white collar crime case study uk

10 White Collar Crime Cases That Made Headlines

Since the collapse of Enron a decade ago due to shoddy and deceptive accounting practices, America has become more aware of the seriousness of white collar crimes. The work of a small handful of people can result in the demise of a multi-billion dollar company, the complete loss of value of its stock, and most problematically, the loss of numerous jobs ranging from the innocent higher-ups to the hardworking office managers. The next time you hear about someone receiving a 12-year sentence because of a marijuana offense, remember the real harm done in these cases of corporate corruption.

1. Enron collapse

With revenues exceeding $100 billion and the distinction of being named by Fortune as “America’s Most Innovative Company,” Enron was a seemingly indestructible energy giant during the beginning of the 2000s. However, even during its rise in the ’90s, rumors swirled that it was involved in illegal accounting procedures with its accounting firm Arthur Anderson, then one of the “Big Five” accounting firms. Jeffrey Skilling, who served as president COO and CEO, along with a staff he assembled, hid billions of dollars of debt through poor financial reporting, accounting loopholes and the use of special purpose entities. Andrew Fastow, COO, deceived the board of directors about the company’s accounting practices and convinced Arthur Anderson to go along for the ride. After stocks plummeted, the SEC conducted an investigation that ultimately resulted in the 24-year, 4-month prison sentence of Skilling and six-year sentence of Fastow. Founder Kenneth Lay died of a heart attack before he was sentenced.

2. Worldcom accounting scandal

Enron’s impressive collapse was followed by the implosion of Worldcom, which was the doing of CEO Bernard Ebbers. His plan to compensate for the downturn of the telecommunications industry in 2000 and Worldcom’s declining stock included the use of fraudulent accounting methods in order to deceive investors into thinking the company was in good health. The underreporting of line costs and inflation of revenues accumulated $3.8 billion in fraud and ended with the company’s bankruptcy, then the largest in U.S. history. Ebbers, who resigned from Worldcom in April 2002, was sentenced to 25 years in prison for conspiracy and securities fraud and filing false statements with securities regulators.

3. Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme

The word “Ponzi” was introduced into America’s lexicon in late 2008 when Madoff was arrested and charged with securities fraud. The former lifeguard, sprinkler installer and chairman of NASDAQ managed to build a multi-billion dollar investment firm with false trading reports and without assistance from the major derivatives firms, each of which refused to trade with him. Although he had been suspected of being a sham a decade before, it wasn’t until 2008 that he was arrested after his misdeeds were reported by one of his sons. In 2009, he pled guilty to 11 federal crimes including securities fraud, money laundering, and theft from an employee benefit plan. The penalty: 150 years in prison and $170 billion in restitution — investors lost billions of dollars due to the scandal, and three people involved with the business, including Bernie’s son Mark, committed suicide.

4. InStock trading scandal

Another chapter in the white collar crime saga of the early 2000s, the InStock trading scandal made headlines because of the involvement of Martha Stewart, who sold about $230,000 of the company’s stock a day before an experimental cancer drug failed to gain FDA approval. Memorably, she was found guilty of obstruction of justice, conspiracy and lying about a stock sale, and served five months in prison. Founder Samuel Waskal, who advised friends and family to sell stock and attempted to sell his own stock prior to the announcement, pled guilty to charges of bank fraud, securities fraud, obstruction of justice and perjury. He was sentenced to a seven-year, three-month prison sentence in 2009, but was released in 2009.

5. Adelphia collapse

At the time of its bankruptcy in 2002, Adelphia was the fifth-largest cable provider in the U.S., and in 2003, it generated more than $3.6 billion in revenue — that’s just $1.3 billion more than the off-balance-sheet debt accumulated by the company, which led to its demise. John Rigas, the founder, and Timothy Rigas, his son who ran the company, are currently serving 15-and 20-year prison sentences respectively for embezzling the money from corporate investors and using corporate funds as their own. Adelphia’s run of more than 50 years officially ended in 2006 when the remainder of its revenue-generating assets were purchased by Comcast and Time Warner.

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6. tyco accounting scandal.

A year after he was named one of the top 25 corporate managers of 2001 by Business Week , it was uncovered that Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski, along with former CFO Mark Swartz, stole more than $150 million from the company, including $2 million that was used for a birthday party for Kozlowski’s wife that was thrown in Sardinia. The thieving men were spared after their first trial was declared a mistrial because a juror said she received a letter urging her to side with the prosecution. The second trial ended with the convictions of Kozlowski and Swartz as both were sentenced to no less than eight years and four months in prison.

7. HealthSouth accounting scandal

One of the largest comprehensive rehabilitative services companies in the country, HealthSouth had been suspected of unethical financial practices since its emergence in the late ’80s. Under the leadership of Richard Scrushy, it was discovered that it falsified at least $2.7 billion worth of profits between 1996 and 2002 and later agreed to pay $325 million for allegedly defrauding Medicare and other federal healthcare programs, according to the Department of Justice. Scrushy was acquitted of charged related to the matter, but later sentenced to a six-year, 10-month prison sentence for bribery in mail fraud in an unrelated case.

8. Jack Abramoff lobbying scandal

In an unmistakably Washington saga deserving of its own movie, Abramoff’s cluster of scandals had far-reaching consequences implicating politicians and even the mob. In 2006, he pled guilty to fraud, conspiracy and tax evasion for his efforts to cheat Indian casino gambling interests out of roughly $85 million in fees. A couple of months later, he was sentenced to 70 months in prison for using a fake wire transfer in order to qualify for a $60 million loan in the purchase of SunCruz Casinos, a deal which resulted in the murder of former owner Konstantinos “Gus” Boulis. Most notably, then-Republican Ohio Representative Bob Ney was sentenced to a prison term for accepting bribes from Abramoff, helping the Democrats in their effort to gain a majority in Congress during the 2006 midterm elections.

9. Countrywide political loan scandal (and contribution to the subprime mortgage crisis)

Politicians and big businesses need each other. And while their relationships are often too cozy, as evidenced by the Countrywide political loan scandal of 2008 and 2009, as long as campaigns are privately financed and businesses have stake in the political game, those uncomfortable relationships will continue to exist. Former Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo can attest to the discomfort, as his Friends of Angelo program, which provided politicians mortgage financing at noncompetitive rates, helped tarnish his already floundering reputation. He resigned on July 1, 2008 and a later reached settlement with the SEC in which he agreed to pay $67.5 million in fines because he misled shareholders regarding the internal dealings of the company.

10. Marcus Schrenker fraud and attempted fake death

Although he didn’t wield the same kind of power as guys such as Lay, Ebbers or Kozlowski, Schrenker, who owned three financial companies, accumulated a bounty of wealth as an investment advisor responsible for multi-million dollar pension funds. But it all disappeared in an instant. His failure to inform seven investors of high fees for switching annuities, and the resulting loss of $250,000, brought forth a complaint from The Indiana Department of Insurance in 2008 that intensified suspicion of his unethical practices. Ultimately, the expiration of his Indiana state financial adviser’s license prompted an investigation. In 2009, instead of facing the consequences of his action, Schrenker attempted to fake his death by faking a plane crash, parachuting out before the damage was done. He was eventually captured and sentences to four years in prison for the fiasco. He still faces charges of securities fraud.

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UK White Collar Crime Outlook

Ryan D. Junck Andrew M. Good Vanessa K. McGoldrick Jason Williamson Molly Brien Jack Zaher

Below is a summary of recent developments and enforcement trends in the UK white collar crime space in the first quarter of 2024.

I. New Legislation

The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 (ECCTA) became law in the UK in October 2023, and although certain parts are not yet fully in force, the act contains key legislative changes around which companies should anticipate making related updates to their compliance programs. The updates include the following:

• The term “senior managers” will likely cover those who are in the direct chain of management or who are in strategic or compliance roles, and may include company directors, senior officers who are not board members and potentially individuals in departments such as HR, in-house lawyers, and regional or division managers in national organisations.
• To help mitigate the risks of offences being committed by a “senior manager”, companies should consider whether their structures provide adequate oversight and if the policies and training in place are appropriate and understood at all levels of the organisation.
• This is a new strict liability offence, modelled on the “failure to prevent” offences previously introduced in the UK ( i.e. , failure to prevent bribery and the facilitation of tax evasion), with only two defences: (i) the company was the intended victim of the fraud; or (ii) the company can demonstrate that it had reasonable fraud prevention procedures in place, or that it was reasonable not to have such procedures.
• Government guidance is pending and, once that is published, the offence will come into force. Companies should consider conducting appropriate risk assessments, updating policies and procedures and rolling out employee training to mitigate risk from this new offence.
• Changes enacted to date include: (i) greater powers to query information and request supporting evidence; (ii) “stronger checks” on company names; (iii) new rules for registered office addresses (all companies must have an “appropriate address” at all times and will not be able to use a PO Box); (iv) greater powers to tackle and remove factually inaccurate information; and (v) the ability to share data with other government departments and law enforcement agencies.
• See our previous client alert “ Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 – Key Developments ” for summaries of the key changes.

II. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) Developments

• Key changes proposed include (i) publicly announcing when the FCA has opened an enforcement investigation, including the identity of the subject of the investigation, and (ii) publishing updates on the investigation if the FCA considers doing so to be “in the public interest”.
• The consultation closed at the end of April 2024.
• The survey requested high-level, aggregated statistics on: (i) the number of NFM incidents recorded by type/category ( e.g. , sexual harassment, bullying or discrimination); (ii) the method by which these incidents were detected ( e.g. , whistleblowing or firm surveillance); (iii) the outcomes of those incidents ( e.g. , dismissal of employee, written warning or dismissal of unsupported complaint); and (iv) the number of further outcomes recorded ( e.g. , nondisclosure agreements and employment tribunals).
• Although it is not yet clear how the FCA will use the information obtained from survey recipients, in requesting the survey, the authority stated that it “expect[s] firms to have effective systems in place to identify and mitigate risks relating to nonfinancial misconduct. Should allegations or evidence of nonfinancial misconduct become known, we expect a regulated firm to take them seriously, have the internal procedures to investigate them promptly and fairly, and to take appropriate action when allegations are upheld”.
• FCA regulated and non-FCA regulated entities alike should be attune to the concerns and expectations of the FCA and reflect upon their systems and procedures for handling NFM allegations.

III. A ‘New Dawn’ for the Serious Fraud Office (SFO)

• Companies should ensure that personnel are trained for the possibility of a dawn raid and are thoroughly briefed on the correct procedures to follow.
• On 10 January 2024, Damian Williams, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York (SDNY), announced the creation of his office’s Whistleblower Pilot Program, which provides notice of the requirements for individuals who wish to self-disclose criminal conduct and cooperate with the government in exchange for a nonprosecution agreement.
• See our previous article “ US Attorney for SDNY Launches Whistleblower Program To Encourage Self-Disclosure by Individuals ” for more details.
• Reiterating his commitment to explore options for incentivising whistleblowers in the UK, on 13 May 2024, Director Ephgrave, speaking before the House of Commons’ Justice Committee, argued that whistleblowers in the UK should be paid for providing “smoking gun evidence” of wrongdoing from any corporate settlement they help bring about, in order to compensate them for the risk of coming forward.
• Regardless of how the incentivisation of whistleblowers develops in the near future, the SFO’s renewed interest in whistleblowing serves as a timely reminder for companies to review policies and procedures to ensure that they align with best practice.
• The SFO has been granted expanded pre-investigative powers.  The ECCTA recently extended the SFO’s pre-investigative (Section 2A) powers enabling the SFO to compel individuals and companies to provide information before a formal investigation has been opened. This power will no longer be limited to suspected international bribery and corruption and will extend to circumstances where the SFO has “reasonable grounds to suspect” that an offence involving serious or complex fraud, including domestic bribery or corruption, has taken place.
• The strategy also includes a commitment to “explore” incentivising whistleblowers, echoing Director Ephgrave’s previous comments on this subject.
• At the international level, the strategy involves a commitment to strengthen operations through the deployment of Criminal Overseas Production Orders (which we discussed in a previous Cross-Border Investigations Update ) and to enhance the SFO’s global engagement strategy.

This memorandum is provided by Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP and its affiliates for educational and informational purposes only and is not intended and should not be construed as legal advice. This memorandum is considered advertising under applicable state laws.

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White-Collar Crime Statistics

Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs is performing a long-running crackdown on white-collar crime such as fraud, piracy and cybercrime. But exactly how common are these types of offence and how are they committed?

DBT & Partners have collected a range of white-collar crime uk statistics in order to explore this illegal field.

What is White Collar Crime?

White-collar crime is often downplayed in general conversation as a victimless crime that isn’t too serious. However, in the UK it is a serious offence and is characterised by actions that are deceitful or involve concealment with the aim to hold onto assets or be rid of them.

All of these actions must be done with the aim to gain a personal advantage, or a business advantage to be counted as white-collar crime. This can be through actions such as fraud, money laundering or embezzlement.

Even though it is classified as a non-violent crime, some of these actions can cause irreparable harm to individuals or businesses, either financially or emotionally.

UK Forgery and Fraud Statistics

Top types of fraud reported.

Fraud has become a category of crime continuously growing at an incredibly fast rate, with 39% of all crimes being recognised as fraud according to the most recent estimate from the Telephone-operated Crime Survey.

Even throughout the pandemic, fraud was found to have grown by nearly a quarter (24%) despite other crime categories falling in the number of reports made.

Despite the last two years showing a fluctuation in fraud cases, the overall growth of fraud-related crimes grew by 25% in 2022 in comparison to 2021, amounting to 4.5 million crimes in the last year alone.

Looking at the last two years (2020 – 2021), we can see how the amount of different types of fraud has changed by analysing the number of crimes that were reported to the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau:

• Total number of fraud crimes in March 2020 – 748,321
• Total number of fraud crimes in March 2021 – 797,879
• Total number of fraud crimes in March 2022 – 936,276

With online shopping taking the prime spot for nearly all customer interaction, fraudsters seem to have re-directed their target as the top types of fraud-related crimes for 2022 were consumer and retail fraud crimes and advance fee fraud – according to ONS .

According to the NCA , the organisations battling fraud saw high levels of reports that had high harm and high volume rate, including investment and romance fraud.

According to a report from Action Fraud, the UK’s national reporting centre for fraud and cybercrime, in 2021 there was £2.35bn lost in reported losses and the top three fraud types were:

• Other financial investment – £318m
• Cheque, plastic card and online bank accounts – £184m
• Share sales or boiler room fraud – £171m

Bogus tradespeople, computer virus attacks, dating scams, fake loan frauds, hacking of social media or email, investment fraud, mandate fraud, retail/consumer fraud and ticket fraud were also particularly prevalent.

How much money has been lost through fraud over the past year?

The most recent white-collar crime statistics show that the UK is losing around £190 billion to fraud per year. This includes:

• £140 billion for the private sector
• £40 billion for the public sector
• £10 billion for individuals

Further information on losses for individuals shows that i n 2022, the majority of those affected by fraudulent crime lost £250 or less , with the median loss amounting to £79. However, 14% lost between £250 and £999 and 9% lost £1,000 or more. 

Where do people commit fraud most and least?

The southeast of England seems to host the largest number of fraud cases. Essex is top for consumer fraud and bank fraud, with 12.7 and 12.2 reports per 10,000 people respectively. The national average for each is 11.3 and 5.4.

London sees the most fraud involving online shopping, ticketing and investment (17, 4.5 and 1.9 reports per 10,000 people respectively, with a national average of 13, 2.2 and 1.3).

Hertfordshire is the area with the highest amount of social media and email hacking. 3.5 reports are made per 10,000 people while the national average is 2.5.

Surrey sees peak numbers of mandate fraud (3.3 reports per 10,000 people with a national average of 2), computer virus attacks (2.5 with a national average of 1.9) and bogus tradespeople (3.2 with a national average of 1.8).

Sussex is home to the highest number of dating scams, with 1.9 reported for every 10,000 people (the national average is 1.1).

The Midlands and East Anglia also have their fair share of fraud, with:

Northamptonshire seeing the country’s largest amounts of fake loan fraud (1.8 reports per 10,000 people with a national average of 1.2) Warwickshire home to the highest numbers of advance fee fraud (15.8 with a national average of 11.9) Norfolk seeing peak levels of computer fixing fraud (10.3 with a national average of 5.9)

Who are fraudsters targeting?

According to top fraud and forgery statistics, the average age of an individual reporting a scam was 49, with the majority of victims in most categories of fraud falling between the ages of 40 and 60.

Rental fraud was a clear outlier, with the average victim age being 33. However, this is probably due to a younger demographic being more likely to rent.

Victims of ticket fraud, online shopping fraud and auction fraud had an average age of 37.

UK Counterfeit and Pirated Goods Statistics

Which industries are most affected by counterfeit products.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has reported that between 2017 and 2019, the rise in value of counterfeit goods was equivalent to 3.3% of trade worldwide. The amount itself rose from $461 billion to $509 billion.

The two industries most affected are tobacco and clothing. They are followed by footwear and perfume (on an even footing), then watches and jewellery, alcohol, electrical goods, toys and DVDs.

When it comes to the most popular locations for the sale of counterfeit goods, statistics show ordinary shops coming out on top at more than 70%. Social media is next at just 10% less, then websites and private residences. In order, the next most common are:

• Auction sites
• Outdoor markets
• Street sales
• Pubs and clubs
• Car boot sales
• Factories and industrial units

Following the pandemic, counterfeit and pirated goods began to dominate markets, from handbags to shoes, tech and currency. Taking advantage of consumers who are not able to tell the difference between legitimate products and counterfeit ones. 

Where do the most counterfeit and pirated goods come from?

The People’s Republic of China is the source of the vast majority of counterfeit and pirated goods, with between 50 and 60% of products of this kind sourced there.

The next most prolific locations are:

• Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

In the UK, some of the most common locations for the illegal production of counterfeit goods include “sweat shops” in Leicester, Birmingham and Manchester.

How are fake goods transported?

The highest value of counterfeit goods is sent via sea, with 56% being transported in this way. In order, the next most popular methods include:

• Courier (8%)
• By road (7%)
• By rail (2%)

However, the number of customs seizures sees just 10% of counterfeit goods overall being transported by sea.

• 57% by mail
• 12% by courier

Which companies and businesses are most affected by counterfeiting?

In 2019, the most popular brands for counterfeiters to reproduce have been:

• The North Face
• Louis Vuitton
• Tiffany and Co.
• Polo Ralph Lauren

How much did counterfeit and pirated products amount to in 2019?

The amount made by pirates and counterfeiters in 2019 equated to approximately £9.3 billion. These goods made up the value of around 4% of UK imports.

£4 billion worth of tax revenue was lost in this way, equating to the amount that would be made through 60,000 UK jobs.

The expected worldwide value of counterfeiting and international trade by the end of 2022 is $3 trillion, according to OECD data.

Which countries does counterfeiting affect the most?

The US is one of the biggest victims of counterfeiting. In 2016, American brands made up 24% of those counterfeited worldwide. The following countries also suffered considerably as a result of this kind of offence:

• France (with 17% of counterfeit goods based on French brands)
• Italy (15%)
• Switzerland (11%)
• Germany (9%)

Other targets include companies from Singapore, Hong Kong, Brazil and China.

The demand side of the fraud equation

So how many people are searching for counterfeit products?

The collaboration between Nike and Kanye West appears to attract the highest number of people looking for “knock-offs”. The current most popular internet searches for counterfeit goods per month include:

• “Fake Airpods” (51,000)
• “Fake Rolex” (40,000)
• “Maison Margiela Replica” (38,000)
• “Fake Balenciaga” (6,800)
• “Fake Gucci” (14,000)
• “Fake Gucci Belt” (15,000)
• “Fake Adidas” (1,800)
• “Fake Jordans” (11,000)
• “Fake Louis Vuitton” (11,000)
• “Fake Yeezy” (16,000)
• “Fake Nikes” (2,900)
• “Fake Yeezys zebra” (5,400)
• “Cheap Nikes from China” (3,600)
• “Replica Nikes” (2,900)

Embezzlement

How long do embezzlement schemes last.

The average embezzlement scheme lasts 4.7 years.

Are men or women more likely to commit embezzlement?

While more women tend to commit embezzlement than men, the average male embezzler tends to work with higher amounts.

What is the average prison sentence for embezzlement cases?

Typically, an individual found guilty of embezzlement may be jailed for up to five years. They are also often served with a fine.

What percentage of organisations are affected by cyber-attacks?

Over the past year, 32% of businesses and 22% of charities worldwide have fallen victim to cyber-attacks. However, this number is gradually falling – as in 2017, 46% of businesses reported being affected by this kind of offence.

On average, a business that has experienced a breach or cyber attack loses £4,180 in a year as a result.

How often do attacks occur?

There were an estimated 65,000 attacks on small businesses within the UK in 2018, totalling approximately 178 per day.

Globally, this equates to 1,824,000 attacks – or around 5,000 attacks per day.

Which country is hit the hardest by cyber-attacks?

From 2006 to 2018, the following countries experienced the highest numbers of significant cyber attacks:

• The US (117 cyberattacks with losses of more than $1 million each)
• India (35 major attacks)
• South Korea (34 major attacks)
• China (25 major attacks)
• UK (25 major attacks)
• Israel (24 major attacks)
• Ukraine (23 major attacks)
• Russia (16 major attacks)

Countries in the “rest of the world” category have seen approximately 165 incidents in total.

H3: Which countries commit the most cyberattacks?

The source of the majority of cyberattacks is estimated to be China. The country was believed to be involved in 108 major cyber-attacks between 2006 and 2018. Following this, the most prolific cyber attackers are based in:

• Russia (98 major incidents)
• Iran (44 major incidents)
• North Korea (38 major incidents)
• India (16 major incidents)
• US (9 major incidents)

What percentage of UK data breaches were due to ransomware?

12% of cyber attacks on businesses in the UK were due to ransomware, as were 7% of attacks on charities.

The most common form of cyber-attack by a significant margin was perpetrated through fraudulent emails or redirection to fraudulent sites. This made up 80% of attacks on businesses and 81% of attacks on charities respectively.

H3: What percentage of victimized organisations paid the associated ransoms?

According to our collected white-collar crime statistics, around 58% of affected UK companies agree to pay the requested ransom when attacked by ransomware. This is despite guidance from the FBI and the National Crime Agencies warning against doing this.

Explore our other insight pages including the statistics about the World Trade Organisation.

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London met repository london met repository london met repository, the investigation of white collar crime in england and wales and france: a comparative study.

Johnstone, Peter (1999) The investigation of white collar crime in England and Wales and France: a comparative study. Doctoral thesis, London Guildhall University.

The investigation of white collar crime in England & Wales has traditionally been conducted by the police. As the need for specialisation has increased the police forces have responded with the formation of fraud squads. These departments comprise of detective officers who have been trained to gather evidence where the criminal offender is operating within the financial and business sectors. Ten years ago the UK government supported the introduction of the Serious Fraud Office who are authorised to investigate and prosecute the most serious cases of white collar crime. The power vested in the SFO has caused considerable concern over the years and cases have been brought before the European Court of Human Rights where the authority to demand answers to questions has been challenged as an abrogation of the fundamental principal that a person cannot be forced to incriminate themselves. In France white collar crimes are investigated by a professional judge. The role of this magistrate has been criticised as they have a considerable power to control the contents of the file of evidence and also, they are allowed to decide on the liberty of the suspect before trial. To many commentators this power is in direct conflict with the ability of the magistrate to remain impartial. White collar criminals have identified an emerging financial market within the European Community and they are aware of the differences that exist in methods and procedures in England & Wales and France. These differences provide fertile territory within which the fraudster can gain. This thesis investigates the differences that exist in respect of the investigation and prosecution of white collar crime in both countries, it then discusses the future role that investigators and regulators will have to perform, if they are to effectively deter and prevent greater criminal activity within individual and cross border jurisdictions.

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White-Collar Crime 2023

England & wales, law and practice, trends and developments.

9BR Chambers is a leading set of barristers’ chambers specialising in all aspects of domestic and international criminal law, as well as extradition, disciplinary, regulatory law and other related matters. Based in the heart of legal London, 9BR Chambers combines the traditional core values of the Bar with a progressive, dynamic and commercially aware approach to the realities of modern practice. Barristers at 9BR Chambers frequently act in some of the most high-profile cases in the courts of England & Wales and in international courts and tribunals.

1. Legal Framework

1.1 classification of criminal offences.

Criminal Offences in England & Wales

Criminal offences are divided into summary and indictable offences. Summary offences are dealt with in the magistrates’ courts, where proceedings are presided over by a District Judge or lay magistrates. Indictable offences are more serious and are heard in the Crown Court, where there is a right to trial by jury and judges have greater sentencing powers. Certain indictable offences may be dealt with in the magistrates’ courts if the crimes charged are deemed to merit sentencing within the powers of that court.

An individual or body corporate can be liable for a criminal offence if:

• the requisite external elements of the offence are established, such as the prohibited act, omission or state of affairs, together with any specified consequences (the “actus reus”); and
• the requisite “fault” elements of the offence are established, such as intention, recklessness, knowledge, negligence or strict liability (the “mens rea”).

In addition to substantive offences, the law criminalises various inchoate offences, such as encouragement to commit crime, attempt to commit crime and conspiracy to commit crime.

The Definition of White-Collar Crime

There is no definition in law of what constitutes a white-collar crime. However, it is apparent that “white-collar crime” has the potential to encompass a wide range of offending conduct, both by individuals and by corporates. It usually implies a connection with the carrying on of a business or profession but is narrower than the general term “economic crime” (see the Crown Prosecution Service’s Economic Crime Strategy (2025)).

1.2 Statute of Limitations

Limitation Periods for Criminal Offences

For summary offences, the general rule is that the application for a summons must be served on the magistrates’ court within six months of the time the offence was committed. However, an offence-creating statute may specify a different starting point, such as the date when the prosecutor has sufficient evidence to justify a charge. Otherwise, there is no statute of limitations or other overarching limitation rule. A prosecution for indictable offences can be commenced at any time and address offending conduct of any age.

1.3 Extraterritorial Reach

The General Rule on Jurisdiction

The criminal courts have the jurisdiction to try any offence under the law of England & Wales, wherever in the world that offence may have been committed. Whether the offending conduct amounts, in fact, to a criminal offence depends on the extraterritorial provisions of the laws themselves.

The General Rule on Territoriality

The general rule is that a criminal offence under the law of England & Wales applies within the realm of England & Wales only, and does not extend beyond those territories. For a criminal offence to have extraterritorial effect in law, this must be specifically provided for by statute. However, R v Smith (Wallace Duncan) (No 4) [2004] EWCA Crim 631 established that a crime may be regarded as having been committed in England & Wales if a “substantial part” of the offence took place within the jurisdiction. There are specific rules governing cross-frontier inchoate offences, such as conspiracy and attempt, which shall not be addressed here.

Extraterritoriality and White-Collar Crimes

The global nature of modern business means that the prosecution and defence of white-collar crime frequently involve consideration of extraterritorial and cross-frontier provisions. Offences such as fraud, false accounting and false statements by company directors are given extraterritorial effect by the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (CJA 1993). Those provisions were designed to cope with the type of modern, multi-jurisdictional offending that is frequently a feature of white-collar crime. Offences under the Bribery Act 2010 (BA 2010) were given specific extraterritorial effect within the Act itself, and offences are justiciable in England & Wales if committed abroad as long as the offender has a “close connection” with the UK.

The fact that the same offending conduct may constitute a criminal offence in more than one country does not preclude it being a criminal offence justiciable in England & Wales. However, considerations of what is commonly known as “double jeopardy” (and specifically pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict) will apply. This often leads to conflict, or enforced co-operation, between investigating and prosecuting bodies from different countries.

1.4 Corporate Liability and Personal Liability

Corporate Criminal Liability and White-Collar Crime

Corporations are a type of “non-natural person” that can be liable for criminal offences. A non-natural person is a legal entity that has a legal personality distinct from that of its constituent individuals. Incorporated bodies include entities such as a public limited company (plc) and a private limited company (Ltd.), and a limited liability partnership (LLP). Given that many corporates are involved in the carrying out of some business or other, the law of corporate criminal liability features heavily in white-collar criminal practice.

Corporate Criminal Liability via the “Identification Principle”

A corporate may be liable for a criminal offence that requires not only an actus reus but also a mens rea by way of the “identification principle”. A corporate can be held criminally liable for acts and omissions committed by a natural person if that person is “identified” with the corporate (sometimes described as the individual being a “directing mind and will” of the corporate). The acts or omissions of the individual are taken to be the acts or omissions of the corporate.

The test of which individuals can be “identified” with the corporate was first set out in the case of Tesco Supermarkets v Nattrass [1972] AC 153: the fundamental point is that the person must be in such a position within the corporate that they are properly to be regarded as exercising the powers of the corporate, and not merely acting as the corporate’s servant or agent. Generally, a corporate’s constitution and its memorandum/articles of association would define which individuals exercise the power of the corporate but other factors could have an impact, such as seniority of the individual, delegation of powers and chains of command within the corporate. These were referred to as the “primary rules of attribution”. In addition to the primary rules, the corporate could only be liable for an act of the relevant individual that is within the “scope” of their office with the company.

The test has been criticised because it tends to restrict the identification principle to a small subset of people, and thus puts significant limitations on the acts and omissions for which a corporate can be held criminally liable. In Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Limited v Securities Commission [1995] 2 AC 500, the Privy Council devised further “special” rules of attribution to sit alongside the primary rules. Essentially, the courts could look at the policy behind legislation to determine who, as a matter of law, should be taken to be capable of being identified with the corporate beyond those identified by the primary rules of attribution. In this way, the individuals through whom liability could attach might be expanded to a wider range of employees, servants or agents. The question of when it is appropriate to go beyond the primary rules of attribution was addressed in St Regis Paper Co Limited [2011] EWCA Crim 2527.

Despite the criticism of the test from Tesco Supermarkets v Nattrass, it was affirmed as the relevant test in Serious Fraud Office v Barclays plc and Another [2018] EWHC 3055 (QB). In that case, the High Court also recognised further principles that applied when considering the identification principle, including that a corporate may delegate its powers and responsibilities to committees. The High Court acknowledged that the primary rules of attribution were very restrictive (perhaps disproportionately so when dealing with the operations of large corporates) but there was always the option for statutory offences to be created that dealt with this.

Statutes Defining Specific Rules of Corporate Criminal Liability

The limitations of the identification principle have led to the creation of corporate criminal offences with their own specific rules of criminal liability that do not have to rely on the identification principle. However, the law has developed in a piecemeal fashion and there has been no unified theory underpinning these various offences.

Section 7 of the BA 2010 created liability for a criminal offence for a commercial organisation if a person associated with it engages in bribery. The corporate entity is under a duty to conduct itself so that people associated with it do not commit bribery, albeit with a due diligence defence if adequate procedures have been put in place to prevent bribery. That can be contrasted with the offence of corporate manslaughter created by Section 1 of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (CMCHA 2007), under which a corporate can be liable for an offence if the way in which its activities are managed and organised causes a person’s death and amounts to a “gross breach of a relevant duty of care”.

Even where the law has created other “failure to prevent” offences, there are differences in the rules that apply. Corporate criminal liability as set out in the offences of failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion offences (under Sections 45 and 46 of the Criminal Finances Act 2007 (CFA 2017)) is worded differently from that in the failure to prevent bribery offence under Section 7 BA of the 2010, despite both following the “failure to prevent” model.

Corporate Criminal Liability for Strict/Absolute Liability Offences

A corporate may be liable for an offence of strict or absolute liability in the same way as a natural person, as there is no requirement for mens rea to be proved.

Corporates and Vicarious Liability

The general rule is that a person (corporate or otherwise) cannot be held criminally liable for the act of another to which they are not a party. However, a corporate can be held vicariously liable for the acts of employees or agents, where provided for by statute. This statutory vicarious liability is to be distinguished from personal liability of a corporate that may arise from a failure to prevent an employee or agent from doing a certain act, or liability for a breach of a duty imposed upon the corporate that has been delegated to an employee or agent.

Relationship Between Corporate Criminal Liability and Liability of Individuals

Subject to the rules outlined above, a corporate can be prosecuted in the same way as an individual, and can be prosecuted alongside individuals for the same offence. A corporate can also be prosecuted alongside its own directors, even if those directors are the directing wills and minds through which the corporate’s liability attaches. An individual can be liable as a secondary party under Section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 (AAA 1861) to an offence committed by a corporate, and vice versa. There is no rule or policy dictating whether the prosecution of an individual or a corporate takes primacy.

Individuals and corporates can be charged with conspiracy, although a corporate cannot conspire with an individual if that individual is the directing will and mind through which the corporate’s liability attaches.

If a corporate is liable for a criminal offence, it does not necessarily follow that its officers, agents or employees will also be liable, nor does the corporate’s liability necessarily prevent or extinguish the liability of individuals. Some statutes have specific provisions detailing the liability of associated individuals, such as employees, directors or managers, where a corporate is criminally liable (eg, where the corporate has committed the offence with the consent or connivance of the individual).

Criminal Liability of Corporates after Merger/Acquisition

As with an individual, where a corporate ceases to exist it no longer attracts criminal liability; if a corporate entity is extinguished in a merger or acquisition, then its criminal liability is extinguished with it. In the case of Serious Fraud Office v Amec Foster Wheeler Energy Limited [2021], the corporate concluded a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) in relation to historic bribery offences. After the indictment period, the corporate’s parent company was acquired twice by other companies in succession, but its existence as the same corporate entity continued. A DPA was able to be concluded in relation to that entity, and the court commented that the current parent company had given an undertaking to pay the financial penalty owed by the offending corporate, despite the fact that it had inherited no criminal liability through its acquisition.

1.5 Damages and Compensation

Compensation, Confiscation and White-Collar Criminal Offences

It is for a court to decide whether it should order a defendant found guilty of a criminal offence to pay compensation for any personal injury, loss or damage to the victim of that offence. Such compensation orders are governed by Sections 133 to 135 of the Sentencing Act 2020 (SA 2020). There is no special law or procedure for white-collar criminal offences that allows victims or other parties to make a claim for damages as part of the criminal proceedings.

The issue arose during the sentencing of Glencore Energy UK Limited for bribery offences (see Nigeria v Serious Fraud Office [2022] EWCR 2). The company had pleaded guilty to various offences of bribery, two of which had either been committed in Nigeria or had targeted officials in Nigeria. The Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN) claimed that it had suffered loss as a result of the corruption, but the SFO indicated that it would not be seeking a compensation order because the amount of compensation could not be readily ascertained (following the principle in R v Stapylton [2012] EWCA Crim 728). The court ruled that Sections 133 to 135 of the SA 2020 only allowed for submissions from the prosecution and the offender, and FRN (as a third party) did not have standing to make a compensation application (applying R v Bewick [2007] EWCA Crim 3297).

In addition to compensation, the Crown Court has the ability to make a confiscation order under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA 2002) to recover the proceeds of criminal offending. The statutory scheme governing confiscation orders is of general application, and there is no special scheme covering white-collar criminal offences. Confiscation does not technically apply to DPAs, but they may include disgorgement of profits that has a similar effect.

1.6 Recent Case Law and Latest Developments

Potential Reform – the Law of Corporate Criminal Liability

The Law Commission’s June 2022 report ( www.lawcom.gov.uk ) setting out options for the reform of corporate criminal liability followed complaints from prosecutors about the difficulties of using the identification principle to prosecute companies with complex management structures.

The government has opted against a complete overhaul of the law of corporate criminal liability in favour of retaining the individualistic approach. However, the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (ECCT Bill) (which, at the time of writing, is undergoing amendment and debate in Parliament) seeks to broaden the scope of the identification principle. Under the ECCT Bill, a corporate would be criminally liable for certain economic crimes if a “senior manager” committed the relevant offence (ie, someone who plays a significant role in making decisions about how the whole or a substantial part of the activities of a corporate are to be managed or organised, or who plays a significant role in the actual management or organisation of the whole or a substantial part of those activities). This replaces the “directing will and mind” test in relation to some specified economic offences.

Potential New White-Collar Criminal Offence – Failure to Prevent Fraud

The ECCT Bill includes provisions creating a new offence of failure of a corporate to prevent fraud. Originally, this failure to prevent offence had been restricted to “large organisations” (ie, corporates with two or more of the following attributes: i) a turnover more than GBP36 million; ii) a balance sheet total of more than GBP18 million; or iii) more than 250 employees), but amendments by the House of Lords expanded the proposed offence to all corporates, regardless of size. The Lords also amended the Bill to create an additional offence of failure to prevent money laundering. These amendments were rejected and, at the time of writing, it remains to be seen what will remain when the Bill receives final assent.

2. Enforcement

2.1 enforcement authorities.

Various authorities in England & Wales are tasked with investigating and prosecuting white-collar criminal offences.

• The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) has a general mandate to prosecute criminal offences in England & Wales, the investigation of which is usually carried out by the police, the National Crime Agency or other investigative bodies, such as HMRC.
• The SFO investigates and prosecutes serious and/or complex offences of fraud, bribery and corruption.
• The Insolvency Service has powers to investigate a director’s conduct and allegations of serious corporate abuse at limited companies and limited liability partnerships. Its Legal Services Directorate can conduct criminal proceedings for offences within the remit of the Department for Business and Trade.
• The Competition and Market Authority investigates unfair market activity and prosecutes criminal cartel offences.
• The Financial Conduct Authority is a regulatory body that also investigates and prosecutes offences relating to financial services.
• Various regional Trading Standards teams investigate and prosecute offences committed by rogue traders, including fraud.

2.2 Initiating an Investigation

There are myriad ways in which investigations into white-collar criminal offences can be initiated. Frequently, investigations will be commenced upon a complaint being made by an alleged victim of an offence. Given the potential overlap between the remits of some investigating bodies, it is not unusual for an investigation commenced by one investigating authority to be passed to another. It is also not unusual for investigations into large-scale corporate white-collar criminal offences to be initiated by tip-offs by insiders, co-operating suspects/defendants or whistle-blowers.

2.3 Powers of Investigation

It is not possible to give a summary of all the investigatory powers at the disposal of the authorities, nor the nuances of their particular powers or mandates. In general, investigating bodies such as the police have the following powers, among others:

• the power to arrest suspects and interview them under caution;
• the power to seize, image and retain documents, electronic devices (computers, servers, mobile telephones, etc), physical exhibits and any other material that may be relevant to an investigation;
• the power to compel third parties to produce material that they may hold that is relevant to an investigation; and
• requests for mutual legal assistance from foreign jurisdictions.

Generally, investigative authorities do not have the power to compel those under investigation to give statements, documents or other materials that could be incriminating. However, those under investigation can be served with notices to provide access to information from electronic devices and other material. Failure to provide such access can lead to prosecution.

Section 2 Notices/Section 60 Notices

A power that is encountered specifically in relation to the investigation of white-collar criminal offences is that possessed by the SFO under Section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 (CJA 1987). The SFO can require a person under investigation (or any other person who is reasonably believed to have relevant information) to answer questions or otherwise provide that information. It can also require the person to produce specified documents and provide explanations for them. It is a criminal offence to fail to comply with a Section 2 notice without reasonable excuse, which carries a maximum penalty of six months’ custody.

The power granted under Section 2 of the CJA 1987 seems like a departure from the general rule against self-incrimination. However, the information given by the subject of a Section 2 notice cannot be used against them in a subsequent prosecution for the offence under investigation. It may still be used, in specific circumstances, as evidence in a prosecution of offences other than those under investigation, or in a prosecution for making false or misleading statements in response to the notice.

A similar investigative power is available to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) by virtue of Section 60 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (SOCPA 2005) in respect of specified offences, many of which can fall under the umbrella of white-collar criminal offences. With the expansion of efforts to combat economic crime, the exercise of this power may well be used more readily.

2.4 Internal Investigations

There is nothing in law that requires corporates to undertake internal investigations in response to allegations or concerns about conduct within the corporate. However, regulatory rules and internal procedures will often cause corporates to investigate allegations of misconduct, in order to safeguard their reputation or business. Even if criminal liability is not made out or offences are not prosecuted, the approach taken by a corporate will undoubtedly have significance to regulators, the government or the public at large. A corporate that relies on business from public contracts may wish to show that it has “cleaned its house” so that it will be trusted to undertake such work and/or avoid debarment.

If a corporate is under investigation and wishes to secure a DPA, one of the key tests is whether the corporate has co-operated fully with the investigation. This includes the provision of witness accounts, documents and other information about the operations of the company. For this to be done properly, the corporate will likely have to conduct a thorough internal investigation.

Internal investigations are distinct from SFO or police investigations, and are not subject to the restrictions imposed by statute that afford a suspect rights. However, they are constrained by lacking the same powers as law enforcement officials. Whereas the corporate is usually in control of the materials within its own domain, it may not receive co-operation from third parties involved in the suspected misconduct or impropriety. The case of SFO v ENRC Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2006 established that materials produced in an internal investigation where there is the possibility or likelihood of prosecution are legally privileged where they are produced “for the dominant purpose of resisting or avoiding contemplated criminal proceedings against [the company] or its subsidiaries or their employees”.

2.5 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties and Cross-Border Co-operation

Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA)

The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) governs MLA in criminal matters between the UK and the European Union. In general terms, the UK-EU arrangements are based on the Council of Europe’s European Mutual Assistance Convention of 1959 (EMCA 1959) and its additional protocols. However, the TCA’s MLA arrangements also retain elements of the European Investigation Order framework, which was applicable to MLA between the UK and EU prior to conclusion of the TCA.

The TCA provides two conditions for an MLA request:

• the request must be necessary and proportionate for the purpose of the proceedings; and
• the requested measure would have also been available under the same conditions in a similar domestic case.

The EMCA 1959 provides two optional grounds for refusal:

• a political and fiscal offence exception; and
• the domestic ordre public – ie, if the requested State considers that execution of the request is likely to prejudice the sovereignty, security, ordre public or its other essential interests.

Refusal based on human rights grounds is also available.

At the multilateral level, MLA is further regulated in sector-specific conventions, including the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

At the bilateral level, the UK has concluded MLA treaties with various countries, including Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, Hong Kong, India, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the United States of America.

Extradition and White-Collar Crime

The general rules for extradition apply to white-collar criminal offences. On the international plane, extradition arrangements between the UK and the EU are governed by the TCA. Domestically, the Extradition Act 2003 (EA 2003) applies to requests received from a “category 1 territory” – currently EU member states and Gibraltar.

The UK’s extradition arrangements with Council of Europe States outside the EU are governed by the European Convention on Extradition of 1957 on the international plane and by Part 2 of the EA 2003 domestically. In addition, the UK has entered into bilateral extradition treaties with various other countries. Domestically, certain of these States are designated as Part 2 territories so that they do not have to provide evidence to justify the issue of an arrest warrant or evidence of a case to answer.

In all cases, a requesting State must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the offence for which extradition is requested is an “extradition offence”. However, the judge is not concerned with the criminal law in the requesting State. For requests governed by Part 2 of the EA 2003, as well as from EU member states where an arrest has taken place after 31 December 2021, the requesting State must establish “dual criminality”.

The EA 2003 further requires an extradition judge to decide if there are any “bars” to extradition, including double jeopardy, extraneous considerations (eg, whether the request was issued for a political purpose) and the passage of time.

Extradition will be “forum” barred in accusation cases if a substantial measure of the alleged criminal conduct occurred in the UK and the judge decides, taking account of the matters specified in the EA 2003, that extradition would not be in the interests of justice.

If the requested person has been convicted, the judge must consider whether the person was not present when convicted. If they were tried in their absence, the judge will consider whether they were deliberately absent. If they were not deliberately absent, the requesting State has to prove to the criminal standard that the person has the entitlement to a retrial, or review amounting to a retrial. If there is no entitlement to a retrial, the person must be discharged. Otherwise, the judge will go on to consider human rights.

There is a rebuttable presumption that a member state of the Council of Europe will fulfil its obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. Diplomatic assurances may be given by a requesting State to establish that there is no risk of a violation of a Convention right. For Part 1 accusation cases, the court will also have to consider whether extradition would be proportionate.

2.6 Prosecution

The Commencement of White-Collar Criminal Prosecutions

Generally, the decision to bring a prosecution for any criminal offence is within the discretion of a prosecuting authority if it believes that there is a realistic prospect of conviction, and that the prosecution would be in the public interest.

Determining whether there is a realistic prospect of conviction requires an objective assessment of the evidence by the prosecutor, which should include any defence or information advanced. The admissibility of evidence should also be considered.

The public interest should only be considered if there is a realistic prospect of conviction. A prosecution will usually occur if the factors in favour of prosecution outweigh those against. Factors to consider are:

• the seriousness of the offence;
• the suspect’s culpability;
• the circumstances of the offence and the harm caused;
• the suspect’s age and maturity;
• community impact;
• the proportionality of a prosecution; and
• the protection of sources.

Once a prosecution is commenced, its continuation is always at the discretion of the prosecuting agency, and developments affecting the sufficiency of evidence or the public interest should be considered. The only discretion of the courts to prevent the continuation of a prosecution is when it would amount to an abuse of process.

Some statutes impose an additional requirement on a prosecuting authority to seek permission before bringing a prosecution for a particular offences – for example, a prosecution for an offence of insider dealing can only be commenced by or with the consent of the DPP or the Secretary of State.

Initiation of Investigations by the SFO

The SFO may investigate any suspected offence that appears on reasonable grounds to involve serious or complex fraud, bribery or corruption. In determining whether an investigation should be commenced, the SFO will consider the actual or intended harm that may be caused to:

• the public;
• the reputation and integrity of the UK as an international financial centre; or
• the economy and prosperity of the UK.

It will also consider whether the complexity and nature of the suspected offence warrants the application of the SFO’s specialist powers and capabilities to investigate and prosecute.

SFO investigations are distinct from those undertaken by other bodies, as the SFO operates under the Roskill model, whereby investigators and lawyers work in conjunction from the outset of an investigation. This can be contrasted with CPS cases, where the investigation is generally undertaken by the police acting in response to advice and request from lawyers.

2.7 Deferred Prosecution

Deferred Prosecution Agreements

DPAs were introduced in 2014 by the provisions of the CCA 2013 but can apply retrospectively. DPAs provide a mechanism whereby a corporate (but not an individual) under investigation for a specified offence can agree with the prosecuting body (either the SFO or the CPS) to admit to the facts underlying the offences on an indictment in exchange for the prosecution deferring the prosecution of the corporate on that indictment.

The terms of a DPA can include remedial and punitive measures, such as financial penalties and disgorgement of profits. As long as the corporate abides by the terms of the order for the duration of the order, then the SFO/CPS cannot recommence the prosecution. If there is a breach of the DPA, the SFO/CPS can choose to commence the deferred prosecution or propose an alternative remedy. The statement of facts agreed as part of the DPA can be admitted in evidence in a subsequent prosecution.

DPAs are only available in respect of the offences specified in Schedule 17 of the CCA 2013, most of which can be classed as white-collar crimes. They include offences of cheating the revenue, money laundering, fraud and bribery.

A DPA can only be entered into if given approval by a court, notwithstanding the fact that the parties may have reached an agreement. The Crown Court must first approve of the DPA in principle at a preliminary hearing (in private) on the basis that the DPA is likely to be in the interests of justice with terms that are fair, reasonable and proportionate. Once the final terms are agreed, the court must then also approve the final agreement on the same basis.

2.8 Plea Agreements

Absence of Formal Plea Agreements or Agreements on Sentence

There is no formal system of plea agreements or plea bargaining in England & Wales. When a charge is properly brought (ie, it meets the dual evidential and public interest tests), a defendant generally faces a choice to plead guilty or to contest the charge at trial. However, the prosecution and defence may engage in negotiations over acceptable pleas to obviate the need for a trial. Usually, the defence will seek to persuade the prosecution that the pleas offered meet the alleged criminality and/or that there would be no public interest in continuing once those pleas had been entered. Similarly, there is no process by which the prosecution and defence can agree a sentence in advance of pleas being entered – sentencing is completely at the discretion of the sentencing judge.

3. White-Collar Offences

3.1 criminal company law and corporate fraud.

General Note on Identification of White-Collar Criminal Offences

There are various criminal offences that could fall within the scope of white-collar crime. The statute books are replete with such offences, many of which involve lengthy provisions. It would be impractical to give a summary of the elements of each of them here – instead, we seek to identify the relevant offences and their sanctions.

Company Law Offences

There are various provisions in the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) and the Companies Act 1985 (CA 1985) that create offences relating to the governance, management, accounting and trading of companies, including the following.

• Fraudulent trading (Section 993 of the CA 2006):
• maximum penalty on summary conviction – 12 months’ imprisonment and/or a fine; and
• maximum penalty on conviction on indictment – ten years’ imprisonment and/or a fine.
• Making a false statement to the registrar of companies (Section 1112 of the CA 2006):
• maximum penalty on conviction on indictment – two years’ imprisonment and/or a fine.
• Destruction, mutilation or falsification of company documents (Section 450 of the CA 1985):
• maximum penalty on conviction on indictment – seven years’ imprisonment and/or a fine.

Corporate Fraud Offences

With regard to corporate fraud, such offending may currently be covered by the provisions of the Fraud Act 2006 (FA 2006) or the Theft Act 1968 (TA 1968), but it is likely that a new corporate offence of failing to prevent fraud will come into existence in the near future. Such offences include the following.

• Fraud by false representation/abuse of position of trust/failure to disclose (Sections 2–4 of the FA 2006):
• False accounting (Section 17 of the TA 1968):
• maximum penalty on summary conviction – 12 months’ imprisonment and/or a fine.
• False statements by company directors (Section 19 of the TA 1968):

3.2 Bribery, Influence Peddling and Related Offences

Bribery and Corruption Offences

Prior to the BA 2010, bribery and corruption offences were provided for by the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889 to 1916. Offences committed before July 2011 may still be prosecuted under the old statutes, but the BA 2010 put in place a new statutory regime, covering:

• bribery of another (Section 1 of the BA 2010);
• being bribed (Section 2 of the BA 2010);
• bribery of foreign public officials (Section 6 of the BA 2010) – for offences under Sections 1, 2 and 6, the maximum penalty on summary conviction is 12 months’ imprisonment and/or a fine, and the maximum penalty on conviction on indictment is ten years’ imprisonment and/or a fine; and
• failure of a commercial organisation to prevent bribery (Section 7 of the BA 2010) – the offence is triable only on indictment and, as it can only be committed by a corporate, is punishable only by a fine.

More general offences of corruption that are linked to public officers fall under the common law offence of misconduct in a public office. This covers situations in which a public officer, without reasonable excuse or justification, wilfully neglects to perform their duty or willingly misconducts themselves to such a degree that it amounts to an abuse of the public’s trust in them.

3.3 Anti-bribery Regulation

There is no overarching anti-bribery regulation nor any legal obligation for corporates to have a compliance programme. However, the government has published guidance for commercial organisations on the measures that they should have in place to prevent bribery (see Bribery Act 2010: Guidance to Help Commercial Organisations Prevent Bribery). An organisation that does not follow such guidance is unlikely to be able to avail itself of the “adequate procedures” defence to a charge under Section 7 of the BA 2010.

3.4 Insider Dealing, Market Abuse and Criminal Banking Law

Offences involving insider dealing, market abuse and financial services fall squarely within the bracket of white-collar criminal offences. Such offences include the following.

• Insider dealing (Sections 52 and 53 of the CJA 1993):
• Breach of the general prohibition against carrying on a regulated financial activity (eg, money lending) in the UK unless authorised or exempt (Sections 19 and 23 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000):
• Making misleading statements and impressions relating to agreements, investments or benchmarks of types specified by Order made by the Treasury (Sections 89, 90 and 91 of the Financial Services Act 2012):
• maximum penalty on conviction on indictment – ten years’ imprisonment and/or a fine (if committed after 1 November 2021, seven years otherwise).

3.5 Tax Fraud

There are numerous criminal offences dealing with tax fraud by both individuals and corporates, some of which may fall within the realms of white-collar crime. These include the following.

• Cheating the revenue (at common law):
• maximum penalty on conviction on indictment – imprisonment at large and/or a fine.
• Income tax evasion (Section 106A of the Taxes Management Act 1970):
• Failure of a corporate to prevent the commission by an associated person of either UK or foreign tax evasion facilitation offences (Sections 45 and 46 of the CFA 2017):
• these offences apply only to corporates and are therefore only punishable by a fine.
• Fraudulent evasion of VAT (Section 72 of the Value Added Tax Act 1994):
• maximum penalty on summary conviction – six months’ imprisonment and/or a fine; and

3.6 Financial Record-Keeping

The Companies Acts contains over 150 provisions that are criminal offences. Many relate to failures to notify the Registrar of Companies of matters affecting the company and its constitution, or to provide information to shareholders. As referred to in 3.1 Criminal Company Law and Corporate Fraud , Section 1112 of the CA 2006 creates a general false statement offence of knowingly or recklessly delivering a document to the Registrar, or making a statement to the Registrar, that is materially misleading, false or deceptive.

Other offences relating to improper financial record-keeping include false accounting (Section 17 of the TA 1968), false statements by company directors (Section 19 of the TA 1968), and the destruction, mutilation or falsification of company documents (Section 450 of the CA 1985), which are covered in 3.1 Criminal Company Law and Corporate Fraud .

3.7 Cartels and Criminal Competition Law

Cartel offences are created by Section 188 of the Enterprise Act 2002 and include activity such as price-fixing, bid-rigging and limitation/prevention of the supply of a product or service. The maximum penalty on summary conviction is 12 months’ imprisonment and/or a fine; the maximum penalty on conviction on indictment is five years’ imprisonment and/or a fine.

3.8 Consumer Criminal Law

Various statutes created criminal offences which target offending behaviour that adversely affects consumers. The most prominent are those created by the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008/1277:

• engaging in an unfair commercial practice (Regulation 8);
• engaging in a commercial practice involving a misleading action (Regulation 9);
• engaging in a commercial practice involving a misleading omission (Regulation 10);
• engaging in an aggressive commercial practice (Regulation 11); and
• engaging in a commercial practice that is, in all circumstances, considered to be unfair (eg, displaying quality marks without the necessary authorisation) (Regulation 12):
• maximum penalty on summary conviction – a fine; and

Various other statutes aim at consumer protection indirectly through the creation of offences relating to the misuse of intellectual property (Section 107 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988), the misuse of trade marks (Section 92 of the Trade Marks Act 1994) and the unauthorised copying of registered designs (Section 35ZA of the Registered Designs Act 1949).

3.9 Cybercrimes, Computer Fraud and Protection of Company Secrets

In general, cybercrime is a modus operandi that intersects with many different offences, particularly fraud. However, there are specific provisions under the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (CMA 1990) that create offences involving the integrity of computer systems, as follows.

• Unauthorised access of a computer (Section 1 of the CMA 1990):
• maximum penalty on conviction in indictment – two years’ imprisonment and/or a fine.
• Unauthorised access of a computer with intent to commit further offences (Section 2 of the CMA 1990):
• maximum penalty on conviction on indictment – five years’ imprisonment and/or a fine.
• Unauthorised acts with intent to impair the operation of a computer (Section 3 of the CMA 1990):
• Unauthorised acts causing or creating risk of serious damage (Section 3ZA of the CMA 1990):
• triable only on indictment – maximum penalty 14 years’ imprisonment and/or a fine.

There is no law creating a specific offence of computer fraud, nor a law protecting company secrets. The latter would likely be a civil matter under an action for misuse of confidential information.

3.10 Financial/Trade/Customs Sanctions

Sanctions Offences

UK sanctions regimes criminalise prohibited activity committed with the requisite mens rea (primary offences). For example, it is an offence to deal with the funds of a designated person without a licence, knowing or having reasonable cause to suspect that the relevant transaction is prohibited. There are also offences that can be committed relating to:

• licences applied for or issued to permit otherwise prohibited conduct; and
• requirements to report or requests to provide information or documents to the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI).

The following also applies.

• Licensing – it is an offence to fail to comply with any condition of a licence, and to knowingly or recklessly provide false information or documentation for the purpose of obtaining a licence.
• Reporting – it is an offence to fail to inform HM Treasury as soon as practicable if a relevant firm knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that a person is a designated person or has breached financial sanctions regulations, and the information on which the knowledge or suspicion is based came to them in the course of carrying on their business.
• Information – it is an offence to:
• fail to comply with a request from OFSI for information or the production of documents without a reasonable excuse;
• knowingly or recklessly provide materially false information or documentation in response to such a request;
• destroy, mutilate, deface, conceal or remove any document with intent to evade requirements under a request for information or documents; or
• otherwise intentionally obstruct HM Treasury in respect of its powers to make such a request.
• Confidentiality – it is an offence for a person who is provided with specified confidential information, or who obtains it, to disclose such information without lawful authority if that person knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that the information is to be treated as confidential.

Primary offences and licensing offences are punishable by up to ten years’ imprisonment and/or a fine. Reporting and information offences are punishable by a fine or imprisonment of up to 12 months. Confidentiality offences are punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment and/or a fine (Section 17 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018).

3.11 Concealment

There is no separate offence of concealment in the criminal law of England & Wales.

3.12 Aiding and Abetting

Offences of Encouraging/Assisting Crime and Conspiracy to Commit Crime

The law distinguishes between principal offenders and those that assist or encourage another to commit a crime, known as accessories or secondary parties. A principal carries out the substantive offence, whilst a secondary party aids, abets, counsels or procures the offence. Section 8 of the AAA 1861 enables a secondary party to be prosecuted as if they were a principal. To be a secondary party, a defendant must encourage or assist the commission of the offence by the principal, and must intend to do so.

The Serious Crime Act 2007 (SCA 2007) also creates offences of encouraging or assisting offences that do not rely on secondary liability, as follows:

• intentionally encouraging or assisting an offence (Section 44 of the SCA 2007);
• encouraging or assisting an offence believing it will be committed (Section 45 of the SCA 2007); and
• encouraging or assisting offences believing one of more will be committed (Section 46 of the SCA 2007).

Sanctions for these offences are indexed to the sanctions that would be available for the anticipated offence.

It is appropriate to charge conspiracy to commit an offence in circumstances where either no substantive offence takes place, or it is not possible to prove participation in a substantive offence but it can be proved that there was an agreement to commit an offence. Section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977 enables the prosecution of statutory conspiracies; they are triable only on indictment. The maximum sentence is the maximum available for the underlying substantive offence.

The interplay between individual and corporate liability for offences is covered in 1.4 Corporate Liability and Personal Liability .

3.13 Money Laundering

Between POCA 2002 and the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017/692 (the “Money Laundering Regulations”) there is a comprehensive statutory regime dealing with various money laundering, including:

• concealing/disguising/converting/transferring/removing criminal property (Section 327 of POCA 2002);
• entering into/becoming concerned in money laundering arrangements (Section 328 of POCA 2002);
• the acquisition/use/possession of criminal property (Section 329 of POCA 2002) – the offences under Sections 327–329 carry a maximum penalty on summary conviction of 12 months’ imprisonment and/or a fine, and a maximum penalty on conviction on indictment of 14 years’ imprisonment and/or a fine;
• failure to report suspected money laundering (Sections 330–332 of POCA 2002);
• prejudicing a money laundering investigation/falsifying, concealing, destroying or disposing of documents relevant to a money laundering investigation (Section 342 of POCA 2002) – the offences under Sections 3330–332 and 342 carry a maximum penalty on summary conviction of 12 months’ imprisonment and/or a fine, and a maximum penalty on conviction on indictment of five years’ imprisonment and/or a fine;
• disclosing information likely to prejudice a money laundering investigation (“tipping-off”) (Sections 333A of POCA 2002):
• maximum penalty on summary conviction – three months’ imprisonment and/or a fine; and
• maximum penalty on conviction on indictment – two years’ imprisonment and/or a fine; and
• breach of a relevant requirement imposed by the Money Laundering Regulations (Regulation 86 of the Money Laundering Regulations):

4. Defences/Exceptions

4.1 defences.

General defences, including those for white-collar crimes, can be divided into two categories:

• defences that involve a denial of the basic elements of the actus reus and mens rea; and
• defences that do not deny the elements of the offence but rely on other circumstances of excuse or justification (eg, duress).

The existence of an effective compliance programme is not a defence to criminal liability, but it may be relevant to specific “due diligence” and “adequate procedure” defences for specific offences (eg, Section 7 of the BA 2010).

4.2 Exceptions

Generally speaking, there are no exceptions or exemptions for white-collar criminal offences. Criminal prosecutions can be brought where a prosecutor has determined that there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction on each charge, and that the prosecution would be in the public interest. There is no further de minimis test that must be met and there are no exempt industries or sectors.

4.3 Co-operation, Self-Disclosure and Leniency

An offender’s co-operation with an investigation, the making of early admissions and/or voluntarily reported offending are often prescribed as mitigating factors under applicable sentencing guidelines. DPAs require extensive co-operation and self-disclosure to persuade the prosecution to enter into an agreement, but also to make sure that the court approves the agreement between the parties. Sanction enforcement requires self-reporting as a mitigating factor when authorities decide what action to take in relation to a sanctions breach (as well as applicable civil monetary penalties).

When a defendant offers to provide information or to give evidence about the criminal activities of others, they may enter a written agreement with a specified prosecutor (a “SOCPA agreement”). A defendant may seek to obtain immunity from prosecution or receive a reduced sentence in return for providing information. The sentence reduction will depend on the timing, nature, extent and value of the assistance (Sections 71–75B of the SOCPA 2005).

4.4 Whistle-Blower Protection

Whistle-blowers disclose information they reasonably believe shows wrongdoing or the covering up of wrongdoing. Employees and workers that blow the whistle are entitled to protection from unfair dismissal as a result of their disclosures under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998.

Public bodies, such as the NHS, and some companies have developed whistle-blower programmes, not only in the public interest but also to protect their management from the consequences of wrongdoing that may go unchallenged and have more serious repercussions upon later discovery.

Protections are not available if the whistle-blower commits a criminal offence or breaches legal professional privilege. In March 2023, the Department for Business and Trade announced a review of the whistle-blower framework, and this is currently at the evidence gathering stage.

5. Burden of Proof and Assessment of Penalties

5.1 burden of proof.

In all criminal proceedings, including those for white-collar criminal offences, the prosecution bears the burden of proving an offence to the requisite criminal standard – ie, so that the tribunal is sure that the offence has been committed.

5.2 Assessment of Penalties

Sentencing White-Collar Offences

The Sentencing Council publishes guidelines for the sentencing of criminal offences. Sentencing courts are obliged to have regard to the relevant sentencing guidelines. Many white-collar criminal offences, such as fraud, bribery and money laundering, have applicable sentencing guidelines, and there is a dedicated guideline for dealing with the sentencing of corporate offenders.

A credit scheme applies for guilty pleas, with the maximum available discount being 33% for a plea at the earliest opportunity and 10% for a plea on the day of trial.

The DPA Codes of Practice stipulate the approach to penalties in the context of DPAs, which should also take into account the guidelines for sentencing corporates and previous DPA decisions.

9BR Chambers

11 / 12 South Square Gray’s Inn London WC1R 5EY UK

+44 20 7489 2727

5 St Andrew's Hill (5SAH) has a national and international reputation for excellence. In white-collar crime, it represents the interests of individual and corporate clients in pre- and post-charge financial and regulatory offences. 5SAH business crime barristers are instructed in high-value and complex white-collar and regulatory criminal investigations, associated hearings and trials. The team is regularly instructed to act in complex and serious financial services cases on behalf of both prosecution and defence. Areas of expertise include SFO, FCA criminal investigations, Cum-Ex and other market manipulation offences, money laundering, deferred prosecution agreements and all types of fraud work, as well as POCA, asset freezing and forfeiture, restraint, civil recovery and search warrants. 5SAH is a market leader in bringing and defending private prosecution cases. The team offers expertise in multi-jurisdictional investigations, often utilising experience in extradition, sanctions and Interpol Red Notices, including the drafting of expert reports.

White-Collar Crime in the UK – Trends and Developments

There has been no shortage of government initiatives in the last few years, including the Economic Crime Plan (2019) and the CPS’s Economic Crime Strategy (2021) to name but two. In May 2023, the government published Economic Crime Plan 2, setting out the objectives and methods for 2023–2025, and focusing on:

• reducing money laundering and recovering more criminal assets;
• combatting kleptocracy and driving down sanction evasion; and
• cutting fraud.

In Parliamentary terms, the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 is now in force, and the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act and the Online Safety Act have recently received Royal Assent.

Public manifestation of the government’s success in these objectives is somewhat hampered by delays in bringing cases to prosecution, still partly due to the onerous requirements of the disclosure regime, and then, post-charge, the delays and backlog in the criminal courts.

Money laundering

Just as a nomenclature of fraud typology has emerged, so the various types of money laundering techniques have evolved from the relative simplicity of “money mules” or “alternative remittance systems”. The nature of the UK economy, coupled with its vibrancy as a financial centre, lends itself to both High-End Money Laundering (HEML) and Cash Based Money Laundering (CBML), with the National Crime Agency (NCA) estimating that over GBP100 billion is laundered through and within the UK or UK registered corporate structures each year using HEML. International Trade Based Money Laundering (TBML) also seems to have used UK registered corporate structures on a grand scale.

A new kid on the block (which may in fact have been around for many years) is “Daigou”, or the apparently straightforward purchase of high-value luxury products in the UK for export. This seems to have become a recognised method of money laundering, although difficulties in reclaiming the VAT may just have made it 20% less attractive! Other techniques will doubtlessly emerge (or become appreciated) as law enforcement tries to keep up with the criminals.

One of the main goals of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act is to reform the role of Companies House and improve transparency in relation to UK companies and partnerships with a view to reducing the risk of UK companies being a vehicle of choice for facilitating money laundering, fraud, corruption, terrorist financing and illegal arms movements. Those who have been involved in cases involving money laundering will be aware of the frequent appearance of UK shell companies or limited partnerships, with Scottish limited partnerships in particular being flavour of the month in some sectors.

The Act will bring about the most significant change to the UK’s regime for registering companies in the last 170 years, and will provide Companies House with enhanced powers to verify the identities of those setting up, managing and owning companies. Companies House will also be able to use enhanced intelligence capabilities to challenge and reject information filed with it and proactively share information where it has evidence of anomalous filings or suspicious behaviour.

Alongside UK corporate structures, overseas corporate entities and trusts remain a means through which illicit funds can be laundered, particularly in the purchase of UK property which has traditionally been at risk from money laundering. Following the introduction of the Register of Overseas Entities in 2022, overseas companies are now required to provide the real identities of their owners to try to prevent illicit funds being laundered through the UK property market. This should go some way towards addressing the surprise of some law enforcers at the decision in NCA v Baker [2020] EWHC 822 (Admin) that High Court Judges do not share the view that the use of complex offshore structures is, without more, a hallmark of criminality. The entries revealing beneficial ownership may well also trigger new enquiries of course.

Failure to prevent money laundering – a lost opportunity?

The government has decided that the new Act should not include a new offence of “Failure to Prevent Money Laundering”, rejecting the amendments proposed in the Lords by Lord Garnier KC and supported by Margaret Hodge MP, a formidable and experienced combination. Since almost all UK money launderers use banks or exchanges and are facilitated by agents, brokers and even solicitors to acquire property at some stage of the cycle, this may come to be seen as a lost opportunity to remove the reputation of “Londongrad”.

Even with the new corporate liability proposals, it is all too easy for an honest company to be let down by a middle-ranking employee or agent, and to become a facilitator. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) used the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 to prosecute NatWest in 2021, so the absence of a more general offence does not leave law enforcement entirely helpless, but such prosecutions are few and far between.

Asset recovery

The Economic Crime Plan 2 sets out how financial year 2021/22 saw a record level of assets being recovered under the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA), totalling GBP354 million, and credits this as being due to a combination of the initiatives introduced by the First Economic Crime Plan and the Asset Recovery Action Plan that was introduced in 2019 to complement it. However, most of the major legislative changes were actually found in the Criminal Finances Act 2017. It is also suspected that EncroChat made a contribution.

Certainly, there has been no shortage of large confiscation orders being handed down by the Crown Courts in the last 12 months, with an order being made against Glencore in November 2022 for GBP93.5 million, which represented the benefit it obtained from bribes in five countries, and an order being made in July 2023 against James Ibori (the former Governor of the Delta state in Nigeria) for GBP101 million.

A breakdown of the GBP354 million figure reveals that GBP179 million derived from imposed confiscation orders (compared with some GBP645 million related to POCA restrained funds), GBP191 million came from civil forfeiture orders (frozen account, cash and listed assets forfeitures) and the remainder (a more modest GBP9.8 million) resulted from civil recovery orders. These figures confirm and highlight that law enforcement agencies have continued to embrace the additional tools introduced to POCA by the 2017 Act.

By the introduction of a new Anti-Money Laundering and Asset Recovery (AMLR) programme, the government intends to continue the trend of increased recovery of assets, which it says will include cross-border co-operation and additional resources for the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). An ever-increasing number of interventions can therefore be expected, particularly in the use of account freezing orders, which are simpler to obtain for law enforcement and arguably more flexible and beneficial for the suspect than the alternative of a restraint order and subsequent criminal proceedings. However, one does sometimes wonder whether successful domestic criminals are sometimes being overlooked in favour of higher profile and more glamorous foreign targets.

The number of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), many of which are submitted so as to give the reporter a defence against money laundering, continues to rise. The NCA reports receiving more than 460,000 a year, and stores more than 2 million SARs on its database. Applications to extend the moratorium period have led to a little more transparency about the process in some cases, and also provide an early opportunity for the subject of an SAR to give an early explanation and perhaps avoid an asset freezing order or restraint order.

In July 2023, the CPS announced that it had obtained (albeit apparently by consent) a civil recovery order for GBP750,000 of crypto-assets after the Police had been able to reconstruct a digital wallet after finding “recovery seeds” in a black book at a suspect’s address. Part 4 of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act brings in new powers for the confiscation and search, seizure, detention and forfeiture of crypto-assets, and a Crypto Wallet Freezing Order (CWFO) seems likely to be added to the ever-growing list of POCA abbreviations. Coupled with the increased regulation of cryptocurrency and its exchanges by the FCA, more of these cases can be expected to come before the courts in the coming months.

After no fewer than 17 amending instruments to the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations in 2022, the pace has calmed a little in 2023, with only three being in place at the time of writing. The list of Designated Persons has been growing throughout 2023. One individual's attempt to challenge his designation has failed at first instance (Shvidler v SSFCDA [2023] EWHC 2121 (Admin)), but the court did agree that it has power to scrutinise the exercise of the discretion. The judgment of Garnham J also provides enlightening information on the practical effects of sanctions upon an individual and their family.

Breaches of sanctions may be met by civil monetary penalties under Part 8 of the Policing and Crime Act 2017, but also by criminal proceedings. On 31 August 2023, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation published a disclosure report about a breach that occurred when a financial services company failed to prevent an ATM cash withdrawal of GBP250. More substantial cases of sanctions-breaking are expected to come before the courts in 2024.

Fraud and bribery

The principal excitement at present relates to the provisions in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act for new offences of failure of a “large organisation” to prevent fraud and the new proposals for the attribution of criminal liability to a body corporate or partnership where a senior manager, acting within the actual or apparent scope of their authority, commits a relevant offence. The listed offences to which the new provisions would apply are extensive.

The change in director at the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) will no doubt be closely watched by commentators for any new trends in the SFO's investigative appetite, and the outgoing director has recently announced the discontinuance of two long-standing investigations without criminal charges being brought against anyone at all. A change in the law of corporate criminality ought to be of significant assistance to the SFO.

The past year has also seen two high-profile arrests by the NCA of overseas officials on suspicion of bribery, highlighting the work of its International Corruption Unit. Commentators and legislators alike are likely to watch closely to see whether the NCA is more effective than the SFO in tackling these difficult cases.

In terms of pending cases, some action is expected in relation to COVID-related frauds and payroll frauds in particular, and money laundering and tax cases involving cryptocurrency.

There have been a number of successful private prosecutions for fraud in 2023, and this trend is expected to continue. The case law on challenges to the issue of private prosecution summonses has stabilised, and private prosecutors and defendants alike now have reasonable guidance as to the boundaries of motive in private prosecutions. Nonetheless, as some of the costs decisions have shown, a private prosecution is still not something to be embarked upon without careful thought and expert guidance. It is not as easy as it looks!

Extradition

The threat of extradition proceedings in white-collar crime cases remains a real one. The use (or misuse) of Interpol Red Notices means that it is sometimes difficult to tell if extradition is being sought for the purpose of prosecution or for political reasons, and proper scrutiny by the courts is essential. The United Arab Emirates is a jurisdiction where fugitives often run if there are allegations of fraud and money laundering. However, despite an extradition treaty dating back to 2008, the UAE's willingness to extradite those accused of criminal offences remains patchy. The operation of the rule of law is not always consistent and it is therefore difficult to predict extradition outcomes. However, with the number of fugitives reputed to be “somewhere in the UAE”, there is likely to be continued pressure from the UK at a diplomatic level to try and bring those fugitives to justice.

The rise and fall of cryptocurrencies have meant that there have been complex Interpol and extradition processes involving the collapse of Terraform labs with requests from South Korea and the US, and the collapse of FTX and a request for Sam Bankman-Fried from the Bahamas to the US. In the UK, the extradition of Mike Lynch in the Autonomy case (Lynch v USA [2023] EWHC 876 (Admin)) shows that the long arms of the US Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission present serious risks for both corporate clients and individuals.

Conclusions

For politicians, 2024 may well be dominated by election promises. There seems to be a compelling public mood that “something should be done” about the huge scale of fraud that is well recorded but about which seemingly little action is taken. Money laundering may be a greater concern at a political and business level, but there is no doubt that there is a strong feeling, perhaps encouraged by recent events, that the reputation of “Londongrad” should be tackled, albeit without the assistance of a new general “failure to prevent” offence for money laundering. But it will now be an offence for some corporates to fail to prevent fraud, as well as bribery and tax evasion. There should therefore be an active year ahead on all fronts – legislative, enforcement, pre-charge engagement to avoid prosecutions and, no doubt in some cases, conclusions in criminal proceedings and asset recovery, or both.

5 St Andrew’s Hill (5SAH)

5 St Andrew’s Hill London EC4 5BZ UK

+44 (0) 207 332 5400

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Criminology

Fraud, white-collar and organised crime

Our work analyses the nature, organisation and governance of serious crimes for gain. Such as corruption, financial and economic crimes, cyber-crimes, and human trafficking and modern slavery.

With expertise in digital technology and crime, we utilise a mixture of research methodologies and specialist approaches to make sense of qualitative and quantitative data, such as:

• social network and crime script analysis;
• advanced statistics.

Research projects 

In pursuit of food system integrity.

October 2019 - March 2020

Funder: ESRC

Principal Investigator: Nick Lord

ScriptNet  is a software package that facilitates an analysis of the organisational aspects of criminal enterprise together with an analysis of the network of people, organisations, places and resources that are in some way involved in the commissioning of these goal-oriented crimes.

More specifically, the software  is geared  towards those interested in analysing varied food crimes (eg food fraud, counterfeit alcohol) that are of an entrepreneurial nature, that is, they reflect on-going criminal activities involving multiple people in order to generate financial gain.

The software  was developed  in collaboration with a non-academic partner, the Food Safety Authority of Ireland (FSAI).

The tool  can be used  by a variety of groups - including law enforcement authorities, non-governmental organisations, academic and social researchers, and many more - to visualise the connections between the different stages of pre-planned criminal behaviours and the people or organisations who play different roles, in different places, using different resources to accomplish specified criminal goals. 

Digital Trust and Security

Our  researchers are contributing to new interdisciplinary research taking place across the University.

The Digital Futures network aims to present a coherent overview of our digital research activity to external stakeholders and bring together our research communities to explore new research areas and address strategic opportunities.

We are leading on the Digital Trust and Security theme, encompassing the security and resilience of the underlying technology, work practices and processes, law and regulation, human behaviour, social norms and context.

We also consider regulation, governance and standards and more traditional security concerns, such as cryptography, access control and verification, whilst taking into account the  societal and sociological concerns that emerge from  big-data analytics, intrusion, cloud computing and the internet.  

Find out more  

Perpetrators of modern slavery offences

Perpetrators of modern slavery offences: motivations, networks and backgrounds (April 2018 - October 2021)

Researchers: Rose Broad, David Gadd, Elisa Bellotti, Carly Lightowlers.

The problem of modern slavery is of global political concern.  Policy development has nevertheless raced ahead of research on the subject, of which there is a genuine lack.

International bodies and governments have tried – not always successfully – to produce estimates of the scale of the problem, and there are now a handful of studies documenting the plight of those trafficked.

However,  few  studies  have been undertaken  with those regarded as the perpetrators of modern slavery offences.

The aim of this project is to produce an understanding of the problem of modern slavery informed by first-hand interviews with those convicted for these offences. It will use arrest and conviction data to profile perpetrators together with in-depth interviews with those convicted under the UK 2015 Modern Slavery Act to explore how and why some people traffic others, what circumstances and social networks have contributed to their offending, as well as what has impeded it.  

Mapping the contours of human trafficking

Funder: N8 Policing Partnership

Principal Investigator: David Gadd and Rose Broad

Project aim: The main aim of the collaboration is to establish a profile of human trafficking incidents and offences known to GMP since the implementation of the Modern Slavery Coordination Unit (MSCU) in March 2015.

Greater Manchester Police has been collating a database of such incidents and offences since this time.

The database includes details of over 250 cases, including those that  were reported  to the National Referral Mechanism, and those that were reported to or detected by the police.

Through an analysis of the complete dataset, the project will produce a problem profile that will capture the characteristics of the suspected offenders and victims, including but not limited to age, gender, ethnicity and nationality.

Distribution and consumption of counterfeit alcohol: Getting to grips with fake booze

Funder: Alcohol Research UK

Principal Investigators: Jon Spencer, Nicholas Lord

Project Aim: The aim of this Alcohol Research UK funded project is to develop a greater and more detailed understanding of the distribution mechanisms associated with counterfeit alcohol. The distribution of counterfeit alcohol requires a high level of organisation and a developed network of actors to ensure market penetration. The discipline of criminology brings a particular approach to the understanding the organisation of this crime and provides more detailed insights into how the networks of distribution operate.

Global white-collar crime survey: Anti-bribery and corruption

Funder: White & Case LLP

Principal Investigators: Nicholas Lord, Aleksandra Jordanoska and Katie Benson

This White & Case LLP funded project will involve undertaking a global anti-bribery and corruption survey with multi-national businesses operating across a variety of sectors and jurisdictions. The purpose of the survey is to develop understandings of how global businesses are responding to the creation of international and domestic anti-bribery laws and standards. This will involve researching the interactions of business with regulators and gaining insights into organisational cultures and ways of operating that may be facilitative of corruption. In addition to the survey, the research will also involve qualitative interviews with key actors representing various strategic and operational levels of the sampled businesses.

The (mis)use of corporate vehicles by transnational organised crime groups

Principal Investigator: Nicholas Lord

Project Aim: This ESRC funded research will, through a criminological and socio-legal lens, critically review the evidence base and the ‘state of the art’ literature, and undertake empirical research to improve our understanding of how, why and under which conditions organised crime groups (OCGs) use corporate vehicles for the concealment, conversion and control of illicit finance. OCGs make money through varied activities (e.g. trafficking, drugs, cyber-frauds, counterfeiting, etc.) and have evolved to make use of licit corporate structures to conceal their illicit finance.

Find out more

Publications.

• David  Buil -Gil, Nicholas Lord and Emma Barrett, 2021. The Dynamics of Business, Cybersecurity and Cyber-Victimization: Foregrounding the Internal Guardian in Prevention, Victims & Offenders, 16:3,  286 -315 .  
• Nicholas Lord ,  Yongyu  Zeng ,  Aleksandra  Jordanoska , 2020 .  White-Collar Crimes  Beyond  the Nation-State .  
• Rose Broad, Nicholas Lord, Charlotte Duncan, 2020. The financial aspects of human trafficking: A financial assessment framework. Criminology & Criminal Justice .
• David Gadd, Rosemary Broad. 2018. Troubling Recognitions in British Responses to Modern Slavery. British Journal of Criminology. Volume 58, Issue 6, November 2018, Pages 1440–1461 .    

News and highlights

• Why victims of  cyber crime  deserve ‘Cyber CPR’  

COVID-19 has seen an increased vulnerability to  cyber crime . In this blog, Professor Emma Barrett, Professor Danny  Dresner , and Dr David  Buil -Gil outline why victims of  cyber crime  need greater protection, including a raft of ‘CPR’ measures designed to help them recover quickly.  

• Stop describing modern slavery as ‘evil’  

David Gadd and Rose Broad highlight how modern slavery and immigration law have become intertwined, whilst acknowledging that referring to perpetrators as evil can idealise victims in ways that can be detrimental.   

• Domestic UK corruption is going unnoticed, say experts  

A  new report has found that corruption in the UK is being overlooked, despite the risk of corruption being fuelled by self-regulation, conflicts of interest and austerity.  

• Criminology academics scoop  Radzinowicz  Prize for modern slavery research

Leading  research into modern slavery has won two University of Manchester academics the prestigious  Radzinowicz  Prize for their contribution to the field of criminology.

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Explosion fraudsters committed 'white collar' mass murder

Three men have been sentenced at Leicester Crown Court for the murder of five people - including three members of the same family - they killed in a huge explosion.

Aram Kurd, Hawkar Hassan and Arkan Ali blew up a Polish store in Leicester city centre last February, planning to claim a £300,000 insurance payout.

The men had poured a huge amount of petrol around the shop, fully aware that the fire they set would be a fatal one.

Their actions have been described as a rare example of "white-collar crime" - insurance fraud - taken to a deadly extreme.

They have all been jailed for life - Kurd and Ali for a minimum of 38 years, while Hassan must serve at least 33 years in prison.

What happened?

Image source, PA

At first, it seemed like it could be a tragic accident. There were rumours about a gas leak, and some speculated that an illegal alcohol distillery had caused the blast.

But as investigators pieced the evidence together, something more disturbing emerged.

Examination of the remains of the Polish supermarket, on the ground floor of the building, found that a staggering 86 litres of petrol had been set alight.

An insurance policy worth hundreds of thousands was taken out just weeks before.

Police soon realised they were looking at one of the deadliest cases of insurance fraud the UK had ever seen.

Image source, Leicestershire Police

Late on 25 February last year, Kurd, Hassan and Ali blew up the store, planning to claim £300,000 of insurance.

They had taken out a policy three weeks before and bought 26 litres of petrol from a garage - with an additional 60 litres estimated to have been used by the trio.

When the blast went off, it killed Mary Ragoobar, 46, her sons Shane Ragoobeer, 18, and Sean, 17, who lived upstairs, and Shane's 18-year-old girlfriend Leah Beth Reek.

Viktorija Ijevleva, who was working in the shop at the time, also died.

Image source, LOROS

Did anyone survive?

Scotty Ragoobeer, who was 15 at the time, and an unnamed passerby were saved when they were dug out of the rubble by police and members of the public.

PC Sophie Hooper, one of the first three officers on the scene, ran to the building to help after hearing a "huge bang".

She and her colleague, PC Shaun Randall, found a man with a concrete girder covering both his legs, which they dragged off him to get him to safety.

"The fire was just getting ridiculous by this point. It was huge. You couldn't stay anywhere near it because it was just so hot," she said.

But while she stayed with the man, PC Randall carried on searching for people and came across Scotty.

"Scotty managed to free his leg and I think Shaun was able to go in from there and pull him out," she added. "If Shaun hadn't have been there then it might be a different outcome for Scotty."

'How lucky'

Adam Wells said he and his girlfriend had been out for dinner and were jolted across the road as they drove within 15ft (4.5m) of the blast.

He rushed to help, kicking at rubble with his feet because the bricks were burning his hands.

For months afterwards, he would dream about it and if he ever heard something loud, he would jump.

"Sometimes I think about how lucky I was," he said.

Why murder over manslaughter?

Originally the Crown Prosecution Service could not prove the men had intended to kill anyone and they were charged with manslaughter.

But the case against them started to build up.

Investigators heard 22-year-old shop worker Ms Ijevleva had only started work the day before, but she had been dating Ali and was seen on CCTV travelling with him to take out an insurance policy.

Detectives started to believe a plot had been hatched to set the shop on fire and claim the insurance.

But CCTV, forensic investigations and phone records and the huge amount of fuel used suggested the plotters had decided the blaze should be deadly.

"There must have been 60 litres at the time of the explosion in addition to the 26 litres taken to the shop the day before," said Janine Smith, chief crown prosecutor for the East Midlands.

"What that indicated to us was there were massive quantities of fuel being used, far more than would have been needed to simply start a fire at the shop."

The motive for killing Ms Ijevleva? Because she "knew too much".

The trial heard that while on remand, Kurd confessed to a fellow inmate , saying he had not wanted to split the money with Ms Ijevleva and the insurance firm would pay more if people had died.

The CPS said there was evidence the three men had been aware there were people upstairs at the time, who had nothing to do with their plan but would be sacrificed for it.

On 28 December, a jury found them guilty of five counts of murder, and they were sentenced on Friday.

"The loss of innocent lives for the pursuit of financial gain is particularly distressing," Ms Smith added.

"You are talking about a shop that wasn't making much money and they might have got a few hundred thousand; it's awful."

An 'unprecedented' crime?

Craig Kelly, a lecturer of criminology at Birmingham City University, told the BBC he believed this was a rare example of "white-collar crime" taken to the extreme.

"White-collar crime is things like fraud and dodgy backroom deals," he explained.

"This is a very extreme case... and quite an abhorrent one.

"As far as we are aware, this is the first mass murder in the UK which was caused by an explosive device specifically for monetary gain."

Mohammed Rahman, a criminology lecturer at Nottingham Trent University, said the killers were so motivated by money they would not have considered the deaths to be anything other than "collateral damage" in their pursuit of profit.

He said: "Cases of insurance fraud are not few and far between but ones that have resulted in murder are quite rare. This is one of the biggest ever, nationally.

"It is for this reason that the case will go down as an iconic 'signal crime', a tragic event that will shape the public perceptions of insurance fraud for many years to come."

Kurd attempted to hide his involvement in the blast, speaking to journalists - including the BBC - in the aftermath of the explosion.

Ms Smith, from the CPS, said Kurd's interviews with reporters showed similarities with Mick Philpott, who was convicted of killing six of his children in a fire in Derby in 2012, and Ian Huntley, who murdered 10-year-old Cambridgeshire schoolgirls Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman in 2002.

She said: "It's not uncommon, is it, if you think back to the Philpotts and that press conference?

"Once [the facts] had been established... they revealed a clear intention to cause immediate and in fact catastrophic damage."

'Every day I cry'

The families of the victims have been left horrified that someone could kill their loved ones for cash.

Jose Ragoobeer, who lost his wife and sons in the explosion, said: "It is the first time in my life that I have got hate in my heart.

"I feel angry - since we came to England we have been doing two jobs all the time for our kids and they [the killers] just wanted to make some easy money.

"The sentencing is a relief but we won't have them back."

Jon Reek, Leah's father, said: "I can't believe the mentality of them. It was for £300,000, I could have remortgaged the house and given it to them."

Jo Reek, Leah's mother, said: "They had no thought for human life, it was obviously cheap for them. I tried to look at them and see any element of sorrow but there was nothing at all - absolutely dead-eyed."

In the midst of tragedy, the family's relationship with Mr Ragobeer has blossomed. They recently invited him to their house for Christmas dinner so he didn't spend it alone - Scotty spent Christmas with relatives in Mauritius.

"We have all gone through it," Mrs Reek said. "It's a link that no-one else knows how we are feeling.

"He's such a kind man, we're bonded for life now - he's stuck with us. And Scotty too, we'll always fight for him."

Mr Ragobeer added: "They are very good friends. It helps so you don't feel lonely, you know there are people around you who will support you."

Follow BBC East Midlands on Facebook , on Twitter , or on Instagram . Send your story ideas to [email protected] .

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Statistical analysis of white-collar crime.

• Gerald Cliff Gerald Cliff National White Collar Crime Center
•  and  April Wall-Parker April Wall-Parker National White Collar Crime Center
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264079.013.267
• Published online: 26 April 2017

As far back as the 19th century, statistics on reported crime have been relied upon as a means to understand and explain the nature and prevalence of crime (Friedrichs, 2007). Measurements of crime help us understand how much of it occurs on a yearly basis, where it occurs, and the costs to our society as a whole. Studying crime statistics also helps us understand the effectiveness of efforts to control it by tracking arrests and convictions. Analysts can tell whether it is increasing or decreasing relative to other possible mitigating factors such as the economy or unemployment rates in a community. Politicians can point to crime statistics to define a problem or indicate a success. Sociologists can study the ups and downs of crime rates and any number of other variables in the society such as education, employment rates, ethnic demographics, and a long list of other factors thought to affect the rate at which crime is committed. Property value is affected by the crime rates in a given neighborhood, and insurance rates are said to fluctuate with the ups and downs of crime.

Analyzing any criminal act’s prevalence, cost to society, impact on victims, potential preventive measures, correction strategies, and even the characteristics of perpetrators and victims has provided valuable insights and a wealth of useful information in society’s efforts to combat violent/index crimes. This information has only been possible because there is little disagreement as to exactly what constitutes a criminal act when discussing violent or property crimes or what has come to be grouped under the catch-all heading of “street crime”; this is decidedly not the case with crimes included under the white-collar crime umbrella.

• white-collar crime
• corporate crime
• crime measurement
• victimization
• computer crime

White-Collar Crime: The Historical Definitional Debate

The challenge of analyzing the phenomenon of white-collar crime lies in the fact that the term “white-collar crime” can mean different things to different disciplines or even different things to different camps within those disciplines. Academics often disagree with the legal profession, who may disagree with law enforcement, who in turn, may disagree with legislators and politicians as to exactly what constitutes white-collar crime. Generally, the varying definitions tend to concentrate on either or both of the following factors: characteristics of the offender, such as social status, or positions of trust within the community and characteristics of the crime itself.

Arguments among stakeholders aside, there is no such thing as the “right” white-collar crime definition—only the definition that is right for the purposes of the entity employing it. It is, however, vital to understand what the term means to the persons using it in order to understand what they are actually saying. This consideration can be especially important when dealing with abstracted statistics. The statement “white-collar crime is increasing” is meaningless without understanding what white-collar crime means to the author. The definition impacts what questions are asked, what kinds of answers are meaningful, and where researchers look for the answers to those questions. As other researchers in the field have noted, “[h]ow we define the term white collar crime influences how we perceive it as a subject matter and thus how we research” (Johnson & Leo, 1993 ). Depending on how one goes about deciding what to study in attempting to understand white-collar crime, one can either conclude that it is a form of conduct peculiar to offenders of high status enjoying positions of trust, as Sutherland seemed to feel, or one may arrive at a different conclusion if the research is confined to those convicted of federal offenses traditionally thought of as white-collar crime. In studying convictions, court records, presentence reports, and so on, of those accused of what would ordinarily be thought of as white-collar offenses, some researchers have used the relative lack of education and lower social/economic status and occupation to claim that white-collar crime is more attributable to the middle class (Weisburd, Waring, & Chayet, 1995 ). This claim tends to “trivialize” white-collar offenses and overlooks offenders who, by virtue of their social status, education, and positions of trust within their chosen professions and their communities are able to influence how their actions are defined, investigated, prosecuted, and in some cases, even the degree to which an act is defined as criminal (Pontell, 2016 ). For example, Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman ( 1997 ) examined the savings and loan crisis that resulted in colossal financial losses that are certainly attributable to “non–middle-class offenders.”

Sociologist Edwin Sutherland is credited with having first coined the term “white-collar crime” in 1939 in a speech given at the American Sociological Society (Sutherland, 1940 ). His comments in the original speech did not formally define the term, but he would eventually come to define white-collar crimes as “crimes committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation” (Sutherland, 1949 ). The offender-based definition seemed to serve sociologists well as a way to label and talk about offenses committed by successful, healthy people who were not suffering from the deficits of poor surroundings, lack of education, and all the other attributes that had come to be associated with perpetrators of violent (street) crime. It helped explain why well-educated people who had ample access to societal resources (members of respectable society) could resort to crime as a means of achieving the goals they should logically have been able to achieve without violating the law. Sutherland’s contribution expanded the discussion to include illegal deviance perpetrated by those who had already achieved traditional success through socially acceptable methods.

Notably, Sutherland’s definition explicitly rejected the notion that a criminal conviction was required in order to qualify (Sutherland, 1940 ). Sutherland ( 1940 ) saw four main factors at play here: (1) civil agencies often handle corporate malfeasance that could have been charged as fraud in a criminal court; (2) private citizens are often more interested in receiving civil damages than seeing criminal punishments imposed; (3) white-collar criminals are disproportionately able to escape prosecution “because of the class bias of the courts and the power of their class to influence the implementation and administration of the law”; and (4) white-collar prosecutions typically stop at one guilty party and ignore the many accessories to the crime (such as when a judge is convicted of accepting bribes and the parties paying the bribes are not prosecuted).

A related concept that again focuses on the offender is “organizational crime”—the idea that white-collar crime can consist of “illegal acts of omission or commission of an individual or a group of individuals in a legitimate formal organization in accordance with the operative goals of the organization, which have a serious physical or economic impact on employees, consumers or the general public” (Schrager & Short, 1978 ).

Although these definitions were vital for expanding the realm of sociology and criminology, they weren’t as well suited to the needs of other criminal justice stakeholders who deal with these issues in a more practical sense (including policymakers, law enforcement, and the legal community). These definitions work well when discussing why white-collar crime occurs or who commits it, but they are not as well suited to asking questions about how much white-collar crime is occurring or whether prevention methods are working.

A model of white-collar crime that lends itself somewhat more to empirical data analysis was Herbert Edelhertz’s 1970 definition: “ An illegal act or series of illegal acts committed by nonphysical means and by concealment or guile to obtain money or property, to avoid the payment or loss of money or property, or to obtain business or personal advantage .” As a crime-based definition, it ignored offender characteristics and concentrated instead on how the crime was carried out. As a result, it covered a far larger swath of criminality—including crimes (or other illegal acts—Edelhertz’s definition also reaches to acts that are prohibited by civil, administrative, or regulatory law, whether or not the perpetrators are ever called to answer for them) perpetrated outside of a business context, or by persons of relatively low social status.

Edelhertz ( 1970 ) identified four main types of white-collar offending:

personal crimes (“[c]rimes by persons operating on an individual, ad hoc basis, for personal gain in a non-business context”),

abuses of trust (“[c]rimes in the course of their occupations by those operating inside businesses, Government, or other establishments, or in a professional capacity, in violation of their duty of loyalty and fidelity to employer or client”),

business crimes (“[c]rimes incidental to and in furtherance of business operations, but not the central purpose of such business operations”), and

con games (“[w]hite-collar crime as a business, or as the central activity of the business”).

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (U.S. Department of Justice, 1989 ) when specifically addressing white-collar crimes (the FBI [U.S. Department of Justice, 2011 ] usually references “financial crimes” instead), uses a very similar definition: “ those illegal acts which are characterized by deceit, concealment, or violation of trust and which are not dependent upon the application or threat of physical force or violence. Individuals and organizations commit these acts to obtain money, property, or services; to avoid the payment or loss of money or services; or to secure personal or business advantage .” This definition has been operationalized by the FBI’s Criminal Justice Services Division to mean the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) offenses of fraud, forgery/counterfeiting, and embezzlement, and a rather longer list of National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) offenses (Barnett, 2000 ). Thus, while this definition and Edelhertz’s are very similar, the FBI’s definition functionally excludes noncriminal illegal activity, as well as such incidents that are not reported to police and don’t fit into a relevant UCR or NIBRS category (for those jurisdictions that participate in NIBRS). At the same time, the FBI’s definition dovetails well with already-collected data, making it a practical tool for generating statistics on white-collar crime activity.

As a practical matter, many people have rather informal interpretations of the term. White-collar crime can informally mean:

Financial crimes

Nonphysical (or abstract) crimes

That is, crimes that “occur” on a form, balance book, or computer

Crime by or targeting corporations

Crimes typically committed by the rich

Criminal businesses or organizations

Including, for some, organized crime and terroristic organizations

Corporate or professional malfeasance

For some, this crime can include acts that are immoral but that are not specifically prohibited by law

Anything that’s against the law that the average beat cop won’t handle

Essentially, everything but street crime

Many people have a general sense that they know what counts as white-collar crime and what does not, but they have no specifically articulated sense of what qualities separate the class of white-collar offenses from non–white-collar offenses.

Having so many definitions in use means that it’s often difficult to compare data gathered by different white-collar crime stakeholders and that theoretical constructs in use by one group may be completely misaligned to the needs of another. One way that various groups have tried to reduce these inefficiencies is by crafting definitions that could enjoy buy-in from larger groups of stakeholders, providing them a common language (and compatible tools) for discussing white-collar crime.

In 1996 , the National White Collar Crime Center convened a group of noted academics specifically to address this definitional dilemma (NW3C, 1996 ). 1 Participants were selected from among the most noted scholars in the criminal justice field, who had devoted significant effort to the study of white-collar crime. Several aspects of white-collar crime were examined and discussed at length. Each attendee was asked to produce a paper on his or her position on how the term should be defined, laying out their arguments in support of their preferred definition. From the presentation of these position papers, extensive discussions among the assembled academics were held. Through this process, white-collar crime was examined from a variety of perspectives.

After considerable discussion and debate, those present at the workshop reached some consensus on the elements that need to be present to satisfy the concept of white-collar crime. Most agreed that the lack of direct violence against the victim was a critical element. They agreed that the criminal activity should have been the result of an opportunity to commit the crime afforded by the offender’s status in an organization or their position of respect within the community. Deception to the extent necessary to commit the criminal offense such as misrepresentation of the perpetrators abilities, financial resources, accomplishments, some false promise or claim intended to deceive the victim, or possibly a deliberate effort to conceal information from the victim—all should be considered as elements of white-collar crime. Some even contended that the term should be abandoned altogether and replaced by something more along the lines of economic crime, elite crime, or simply financial crime (Gordon, 1996 ).

In the end, those in attendance ultimately agreed that an acceptable definition would be: “ illegal or unethical acts that violate fiduciary responsibility of public trust, committed by an individual or organization, usually during the course of legitimate occupational activity, by persons of high or respectable social status for personal or organizational gain .”

This statement may address the definitional dilemma to some degree, but to further emphasize the difficulty of arriving at a universally acceptable definition, it still does not address some aspects of white-collar crime. Financial crimes committed with a computer, using the Internet, normally do not involve physical threat or violence, they almost always involve deception in some manner, and they can result in devastating damage to the victim(s), yet they have absolutely nothing to do with the social status of the perpetrator, do not require that the perpetrator occupy a position of trust within an organization or community, and may not even require a significant level of education. Perhaps the best way to conceptualize white-collar offenders is on a continuum that considers all aspects of the crime itself, the perpetrator, the relationship to the victim, and the position the perpetrator occupied that made it possible to commit the offense.

As this article does not intend to advocate for any particular interpretation of the term, we will be using the term “white-collar crime” in the widest possible sense, so as not to exclude any of the various camps from the discussion (though many will doubtless find some aspect of the article that treats the term in a broader sense than their personally held definitions would allow).

Why White-Collar Crime Matters

Violent crime is both alarming and costly. However, despite its physical and psychological impact on victims and even witnesses, street crime pales in many ways when compared with white-collar crime. A victim of a robbery is often traumatized by the experience and suffers the loss of any valuables taken by the perpetrator. They also suffer psychologically by being put in fear of injury or death, but, assuming the victim was not injured, valuables can be recovered by the police and may be covered by insurance and, as such, may not actually be a loss at all. An armed robber can certainly empty a cash drawer, take a wallet and jewelry, even steal a victim’s car, but the loss of these items is insignificant when compared to the loss of the total contents of a person’s bank account, life savings, credit rating, home, investments, and overall peace of mind. A number of anecdotal cases and studies have pointed to the unique stressors that a victim experiences after suffering loss from fraud. For example, there is evidence that financial loss due to fraud is a direct causal factor in many cases of depression and suicides (Saxby & Anil, 2012 ).

Addressing the issue of white-collar crime is extremely important because of its serious impact on victims, society, and the economy. Additionally, white-collar crimes are unique in that in many instances there is an inherent ability to victimize large numbers of individuals, often with a single act (i.e., identity theft). Estimates of monetary loss to employees and stockholders and, ultimately, society in general due to white-collar and corporate crime have reached hundreds of billions of dollars (Public Citizen, 2002 ). A 1976 estimate of the total cost of white-collar crime puts the figure in the neighborhood of $250 billion per year (Rossoff, Pontell, & Tillman, 1998 ), while a more recent study estimates financial losses from white-collar crimes to be between $300 and $600 billion per year (Stewart, 2015 ).

It is estimated that approximately 36% of businesses (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2016 ) and approximately 25% of households (NW3C, 2010 ) have been victims of white-collar crimes in recent years, compared to an 8% and 1.1% prevalence rate of traditional property and violent crime, respectively (Truman & Langton, 2015 ). In addition, an examination of some of the most prevalent areas in which white-collar crime seems to be found will amply illustrate the gravity of the problem.

One area of white-collar crime that consistently remains in the spotlight is health care and insurance fraud. The rising costs of medical care have driven the cost of health care insurance increasingly higher. Recent estimates put total health care spending in the United States at a massive $2.7 trillion, or 17% of GDP. No one knows for sure how much of that sun is embezzled, but in 2012 Donald Berwick, a former head of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and Andrew Hackbarth of the RAND Corporation estimated that fraud (and the extra rules and inspections required to fight it) added as much as $98 billion, or roughly 10%, to annual Medicare and Medicaid spending—and up to $272 billion across the entire health system ( The Economist , 2014 ).

Identity theft is another type of fraud that is frequently highlighted in discussions of modern white-collar crime. This fraud can range from simply using one’s credit card under false pretenses to opening entire bank accounts or mortgages using someone else’s personally identifiable information (PII). Through use of the Internet, this particular type of fraud often strikes multiple victims at once via corporate data breaches. The 2015 Identity Fraud Study, released by Javelin Strategy & Research, found that $16 billion was stolen from 12.7 million U.S. consumers in 2014 , compared with $18 billion and 13.1 million victims a year earlier. Further, there was a new identity fraud victim every two seconds in 2014 (Javelin, 2015 ). Aside from the considerable losses caused by identity theft and other characteristics that it may share with white-collar crimes (such as the lack of face-to-face contact between the victim and perpetrator and the fact that they are financial crimes and are complex to investigate), there are those who make a compelling case that identity theft should not be characterized as white-collar crime. Certainly, there is no requirement that a perpetrator enjoy some employment-related position of trust or require above average levels of education. “Many financial cases of identity fraud are the work of con artists and organized crime rings, in which offenders possess no legitimate occupational status, which is generally a major prerequisite for inclusion into the ranks of white collar criminals” (Pontell, 2009 ).

A wide variety of fraudulent practices that could be categorized as white-collar crime (including identity theft, advance fee frauds, online and telemarketing scam complaints) are tracked by the Federal Trade Commission’s Consumer Sentinel Network. In 2015 , the network collected a total of 3,083,379 consumer complaints (Federal Trade Commission, 2016 ). This is an increase of nearly 850% since the network began reporting in 2001 (Federal Trade Commission, 2016 ), with an annual percentage growth rate of 56%. Such growth far exceeds that of more traditional crime types, which have actually been declining in recent years.

In addition to the so-called more traditional forms of white-collar crime, a long and growing list of other white-collar crimes have come into prominence in recent years—especially intellectual property crime, mortgage fraud, and financial abuse of elders.

When intellectual property (IP) crimes are mentioned, many probably think of the controversies involving the downloading of copyrighted songs and movies. But IP theft is more than that. “Intellectual property crimes encompass the full range of goods commercially traded worldwide” (Dryden, 2007 ) and involve far more serious and potentially damaging practices than are usually considered. These practices can include everything from car parts (including nonfunctioning and substandard airbags and brake parts) to tainted pet food and baby formula. For example, Operation Opson V, conducted between November 2015 and February 2016 , seized more than 10,000 tons and one million liters of hazardous fake food and drink in operations across 57 countries (Interpol, 2016 ). These products are produced and sold in underground economies or in markets where they go unregulated and escape normal tax and tariff payments. They are not subject to the most basic requirements of regulatory oversight intended to assure the safety, integrity, and purity of the product. They expose consumers to health and safety risks and impose costs on society in a multitude of ways. Counterfeit products that are of particular concern are pharmaceuticals. Recent studies suggest that only 38% of prescription drugs purchased online are genuine (European Alliance for Access to Safe Medicines, 2008 ). The International Chamber of Commerce estimated that the total global economic value of counterfeit and pirated products is as much as $650 billion every year (International Chamber of Commerce, n.d. ).

Mortgage fraud is also a continuing problem, with the most recent information available indicating that “residential mortgage loan applications with fraudulent information totaled $19.8 billion in mortgage debt for the twelve months ending the second quarter of 2014 ” (Corelogic, 2014 ). As large as these numbers are, they represent only a small percentage of the actual losses incurred, owing largely to the complexity of investigating and prosecuting these types of offenses. Executives in large corporations who engage in high-level white-collar crime enjoy a degree of insulation from exposure to the criminal justice system. This insulation derives from the complexity of investigating and prosecuting their crimes; their ability to mount expensive and challenging defenses; their own position and that of their corporations in society; and the criminal justice system’s tendency to allow the accused to negotiate a settlement without admitting guilt. For example, a recent Securities and Exchange Commission press release revealed that “that a California-based mortgage company and six senior executives agreed to pay $12.7 million to settle charges that they orchestrated a scheme to defraud investors in the sale of residential mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae). In settling the charges without admitting or denying the allegations, each of the six executives agreed to be barred from serving as an officer or director of a public company for five years” (SEC press release, 2016 ). This type of settlement is not captured in the statistics as a conviction and, although the actions of the perpetrators would certainly fulfill the definition of white-collar crime, because there was no admission of guilt and no conviction (since no trial ever took place), the entire incident would never appear in any official statistical count of white-collar crime.

This is not necessarily uncommon with offenses that can be labeled as white-collar crime and points to a larger issue involved in “measuring”: many of these crimes may not appear in the ledgers of adjudication. Unfortunately for studies of statistical trends in white-collar crime, we are often left with partial views of the true scope of this crime, painted purely through adjudication measurements. Many tend to think of white-collar crime as targeting wealthy companies and individuals or the government. This belief may allow many to rationalize this type of crime, leading to the belief that the victim impact is minimal due to already inflated financial statuses. When we take a closer look at some key examples of white-collar crime, however, we see that this area of criminal activity merits considerable concern.

One of the most high-profile cases in recent history, the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme, is a good illustration of how one person committing white-collar crime can victimize hundreds, even thousands, of victims. News of Madoff’s crimes hit the news cycle in 2008 . Madoff’s investors provided him with approximately $20 billion to invest; Madoff made it appear as though his investors, as a group, had earned nearly $65 billion in returns (on which they ultimately paid taxes), which was simply not the case. Discussing the recovery of a sizable portion (approximately $11 billion) of the monies lost to the victims, one author observed: “It’s as though they’d put all that money under the mattress for decades, and now they can spend a little more than half of it. Making matters worse, they all paid federal capital gains taxes on that $45 billion in investment income that never existed” (Assad, 2015 ). Based on Madoff’s accounts with 4,800 clients (as of November 30, 2008 ), prosecutors estimated his fraud to have totaled $64.8 billion. Legal efforts to recover some of the monies lost through this scam have been underway since the case first broke. Ultimately, Madoff was sentenced to 150 years in prison and ordered to pay $170 billion in restitution. His victims were left with trying to rebuild their lives, a prospect that some could not face ( The Telegraph , 2009 ).

The Madoff case is just one example of how white-collar crime can touch many lives. There are a number of “more mundane” forms of white-collar crime that alter peoples’ lives on a daily basis. Consumer crime is an all-encompassing term that covers a number of white-collar crimes affecting the populace, including but not limited to, false advertising, commercial misrepresentations, price manipulation, and a host of related criminal and/or unethical behaviors. Few statistics exist that address this group of crimes as a whole, as the underlying actions are often handled through a host of distinctly different channels and much of the information exists purely in anecdotal form. That said, existing data (though incomplete) suggest that enforcement of these matters is on the rise. Take, for example, the number of federal actions each year under the False Claims Act, which more than doubled from 1987 to 2015 (U.S. Department of Justice, 2015 ), or the number of complaints to FTC’s Consumer Sentinel Network, which increased more than eightfold from 2001 to 2015 (Federal Trade Commission, 2016 ). Whether this increase can be attributed to an increase in the underlying activities, greater likelihood to report victimization, or greater law enforcement interest or ability to combat the activities is difficult to determine.

Another rising problem that can affect all facets of society is elder financial abuse. White-collar criminals take advantage of one of the most vulnerable sectors of our society, individuals who are at their most defenseless time of life, stealing from them at a time when they can least afford to be victimized. The True Link Report on Elder Financial Abuse 2015 ( 2015 ) reveals that seniors lose $36.48 billion each year to elder financial abuse—more than 12 times what was previously reported. Moreover, the highest proportion of these losses—to the tune of $16.99 billion a year—comes from deceptive but technically legal tactics designed to specifically take advantage of older Americans. The reported incidence of this particular form of white-collar crime is likely just a shadow of the real problem, as the number of unreported cases of this crime can never truly be estimated. Elder financial abuse cases often go unreported for any number of reasons. The victim is unwilling to report crimes being committed by their family members (a frequent source of elder abuse fraud); the victim may not know who to report the crimes to; or they may not even be aware that they are being victimized in the first place. As the average age of our society increases over time, these crimes will likely also increase and keep pace with the growing number of elderly potential victims in society.

The Internet and emerging technologies have helped accelerate the growth of many white-collar crimes, providing not only a new vehicle for perpetrating crimes but also entirely new categories of criminal activity that would not be possible without emerging technologies. Computer crimes (those crimes committed using a computer as the instrument of the crime ) involve the use of technology to facilitate or initiate consumer fraud and is now so commonplace that 50% of all consumer frauds reported to the FTC in 2012 were Web- or e-mail based. In order to attempt to track and categorize crimes related to the Internet, the Internet Crime Complaint Center (formally known as the Internet Fraud Complaint Center, or IC3), was formed in 2001 . This joint effort between the National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C) and the FBI was established to track crimes committed over the Internet and refer those crimes to law enforcement. In its first year of operation, IC3 received 49,711 crime complaints. Since that time, the number of complaints received by IC3 has steadily increased at an annual growth rate of 12.4%. In 2014 , the IC3 received 288,012 complaints, with losses of over $1 billion reported (Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2016 ).

The message here is that while all of us have a healthy fear of violent/street crime, white-collar crimes can be, and often are, far more damaging in terms of costs to the society and the rate at which the crimes are multiplying. One of the most difficult challenges is measuring just how much white-collar crime exists. This task is made infinitely more difficult by the fact that there is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes white-collar crime. This lack of consensus is understandable considering the many different types of crime that can fall under the umbrella of white-collar crime. Yet, without the ability to clearly define an act as a white-collar crime, it is impossible to determine with any accuracy just how much white-collar crime is taking place, what treatments intended to mitigate its prevalence are having an effect, or what level of punishment is likely to act as a deterrent.

Statistical Evidence of White-Collar Crime

Unlike the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) for index crimes, there is no universal dataset of white collar crime statistics. When looking for hard statistical evidence of the prevalence of white-collar crime, researchers are left with a patchwork of federal data sources (i.e., Uniform Crime Report, Judicial Business of the United States Courts, United States Attorneys Annual Statistical Report, Annual Report and Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, and many more) citing various crime types and a handful of self-report victim surveys. Federally published data (see Table 1 ) indicate that white-collar crimes in their various officially recorded forms are decreasing, much as index crimes have been steadily decreasing over recent years (Cooke, 2015 ). The weakness of using the UCR as a measure of white-collar crime, however, is that there are far more types of white-collar crime than the UCR system tracks.

Table 1 Ten-Year Arrest Trends a

a Note : The information in this table is taken directly from Table 33 of the Uniform Crime Reports. The year range is intended to illustrate the ten-year trends in the three offense categories tracked by UCR that would logically constitute white-collar crime offenses.

Source: United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. (September 2012–2015). Crime in the United States, 2011–2014 .

The UCR data, however, are at odds with self-report victim data (such as the IC3 Annual Report and Federal Trade Commission Report) and anecdotal data sources, which indicate that white-collar crimes are on the rise. Therefore, the following questions arise: is this increase due to more awareness of the problem or to actual increases in crime rates? Do the data reflect a reluctance to charge and prosecute white-collar crime, or are white-collar crimes decreasing? With no longitudinal data and without a consistent way to count arrests and prosecutions associated with white-collar crime, it is nearly impossible to determine what is affecting the incidence of white-collar crime. That said, the comparison of statistical arrest data versus self-report data is not the most desired comparison; but the sheer lack of available white-collar crime datasets leaves us little choice as far as worthwhile comparisons go. This problem is further complicated by the fact that many white-collar crime victims may not even know that they have been victimized (Friedrichs, 2007 ) or do not report their victimization to the proper authorities (e.g., a victim of credit card fraud reporting to the credit card company but not to local police) (NW3C, 2006 ), which can further frustrate statistical counts.

It is generally accepted, however, that modern instances of white-collar crime touch the public much more than traditional crimes. Reputable data show that traditional street crimes have been decreasing in frequency across the board for some time. The Bureau of Justice Statistics’ victimization studies show that, from 2005 to 2014 , reported victimization by violent crime decreased by 22.8%, and reported victimization by property crimes decreased by 18.1%; the rate of violent crime declined slightly from 23.2 victimizations per 1,000 persons in 2013 to 20.1 per 1,000 in 2014 (Truman & Langton, 2015 ). The violent crime rate did not change significantly in 2014 compared to 2013 ; violent crimes include rape or sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault. In comparison, the property crime rate, which includes burglary, theft, and motor vehicle theft, fell from 131.4 victimizations per 1,000 households in 2013 to 118.1 per 1,000 in 2014 (Truman & Langton, 2015 ). The overall decline was largely the result of a decline in theft (Truman & Langton, 2015 ). The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (which rely on police reports instead of victim data) show that when considering 5- and 10-year trends, the 2014 estimated violent crime total was 6.9% below the 2010 level and 16.2% below the 2005 level (U.S. Department of Justice, 2014 , 2015 ).

Comparatively, the most recent comprehensive white-collar crime victimization study (NW3C’s 2010 National Public Survey on White Collar Crime) found that 24.2% of American households in 2010 reported experiencing at least one form of white-collar crime, compared to 12.5% of all households being victimized by property crime in that same year (Truman & Planty, 2012 ). In this case, the term “white-collar crime” was operationalized to mean the following specific activities: credit card fraud, price fraud, repair fraud, Internet fraud, business fraud, securities fraud, and mortgage fraud (excluding identity theft, insurance fraud, embezzlement rates, or regulatory violations, for example).

Meanwhile, there are clear indications that white-collar crime should be on the increase:

The Skills Required to Commit White Collar Crimes are Becoming More Common

Many white-collar crimes require significantly higher levels of education than street crimes, or specialized technical skills. All of these skills are becoming more available in our society as we witness a widespread increase in literacy rates, computer use, and educational attainment (UNESCO, 2016 ; File & Ryan, 2014 ; Ryan & Bauman, 2016 ).

The American Populace Is Aging

Physical crimes favor the young, while fraud is generally associated with older perpetrators. Financial scams targeting seniors have become so prevalent that they’re now considered “the crime of the 21st century ” (National Conference on Aging, 2016 ). The FBI reports that these white-collar crimes, such as Internet sweepstakes schemes, specifically target seniors because of their access to liquid assets and because their deteriorating cognitive ability makes them more susceptible to Internet fraud than the general public) (Cooper & Smith, 2011 ; Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2016 ).

Opportunity to Commit White-Collar Crimes Is Increasing

In traditional, “on-the-job” white-collar crime, there was a time when only a very few individuals had access to the means to commit many crimes. As recently as the 1980s, far fewer American workers had realistic access to corporate information (Bureau of Labor Statistics, n.d. ). By 2012 , the number of Americans in the agricultural sector had declined by 55% and those in the industrial sector by 41.6%, while those employed in the service sector, including management, had increased by 16.3%. In other words, 47.6% of the total workforce is now in a position to sell trade secrets, embezzle funds, or commit other traditional white collar crimes (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013 ).

Things of Value are Increasingly Likely to be Intangible

Moving from means and opportunity to motivations, the nation is increasingly embodying its wealth in information or information products (Apte, Karmarkar, & Nath, 2008 ). The value of a pirated CD is found in the information encoded on the disc rather than in the cheap plastic medium itself. When the Business Software Alliance reported that $62.7 billion worth of software had been illegally copied (“pirated”) as of the 2013 report (BSA, 2014 ), they were reporting on the hypothetical value of lost sales of information, not on the loss of the worth of the plastic discs (which the perpetrators likely legitimately purchased in the first place). The concept of wealth itself is increasingly represented in nonphysical units. There was a time when, if thieves did not steal hard currency, they were invariably stealing something other than money. Now, money can be stolen by manipulating digital banking information stored in computer hard drives or even digital currencies that really only exist in concept.

White-Collar Techniques are Very Effective at Obtaining Intangible Things of Value

Things of value embodied in the form of information are particularly susceptible to attacks using information technology (computers). The rise of business computing means that a great deal of sensitive information that might once have been physically secured in locked cabinets or safes is now transmitted by e-mail or stored on company servers or in the cloud. Although it is difficult to quantify the extent to which the use of digital storage and retrieval systems renders the underlying information more vulnerable, it stands to reason that the information is now less secure and, hence, more likely to be exploited.

Computer-Related Crime

Linking computers together through the Internet has led to unprecedented potential for securing money through informational manipulation. The proliferation of technology in today’s society has resulted in a situation where “almost all business crime in the 21st century could be termed computer crime, as all major business transactions are carried out with computers” (Pontell, 2011 ). Compared to “traditional” scam techniques, the Internet provides an incredibly cheap, relatively anonymous means of reaching potential victims. In the offline environment, a scam that only snares one target out of a thousand is unlikely to offer a high enough return on investment to be worth pursuing. On the other hand, the online version of that same scam can be enacted several thousand times at once with the use of a mailing list (or any other means of electronic mass distribution). If the criminal sends the opening gambit of the scam to 20,000 potential victims, he or she may well get 20 useful replies in an afternoon. This is done with very little setup cost, very little time investment, and relative anonymity compared to performing the scam in person. This also allows criminals to realistically pursue distributed victimization strategies, where the dollar loss is spread out across such a wide group of victims that no one case is worth investigating.

Thus, a single white-collar criminal (or group of criminals) can easily be at the center of what seems like a worldwide crime wave. A single fraudster—like Robert Soloway, convicted in 2008 of fraud and criminal spamming—can completely flood the Internet with unsolicited and fraudulent e-mails. In Soloway’s case, it was to the self-admitted tune of trillions of e-mails, which made him thousands of dollars a day (Popkin, 2008 ) for a period spanning 1997 to 2007 (Government Sentencing Memorandum No. CR07-187MJP, U.S. v Soloway ) and for which he received a sentence of 47 months. Similarly, hacker Albert Gonzalez recently received a 20-year sentence for leading a group of 10 people who stole and then sold 40 million credit card numbers from customers of various companies that had unsecured wireless access points in the Miami area (Qualters, 2010 ).

Advanced information technologies and communication devices make white-collar crimes easier to commit, while having little impact on street crime (as they are primarily used for interacting with nonphysical constructs, which is the general province of white-collar crime). These technologies have become increasingly common across diverse social strata in recent years (Zickuhr & Smith, 2012 ). Unlike the portable communications technologies of the 1980s, the ability to possess and utilize these new technologies is not restricted to those with substantial incomes and/or higher levels of education. Their comparatively low price, combined with their ever increasing capabilities, make them the ideal method of committing crime. The widespread adoption of these technologies in the United States is a positive sign in the vast majority of respects, but a logical consequence of increasing the online population is that there are more opportunities to either commit a white-collar crime or become a victim of one.

Although these factors give researchers confidence that white-collar crime should be occurring in relatively large numbers (and should be growing at a time when other crimes are shrinking), proving it or putting a hard number on it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, due primarily to the definitional debate that has plagued the field for decades.

Similarly, efforts to reduce white-collar crimes are difficult to analyze with respect to their effectiveness, since the inability to define what constitutes white-collar crime means an inability to track its prevalence accurately. If we can’t establish a cause-and-effect relationship between a treatment and a reduction, we can never conclusively establish the effectiveness of that treatment.

The lack of a universal definition of white-collar crime poses more far-reaching consequences than simply lack of consistency; it is actually the key to the problem of analyzing white-collar crime. If something cannot be defined, then it cannot be accurately measured. Under varying definitions, white-collar crime can constitute anything from a simple check forgery to large-scale corporate malfeasance and sophisticated computer crimes, that is, he definitional debate regarding whether some types of financial fraud, identity theft, and computer/Internet crimes really constitute white-collar crime. This definitional variance makes it extremely difficult to gather information pertaining to criminal acts because, even if white-collar crime data are captured, it does not mean that the data will be comparable to other data or that anything meaningful can be garnered from its analysis.

Adding to the confusion is an apparent lack of consistency in the handling of white-collar offenses. Some highly damaging offenses may be handled administratively or civilly by a regulatory agency as opposed to criminally, while other similarly damaging offenses may be handled through the traditional criminal prosecutorial process. Administrative regulatory actions, civil court actions, and out of court settlements (where part of the settlement includes “no admission or finding of guilt” in return for a hefty financial settlement)—all combine to conceal the true presence of what would ordinarily be considered white-collar offenses but are not captured as an offense or enforcement statistic.

A lack of crime and arrest statistics goes so far as to “implicitly suggest that white-collar crime is not as serious as conventional crimes” (which law enforcement takes exhaustive measures to count accurately) (Albanese, 1995 ). As already discussed, this is most certainly not the case. Incidences of white-collar crimes not only affect many more individuals than traditional street crimes, but they also bring with them significant financial, emotional, and even physical tolls for the victims (NW3C, 2006 ).

Without question, the analysis of statistics on crimes committed, by whom, where, and when, details about perpetrators and victims, including background, personality traits, ethnicity, and age, can be considered “essential” in understanding crime trends. Knowledge of the “who, what, when and where” of any criminal act is required for developing strategies to prevent and reduce crime. Knowledge of common characteristics of offenders is necessary for understanding how to develop sentencing practices that help deter criminal activity and for developing programs to treat offenders so that they can be rehabilitated. The lack of a common definition of the term white-collar crime then, presents a major obstacle to using normal approaches to studying and dealing with it.

For white-collar crime, there is also the problem of even knowing when one has been the victim. It’s far easier for victims of a street crime to recognize that they have been victimized than it is for the persons who have fallen for a financial scam. One of the key elements of this type of scam is to keep the victims from finding out that they have been taken, for as long as possible. This calls to mind a simple formula in criminal law that is often used to determine whether a police report is even prepared by an investigating officer: “No complainant, no crime.” If the victim refuses to prosecute, no report of the offense is prepared, which means that no crime is added to the statistics; however, a criminal act has still occurred, one that fails to appear in the overall statistical profile of crime. If the victim is not even aware that he or she has been victimized, it’s unlikely that a true measurement of the prevalence of the crime will be possible.

The decision of whether one chooses to address issues through administrative or civil avenues, as opposed to criminal, will also determine whether that act is even defined as a crime. The problem for those charged with enforcement may involve consideration of whether the offense was a product of the actions of one person or of multiple people within an organization working together. The issue then becomes whether the act was committed with knowledge and intent, with disregard for the negative impacts their act would cause, or whether the group was simply committing a misguided act with an eye toward the financial bottom line.

Regardless of how the debate ultimately resolves itself, it is critical that we continue to educate the public regarding the methods of white-collar crime victimization, better enabling them to identify when they have been victimized and encouraging them to report these crimes to the police. Furthermore, regulatory agencies need to make data more accessible to those studying white-collar crime; while many corporations are understandably reticent to provide such data, the fact remains that this is a serious issue that can relate to public safety. It needs to be dealt with partly through transparency of data. Sharing information on how various enforcement and regulatory agencies handle white-collar crimes allows multiple entities to learn from one another what works best in dealing with the problem. If researchers and practitioners cannot empirically support claims regarding the incidence and prevalence of white-collar crimes, then it is impossible to justify the expenditure of funds for research and development that could potentially impact the lives of millions of citizens through the prevention and control of these ever-expanding crimes.

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• Zickuhr, K. , & Smith, A. (2012, April 13). Digital differences . Pew Research Center. Retrieved from http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media/Files/Reports/2012/PIP_Digital_differences_041312.pdf .

1. A complete treatment of every position of every participant of the proceedings would be far beyond the scope of this article. The citations that follow, referring to those proceedings of 1996, were selected simply to help illustrate the magnitude of the problem of finding an acceptable definition. Inclusion or exclusion of mention of any of the participants is not intended in any manner to suggest that any single contribution was superior or inferior to another. The citations used were selected simply to represent the various perspectives from which the group examined the task of defining the concept of white-collar crime.

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Discovery land v sj (2022-2023, private prosecution), david kennedy found guilty of fraudulent trading. paul raudnitz kc leads for the sfo., re: an investigation by the insolvency service under section 194 of the trade union and labour relations consolidation act 1992, re an investigation by the insolvency service under section 194 of the trade union and labour relations consolidation act 1992, re an investigation by the insolvency service under section 194 of the trade union and labour relations 'consolidation' act 1992, stuart bayes found guilty of insider dealing. tom broomfield prosecutes on behalf of fca, court of appeal reserves judgment in ibor conviction appeals, serious fraud office drops 10 year corruption inquiry into kazakh miner enrc. mark ellison kc, sean larkin kc, zoe johnson kc and kathryn hughes instructed for the company., fca v currie and currie, defendants acquitted in sfo prosecution of former g4s executives.

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• Justice Is Served: 5 Famous…

Justice Is Served: 5 Famous White Collar Crime Cases

Some of the most complex and high-profile types of criminal investigations are those involving white collar crime cases. Though the term can refer to crimes ranging from securities fraud to embezzlement to money laundering, “white collar crime” generally refers to a nonviolent crime committed for financial gain , according to Investopedia. These crimes are usually investigated by federal agencies like the FBI and Securities and Exchange Commission along with state-level agencies.

In fact, Utah established America’s first online registry for white collar criminals in 2016, Investopedia says. Those convicted of white collar crimes face prison sentences along with the potential of paying millions of dollars in financial damages and fines.

Because those involved in white collar crime are usually high-ranking business professionals and executives, serious cases usually make headlines nationwide and even globally. The following are some of the most famous (or infamous) companies and individuals involved in white collar crime cases. These examples show that, while such crimes involve large amounts of money and extensive concealment, trained law enforcement professionals are able to investigate and prosecute white collar crimes successfully.

In this famous white collar crime case, a company that was once successful resorted to schemes to hide losses and fabricate profits. Though Enron shares were worth $90.75 at its peak , they fell to just $0.67 after the company filed for bankruptcy in 2002. Some of the criminal practices involved in the Enron case included using off-balance-sheet special purpose vehicles (SPVs) in order to hide mounting debt and “toxic assets” from both investors and creditors. Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Andrew Fastow was held largely responsible for orchestrating these false business tactics.

As one of the “ biggest accounting scandals in U.S. history ,” according to CBS News, the WorldCom investigation began when internal audits found “improper accounting of more than $3.8 billion in expenses over five quarters.” These accounting irregularities did not conform to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and resulted in the resignation of senior vice president and controller David Myers, as well as layoffs for more than 17,000 WorldCom employees.

HealthSouth

In 2004, auditors discovered “ hundreds of millions of dollars in previously unreported accounting fraud at HealthSouth ,” according to The New York Times . The chain of hospitals and clinics was found to have “$2.5 billion in fraudulent accounting entries from 1996 to 2002, $500 million in incorrect accounting äó_ and other items involved in acquisitions from 1994 to 1999, and $800 million to $1.6 billion in ‘aggressive accounting’ from 1992 to March 2003,” the same article reports. This brought the total range of fraudulent entries to a staggering $3.8 billion to $4.6 billion. Founder Richard M. Scrushy was indicted on 84 counts of fraud, and at least five former CFOs pleaded guilty to charges.

Bernard Madoff

Perhaps the most well-known white collar criminal is Bernard Madoff, who was convicted of fraud costing investors $65 billion in 2009. The wealth management portion of his business took money from investors to pay former investors, without ever actually investing funds. Madoff, the former chairman of Nasdaq and founder of a successful Wall Street firm, was sentenced to 150 years in prison for running “an elaborate Ponzi scheme , which promised large returns on investments,” Investopedia says.

Wells Fargo

One of the most recent instances of a white collar crime case involves Wells Fargo, a banking and financial services provider. In 2016, “federal regulators said Wells Fargo (WFC) employees secretly created millions of unauthorized bank and credit card accounts äóî without their customers knowing it äóî since 2011,” CNN Money says.

Opening some 1.5 million fraudulent deposit accounts and submitting 565,443 credit card applications allowed employees to hit unrealistic sales targets and receive bonuses. Customers were then wrongly charged fees for accounts they didn’t know existed. Wells Fargo must pay $185 million in fines and refund $5 million to affected customers. This is the largest penalty since the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was founded in 2011.

Stopping White Collar Crime: Criminal Justice Education at King University

Fighting white collar crime requires law enforcement to look beyond traditional offenses and hold corrupt businesses and corporations accountable. Earning a criminal justice degree can help qualify you for careers that help keep communities safe and prevent crimes like those discussed here.

King University’s online Bachelor of Science in Criminal Justice teaches you vital knowledge and skills related to law enforcement, restorative justice, and other key topics. This King degree can be completed in as little as 16 months, and graduates are prepared for careers in fields such as state and federal law enforcement and the court system.

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