communication practices often reflect distinct “values of intimacy, connection, inclusion, and problem sharing” (Burrow 2010: 247).

Ayim argues that in order to avoid reinforcing patterns of subordination, we must detect and examine how values and presuppositions play into the ways that we interpret argumentation (1988: 185). Rooney adds that cooperative and collaborative inclinations may involve a tendency to defer, a reluctance to take responsibility for a position, or a lack of confidence in one’s ideas (2010: 213–214). The need to appease those with greater power may explain why an open-ended and tentative quality sometimes distinguishes women’s style of arguing and practices of communication associated with femininity. Sylvia Burrow suggests that women may give others’ interests priority over their own in order to secure cooperation and connection (2010). This may characterize subordinate roles more generally, sometimes extending to marginalized races and ethnicities.

While styles of “femininity” and “masculinity” are neither wholly good nor bad, they both have inherent dangers. A danger for masculinity arises from its association with activity and aggression as apparently natural features of maleness. As a result, these masculine ideals constrain women’s communication, as has often been noted by feminist theorists, while feminine modes tend to be dismissed. Because masculine characteristics also operate as ideals of humanity or personhood (Hundleby 2016), men can over-identify with them and have no motivation to reflect on or problematize their gender identity (Bruner 1996).

The strategy of transgressing gender by adopting an aggressive masculine mode for arguing can seem useful to women and the temptation may be strongest in “masculine” discourses such as philosophical discussion, or wherever listeners treat an authoritative manner as valuable. Yet, when women adopt masculine discursive styles and adversarial techniques, they can garner criticism for being selfish, cold, and mean, which is criticism that men would not receive (Burrow 2010). Furthermore, such character challenges weaken women’s authority and their ability to participate in argumentation (Burrow 2010; Hundleby 2013a). Even when those challenges are not interpreted as a character fault, the effect may be to present women as merely requesting permission to participate, whereas men are not taken to need permission (Kukla 2014; Olberding 2014). When women decline to offer explanations, they are considered incompetent, whereas the same behavior reads as strength in men. Women’s attempts to defend their authority can easily backfire because the very nature of authority depends on not always having to defend what one says (Hanrahan & Antony 2005).

The consideration that women may have a “different voice” in moral reasoning (Gilligan 1982) gave rise to care ethics as a feminist alternative to traditional accounts of morality. Ayim (1988) suggests that metaphors of nurturing could also replace violent ones describing arguing, especially because arguing can help to foster community (Makau & Marty 2013). Approaches to reasoning that presume interest in the flourishing of other people and that consider the needs of others may be common among girls and women in cultures that press them into practices of motherhood and related caring labor, such as teaching, nursing, and food service.

Attention to the unique audience and the speakers involved in a particular discussion forces consideration of its detailed situation. In one sense, this attention exhibits a bias toward certain sorts of evidence. That bias does not pretend to value-neutrality. Yet, Karen Warren argues that attention to detail provides a feminist sense of “open-mindedness” that enriches feminist reasoning with data in a way that entails a type of impartiality (1988: 38). Reasoners operate from specific locations that cannot be adequately addressed by an epistemology of generic or uniform knowers, as feminist epistemologist Lorraine Code argues (1991). And feminist communications scholars Josina M. Makau and Debian L. Marty note that “taking other people’s perspectives seriously is a basic requirement in peaceful coexistence” (2001: 11; 2013: 51).

Accounting for reasoners’ social situations in the way that Warren and Code advise provides part of the goal for Maureen Linker’s model of “intellectual empathy” (2015). This involves working to understand the history of social inequality and how it affects the reasoning and arguing of ourselves and others. Linker argues that

reason and understanding must be supplemented with emotion and experience so that we can know in the fullest possible sense. (2015: 13)

Attention to specific personal experiences that historically have been ignored provides a feminist standpoint with particular empirical and scientific value, and marks a place where the two general feminist epistemologies of science, feminist standpoint theory and feminist empiricism, coincide (Intemann 2010).

The same feminist epistemological concerns motivate Michael Gilbert’s model of “coalescent argumentation”, which treats arguing as communication that involves much more than a generic expression of a premise-conclusion complex. In coalescent argumentation, the views of speakers stand in opposition to each other without the people speaking being opposed to each other. Arguers’ orientation to other people requires that they account for their interconnection with those in conversation and how their decisions affect others. In this collaborative model, the defeat neither of ideas nor of an opponent provides the goal; instead the goal is to find mutual ground among people, which requires a broad view of relevant considerations (1994; 1997). The processes of coalescent argumentation demand more information than required simply to find fault with others’ arguments. The premise-conclusion complexes that logicians recognize as arguments become understood in coalescent arguing as standing in for “a position-cluster of attitudes, beliefs, feelings and intuitions” belonging to the arguer (Gilbert 1994: 96, original emphasis). Arguers’ motivations offer a basis for interpretation that provides greater room for recognizing middle ground among people who seem to disagree. Exploring this common territory also suggests ways in which alternative solutions may be developed. By emphasizing how divergent positions involve agreement among the proponents’ views and desires, points of disagreement can be distinguished from points of agreement and minimized. On Gilbert’s model, “one asks not, ‘What can I disagree with?’ but, ‘What must I disagree with?’” (1994: 109).

In light of the general feminist interest in collaborative and coalescent models of argumentation, Tempest M. Henning (2018) warns they may reflect certain cultural assumptions, and presumptions of universal culture. The norms recommended by what she identifies as “non-adversarial feminist argumentation models”, and attributes especially to Ayim, may run contrary to the cultures and needs of U.S. Black women. More generally, argumentation theory tends to prescribe a pleasantness of tone and directness of speech that connotes respect in some cultures but not others (Henning 2021; see Section 2.4 on Politeness and civility ). Some feminist philosophers also value adversarial arguing or even identify personally as adversarial arguers. So, the resistance to forms of adversarial arguing that appears to provide a valuable commonality between some feminist concerns and accepted views in argumentation theory may reflect only the interests of certain white women. It may actually work against the interests of other groups of women and risk reinforcing racial marginalization.

Even feminists with concerns about adversarial reasoning recognize that it promotes criticism that may advance the goal of attaining knowledge and understanding. Knowledge is an important purpose among those that arguing serves and different styles of arguing can serve different purposes. Some efforts to build knowledge may benefit from the adversarial styles and models, especially if arguers can avoid automatically slipping into hostile, “ancillary” modes of aggression (Govier 1999). Arguers may also need to avoid reinforcing other epistemic cultures and subcultures that prioritize men’s interaction with each other (Rooney 2012). So feminists need norms for arguing that support criticism of such androcentric cultures and practices and the development of knowledge about how such systems function.

Non-adversarial models of reasoning such as coalescent argumentation may aid people’s understanding too, especially about others and their positions. Mutual understanding develops from coalescent arguing because it demands finding common ground. The remaining opposition among people and their beliefs constitutes a minimally adversarial orientation that Trudy Govier (1999) and Rooney (2010) argue may be valuable for both the development of arguments and the role of arguing in the processes that generate knowledge. Arguers can aid each other in achieving knowledge, which is the main goal in academic arguing, despite the fact that academics sometimes can be side-tracked by mundane power play.

Because of overarching epistemic purposes, Cohen suggests that the people whose ideas lose in eristic debate thus may benefit the most because they learn the most (1995: 182). People may also share an inquiry (Dutilh Novaes 2015: 598–599), and epistemic benefit may accrue to communities. The discursive practices in which individual scientists work together by testing each other’s claims may exhibit certain characteristics that Helen Longino’s (1990) model of scientific reasoning sees as supporting a form of objectivity. Longino’s account of objectivity addresses feminist concerns with about gender bias in scientific theories and involves both collaborative and adversarial elements.

Such shared epistemic projects among people might be understood as “arguing with” rather than “against” other reasoners (Rooney 2003). Rooney argues that readily available logical terms such as “contradictory” and “contrary” can adequately describe differing opinions without implicating opposition among the people holding divergent views (2003; 2010: 222). Such language may help reasoners move away from both the Adversary Method’s dominance as a Paradigm and eristic arguing that may be otherwise dysfunctional. The negative connotations of “argument” and “arguing” in the English language may be part of the problem. [ 4 ] Related words in other Indo-European languages carry no such implication of verbal fighting (Hitchcock 2017: 449). Avoiding the English-language connotations is part of the reason theorists often speak instead of “argumentation” even though that terminology can be unclear or unnecessarily abstract.

Yet, criticism must be part of feminism, especially to direct it at sexism, and feminists may be no more skilled than anyone else at avoiding the pitfalls of arguing such as its tendency to aggravate conflict. Feminist models of arguing avoid levelling criticism against people and direct it toward the views they hold so as to better serve everyone’s understanding. Feminist models of arguing and some ways of arguing used by feminists and non-feminists alike exhibit a benevolent attentiveness to other arguers in the processes of arguing and yet they may also subject what other people say to extensive criticism and opposition.

According to Govier, the characteristic explicitness of reasoning when people argue enables them to learn from disagreement and doubt (1999). Explicitness also promotes honesty with ourselves and each other and respect for interpersonal differences:

an arguer, in actually or potentially addressing those who differ, is committed to the recognition that people may think differently and that what they think and why they think it matters. (1999: 8, 50)

Feminist criticism often involves anger, an emotion also regularly associated with arguing. Anger can be a distracting or even destructive influence on reasoning and it can signify harmful arrogance (Tanesini 2018). Moira Howes and Catherine Hundleby make a case that arguing can help derive cognitive benefit from anger because arguing encourages reasoners to express and to articulate their reasons (2018). It can reveal aspects of reasoning that otherwise would remain unconscious, a feature of arguing processes that Douglas Walton identifies as the “maieutic effect” (1992).

Styles for communicating and sharing reasons often distinguished as “feminine” also play roles in feminist epistemologies of argumentation: Gilbert assigns a fundamental role in coalescent argumentation to the values of attention to the speaker and seeking agreement, while Linker characterizes empathetic intellectuals as having the skills of cooperation and accepting vulnerability. Feminist ethical goals of accountability to women thus can benefit from the pursuit of knowledge. Not only for feminists but for all reasoners, the ethical value of understanding other people can enhance the standard philosophical treatment of arguments as logical premise-conclusion complexes. Coalescent and intellectually empathic reasoning complement critical analysis once we distinguish criticism from the eristic culture of aggressive fault-finding (Miller 1995).

As a remedy for some of the problems that women and other arguers face, some feminists champion politeness, while others stress that expecting etiquette to address abuses of power belies the realities of women and others who are socially marginalized. Norms of politeness function to minimize conflict and so can hold people in subordinate positions (Mayo 2001). Like “ideal theory” in philosophy (Mills 2005), politeness can exacerbate the oppression it ignores—in this case, discursive marginalization.

Govier argues that the discursive norm of politeness limits the problem of overt interpersonal aggression in arguing (1999). Respect for other people and careful consideration of their views ought to be part of persuasion , including rational persuasion, which scholars often take to be the central or even the sole purpose for arguing (1999: 58–59). On this view, aggressive styles of communication or “ancillary adversariality” can be dismissed as simple rudeness or hostility. These ought not to be tolerated in any context and may not impact much on the beliefs and attitudes of the audience (Govier 1999; Miller 1995).

The main difficulty with this ideal arises because norms of politeness tend to be gendered in ways that undermine women’s authority when people argue, affirming power and status for men but not for women. This dynamic can receive reinforcement when women adopt cooperative strategies that play into norms of “femininity”, according to Burrow (2010) and Hundleby (2013a). Securing cooperation and connection with other people provides the very purpose for politeness. Both “masculine” and “feminine” forms of politeness can reflect this purpose. However, the gendered dynamics of politeness in many cultures may entail that cooperative or collaborative argumentation serves women poorly. It contributes to their subordination and perhaps also the subordination of other people with marginalized social identities. For women, cooperating and connecting with others may entail deferring one’s interests and promoting dialogue through hedging, questioning intonation, and use of tag questions, for example, “You know?” “Right?” “Don’t you think?” These strategies generally imply powerlessness or conflict avoidance. In contrast, masculine norms of polite connection facilitate shared competition and encourage joint autonomy along with regard for each other’s needs (Burrow 2010).

Burrow argues that women often have no easy options for conforming with the etiquette demands that reinforce power differences among speakers. Deferential styles of dialogue are part of most subordinate positions and, for women, other aspects of social rank do not mitigate this much. Therefore, to negotiate politeness and to argue effectively, women need complex strategies tailored to their circumstances (2010).

Henning (2021) observes that what many feminist and not-specifically-feminist argumentation theorists count as rudeness may actually belong to politeness strategies in African-American Vernacular English (AAVE). In particular, “signifying” or “signification” within AAVE “utilizes exaggeration, irony, and indirection to partake in coded messages, riddled with insults”. To refuse to participate in signification is rude and politeness demands participation in speech that on the surface suggests disrespect. In some cultures, arguing not only performs pro-social functions, it provides such an important form of sociability that superficial or even insincere arguing may be an essential part of interaction and social bonding (Schiffrin 1984).

Because of the range of conflicting politeness strategies across different communities, it may serve better to seek an alternative to politeness as a norm and that may lie in an inclusive practice and ethic of civility in dialogue. Civility tends to be understood as deeper than politeness, sometimes considered itself to be a virtue or as involving such virtues as respect for other people (Calhoun 2000: 253; Bone et al. 2008; Laverty 2009; Reiheld 2013). Respecting others requires trying to understand them “as they wish to be known and understood” in the cooperative argumentation model developed by Makau and Marty (2013: 69). Others suggest that civil respect be parsed in ethical frameworks, such as deontology or consequentialism, because simple deference to existing social standards may be oppressive in assigning more restrictive practices to certain groups of people. Practices of respect may involve people’s adherence to oppressive social roles, just as they do for politeness, if common practice determines them. Ethically rich interpretations of civility must be shared among interlocutors in order that civility can fulfill its function to regulate disagreement. Such shared norms of civility not only aid the articulation of understandings that prejudiced and oppressive behavior are intolerable, they also aid people’s ability to challenge broader social problems (Calhoun 2000).

Civility may be distinguished from other virtues as “an essentially communicative form of moral conduct”, a display and expression of how one regards others (Calhoun 2000: 260). However, this virtue has limits and incivility can also perform important argumentative functions. Uncivil communication can create space for new forms of meaning and value:

The disruption entailed by incivility provides room for concerted reconstruction of social practices, identities, and spaces. (Mayo 2001: 79)

Uncivil communication and arguing may even be necessary for some social change (Lozano-Reich & Cloud 2009: 223–224). Because certain practices viewed as “civil” may depoliticize disagreement, incivility that highlights these political problems can prove to be as necessary as civility is to democratic decision-making (Mayo 2001). Which moral and political demands justify incivility remains, however, a complicated question that demands analysis of the discursive norms in operation in a particular context for their ability to sustain interpersonal respect.

3. Informal Logic and Argument Interpretation

Feminist philosophical work on argumentation as it emerged in the early 1980s coincides with the rise of informal logic, an approach that encompasses much of contemporary philosophical work done in argumentation theory (Johnson 1996 [2014: 12]). Many feminists and informal logicians share both a resistance to the idealization by some philosophers of formal deductive methods for reasoning and a desire to provide better tools for addressing real world contexts of reasoning and arguing (Govier 1999: 52).

Any interpretation or analysis of an argument omits some aspects of the reasoning involved in the surrounding discourse while it attends to others, and different forms of abstraction suit different purposes (Rooney 2001). Interpretations become problematic for feminists when they leave out salient details that would make possible other interpretations that account for social bias. For instance, interpreting an argument as a deductive inference may not allow for the sorts of analysis of social situation that a standard informal logic interpretation of ad hominem makes possible.

Even informal logicians may assume an equality among arguers that is more ideal than real and that may obstruct political progress. The problems that feminists find with assumed equality may be most visible in accounts of ad hominem arguing. Both feminist (Janack & Adams 1999; Yap 2013, 2015) and not-specifically feminist (Walton 1995) argumentation theorists recognize that appeals to the person may or may not be fallacious. The difference is that while the informal logic analysis informs an audience about the irrelevance of a personal attack, a feminist analysis also maintains that the line of reasoning may still succeed because of unconscious biases such as implicit sexism and racism that feminists find unacceptable. For this reason, feminist critiques of ad hominem arguments require more than logical analysis and also consider the epistemology of testimony (Yap 2013).

Addressing women’s more general concerns about arguing and assessing feminist arguments about women’s marginalization requires a richer and more diverse analysis than a logical analysis of inferences provides. Andrea Nye (1990) suggests ways that the language of logic, including both the artificial language of abstract ideals and the surrounding discourse of logicians, might convey the interests and purposes of people who hold social power. Logical models for argument, especially formal ones, are developed, according to Nye, to prioritize some people’s interests over others and to hide that prioritization by claiming generality and the dominance of such models can lead to systematic misinterpretations of women’s arguments.

Other feminists maintain that abstract interpretation causes trouble only when reasoners mistake it for a uniform authority. The trouble with abstract analysis, Ayim suggests, lies not in the models themselves, but in how people use them (1995: 806). Logical or argumentative ideals that involve abstract models may be partial in representing some people’s preferred inference forms without these models having an intrinsically universalizing character that makes them false. Ayim believes that any such problems in the disciplines of logic result from the practitioners’ failure to be realistic and humble. She says that

It is only when logic is seen as the exclusive avenue to truth and reason that problems arise—not when it is seen as an avenue to truth and reason. (Ayim 1995: 810, emphasis added)

Gilbert suggests that the practical concerns and interdisciplinary considerations of informal logic must be expanded and become more attuned to the specific social situations from which arguments arise (2007). Neglected aspects of argumentation may include the identities of speakers (Code 1991), the power relationships between speakers (Bondy 2010; Linker 2011, 2015; Rooney 2012), the emotions involved (Nye 1990; Gilbert 1994; Linker 2015), the social consequences of argumentation (Code 1991; Rooney 2012), and intersectional identities (Henning 2018, 2021). When feminine speech and writing styles are poorly received and misinterpreted, women will encounter difficulties getting their arguments heard or to taken seriously, let alone recognized as good reasoning. The demand from feminist philosophers to situate argumentative reasoning and to evaluate it in the larger discursive contexts (Burrow 2010; Lang 2010) can be met at least in part by the recent revival of rhetorical accounts of argumentation that address the role of audience (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958 [1969]; Perelman 1977 [1982]; Tindale 1999, 2007).

Formal logic employs artificial abstract languages generally understood to address particular types of inference. Formal symbolism is also used to interpret arguments from natural language so as to assess the strength of an argument’s inference, in particular, whether the argument has deductive validity. So, the argument, “It is icy outside and therefore I will not travel today” might fail to be translatable into a deductively valid form, although people easily recognize its good reasoning. (“Missing premises” might be added to make the argument deductive but that requires more than formal interpretation.)

Nye’s work on formal logic, especially Words of Power: A Feminist Reading of the History of Logic (1990), provides the point of departure for many of the initial feminist philosophical discussions of argument and arguing. Nye considers certain historical points when deductive logic’s operation as the default interpretive mechanism for arguments may have had an oppressive influence. Rather than arguing for this interpretation, she adopts a practice of “reading” that includes attention, listening, understanding, and responding (1990, 183), approaches that are traditionally associated with rhetoric (Keith 1993). Her feminist “reading” of episodes in the history of Euro-American logic suggests ways in which abstract logical systems may have helped to justify social dominance at different moments in time. Her “reading” purposefully aims to consider the personal and political desires behind logic that might motivate its prescription of rules for thought (Nye 1990: 9).

Nye begins her study with Parmenides’ logic of “what is”, what exists beyond sensuous existence and human communities. The ensuing silence among the ancient Greeks was broken by Plato who addressed “what is not” through using rational discussion to reveal the existence of differences. For Aristotle, this dialectic involved only men from the upper classes, making the exclusive nature of the logic most explicit. As a result, in Nye’s view, a silence regarding a lot of reasoning surrounds logic. Nye notes that

once rationality is defined as what is not emotional, and emotionality established as the characteristic of women understood as what is only a body, there could be no discussion of institutions of slavery and sexism. (1990: 50)

She traces through medieval formulations of logic ways in which the claims of logic’s universal application may have discouraged criticism of social institutions that authorized those accounts of logic. These institutions include patriarchy in general, sometimes underwritten by God, the Roman Empire, and the Catholic Church.

Logical restriction on what counts as reasoning culminates, on Nye’s reading, when Gottlob Frege moves logic out of human discourse to formulate it in a symbolic language. Frege’s functionalist notation promises to express all forms of truth with the aim, Nye suggests, “that thought will be unified and logical errors in science, mathematics, and philosophy exposed” (1990: 131). Using Frege’s approach, how a concept refers to the world becomes “an objective fact:…one cannot invent its value” (1990: 135). As a result, the institutions that render concepts meaningful, including the social institution of language, stand beyond question, creating a new form of muteness that harkens back to Parmenides. The surrounding silence breaks again when the Vienna Circle adds empirical input in place of the concepts on which the Fregean functions work. Nye indicates that this theoretical development places science above meaningful criticism, and so allows scientific reasoning to be co-opted by authoritarian regimes (1990: 163–171).

As an alternative to logic, Nye suggests building confidence for women and developing new concepts aided by a concrete (natural, not artificial) “women’s language”. Discourse that is for or about women might provide inclusion, bonding, and ways to share power. Women have relied historically on the skills needed for reading:

We have listened and read to survive, we have read to predict the maneuvers of those in power over us, to seduce those who might help us, to pacify bullies, to care for children, to nurse the sick and the wounded. (1990: 184)

The next step lies in developing the language to respond.

Nye’s experiment in avoiding argument falters in two ways observed by feminists and other scholars who have not been convinced by her socio-historical reading. Some cite errors in her historical interpretation (Keith 1993; Weiner 1994). Others find that in Words of Power, Nye does argue, but fails to persuade and so fails to provide the alternative to logic she seeks (Gilbert 1994; Ayim 1995).

Gilbert offers a related but distinct criticism of formal logic for its role in the “Critical-Logical” approach that he characterizes as extracting text from utterances for the purposes of applying a competitive or eristic process to the stylized text (1994). He suggests, like Moulton (1983), that such abstraction serves the competitive functions and standard practice of Euro-American academic philosophy. Because arguing need not adhere to the Critical-Logical model, it remains possible that feminine styles of reasoning may ground effective interpretive practices for arguers. Arguing also may find natural corollaries in other styles of communication and other values that operate within communication.

Reasoners appeal to logic and to other abstract accounts of what other arguers say partly so they might avoid bias as they interpret natural language. Yet such abstract interpretation may favor forms of argument evaluation unsuited to the context of utterance. For instance, if the Critical-Logical model of argument evaluation provides the basis for legal procedures, then it may compromise access to justice for people who are socially marginalized based on gender, race, class, and education. Gilbert echoes Nye’s concern that logical systems can reflect the lingua franca of the ruling class that captures their own interests (1994: 105). Applying it to other contexts risks distorting and disenfranchising other people and their modes of communication.

Nye concedes that a women’s language cannot stand up to the power and authority of logic but believes that perhaps reasoners may gain something different from a replacement for logic. It may be that

her notion of reading teaches that the circumstances in which something is said and the person who says it are relevant considerations. (Tindale 1999: 196)

The appeal of Nye’s “reading” may be that

currently popular theories of reading, unlike traditional logic, highlight rather than diminish the interests, personality, and motives that the reader brings to the task of reading. (Ayim 1995: 807)

Arguers can emphasize the moral goals behind an argument through their emotional language. Likewise, an explanatory purpose for an argument would mean that the speaker offers it up as a truthful description rather than as a subject for debate (Gilbert 1994). Such purposes and values can fall away with the abstraction of a premise-conclusion complex from its context of utterance. When the Critical-Logical model grounds decision-making processes, the authority it carries creates problems for anyone using other styles of reasoning and communication.

Note that Nye is the only feminist philosopher to date suggesting a substitute for arguing and logic. Ayim (1995) and Gilbert (1994) stress that different styles of communication and value-systems can be natural corollaries for each other. Govier (1993) further suggests that the power of universal logic may be indispensable, and that feminist concerns can be addressed through a better understanding of the interpretation and application of logical norms.

Rhetorical studies attend to argument audiences in a way that can help to address feminist concerns about the emotional and gendered aspects of argument (Tindale 1999: 201). They may also help to resolve a dilemma of feminist arguing practice by demonstrating how the advancement of feminist affirmative projects, such as acknowledging the significance of women’s experience, may require adversarial forms of argumentation often associated with masculinity. Communication styles identified as rhetoric create both problematic and constructive aspects of social identity, including feminine identity. Rhetorical analysis of the situational specifics can reveal how communication helps to produce social identities and can suggest ways to address particular power differences among reasoners (Bruner 1996; Palczewski 2016).

M. Lane Bruner argues that some aspects of gender stereotypes make it harder to argue, while other aspects make it easier (1996). Distinguishing the empowering from the disempowering aspects of social identity depends on examining the ways in which “masculine” identity is tied up with ideals of arguing and the ways in which identity politics can counteract the power of dominant identities. Although speakers must suppress each of their unique differences from others in order to communicate explicitly in regard to their own social positions, the resulting feminine and masculine identifications do not become fixed. Because identities are created, they must be maintained and they remain subject to transformation. That flux in identity gives feminists strategic opportunities for developing women’s argumentation and giving credit to it.

Rooney notes that an artificial severing of arguing from narrative and rhetorical practices helps to dissociate arguments from femininity and frustrates feminist practices of philosophical arguing (2010; Le Doeuff 1980 [1989]). Research that attends to rhetoric and its influences may go under the name of “rhetorical studies” (often in English or literature departments) but may also be found in communications studies, psychology, and interdisciplinary fields such as women’s and gender studies or argumentation studies. Rhetorical studies give attention to the perspective of a particular audience and that concern with the audience and the various interests audiences may have challenges the view—especially in the discipline of philosophy—that reasoning and argumentation must be a constant battle. Rooney argues that philosophical practice itself involves rhetoric and narrative through myths, thought experiments, and metaphors. These rhetorical practices make theories more attractive to specific audiences. Philosophers commonly portray reason as in battle against feminine forces which “primarily makes sense to men among men in cultural contexts where sexism or misogyny is a cultural given” (2010: 227).

Rhetorical studies of speakers, audiences, their purposes, and their social contexts were revived in twentieth century argumentation theory by Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958 [1969]). Perelman, writing on his own, advocates that instead of appealing to “the rational” as a standard for argumentation, scholars should consider a “reasonable” person in terms of the standards of a particular community (1977 [1982]).

The discipline of rhetorical studies typically takes persuasion to be the goal of arguing. Some feminists resist this assumption. Concern that persuasion may be intrinsically an act of domination of one person over another and even an act of violence (Gearhart 1979) led feminist rhetoricians to develop an alternative in “invitational rhetoric” that makes understanding the goal of arguing (Foss & Griffin 1995; Bone et al. 2008). This approach resonates with rhetoric’s Aristotelian history, Christopher Tindale observes, which does not involve intentions to change another person that some feminists consider violent, because Aristotle conceives change as an internal process. On Tindale’s model of “rhetorical argumentation”,

the audience, when persuaded, is persuaded by its own deliberations, after reflection on reasoning that it has understood in its own terms and may even have had a hand in completing. (1999: 191)

However, at the same time, invitational rhetoric demands a civility that may presume social equality (Lozano-Reich & Cloud 2009) and thus it faces the same problems as politeness (addressed in Section 2 ).

Linker suggests that reasoning across power differences can be aided by speakers employing a process of “intellectual empathy”; other people’s claims, especially if these people are relatively disadvantaged, can help reflect on one’s own interpretive assumptions in order to move past unreflective bias (2011; 2015). Relatedly, an attitude of playfulness may facilitate consideration of another’s perspective, that is, “travelling” to the person’s “world” as described by Maria Lugones (1987). Perhaps this attitude will help philosophers appreciate the viewpoints presented in feminist epistemology (Lang 2010). However, Mariana Ortega (2006) warns that the radical potential of playfulness demands a deep engagement with work by women of color. Superficial citation of women of color by white feminists only replicates oppressive gatekeeping in philosophical argumentation.

Assuming the goal of arguing to be persuasion invokes a limited context and one that poses problems for some feminists, especially regarding power differences among speakers. Nevertheless, rhetorical analysis offers many resources for feminist analysis because its attention to the audience provides valuable details about the situations in which people argue. As we will see next, recent work in philosophy concerning credibility and developing the concept of “argumentative injustice” articulates persistent concerns for feminists about arguing, as does both regular and feminist philosophical scholarship about fallacies and critical thinking education.

Credibility granted to speakers and their testimony affects processes of arguing and may adhere to social categories following lines of gender and other axes of oppression (Govier 1993). Miranda Fricker (2007) describes the case of testimonial injustice, which is a species of epistemic injustice, and identifies when a listener gives diminished credibility or epistemic authority to a speaker based on that speaker’s social identity. Patrick Bondy (2010) defines analogous “argumentative injustice” as consisting in a related harm done to the processes of arguing when people wrongly assess an arguer’s credibility. We can underestimate or overestimate an arguer’s credibility by using social stereotypes to assess it (2010). Bondy explains that both overestimation and underestimation can result from viewing testifiers through social stereotypes—typically men’s credibility becomes overestimated whereas women’s becomes underestimated. Additionally, testimony from people with social identities different from our own may be difficult to accept simply because their experiences contrast with our own and those experiences with which we identify. This second problem when considered as a fallacy goes by the name of “provincialism” (Kahane & Cavender 2001) and is sometimes attributed to the psychology of in-group bias (Brewer 1979; Rudman & Goodman 2004). Whether due to stereotypes or to in-group bias, being discounted as a participant in discussion amounts to an epistemic injustice that Christopher Hookway (2010) describes as “participant injustice”.

Bondy argues that an underestimated testifier loses at least some capacity for critical engagement with other people. This capacity might progressively deteriorate, or the person might internalize its diminished form. Underestimating a testifier undermines the rationality of arguing processes with the result that the audience tends to lose potentially valuable information and insight. On the other hand, an overestimated testifier also can fail to gain valuable information from others, derailing the argumentative exchange by preventing the success of the better line of reasoning. After the particular discussion, the overestimated person can come to be viewed as beyond scrutiny, thus losing (at least on occasion) the benefits of engaging in discursive argumentation. By contrast, Fricker’s original conception of testimonial injustice accounts for the harmful effects on knowers only when their testimony is underestimated, and she argues that epistemic injustice does not accrue from overestimating credibility.

The solution to argumentative injustice might be simply for the listener to take care to treat arguers on their own terms. This would avoid viewing people in terms of group membership, a practice that leaves reasoners vulnerable to stereotype-thinking (Govier 1993, 1999). However, sometimes people’s social identities are relevant to the credibility of what they say, when, for instance, it concerns their personal experience of discrimination. Also, social stereotypes influence our thinking unconsciously, in a way that earns the label “implicit bias”. This bias differs from in-group bias but works alongside it, sometimes reinforcing it and sometimes conflicting with it. As a result, women often hold prejudices against other women (and even themselves) just as men do, and people of color may hold unconscious biases against their own ethnicity. When such bias persists despite conscious beliefs to the contrary, psychologists describe it as “aversive bias” (Greenwald & Banaji 1995; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek 2004; Kay & Zanna 2009).

Implicit social biases work like other cognitive biases, such as those that encourage us to generalize from small samples and personal experience and can affect many of our best intentions in reasoning and argumentation. Insofar as these biases undermine our ability to manage our own confidence, they frustrate the virtue of intellectual humility that otherwise might offset adversarial inclinations and momentum when people argue (Kidd 2016; Aberdein 2016). Ian James Kidd considers ways in which arguing can foster humility, and suggests that ideally, arguing

is also a route to other intellectual and ethical goods such as truth, knowledge, and enlightenment, as the ancient philosophers maintained. (2016: 399)

The challenge remains to bridge the real and the ideal.

Bondy argues that because social bias may be inevitable in people’s perception of speakers’ credibility, we need to counteract it actively. He recommends that we adopt a general attitude of “metadistrust” in which we exercise skepticism about our credibility judgments regarding testimony from people belonging to marginalized social groups.

Alternatively, we might try “intellectual empathy” based on mutual compassion, which is the approach that Linker develops. She argues that compassion must involve consciousness of how oppression operates through specific intersecting social matrices, including social privileges that can be very difficult to recognize. Such intersectional intellectual empathy may especially help us realize that it is our own biases or limited experiences that lead us to dismiss others’ testimony by interpreting them as whining, complaining, or “playing the gender (or race, etc.) card” (Linker 2011, 2015).

Achieving epistemic justice when we argue requires some sort of accounting for the identities of arguers, and might include appeal to the “epistemic privilege” described in feminist standpoint epistemology. Some standpoint theorists maintain that epistemic privilege can accrue to people who oppose oppression. Their engagement with the lives of oppressed people and their resistance to the oppression structuring those lives provides a unique and valuable awareness of the social structures of power. Thus a “feminist standpoint” and those who achieve it may gain epistemic advantage from fighting the oppressed condition of women’s lives. Although it is not necessary to be a woman to achieve this standpoint and its advantage, women themselves may most easily achieve it (Harding 1991; Intemann 2010).

One way that arguers might try to address the effects of social position on arguing is through meta-debate—a background argument may address arguers’ biases operating in the central discussion (Kotzee 2010). However, Linker (2014) argues that regardless of what the meta-debate yields, the person with social privilege will continue to benefit from debates that are adversarial. Arguers have difficulty recognizing when their biases reflect their own social privilege at any level of debate because social identity frequently affects testimonial authority unconsciously.

Linker suggests that we treat epistemic privilege as a form of expertise about arguing. This allows feminists and other anti-oppression advocates to set the bounds for ending inquiry (2014). Such advocates operate as the authority and determine the place where explanation stops (Hanrahan & Antony 2005). Rooney argues that this kind of expertise should be accorded to women philosophers whose lived experience tends to ground their feminist philosophy. Arguers should recognize expertise in situations

where A ’s minority status relative to B (with respect to some locally salient status or power differential) makes it likely that A has insights and understandings relating to P that are less available to B . (2012: 322)

Rooney says that speaking from personal experience becomes important for arguing because of the “hermeneutical injustices” (Fricker 2007) facing women. Hermeneutical injustice, according to Fricker, means that women’s experiences may not receive adequate consideration because the language to describe them is underdeveloped. Men may therefore have trouble recognizing evidence that women provide, and they

are not in the same position as women to confidently assert whether they find it plausible or not because they do not have access to the evidence in the way women are likely to have. (Rooney 2012: 328)

Argumentation theory has a tradition of taking fallacies as an operational concept for identifying problems with arguments. The types of deficiency identified as fallacies emerge from disparate points in the history of philosophy, and, as Charles Hamblin (1970) first recognized, the fallacies approach to argument evaluation tends to lack consensus regarding what constitutes a fallacy. Further, many theorists find that “fallacy” fails as both an analytic category (Massey 1995) and a pedagogical tool (Hitchcock 1995), and yet the scholarly controversy has not put a stop to the regular use of fallacies for evaluating arguments and for teaching reasoning. Feminists share the ambivalence of other philosophers regarding fallacies, adding their own criticisms and developments, but a specific controversy emerges in regard to the adversarial nature of fallacies.

Some feminists decry the inadequacy of traditional fallacies for addressing problems women face in argument exchanges (Al Tamimi 2011) and others point out how some philosophers use fallacy labels to dismiss and silence feminist philosophers. [ 5 ] In particular, when feminist philosophers employ arguments concerning the history of philosophy, they have been charged with committing the genetic fallacy (e.g., Levin 1988). That fallacy results from taking the significance of a claim or theory to depend on its origin and history—its genesis—and thereby dismissing that view without attention to its current meaning and context. Feminist philosophers consider how the fact that mostly men developed certain theories, including many philosophical theories, may undermine the justification for applying these theories to women. In doing so, feminists also attend to how those theories currently operate.

The difficulty some philosophers have in recognizing the sophistication of feminist historical criticism regarding philosophical theories may be due, first, to feminist use of certain theories that were the target for philosophers who developed the category “genetic fallacy”. Margaret Crouch explains that the concept of the genetic fallacy was developed only in the early twentieth century by some philosophers in the analytic tradition with the explicit intention of discounting the scientific status of Marxist and Freudian accounts. Given that Marxist and Freudian accounts from the continental European tradition have influenced a good deal of feminist theory, Crouch argues that it is unsurprising that feminist analysis might seem at first glance to commit the genetic fallacy (1991; 1993).

Moreover, Crouch argues, employing the label of “genetic fallacy” against feminist criticisms of the historically masculine sources for popular views in the discipline of philosophy relies on a misunderstanding of what constitutes a fallacy at a point where reasonable consensus has emerged: not every instance of a pattern of reasoning associated with a fallacy label—here genetic appeals—constitutes that fallacy; there may be exceptions and even highly reasonable practices that employ the same pattern. So, some appeals to personal characteristics are relevant and do not commit the ad hominem fallacy and some appeals to authority are perfectly reasonable and not cases of the ad verecundiam fallacy (Walton 1995). Scholarship on the genetic fallacy likewise recognizes that the way a theory developed historically only sometimes affects the value of the reasoning now supporting it. In particular, Crouch explains that the genesis of a claim affects its justification when testimony provides its only support, or when a claim involves the speaker as a subject, and whenever the source of information has an objective connection supporting the statement’s truth or falsity (1991; 1993).

The charge that feminist epistemology commits the genetic fallacy in asking such questions about the origins of the canon not only depends on a misunderstanding of that fallacy, the criticism itself also commits the fallacy of begging the question. Critics of some feminist philosophy make the epistemological assumption that the origins of a belief are irrelevant to its justification, which is the very claim that these feminists reject (see Crouch 1991). For instance, standpoint theorists argue that women’s material situation affects and can advantage the types of understanding that women and feminists have (Harding 1991). Critics of feminist epistemology cannot simply assume that the use of a certain type of premise makes a line of reasoning unjustified.

This kind of exchange between feminists and their critics—one that involves each party accusing the other of committing fallacies—illustrates how arguers may use fallacy labels to characterize their disagreements. Some feminists advocate fallacy analysis as a contextualized form of epistemology (Janack & Adams 1999) and some suggest the development of new fallacy labels to help address feminist epistemological concerns. Code suggests a counterpart for ad hominem be known as ad feminam to address how listeners and audiences discount women’s testimony (1995: 58–82). Also, androcentrism, the assumption of a masculine standard, can be named as a typical problem arising in argumentation by using the fallacies approach. More generally, Hundleby (2016) argues that assuming the desirability of stereotypic qualities of people who tend to be systematically granted social authority, such as men and white people, may be identified as the “status quo fallacy”. Better education about fallacies in argumentation may help to address the implicit bias that can underlie the “status quo fallacy”. The proposal of new fallacy labels, for example, ad stuprum or the appeal to sex (Anger & Hundleby 2016), is by no means unique to feminism, but it offers special power for social justice projects in providing language to account for socially marginalized experience, thus addressing hermeneutical injustices.

Proficiency with the fallacies approach can be empowering even though any claim that a fallacy has been committed makes disagreement explicit and that involves an adversarial quality which can make it difficult for socially marginalized people to use. It entails at least a minimal level of adversariality of the sort described by Govier (1999): “minimal adversariality” is opposition to another person’s view but not to the person. The involvement of even this minimal level of adversariality may make the fallacies approach a form of argument analysis difficult for members of subordinated classes to employ in contexts where socialization and norms of politeness discourage subordinates from expressing dissent (Rooney 2003). Yet, some individual women find success in adversarial engagement, some take pleasure in the heightened opposition of debate, and adversarial conversation is key to some women’s culture and identity (Schiffrin 1984; Henning 2018, 2021). Moreover, opposition is necessary for feminist resistance, struggle, and change. In these ways, women, feminists, and others with related liberatory projects can find unique resources in the adversariality of the fallacies approach.

Fallacies remain a popular way to teach reasoning, as does argument analysis more generally. Both play central roles in the content of Canadian, US, and UK post-secondary education as part of the set of skills regularly taught under the name “critical thinking” in philosophy departments. Education allows cultures of reasoning to reinforce and reproduce themselves and these cultures affect the prospects for feminist transformation of the larger society. Educational institutions have authority and grant authority to systems of thought and to individuals and in this way critical thinking education provides opportunities for conformity or for social transformation, starting at the level of individual reasoning and interpersonal discourse. In many ways, the ideal and practice of critical thinking serves social progress but in other ways it needs reform.

The way that argument education works its way from the academy into ordinary reasoning practices may be rather indirect and slow but academic philosophy is not merely one discourse among others and it has a central role in validating or authorizing other discourses (Alcoff 1993), especially in the epistemological assumptions conveyed through critical thinking pedagogy. Courses in critical thinking became stock components of the undergraduate curriculum during the late twentieth century and so the standards for reasoning implicit in “critical thinking” as an educational goal for students directly impact on countless students every year. Critical thinking operates as a specifically Western practice and ideal that provides alternatives to patterns of reasoning that enforce male dominance in various cultures, Western culture included (Norris 1995). The appeals to individual rationality and independent reasoning in the critical thinking curriculum contrast with appeals to tradition and with prioritizing community and personal relationships.

Systems of thinking, such as theories or logics, and speech acts, such as arguments, can hold authority that is not attached to a specific speaker or type of speaker, even though people may be paradigmatic holders of authority. The authority of social institutions, especially in their claims to be objective, Code argues (1995: 21, 181), may be likewise justified or not justified. Granting the justification of depersonalized authorities that include institutions of postsecondary education becomes second nature in a technological society, while those who lack social status and expertise have heightened dependence on the authority of expertise. This authority actually lies in the hands of people who have social privilege and yet people who are socially marginalized have a serious stake in the institutions that develop knowledge, from the legal system and the media to the pedagogy of argumentation in the form of “critical thinking” education (Hundleby 2013b).

Hundleby makes a case that critical thinking courses provided by philosophy departments currently tend to reinforce disciplinary biases because they invoke an authority that lacks the monitoring and evaluation that justifies authority (Hanrahan & Antony 2005). The typical way that textbooks present fallacies exhibits ignorance of the current informal logic scholarship, which would provide the appropriate source of expertise. There are few textbooks written by scholars who have published even one article in argumentation or logic and these same textbooks written by non-specialists are most likely to evince the Adversary Method described by Moulton (1983). The unreflective nature of dependence on that Method suggests that it remains authoritative—as well as “paradigmatic”—in philosophy (Hundleby 2010).

Gilbert argues that critical thinking education ought to affirm a range of considerations that do not enter into traditional logic (Gilbert 1994: 111). Contemporary philosophical theorizing tends to treat arguments as premise-conclusion complexes, merely as “products” of the discourse that generates them (Wenzel 1980 [1992]), without considering the processes that give rise to them. The focus on premise-conclusion complexes obscures factors relevant to the feminist goal of preventing harm (Lang 2010) and such a lack of appropriate “rhetorical spaces” or conceptual frameworks in philosophy impedes the education of people about the problems that women face (Code 1995). The standard Euro-American philosophical practices of the Adversary Paradigm or the Critical-Logical model sideline important aspects of arguing that indicate the significance and cogency of feminist claims about things like the social identities of arguers. Argument has a testimonial dimension, as Audrey Yap explains (2013; 2015). Consciousness of such situational aspects of reasoning and philosophical argumentation facilitates the appreciation of feminist perspectives. It also provides for more rigorous analysis and more thoroughly critical thinking.

Bucking the large trend of textbooks that fail to reflect the argumentation scholarship, Linker (2015) follows in a minor tradition of textbooks by expert authors that also advance scholarly theorizing about argumentation (e.g., Govier 1985; Johnson & Blair 1977; Makau & Marty 2001, 2013). Her Intellectual Empathy aims to provide reasoners with skills for understanding how social inequalities affect people’s lives and how those structures are maintained. The first three skills involved in “intellectual empathy” are: (i) understanding the invisibility of privilege; (ii) knowing that social identity is intersectional; [ 6 ] and (iii) using models of cooperative reasoning. Linker argues that social identity lies at the center of what Quine calls the “web of belief”, [ 7 ] which is to say it is deeply connected with many of a person’s beliefs; and for Linker that involves it in their self-esteem. The personal stake people have in their social identities means that discussion that engages our identities can be emotionally fraught. We “take it personally”. When people are arguing about aspects of social identity, they often fall into feelings of blame or guilt. Linker suggests that reasoners can find alternatives to such destructive responses by consideration of the complexities of everyone’s individual situation regarding social privilege. Attending to the specificities of each other’s perspectives allows us to better understand each other and set up reasoners for more cooperative and less adversarial arguing (Linker 2015: 98).

According to Linker, intellectual empathy also requires that when encountering a view that seems biased or stereotypical reasoners (iv) apply a principle of conditional trust, treating the person holding the view as reasonable and well-intentioned. This assumption allows us better to learn about the real reasons the person holds the view, and generally improves the audience’s ability to gather and share evidence (2015: 156–158).

Finally, Linker advises (v) recognizing our mutual vulnerability to bias and stereotype, while at the same time allowing ourselves to be responsive and accommodating to new information. This demands courage and strength. Linker’s five skills thus provide a way to address the testimonial dimensions of arguing with special attention to their operation when people argue from very different social locations. This vision of critical thinking steps forward in addressing feminist concerns with the cultures and practices of argumentation.

In conclusion, as we see especially in the discussions of fallacies and argument pedagogy as well as in the dominance of the Adversary Method, feminist philosophical work on argumentation reveals a need for philosophers to attend to argumentation scholarship. Outdated or unscholarly conceptions of how different modes and styles of arguing serve the advancement of knowledge can undermine the value of philosophical reasoning and specifically how philosophers respond to feminist philosophy. Yet, the work by interdisciplinary argumentation scholars and feminist philosophers to explore these tensions receives little uptake in the discipline of philosophy.

Among the feminist topics in argumentation scholarship that remain in need of philosophical attention are: the range and complexity of values that arguing can serve, including social justice, social bonding, dispute resolution, and knowledge; and more thorough representations of arguing practices that account for how discursive norms code power and privilege, such as through politeness and testimonial authority. Feminist research on these topics will be important for scholarship on argumentation and also for the discipline of philosophy, given the centrality of arguing to its practice. Interdisciplinary vantage points on argumentation provide resources useful for feminist purposes and promise a broader perspective that might unify different feminist concerns; at the same time, other disciplines can face their own challenges from a feminist perspective, as rhetorical studies does for taking persuasion to provide the only purpose for arguing.

Feminist concerns about argumentation pull in different directions and create a great deal of room for further research. Feminists regularly oppose practices and theories central to the discipline of philosophy and some such form of opposition is intrinsic to feminist work. Yet feminists criticize overemphasis on the opposition that occurs in the default adoption of adversarial styles of reasoning in philosophy and in the assumption that arguers must oppose each other or that they must have contrary beliefs. Appeals to politeness do not provide the easy resolution to these concerns that some argumentation theorists often presume. In addition, although some of the worst tendencies in argumentation scholarship may be passed on generation to generation in critical thinking classes taught by philosophers, these classes have potential to create progress toward social justice. Let us note that, overall, feminist perspectives on argumentation challenge broad social and epistemological norms as well as attend to the ways the norms play out in the culture of critical thinking, academic philosophy, and other accepted standards for shared reasoning.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

Aberdein, Andrew, 2019–, Virtues and Arguments; A Bibliography , Regularly updated.
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Home — Essay Samples — Social Issues — Gender Equality — Essay On Feminism In Society

Essay on Feminism in Society

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Published: Mar 19, 2024

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I. introduction, ii. history of feminism, iii. feminism in the workplace, iv. feminism in politics, v. feminism in media and pop culture, vi. feminism in education, vii. criticisms of feminism, viii. conclusion.

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Feminist Film Theory: An Introductory Reading List

Evolving from the analysis of representations of women in film, feminist film theory asks questions about identity, sexuality, and the politics of spectatorship.

Director Julie Dash poses for the movie "Daughters of the Dust," circa 1991

Not unlike the emergence of feminist theory and criticism in the domains of art and literature, the women’s movement of the late 1960s and 1970s sparked a focused interrogation of images of women in film and of women’s participation in film production. The 1970s witnessed the authorship of massively influential texts by writers such as Claire Johnston, Molly Haskell, and Laura Mulvey in the United Kingdom and the United States, and psychoanalysis was a reigning method of inquiry, though Marxism and semiotics also informed the field.

Feminist film theory has provoked debates about the representations of female bodies, sexuality, and femininity on screen while posing questions concerning identity, desire, and the politics of spectatorship, among other topics. Crucially, an increasing amount of attention has been paid by theorists to intersectionality, as scholars investigate the presence and absence of marginalized and oppressed film subjects and producers. This reading list surveys a dozen articles, presented chronologically, as a starting point for readers interested in the lines of inquiry that have fueled the field over the last fifty years.

Laura Mulvey, “ Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema ,” Screen 16, no. 3 (1975): 6–18.

To put it most simply, Mulvey’s 1975 essay is nothing short of iconic. A cornerstone of psychoanalytic feminist film theory, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” describes the ways in which women are displayed on screen for the pleasure of the male spectator. Many of the essays listed below engage explicitly with Mulvey’s essay and the notion of the male gaze, illustrating what Corrin Columpar (2002, see below) describes as a “near compulsive return” to this pioneering work. But even Mulvey herself would later push back on some of her most provocative claims , including her positioning of the spectator as male, as well as her omission of female protagonists.

“ Feminism and Film: Critical Approaches ,” Camera Obscura 1, no. 1 (1976): 3–10.

Established in 1976, Camera Obscura was (and remains) a groundbreaking venue for feminist film studies. This introductory essay to the first issue contextualizes the necessity of such a journal in a scholarly and cultural environment in which there is a true “need” for the feminist study of film. Camera Obscura was, in part, an American response to the wave of British contributions to the field, often published in the journal Screen (the home of Mulvey’s essay). The editors spend much of this essay unpacking the camera obscura, an image projection device, as a metaphor for feminist film theory, as it functions as a symbol of contradiction that “emphasizes the points of convergence of ideology and representation, of ideology as representation.”

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Michelle Criton, Julia Lesage, Judith Mayne, B. Ruby Rich, and Anna Marie Taylor, “ Women and Film: A Discussion of Feminist Aesthetics ,” New German Critique no. 13 (1978): 83–107.

What makes film an enticing object of study for feminists in the first place? As Criton et al. attest, the answers lie in the social rather than individual or private dimensions of film as well as in its accessibility and synthesis of “art, life, politics, sex, etc.” The conversation featured here provides a glimpse into contemporary conversations about the work of Claire Johnston and Laura Mulvey and psychoanalysis as a shaping force of early feminist film theory. Additionally, they consider how a feminist filmmaking aesthetic can reveal and critique the ideologies that underpin the oppression of women.

Judith Mayne, “ Feminist Film Theory and Criticism ,” Signs 11, no. 1 (1985): 81–100.

Acknowledging the profound impact of “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” Mayne surveys the development of feminist film theory, including both its historical contexts and its fixations upon psychoanalysis and the notions of spectacle and the gaze. Mayne outlines how contradiction—variously construed—is “ the central issue in feminist film theory and criticism” (emphasis added). Additionally, the author calls into question the historiography of women’s cinema, noting the “risk of romanticizing women’s exclusion from the actual production of films.” She urges scholars to, certainly, continue the necessary exploration of forgotten and understudied female filmmakers but to also open up the conception of women’s cinema to include not just the work of female directors but also their peripheral roles as critics and audience members.

Jane Gaines, “ White Privilege and Looking Relations: Race and Gender in Feminist Film Theory ,” Cultural Critique , no. 4 (1986): 59–79.

What, Gaines asks, are the limitations of feminist theory’s early fixation on gender at the expense of nuanced understandings of race, class, and sexuality? While feminist theory may, in its earliest years, have opened up possibilities for interrogating the gendered politics of spectatorship, it was largely exclusionary of diverse perspectives, including, as Gaines notes, lesbians and women of color. In doing so, “feminist theory has helped to reinforce white middle-class [normative] values, and to the extent that it works to keep women from seeing other structures of oppression, it functions ideologically.” Through an analysis of the 1975 film Mahogany and informed by black feminist theorists and writers such as bell hooks, Mayne argues that psychoanalysis ultimately results in erroneous readings of films about race.

Noël Carroll, “ The Image of Women in Film: A Defense of a Paradigm ,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 48, no. 4 (1990): 349–60.

Carroll theorizes why psychoanalysis was so attractive to feminists in the 1970s and 1980s: by providing a theoretical framework, he argues, psychoanalysis was a means to “incorporate” and “organize” the “scattered insights of the image of women in film approach.” Taking issue with Mulvey’s perspective on voyeurism, Carroll positions the image approach, or the study of the image of women in film—in this case with an emphasis on theories of emotion— as a “rival research program” to psychoanalysis. He argues that paradigm scenarios, or cases in which emotions are learned behavioral responses, influence spectatorship and how audiences respond emotionally to women on screen.

Karen Hollinger, “ Theorizing Mainstream Female Spectatorship: The Case of the Popular Lesbian Film ,” Cinema Journal 37, no. 2 (1998): 3–17.

Hollinger surveys theoretical responses to lesbian subjectivity and the female spectatorship of popular lesbian film narratives. She articulates the subversive power of the lesbian look as a challenge to Mulvey’s notion of the male gaze, asserting its potential to empower female spectators as agents of desire.

Corinn Columpar, “ The Gaze As Theoretical Touchstone: The Intersection of Film Studies, Feminist Theory, and Postcolonial Theory ,” Women’s Studies Quarterly 30, no. 1/2 (2002): 25–44.

The male gaze is not, as Columpar articulates, the sole tool “in the contemporary feminist film critic’s box”: so are the ethnographic and colonial gazes, brought to film theory from postcolonial studies. Columpar reiterates that the early fixation upon gender and the male gaze “failed to account for other key determinants of social power and position.” Interdisciplinary perspectives, such as those informed by postcolonial theory, are better equipped to unpack “issues of racial and national difference and acknowledge the role that race and ethnicity play in looking relations.”

Janell Hobson, “ Viewing in the Dark: Toward a Black Feminist Approach to Film ,” Women’s Studies Quarterly 30, no. 1/2 (2002): 45–59.

Hobson illuminates the absence and/or disembodied presence of Black female bodies in Hollywood cinema. She argues that the invisibility of Black women’s bodies on screen was a defense mechanism against the disruption of “whites as beautiful, as the norm.” By turning away from the gaze and toward the sound of Black women’s disembodied voices in speech and song, viewers are better equipped to recognize how their voices are “used in mainstream cinema by way of supporting and defining the normalized (white) male body,” therefore “ensur[ing] the identity of white masculinity.”

E. Ann Kaplan, “ Global Feminisms and the State of Feminist Film Theory ,” Signs 30, no. 1 (2004): 1236–48.

Kaplan reflects on her trajectory as a pioneering feminist film theorist, illuminating her shift from cinema’s depictions of the “oppressions of white Western women” to the study of trauma in global and indigenous cinema. Importantly, she notes that in her earlier research, she failed to “confront the really tough questions of my own positionality.” In doing so, she invites readers to consider the ethics of witnessing and white, Western feminist participation in the development of multicultural approaches.

Jane M. Gaines, “ Film History and the Two Presents of Feminist Film Theory ,” Cinema Journal 44, no. 1 (2004): 113–19.

It may come as a surprise to many that, internationally speaking, women were indeed undertaking various forms of creative labor in the world of film production during the silent era, including screenwriting, producing, directing, etc. The question, then, is not just “why these women were forgotten” but also “why we forgot them.” Gaines considers the “historical turn” in feminist film studies, arguing that scholars must be mindful of how they narrativize and rewrite the rediscovered facts of women’s work in cinema.

Sangita Gopal, “ Feminism and the Big Picture: Conversations ,” Cinema Journal 57, no. 2 (2018): 131–36.

In this fascinating article, Gopal synthesizes responses to a series of questions posed to film scholars regarding feminist theory, praxis, and pedagogy, as well as feminism as “an unfinished project” and feminist media studies as a “boundless” field. Where theory is concerned, Gopal usefully highlights Lingzhen Wang’s and Priya Jaikumar’s suggestions for more explicitly linking and situating feminist media studies within “the big picture.” Notably, Jaikumar ponders the possibilities of feminism creating a framework such that “it is not possible to ask a question if it is absent of a politics.”

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✍️Essay on Feminism for Students: Samples 150, 250 Words

Updated on
Nov 2, 2023

In a society, men and women should be considered equal in every aspect. This thought is advocated by a social and political movement i.e. feminism . The word feminism was coined by the French Philosopher Charles Fourier in 1837. He was known for his strong belief in equal rights for women as men in every sector, be it the right to vote, right to work, right to decide, right to participate in public life, right to own property, etc. Feminism advocates the rights of women with respect to the equality of gender . There are different types of feminism i.e. liberal, radical, Marxist, cultural, and eco-feminism. Stay tuned and have a look at the following sample essay on feminism!

Also Read: Popular Struggles and Movements

Essay on Feminism 150 Words

India is a land of diversity of which 52.2% are women as per an estimate for the year 2023. This doesn’t mean that every woman is getting basic fundamental rights in society. We should not neglect the rights of women and treat them as a weaker sex. Women are equally strong and capable as men. To advocate this thought a movement called Feminism came into existence in 1837. Feminism is a movement that advocates the equality of women in social, political, and economic areas.

India is up eight notches in #WorldEconomicForum ’s annual gender ranking. And Iceland is #1 for women, again, for the 14th year in a row. @namitabhandare ’s newsletter, #HTMindtheGap looks at why. Plus the week’s other gender stories https://t.co/9Fen6TaEnb Subscribe here… pic.twitter.com/r6XfFMINO0 — Hindustan Times (@htTweets) June 25, 2023

Traditionally, women were believed to stay at home and there were severe restrictions imposed on them. They were not allowed to go out, study, work, vote, own property, etc. However, with the passage of time, people are becoming aware of the objective of feminism. Any person who supports feminism and is a proponent of equal human rights for women is considered a feminist.

Feminism is a challenge to the patriarchal systems existing in society. Despite this strong movement burning in high flames to burn the orthodox and dominant culture, there are still some parts of the world that are facing gender inequality. So, it is our duty to make a world free of any discrimination.

Essay on Feminism 250 Words

Talking about feminism in a broader sense, then, it is not restricted only to women. It refers to the equality of every sex or gender. Some people feel offended by the concept of feminism as they take it in the wrong way. There is a misconception that only women are feminists. But this is not the case. Feminists can be anyone who supports the noble cause of supporting the concept of providing equal rights to women.

Feminism is not restricted to single-sex i.e. women, but it advocates for every person irrespective of caste, creed, colour, sex, or gender. As an individual, it is our duty to help every person achieve equal status in society and eradicate any kind of gender discrimination .

Equality helps people to live freely without any traditional restrictions. At present, the Government of India is also contributing to providing equal rights to the female sector through various Government schemes like Beti Bachao Beti Padhao, Pradhan Mantri Mahila Shakti Kendra, One Stop Center, and many more.

Apart from these Government policies, campaigns like reproductive rights or abortion of unwanted pregnancy also give women the right to choose and lead their life without any external authority of a male.

Feminism has also supported the LGBTIQA+ community so that people belonging to this community could come out and reveal their identity without any shame. The concept of feminism also helped them to ask for equal rights as men and women. Thus, it could be concluded that feminism is for all genders and a true feminist will support every person to achieve equal rights and hold a respectable position in society.

Check Out: Women Equality Day

Kajal Thareja

Hi, I am Kajal, a pharmacy graduate, currently pursuing management and is an experienced content writer. I have 2-years of writing experience in Ed-tech (digital marketing) company. I am passionate towards writing blogs and am on the path of discovering true potential professionally in the field of content marketing. I am engaged in writing creative content for students which is simple yet creative and engaging and leaves an impact on the reader's mind.

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PDF From Classic to Current: Inspiring Essays on Feminism
The Future is Feminist: Radical, Funny, and Inspiring Writing by Women. Chronicle Books, 2019. 144 pages. $24.95, ISBN 978-1452168333. We've all heard the saying or seen the T-shirts: "The future is feminist!" Now we have the book to confirm it. Between these brightly colored cov-ers are 21 essays about feminism's past, present, and future.
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The fetishization of the beauty of other- ness can operate as problem and as solution. An equation designed to sus- tain simultaneously the three loaded terms of race, feminism, and aesthetics yields contradictory moral and political ramifications that far exceed the. kind of resolutions we currently possess.
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Important topics for feminist theory and politics include: the body, class and work, disability, the family, globalization, human rights, popular culture, race and racism, reproduction, science, the self, sex work, and sexuality. Extended discussion of these topics is included in the sub-entries. Introduction.
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Feminism provides a worldview with innovative possibilities for scholarship and activism on behalf of families and intimate relationships. As a flexible framework capable of engaging with contentious theoretical ideas and the urgency of social change, feminism offers a simultaneous way to express an epistemology (knowledge), a methodology (the production of knowledge), an ontology (one's ...
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Essay on Feminism for Students: Samples 150, 250 Words
Essay on Feminism 250 Words. Talking about feminism in a broader sense, then, it is not restricted only to women. It refers to the equality of every sex or gender. Some people feel offended by the concept of feminism as they take it in the wrong way. There is a misconception that only women are feminists. But this is not the case.
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C. Feminism and the Diversity of Women

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Feminist Film Theory: An Introductory Reading List

Laura Mulvey, “ Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema ,” Screen 16, no. 3 (1975): 6–18.

“ Feminism and Film: Critical Approaches ,” Camera Obscura 1, no. 1 (1976): 3–10.

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Michelle Criton, Julia Lesage, Judith Mayne, B. Ruby Rich, and Anna Marie Taylor, “ Women and Film: A Discussion of Feminist Aesthetics ,” New German Critique no. 13 (1978): 83–107.

Judith Mayne, “ Feminist Film Theory and Criticism ,” Signs 11, no. 1 (1985): 81–100.

Jane Gaines, “ White Privilege and Looking Relations: Race and Gender in Feminist Film Theory ,” Cultural Critique , no. 4 (1986): 59–79.

Noël Carroll, “ The Image of Women in Film: A Defense of a Paradigm ,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 48, no. 4 (1990): 349–60.

Karen Hollinger, “ Theorizing Mainstream Female Spectatorship: The Case of the Popular Lesbian Film ,” Cinema Journal 37, no. 2 (1998): 3–17.

Corinn Columpar, “ The Gaze As Theoretical Touchstone: The Intersection of Film Studies, Feminist Theory, and Postcolonial Theory ,” Women’s Studies Quarterly 30, no. 1/2 (2002): 25–44.

Janell Hobson, “ Viewing in the Dark: Toward a Black Feminist Approach to Film ,” Women’s Studies Quarterly 30, no. 1/2 (2002): 45–59.

E. Ann Kaplan, “ Global Feminisms and the State of Feminist Film Theory ,” Signs 30, no. 1 (2004): 1236–48.

Jane M. Gaines, “ Film History and the Two Presents of Feminist Film Theory ,” Cinema Journal 44, no. 1 (2004): 113–19.

Sangita Gopal, “ Feminism and the Big Picture: Conversations ,” Cinema Journal 57, no. 2 (2018): 131–36.

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✍️Essay on Feminism for Students: Samples 150, 250 Words

Essay on Feminism 150 Words

Essay on Feminism 250 Words

Kajal Thareja

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