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Learning to Think Things Through

By Gerald Nosich View Book Sample including Table of Contents, overviews and selected pages.

The Miniature Guide to Critical Thinking: Concepts and Tools, Chinese

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Original research article, how do chinese undergraduates understand critical thinking a phenomenographic approach.

• 1 Faculty of Education, Southwest University, Chongqing, China
• 2 Centre for Higher Education Studies, Southern University of Science and Technology, Shenzhen, China

The cultivation of critical thinking in undergraduates is crucial for teaching in higher education. Although scholars have defined critical thinking in various ways, limited study about critical thinking from the learner’s perspective. In this phenomenographic research, we collect essays written by 80 Chinese undergraduates with multiple disciplinary backgrounds to reveal their understandings of critical thinking. Four conceptions of critical thinking were found, namely critical thinking as query and reflection on the irrationality of things (Conception 1); an objective and comprehensive understanding of things (Conception 2); independent thinking with innovation (Conception 3), as well as a willingness and attitude (Conception 4). Further analysis in the light of the referential-structural framework helps to construct a hierarchical relationship between different conceptions, with Conception 1 the least complex and Conception 3 the most complex. While Conceptions 1–3 are skill-oriented, Conception 4 is deposition-oriented, and there is no hierarchical relationship between the two groups of conceptions. They deal with different dimensions of critical thinking. University lecturers can use these findings to help equip undergraduates with deepened conceptions of critical thinking in their daily routine teaching.

Introduction

Critical thinking has almost become “one of the defining concepts of the Western University” ( Barnett, 1997 , p. 3). In the United States, school education has always emphasized the cultivation of citizens who are able to adapt themselves to modern society’s development and to independently judge and process information since Dewey advocated “reflective thinking” in the early twentieth century ( Zhong, 2002 ). The critical-thinking movement was popular in western countries in the 1960s, and regarded as a major goal of higher education ( Yuan, 2012 ), and it has now generally been accepted as a significant competence and an important objective for higher education ( Bali, 2015 ). In fact, studies have indicated that critical thinking has a significant impact on Students’ academic performance and achievements in higher education ( Fong et al., 2017 ; Ghanizadeh, 2017 ; Ren et al., 2020 ).

Over the past decades, several scholarly issues related to critical thinking have become prominent ( Cáceres et al., 2020 ). Teaching for critical thinking, or pedagogical strategies for promoting critical thinking is a key research theme throughout the years at all education levels (e.g., Cáceres et al., 2020 ; Aktoprak and Hursen, 2022 ) and for diverse disciplines (e.g., McLaughlin and McGill, 2017 ; Bellaera et al., 2021 ), since critical thinking has been viewed as skills and dispositions that can be learned instead of an innate and unmodifiable mental function ( Liyanage et al., 2021 ). Researchers also endeavor to measure critical thinking skills, which heavily relies on standardized multiple-choice tests ( Larsson, 2017 ). Numerous measurement tools have been made, such as the Cornell Critical Thinking Test (CCTT), the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (CCTST), the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal-FS (WGCTA-FS) ( Behar-Horenstein and Niu, 2011 ) and the HEIghten <reg>(</reg> critical thinking assessment ( Liu et al., 2018 ; Shaw et al., 2020 ). Noticeably, as Larsson (2017) contends, there is an ongoing extensive debate on the definition of critical thinking.

Scholars define critical thinking in diverse ways ( Arisoy and Aybek, 2021 ), one of which is “reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do” as proposed by Ennis (1991 , p. 6). Paul and Elder (1999) argue that critical thinking is a process of interpreting, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and evaluating the information which dominates beliefs and behaviors in a positive and skillful manner and which is collected from observation, experiments, reflection, reasoning, and communications. Bailin et al. (1999) believe that critical thinking is a process of problem-solving in nature, stressing the key role of real problem situations in critical thinking training. Facione (1990) found that critical thinking is characterized by purposeful and self-disciplined judgment in obtaining the interpretation, analysis, evaluation, deduction, and explanation for the evidential, conceptual, methodological, standard, and situational thinking. Chinese scholars have also expressed their understanding. Yuan (2012) suggests that critical thinking is a review and query of, and reflection on existing knowledge, thoughts, and theories, and the problems therein. It includes critical spirit and skills. Yu et al. (2015) believe that critical thinking is exhibited by an inclination to make value judgments on the relevant information according to certain criteria and constantly improve problem-solving skills.

Based on these studies, critical thinking is a combination of the skill and disposition aspects ( Liu et al., 2021 ). The former refers to the elements selected as essential advanced cognitive skills and which are taught to students. As proposed by Schmaltz et al. (2017 , p. 1) “the term critical thinking has come to refer to an ever-widening range of skills and abilities.” The latter (disposition aspect) refers to “the extent to which an individual is inclined or willing to perform a given thinking skill” ( Dwyer and Walsh, 2019 , p. 18). While critical thinking has been defined in multiple ways, Ennis (2018 , p. 166) contends that these definitions do not differ significantly from each other, as each seems to be “a different way of cutting the same conceptual pie.” Although scholars hold different views on elements of skills, the commonalities can be summarized as clarifying the meaning, analyzing and demonstrating, evaluating evidence, judging and inducing rationality, and making reliable conclusions. In addition, the common points in mentality and attitudes also involve open-mindedness, fair mentality, evidence seeking, comprehensive and full understanding as much as possible, concern for others’ opinions and reasons, matching between beliefs and evidence, and willingness to accept alternative selection and belief revision ( Dai et al., 2012 ).

Researchers express distinct definitions of critical thinking and the divergence mainly lies in their emphases. However, there must be some common factors as they show different understanding modes for a common concept. For instance, researchers recognize critical thinking as a kind of thinking, focus on reflection, review, and re-examination, and attach great importance to the evidence. They also stress the explicit judgment as well as the consideration of both critical thinking capability and attitude inclination.

Researchers tend to define critical thinking based on personal experience and reflection, but this may not be enough for pertinent educational implications. In relation to higher education, better insights into how undergraduates understand critical thinking are important if we are to improve their critical thinking. Therefore, a change from the researcher’s perspective to that of the students is necessary. Only if educators fully understand Students’ conceptions of critical thinking can they suit the remedy to the case and complete the cultivation work with a definite purpose. The overarching question for this study is: what are the conceptions of critical thinking held by Chinese undergraduates? A phenomenographic approach was employed. The next section will outline this methodology, followed by data collection, analysis, and the presentation of the findings. Then the elements within each conception will be discussed, before we propose some practical implications.

Research design

Phenoemnography.

The focus of this research is conceptions, that is, people’s understanding and specific views of certain things. We use phenomenography, defined as an empirical research method aiming to study the qualitatively different ways in which people perceive, understand, and experience various phenomena or aspects of the surrounding world ( Marton, 1981 ). In phenomenographic studies, a number of terms like “conceptions,” “understandings,” and “views” are used to refer to the same thing, the same object of study. Researchers group similar ways of experiencing (conceptions) together into categories to highlight “qualitatively different” ways of experiencing. The focus is on “stripped” rather than rich descriptions of conceptions, because phenomenographers highlight the key aspects of experience/conceptions.

Phenomenography takes a “from-the-inside” perspective, with a focus on uncovering others’ understanding and perceptions of some phenomena (second-order perspective), rather than the researcher’s understanding and perspectives (first-order perspective). This is in line with phenomenography’s non-dualistic philosophical foundation. The focus is on the relationship between the subject (the experiencer) and the object (the phenomenon experienced). From a phenomenographic perspective, meaning is seen as constructed in the relationship between the experiencer and the experienced.

Qualitative research methods (such as interviews, reflective writing, and observation) are used to collect data. The objective lies in uncovering the different ways of experiencing a phenomenon as variously as possible and the selection of the participants should adhere to this principle. Maximum variation, the interest of which lies in heterogeneity or diversity ( Green, 2005 ), is an appropriate sampling method. Åkerlind et al. (2005, p. 79) contend that “[i]n phenomenography, small sample sizes with maximum variation sampling, that is, the selection of a research sample with a wide range of variation across key indicators (such as age, gender, experience, discipline areas, and so on), is traditional.”

Phenomenographic analysis involves a search for both commonalities and variations in the data and categories. Searching for qualitatively different categories, phenomenographers maximize the similarities between data within a category, and also maximize the differences between data representing different categories.

Data collection

Qualitative data were collected through the Students’ written essays. The first author was teaching a course named Basics of Education which undergraduates from different disciplines attended. An essay writing task was given to all the 80 undergraduates in the middle of the semester as the midterm assignment. The students were asked to give their understanding and the perceived importance of critical thinking in Chinese. They knew that the essays would be used as data for the study. Once the essays were collected, we asked a professional translator to translate Chinese into English for analysis. One reason for choosing this way to collect data was to minimize the amount of researcher intervention, compared to, for example, an interview approach. Another reason was that this method allows the students sufficient time to organize their thoughts and ideas, fostering the expression of their viewpoints in a clear and thoughtful way. The third reason for choosing this way to collect data was the large number of students which allowed the inclusion of student participants from diverse disciplines (such as pedagogy, literature, history, science, engineering, law, agronomy, and art) and of different genders and ages, which ensured the maximum variation required by phenomenography. The background information of the respondents has been listed below ( Table 1 ):

Table 1. The background information of the respondents.

Although the requirements of critical thinking may vary according to different disciplines ( Grussendorf and Rogol, 2018 ), it is not the aim of the present research to explicate the relation between academic discipline and critical thinking. The goal of this study is to attain a general picture of critical thinking conceptions across different disciplines. Moreover, given the qualitative nature of this investigation, it is inappropriate to claim that certain students can represent a discipline as a whole.

Data analysis

We read the essays repeatedly to ensure sufficient familiarity with the essay data after the essays were collected. Subsequently, the expressions related to the research question were extracted to form a “pool of meanings,” and the analytical focus was transferred to this pool. Using the “pool of meaning” approach, we could better focus on the collective-level analysis. The collective interpretation aims to uncover people’s understandings across the group under investigation ( Åkerlind et al., 2005 ), rather than focusing on any individual’s understanding. As Åkerlind et al. (2005, p. 76) contend, the analysis should be “based on the interviews as a holistic group, not as a series of individual interviews.” The approach may also help to highlight the key characteristics of the meanings ( Åkerlind, 2005 ). From a practical perspective, extracting the meaning-laden statements from the whole transcripts into a pool of meanings make the data manageable ( Svensson and Theman, 1983 ).

Similarities and differences were found by carefully comparing, contrasting and distinguishing the extracted expressions, and then categorization and naming (labeling of the categories) was carried out to form a preliminary list of categories. The list was then continuously corrected, inspected, polished and confirmed, and each category checked for supporting empirical data. It was an iterative process to guarantee that the materials (expressions related to the research question) were rationally allocated to the categories and the borders between the categories were becoming increasingly clear to generate the categories. Each category was interconnected rather than separated. We finally concentrated on the establishment of the hierarchical relationship between different categories and ended up with the outcome space.

Research findings

The results showed that the participant undergraduates expressed four categories of conception of critical thinking. The corresponding explanations were as follows.

Critical thinking is query and reflection on the irrationality of things

This conception highlighted criticism as its core, where questioning, negating, reflecting on, and analyzing things and information served as a key part of critical thinking. The students argued that “critical thinking is nothing more than reflection and criticism in essence” (S66). Similar statements included: “Critical thinking is to view problems through critical thinking and figure out the inappropriate points in the problems” (S19); “Critical thinking is mainly represented by suspicion, which means finding fault with anything” (S27); and, “Critical thinking is criticizing and correcting others” (S41). One reason for holding this conception was the maladies of the virtual world in the information age. As S46 wrote:

We are in an era of information explosion. The arrival of the Internet gives information wings, and information sources vary from the traditional media to the We-Media in large quantity. Everyone can be an information publisher. For these reasons, we need to make efforts to screen the true or false information on the network.

The other reason was the social context as observed by S49:

Confronted with various information everywhere in society, we should have critical thinking and a questionable attitude. We ought to explicitly know whether the information is useful or useless, and good or bad.

In addition to questioning and reflecting on the people, things, and objects, critical thinking also involves the re-examination, negation, and correction of judgments, deductions, analysis, and explanations of individuals themselves, which is equivalent to “self-correction,” consciously monitoring one’s own cognitive activities. Taking what S52 said as an example, “Critical thinking refers to correcting one’s own original immature or false ideas while absorbing knowledge.” When it comes to the attitudes of querying and reflection, students thought individuals should remain rational and reduce subjective sensibility: “They can question the existing views but cannot blindly object or quarrel. Critical thinking is reasonable speculation and discussion instead of groundless non-senses” (S55).

This category focuses on a uni-directional search for what is incorrect, misleading, irrational, inappropriate, and/or not useful. This may be compared with the search for and balancing of multiple perspectives that is seen in next category.

Critical thinking is an objective and comprehensive understanding of things

Compared with the previous conception, this category of critical thinking seemed to be more comprehensive as the rationality and irrationality of things could be considered with negative aspects criticized and positive aspects affirmed. The undergraduates were able to objectively and comprehensively see things from multiple perspectives.

First, the ability to distinguish between two sides of the same thing was needed when judging and evaluating certain things. Students holding such a conception were aware of analyzing the internal contradictoriness of things and were able to actively think about both sides of the various things and phenomena they encountered. S9 felt that he “generally considers a thing from two sides, namely advantages and disadvantages.” S21 also believed that “Critical thinking means taking the good and bad aspects of a thing into account, namely strengths and weaknesses.” S25 said that:

Critical thinking is to view the problem in a critical manner, through which both sides should be discovered in things and problems. For example, both benefits and harms of Internet development in our life should not be ignored in the age of rapid Internet development.

S50 realized that critical thinking “helps me distinguish true or false better and screen the right information beneficial to me from a great deal of information obtained every day.” The reason why we are supposed to consider both sides of things was because in real life, “we are perhaps immersed in a sea of information, confused by specious solutions, and misguided by others’ ill-intentioned lies” (S33).

Second, observation and thinking should be performed from multiple perspectives to gain a more comprehensive and abundant understanding of things beyond a dichotomous analysis of only the positive and negative aspects. The perspective for observing and interpreting the external world is not limited to positive and negative sides. As S12 mentioned, “We should consider problems from another perspective beyond the positive and negative impacts considered, which usually brings about different feelings and understandings.” S69 also pointed out the importance of diverse perspectives and argued that “critical thinking refers to regarding problems and events from different points of view. We are considered to have critical thinking when we interpret things or problems on the basis of different angles.”

Compared with the dualist approach, employing diverse perspectives to deal with problems can be more conducive to students’ analyzing the full view of things and phenomena and acquiring a more comprehensive cognition. As S50 put forward, “Efforts should be made to analyze an object from multiple perspectives to achieve the effect of overall understanding.” S18 “independently takes objective things into consideration from various aspects, perspectives, and levels” in daily life. In the process of thinking from diverse perspectives, individuals should be able to decrease the interference of personal experience and prejudice, and take an objective, rational, and neutral position as far as possible. As S26 stated, “objective knowledge should not be looked at through rose-colored spectacles and excessive personal preference.”

Critical thinking is independent thinking with innovation

This conception attaches special importance to independence, that is, critical thinking is not seen as constituting a relationship of subordination or dependence with any person, theory or point of view. It neither relies on other things to exist nor depends on others for independence. In describing the necessity of independent thinking, many students took into account the prominent features of the information age. They believed that it was of great significance to be able to engage in rational and independent thinking in the current information environment. S43 believed:

If a person is capable of thinking independently, he/she will not be confused by wrong information from the outside world. One can obtain the information needed from a large amount of information and develop his/her own thinking.

The basis of thinking was the knowledge that individuals searched for and utilized in their argument, because “the foundation of critical thinking is knowledge, and the more knowledge and experience one accumulates in a field, the easier it is for one to have his/her own ideas subjectively, and he/she won’t blindly repeat what others say” (S44).

Independent thinking does not necessarily mean being different from others, but emphasizes the whole process of making a careful analysis of things and arriving at one’s own opinion without outside interference as much as possible. The final result may not be “astonishing,” yet it is a subjective and well-founded opinion and judgment. For instance, S50 said:

I think critical thinking is not about standing on the opposite of the public to be different, but about having one’s own independent thinking. As an independent person, one has a new point of view or way of thinking to support the events that he/she describes. It’s neither fault-finding nor dismissal, disbelief, or skepticism. Instead, it is a process of reflection, rationality, logic, comparison, discrimination, and evaluation that goes deep into the essence of things with a full understanding of the situation.

According to S80, critical thinking was:

[…] having one’s own unique ideas and cognition, opinions, and insights based on facts. Even if one doesn’t agree with many people, he/she doesn’t easily deny himself/herself because of hearsay. Instead, one carefully analyzes the events and comes up with your own opinion.

Independent thinking usually leads to independent personal views, opinions, judgments, and even innovation. Therefore, some students closely linked their understanding of critical thinking to innovation, seeing the former as an important source and logical basis for the latter. For instance, S26 stated, “I think that critical thinking is a kind of innovative thinking, which refers to the abandonment and innovation based on the generalization of previous or old thinking.” S10 also remarked that “critical thinking can stimulate our imagination and creativity, and spark our thinking.” S25 argued that “innovation is the soul of a nation, while critical thinking is the foundation of innovation, in which logic plays a vital role.” S68 claimed that “without criticism, there is no innovation. Without critical thinking, the source of innovation will be nowhere to be found, and the technological development of the society will be limited.” S80, from a wider perspective, believed that the cultivation of critical thinking is of great significance for the cultivation of innovative talents.

Critical thinking cannot be separated from the innovation capability, and lack of critical thinking directly gives rise to weak innovation capability; only by achieving the goal of cultivating critical thinking in education can we truly cultivate a large number of innovative talents.

Critical thinking is a willingness and attitude

In the final category, the Students’ emphasized their willingness and attitude to thinking critically. Without willingness and attitude, they thought it was unlikely that people would be able to think critically, thus failing to exercise and develop their critical thinking skills. This willingness and attitude were regarded as a prerequisite for critical skills and abilities in this sense. Meanwhile, the willingness and attitude also served as pillars in the process of skill development. With them, the students are perceived as more likely to develop critical thinking habits that will motivate them to think positively, question, express their opinions, and explain themselves, so as to allow themselves to exert autonomy and take initiatives in their studies and lives. In short, willingness and attitude are perceived as prerequisites for skill cultivation, always reflected in the demonstration of skills and provide support for the development of skills. Willingness and attitude are more implicit than skills, yet they are indispensable.

In this category, students’ willingness was first reflected in the fact that they had no blind faith in authority. For example, many mentioned the need to have a questioning willingness and attitude, “not to follow authority, to dare to question authority” (S18), and “to have a critical perspective, to dare to question, and to dare to seek evidence” (S58). Second, it was also reflected in independence, which was already evident in the analysis of the previous conception. Third, students were willing to think and remain curious. As S53 stated:

Critical thinking, I think, means … to ask questions and think about the phenomena that occur in life. Maintaining curiosity is a motivation for learning … though some may say Chinese education kills curiosity. We can gain a lot by finding problems and learning to solve problems.

Relationships between the conceptions

In addition to the qualitatively different ways of understanding, phenomenography also seeks to explore the potential structural relationship between various conceptions. This enables the conceptions to be ordered hierarchically, in terms of increasing complexity of understanding.

As for phenomenography’s analysis of different conceptions, there is a specific theoretical framework provided by phenomenography for analysis of relationships between conceptions. Within this framework, each conception is composed of a referential aspect and a structural aspect. The former refers to the global meaning of the phenomenon, while the latter consists of the internal horizon (the elements simultaneously present in consciousness and the relationship between them) and the external horizon (the environment in which the conception is present). With the help of this framework, the four abovementioned conceptions of critical thinking, as well as their internal components, can be analyzed one by one, and the relationship between them can be constructed ( Table 2 ).

Table 2. Critical thinking in the “referential-structural” analytical framework.

The different components of these four conceptions of critical thinking are analyzed and compared in Table 2 . It can be seen that Conceptions 1–3 generally demonstrate a trend from simple to complex, from one-sided to comprehensive. For example, from the perspectives of Method and Result, only looking for the irrational information is focused on in Conception 1, developing a relatively comprehensive understanding is targeted in Conception 2, and developing personal views with innovation on the basis of careful analysis is encouraged in Conception 3, placing more emphasis on dispositional development is highlighted in Conception 4.

Based on the above findings, the four conceptions can be presented as a structurally related “outcome space” of conceptions of critical thinking (as seen in Figure 1 ). In the light of the theory of phenomenography, each conception of critical thinking is a reflection of different dimensions of experience and has qualitative differences from the other three conceptions. Furthermore, there is a hierarchical relationship between the four conceptions. In contrast with lower-ranked conceptions, higher-ranked conceptions are much more complex and contain new elements.

Figure 1. The outcome space.

Conception 1 is the most basic type of conception of critical thinking exemplified by questioning and reflecting on the irrationality of things—but only one side of things is considered in this way. Although “questioning” and “denying” are indeed two of the prominent features of critical thinking, they are not the only ones. People are not required to immediately deny things absolutely in critical thinking about certain views, judgments, and phenomena. However, many people equate critical thinking with absolute opposition and negation, which is a narrow or even wrong understanding. From this point of view, Conception 2, which can recognize both advantages and disadvantages of things and observe from multiple perspectives, is superior to Conception 1.

Bloom’s (1956) taxonomy of learning objectives is a starting point for identifying the necessary skills of critical thinking. He put forward the six classifications of educational goals in the cognitive field: knowledge, understanding, application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. Anderson and Krathwohl (2001) revised the stage of the human cognitive process to progress from a lower to higher advancement, that is, memorization, understanding, application, analysis, evaluation, and innovation. Comparing the six classifications with the findings of this study, it can be seen that the students’ behaviors in analyzing problems, such as identifying different levels of things, phenomena, and views to acquire a more objective and comprehensive understanding, are fully embodied in Conception 2.

Corresponding to the innovation level, and regarded as the highest level of thinking, Conception 3, the emphasis on the construction of new conceptions or solutions with strong originality based on independent personal thinking, is a display of the rich imagination and creativity of students, as well as a reflection of their pioneering spirit in response to their existing knowledge and information. According to the six-level theory of cognitive process proposed by Bloom (1956) and Anderson and Krathwohl (2001) , Conceptions 2 and 3 should be in a progressive hierarchical relationship.

The hierarchy between conceptions can be seen in Figure 1 , which shows a hierarchy of increasing complexity based on inclusively expanding awareness. Like Conception 1, Conception 2 includes awareness of searching for irrationality as part of critical thinking, but adds awareness of using multiple perspectives. Similar to Conception 2, Conception 3 includes awareness of multiple perspectives, but adds the notion of independent thinking and innovation. However, Conception 4 shifts the focus from skills to dispositions. As stated, both skill and disposition are indispensable aspects for critical thinking ( Liu et al., 2021 ), the former deals with the abilities and the latter deals with inclination or willingness. Nevertheless, it may not be reasonable to contend which aspect is more superior to the other, as they deal with different dimensions of critical thinking ( Hemming, 2000 ).

Support for each of the conceptions of critical thinking found in this study may be found in the literature. For Conception 1, the undergraduates are critical of both others and themselves. They have a tendency to find fault with others ( Wu, 2011 ), which is similar to what Moore (2013, p. 512) refers to as “a propensity to judge in a negative way.” Additionally, they are able to exercise self-reflection or self-correction. The analogous expressions can also be found in Moore’s (2013) finding of self-reflexivity, where the participants claimed that it was important to critically inspect their own conceptions and opinions. In general, the participants holding this conception place great emphasis on flaw finding or criticizing, which might be due to a translation problem ( Chen, 2017 ). The word “critical” has been translated into Chinese as pi pan , the meaning of which resembles criticizing ( Wu, 2011 ). Other important meanings, such as logical thinking and decision making are devalued or even ignored, which implies that it is not easy for some western concepts to be accurately understood and assimilated in the Chinese context.

The participants holding Conception 2 see both sides of things: in Phillips and Bond’s (2004, p. 284) words, they weigh up both “pros and cons, positives and negatives.” They also emphasize being objective, fair, neutral, and less biased ( Phillips and Bond, 2004 ). Chen (2017, p. 147) terms this conception “ the omnipresence of the opposite point of view ,” the root of which can be found in indigenous Chinese philosophy. The dialectics of Chinese philosophy hold that black and white are ubiquitous, meaning that contradictions have always existed in the world. People should look at things from both sides. Another reason, as the students in the research add, is to better distinguish and filter useful and beneficial information. As S33 states, “one would be overwhelmed and misled by the information ocean unless he/she can weigh up the positives and negatives.” Other participants go beyond the simple differentiation of black and white to view things from diverse perspectives. For them, the value judgment of right or wrong, positive and negative is less important. As Phillips and Bond (2004, p. 285) contend, the emphasis is put on “seeing multiple angles and perspectives.” The interviewees in Phillips and Bond’s (2004) study stress the outcome or, more specifically, the diverse decisions and solutions as a result of standing in varying positions. Our participants, however, aim to achieve more comprehensive ways to understand things around them because of different perspectives. Regardless of both sides or multiple angles, the core of this conception of critical thinking is about the perspectives from which students view the world.

Conception 3 is similar to the intellectual autonomy, with which people tend to accept only what they have found themselves, and rely only on their own cognitive, investigative and inferential capacities ( Fricker, 2006 ). Likewise, Chen (2017) also uses the term in his study with Chinese college students, who stress the significance of originality. While the students in Chen’s (2017) research talk about having their own opinions that differ from those of teachers or parents, the participants in this study relate independent thinking to the situations where they have to face an overwhelming amount of information. Also in this conception, the participants relate critical thinking to innovation, which verifies Lucas’ (2019) finding that Chinese students connect critical thinking with innovative activities. Moore (2013) terms it “a simple originality,” which goes beyond challenging existing ideas and knowledge to produce something new to contribute to knowledge. The students attach importance to the “ownership of their ideas” ( Chen, 2017 , p. 145) and the production of thinking, or more specifically, the generation of new insights ( Lucas, 2019 ). The difference in this study is that the participants discuss the innovation of thinking at a macro level, i.e., the contribution of innovative thinking to society and the whole nation, rather than being confined to knowledge or scholarship.

Conception 4 is inherently a focus on disposition and attitudes, not just skills, in critical thinking. Undoubtedly, epistemic skills are crucial for critical thinking, yet scholars have contended that dispositions and attitudes are equally important to carry out the skills ( Pithers and Soden, 2000 ; Stapleton, 2001 ; Davies and Barnett, 2015 ). Critical spirit has been defined as the tendency or disposition to think critically in a variety of contexts in a regular manner ( Siegel, 1988 ). To be a critical thinker, one should have the “willingness to inquire” ( Hamby, 2015 , p. 77). As Davson-Galle (2004 , p. 504) argues, “[i]t is one thing to be able to think critically; it is another thing to be willing to exercise that ability.” Critical spirit is the driving force for people’s engagement in critical thinking ( Siegel, 1988 ); that is, it helps to understand what motivates individuals to apply critical skills and view phenomena from a critical perspective ( Hemming, 2000 ). Furthermore, those who possess critical thinking skills may not have a well-developed critical spirit, yet others “may have developed a disposition which views the world with a more critical eye,” even if they do not possess as many skills as others ( Hemming, 2000 , p. 177).

Students have demonstrated attitudes such as “dare to question authority” (S18), “dare to seek evidence” (S58), and “keep curiosity” (S53). However, the essays relating to dispositions or attitudes are few and only mention limited dispositional traits of critical thinking as proposed by Facione and Facione (1992) , such as inquisitiveness and truth-seeking. The findings are also consistent with early surveys which conclude that Chinese students have negative dispositions toward critical thinking ( Tiwari et al., 2003 ; Zhu et al., 2005 ; He et al., 2006 ).

Conclusion and implications for teaching in higher education

To sum up, the research found that Chinese undergraduates possessed four different conceptions of critical thinking and revealed a progressively hierarchical relationship between the four. Conception 1, questioning and reflecting on the irrationality of things, is the least complex conception. To scrutinize and recognize things comprehensively is encouraged in the more complex Conception 2. Conception 3, independent thinking with innovation is more complex than Conceptions 1 and 2, and creativity is emphasized. Conception 4 elevates critical thinking to a kind of willingness and attitude.

Based on the above analysis, two key problems are revealed: first, the progress of cultivating undergraduates’ critical thinking in higher education is not satisfactory as some students only recognize some basic and superficial conceptions instead of deep understandings. Second, the cultivation of critical thinking is mainly focused on tangible rather than intangible aspects, as evidenced by the fact that most students can be aware of the skill dimension, but only a minority realize the dispositional dimension.

The first implication for university teaching is that lecturers should play an active role in equipping undergraduates with deepened conceptions of critical thinking in the daily routine of teaching and learning. To this end, it is vital that teachers should have acquired correct and comprehensive understandings and can undertake the responsibility of advocating the critical disposition. Lecturers are expected to be motivators for students rather than the embodiment of authority and possessors of knowledge. Students should be encouraged to question, criticize, make independent judgments from different perspectives, and search for relevant evidence to support their views. Furthermore, teachers should strive to create a democratic, active and free academic discussion environment where different viewpoints are accepted and tolerated. Efforts should be made to enable students to realize that critical thinking is not only a skill, but also an attitude and willingness. It is not enough to only focus on the skills: critical thinking cannot be acquired and maintained through repeated, mechanical, uninteresting training. If students do not have a clear understanding and a deep recognition of mastering critical thinking, they will not agree with the value of critical thinking from their hearts. As a result, their conscious support for critical thinking may be lost, and students’ motivation for learning will decrease or even disappear. Qian (2018) points out that critical thinking education can not only improve students’ thinking ability, but also shape their values and life attitudes.

Second, critical thinking should be promoted in both specific and integrated ways. Even though some researchers question the possibility of teaching critical thinking ( Willingham, 2008 ; Weissberg, 2013 ), there is an emerging consensus that critical thinking should be taught and viewed as a component of education ( Aktoprak and Hursen, 2022 ). It is expected that universities will develop critical thinking skills through institutionalized and formalized courses, i.e., individual critical thinking course ( Ennis, 2018 ), which can be proved by recent empirical evidence ( Abrami et al., 2015 ). Yu and Gao (2017) claim that critical thinking is a unique way of thinking with unique rules, formation mechanisms, and promotion strategies and needs to be cultivated in a targeted manner. Critical thinking requires certain thinking skills and techniques acquired through specific courses. Additionally, the integrated courses are more implicit. For such courses, the fostering of critical thinking skills and disposition is valued while maintaining the professional or disciplinary teaching mode. In this way, the training of skills and the disposition of critical thinking are both developed. More group discussions, debates and presentations are used to stimulate students to express and defend their own opinions and ideas, and doubt, criticize and argue against others’ viewpoints. Meanwhile, more real cases or events can be introduced to bridge the course content and the real world and stimulate thinking. Moreover, routine learning tasks can be added with more critical elements. For example, students could choose some reading material (books, articles, etc.) and then write a reasoned critique on its flaws and omissions.

Data availability statement

The raw data supporting the conclusions of this article will be made available by the authors, without undue reservation.

Ethics statement

This study was reviewed and approved by the Southwest University. The participants provided their written informed consent to participate in this study.

Author contributions

XZ wrote and refined the introduction, research design, and findings sections. XL wrote and refined the study’s discussion and conclusion sections. Both authors were involved in preparing the manuscript.

This research was supported by the Chinese National Education Science Planning Project (BIA210200).

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The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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Keywords : critical thinking, undergraduates, conceptions, phenomenography, teaching

Citation: Zhao X and Liu X (2022) How do Chinese undergraduates understand critical thinking? A phenomenographic approach. Front. Educ. 7:956428. doi: 10.3389/feduc.2022.956428

Received: 30 May 2022; Accepted: 05 September 2022; Published: 20 September 2022.

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Copyright © 2022 Zhao and Liu. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) . The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

*Correspondence: Xu Liu, [email protected]

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Study on the Characteristics of the Chinese Students’ Critical Thinking

School of Culture and Media, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, China

Contributor Roles: Shi Jing is the sole author. The author read and approved the final manuscript.

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The critical thinking trait is the premise and foundation of innovative thinking, and has become the necessary ability and core quality for cultivating innovative talents. Different scholars have different understandings about the definition and constituent elements of the characteristics of thinking and critical thinking. Their common view is that the characteristics of thinking is the intention and will of thinking activity, and the characteristics of critical thinking is the individual tendency of critical thinking. Facts have proved that the general lack of critical thinking ability of Chinese students has become a defect in their qualities. Thus, the education of critical thinking should start from primary education, and the cultivation of critical thinking at university stage should strengthen the existing foundation laid in primary and secondary schools. Faced with the educational growth process of these potential innovative talents of the Chinese students, this paper puts forward five countermeasures and suggestions on the cultivation of critical thinking characteristics, which have theoretical and practical significance for promoting the reform of critical thinking teaching, improving the level of critical thinking of the Chinese students, improving the qualities of cultivating innovative talents and promoting independent innovation.

Characteristics of Thinking, Critical Thinking, Innovative Talents, Teaching Reform

Shi Jing. (2020). Study on the Characteristics of the Chinese Students’ Critical Thinking. Higher Education Research , 5 (3), 94-102. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.her.20200503.14

Shi Jing. Study on the Characteristics of the Chinese Students’ Critical Thinking. High. Educ. Res. 2020 , 5 (3), 94-102. doi: 10.11648/j.her.20200503.14

Shi Jing. Study on the Characteristics of the Chinese Students’ Critical Thinking. High Educ Res . 2020;5(3):94-102. doi: 10.11648/j.her.20200503.14

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Exploring Criticality in Chinese Philosophy: Refuting Generalisations and Supporting Critical Thinking

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• Published: 09 November 2022
• Volume 42 , pages 123–141, ( 2023 )

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Much of the literature exploring Chinese international student engagement with critical thinking in Western universities draws on reductive essentialisations of ‘Confucianism’ in efforts to explain cross-cultural differences. In this paper I review literature problematising these tendencies. I then shift focus from inferences about how philosophy shapes culture and individual students, toward drawing on philosophy as a ‘living’ resource for understanding and shaping the ideal of critical thinking. A cross disciplinary approach employs historical overview and philosophical interpretation within and beyond the Confucian tradition to exemplify three types of criticality common in Chinese philosophy. These are criticality within tradition, criticality of tradition, and critical integration of traditions. The result is a refutation of claims or inferences (intentional or implicit) that Chinese philosophy is not conducive to criticality. While this paper focuses on types of criticality, it also reveals a common method of criticality within Chinese philosophy, in the form of ‘creation through transmission’. This resonates with recent research calling for less confrontational and more dialogical engagement with critical processes. However, I also draw attention to examples of confrontational argumentation within Chinese philosophy, which may provide valuable resources for educators and students. Finally, I conclude careful and explicit consideration is needed regarding the types of criticality sought within Western universities to prevent educators and students from ‘speaking past’ one and other instead of ‘speaking with’ one and other in critical dialogue.

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Introduction

Scholars reviewing research on Chinese international student engagement with critical thinking in Western Footnote 1 universities have identified tendencies to draw on reductive essentialisations of ‘Confucian heritage’ to explain difficulties engaging with critical thinking (Clark and Gieve, 2006 ; Heng, 2018 ; Li, 2017 ; Moosavi, 2020 ; O'Dwyer, 2016 ). This paper reviews and contributes to a growing body of literature problematising such essentialism and generalisation. To avoid these problems, I shift focus from inferences about how philosophy manifests in contemporary culture, specific practices, or groups of students, toward drawing on philosophy—past and present—as a ‘living’ resource for understanding and actively shaping the normative concept of critical thinking. This theoretical shift is justified by the fact that critical thinking is not a description of how people do think, but an ideal of how people ought to think in certain situations for certain purposes. Furthermore, the norms and ideals shaping dominant conceptions of critical thinking are typically rooted in, and derived from, the Western philosophic traditions (Tan, 2017 ). However, this is not because ‘the West’ (an equally problematic term of generalisation) has any monopoly on criticality. Consequently, exploring Chinese philosophy may shed new light on an old concept. Light much needed in the increasingly international contexts of Western higher education.

I begin by providing an outline of critical thinking and its relationship to traditions. The aim is to draw on commonly agreed features of criticality to facilitate exploration of its manifestations within Chinese philosophy. I then review literature problematising tendencies toward cultural generalisation and reductive essentialisation of Chinese philosophy within existing research. Next, I draw on a cross-disciplinary approach, employing historical overview and philosophical analysis to show three types of criticality within Chinese philosophy. These are criticality within tradition, criticality of tradition, and critical integration of traditions. This is done by exploring criticality within the Confucian tradition through examples from the Analects and the critical evolution of Confucian theory through Mencius and Xunzi. I then briefly consider the influence of Buddhist metaphysics on Neo-Confucianism to exemplify critical integration of traditions within Chinese philosophy. Next, I shift attention beyond Confucianism, to show criticality of tradition along with further critical integration of traditions. This is done by looking at Daoist and Mohist philosophy of the ancient Warring States Period and the impact of Western philosophy in China beginning in the nineteenth century. I conclude by considering the implications of this work for research and practice.

The prioritisation of breadth over depth in this approach is deemed necessary because the diversity of Chinese philosophy is not well represented in Anglophone critical thinking literature (Moosavi, 2020 ). Furthermore, attention to breadth serves my primary aims of problematising reductive generalisations and refuting claims or inferences (intentional or implicit) that Chinese philosophy is not conducive to criticality. Importantly, in demonstrating the critical capacity of Chinese philosophy, I make no effort to ‘explain’ or describe Chinese culture or students, both of which are too diverse and dynamic to generalise. This is not to deny the interconnectivity of philosophy, culture, and individuals but simply an analytical separation facilitating focus on one aspect of an interrelated totality. My point is that if Chinese international students struggle with critical thinking, it is not the inevitable result of inherently uncritical philosophy. Quite the contrary, Chinese philosophy contains great potential as a ‘living’ resource capable of informing the conceptualisation and practice of critical thinking. In service of actualising this potential, I provide examples of criticality within Chinese philosophy. Importantly, while the focus here is on Chinese philosophy, this work has relevance for anyone interested in exploring and better understanding criticality within and across traditions more generally.

Criticality and Tradition

Critical thinking has a long history of definition and redefinition (Ennis, 2016 ; Johnson and Hamby, 2015 ). For the purposes of this paper, I draw on basic but broadly agreed aspects of critical thinking, conceived of as a process of reasoning about what to believe and how to act, the exercising of which requires a combination of knowledge, skills, and dispositions (Bailin and Siegel, 2003 ; Ennis, 2016 ; Facione, 1990 ). Such a simplified definition cannot capture the complexity of all criticality. However, this very general approach highlights a key aspect of critical thinking; the fact that it is necessarily criteriological (ibid). There must be some form of criteria by which reasons for thought and action are justified. The origin and nature of the criteriological framework(s) guiding criticality within and across contexts are the source of much philosophical debate. Some suggest such frameworks can only be achieved through consensus and practice (Rorty, 1991 ). Others argue the very possibility of commensurability between critical frameworks logically entails transcendent meta-criteria capable of guiding universal rationality, and thus criticality (Siegel, 2017 ). Biesta and Stams draw on Derrida to claim, “…there are no pure, uncontaminated, original criteria on which we can simply and straightforwardly base our judgments” (2001, p. 68). In this view we are always embedded within a context of assumptions, the ultimate boundaries of which cannot be comprehended or transcended, yet criticality can reveal new possibilities without recourse to foundational, self-selected, or transcendent criteria (2001). This is an important debate for criticality, the justification of critique within philosophy, and questions about the nature of rationality. However, it is not a debate I can settle here. In this paper, I am not claiming to provide a ‘new’ conception of critical thinking. Instead, I am pointing out the unsettled complexity of the topic and drawing on examples from Chinese philosophy to provide perspectives typically not considered in the critical thinking literature.

What is most relevant for this paper is that the sources of criteria guiding criticality are commonly understood to be contextually dependent on factors such as discipline, practice, and culture (Evers, 2007 ; McPeck, 2016 ). What constitutes good reasons, which values guide judgment, and how those values are conceived may vary depending on the purposes toward which critical thinking is directed and the context in which it is practiced. Consequently, to account for contextual variance, the preceding conception of critical thinking can be expanded to include reflexive examination, and potential transformation, of the aims, assumptions, and criteria guiding critical thinking and action. Barnett and Davies call this a form of ‘metacritique’ (Barnett, 1997 ; Davies, 2015 ) and Lipman identifies it as the ‘self-correcting’ aspect of criticality (2012). Critical thinking, then, is not only a process of reasoning about what to believe and how to act, but also a process that questions the aims, assumptions, and criteria guiding reasoning itself. This conception of critical thinking recognises the ‘internal’ coherence of reasoning may vary by context. However, it also requires questioning the aims and assumptions that guide that reasoning. Consequently, the antithesis of criticality is ideology, the unquestioning adherence to any set of aims and assumptions as an immutable guide to reasoning, belief, and action.

The primary ‘contexts’ under consideration in this paper are various traditions of Chinese philosophy. While the boundaries of traditions are difficult to delineate, they also provide enough pragmatic clarity to meaningfully explore criticality without having to resolve debates on the ‘ultimate’ nature of criticality. Traditions are defined by constellations of aims, assumptions, and criteria. For example, ancient Confucian traditions assume the value of learning and ritual in meeting the aims of social harmony. These, and other aims and assumptions, guide reasoning within the tradition. The fact that traditions (philosophical and otherwise) are shaped by pre-existing aims and assumptions does not preclude, but in fact creates, the possibility for criticality. For example, a tradition may encounter what MacIntyre calls an ‘epistemic crisis’ resulting from inadequacy in practical explanation or breakdowns of internal coherence (1990; 1988). This can derive from new experiences and ideas or contact with other traditions, which creates opportunities for criticality within tradition, of tradition, or critical integration between traditions. However, holding any assumptions as unassailable, particularly in the face of epistemic crisis or when encountering alternatives, constitutes uncritical dogmatism.

These different types of criticality and how they articulate with traditions can be understood through analogy with the playing of a game. In such an analogy, one of the most fundamental assumptions is that a particular game (a tradition) ought to be played. The most likely underlying aim is to ‘win’ the game. However, other aims, such as enjoyment or display of style may also influence the nature of play. The rules of the game are equivalent to the criteria guiding criticality. Using this analogy, dogmatism is playing the game without questioning the aims or rules. This may be highly uncritical if it involves playing in a proscribed manner or by a dictated strategy. However, it may also include a degree of critical (perhaps calculated is a better word) reasoning about overall aims and what moves to make in service of achieving those aims without questioning the rules of the game . Criticality within tradition, questions the rules of the game. This does not require breaking the rules, as there are means by which the rules of a game can be agreeably changed by the participants. Criticality of tradition suggests playing a new game altogether. This may result in radical transformation akin to a Kuhnian paradigm shift or serve to strengthen existing assumptions and reaffirm the value of the current game. Critical integration between traditions arises when a new game is encountered, providing opportunities to combine criticality within and of tradition to either internally transform the rules of the existing game, or perhaps create a new game altogether. It is not, however, simply abandoning one game to play another, as that would lack integration.

Finally, I must note why I use criticality and critical thinking as interchangeable synonyms. A case can be made for separating the two concepts (Davies, 2015 ). While I am open to the possibility of such a distinction having value in many contexts, I make no such distinction here because I think this separation sells short the broader aims, and spirit, of criticality in higher education. Many theorists and practitioners lament critical thinking being taught and practiced in Western universities as an instrumentalised processes of proposition evaluation and argumentation (Barnett, 1997 ; Davies, 2015 ; Thayer-Bacon, 1998 ) . The intention here is not to diminish the centrality of thinking, or value of logic, to critical thinking, but simply to recognise the types of criticality I aim to identify within Chinese philosophy are not focused only on procedures of thought or discursive processes, but on critical changes to the way people reason and judge what to believe and how to act. I am concerned with demonstrating criticality that changes the ‘rules’ of the game or proposes an entirely new ‘game’ to play. This is the type of criticality many suggest is absent from Chinese philosophical traditions. My aim is to refute any such assumption.

Problematising the ‘Construct of the Chinese Learner’

Why do Chinese international students struggle to think critically while studying in Western universities? This is a problematic question, laden with assumptions (that they do), cultural generalisation (that all Chinese students are somehow similar), and, very often, philosophical reductivism (the nature of that similarity is a homogeneous form of ‘Confucianism’). Despite these problems, it is also a question many educators and students find themselves asking, because many students do struggle with critical thinking while studying abroad (Durkin, 2007 ; Sun et al., 2018 ; Wu and Hammond, 2011 ; Wu, 2015 ). Research also shows challenges with critical thinking within Chinese higher education (Jiang, 2013 ; Li and Wegerif, 2013 ; Tan, 2020 ; Tian and Low, 2011 ). This leads some scholars to claim ‘Confucian culture’ is not conducive to ‘Western’ style criticality (Atkinson, 1997 ; McBride et al., 2002 ). In an example of extreme generalisation, Dong claims,

It has been commonly acknowledged that Chinese traditional culture is generally uncritical… Confucianism shaped a tradition that valued respect for parents and the elderly, the collective good, social order, and harmony. This is in contrast with ancient Greek civilization, which valued independent thought, reason, and ability to debate and argue in public (2015, p. 357).

It is unclear why respect for elders and pursuit of social harmony (aims shared by many Ancient Greek philosophers) are necessarily uncritical. Furthermore, implicit in this statement is the idea that ‘Chinese traditional culture’ is essentially ‘Confucian’. While there is no doubt Confucian philosophy has an immense impact on Chinese culture, such an observation overlooks the diversity and plurality of culture, while also obscuring the complexities of Confucian philosophy as a resource for actively reshaping culture and reconceptualising normative concepts like critical thinking.

Reductive essentialisation of Confucian philosophy is increasingly seen as problematic. Ryan and Louie contend that treating 2,500 years of ‘Confucianism’ as the same thing is like treating the various manifestations of Christianity as essentially homogenous (2007). After all, it could be (rather reductively) argued that Catholics, Quakers, and the Ku Klux Klan are all ‘Christians’. Furthermore, contemporary politics probably exert more influence on culture, and certainly on the teaching and learning of critical thinking in contemporary China, than any philosophical tradition (Zhang, 2017 ). Along these lines, any lack of opportunity to cultivate and practice critical thinking in Chinese education as the result of historical or contemporary political circumstances does not necessarily indicate a cultural or philosophical disinclination toward, or lack of ability to engage in, critical thinking (Bali, 2015 ; Tian and Low, 2011 ). It is also important to note research showing the challenges of engaging with critical thinking in a foreign language (Floyd, 2011 ). Linguistic barriers should not be misconstrued as conceptual impediments or lack of capacity. Furthermore, research also shows that while many Chinese students initially struggle with critical thinking while studying abroad, they are capable of developing and learning the required skills and dispositions over time (Wu, 2015 ). Thus, it is problematic to assume the difficulties some Chinese students face while studying abroad are the result of ‘deficit’ instead of merely challenges arising from difference (Heng, 2018 ). Indeed, it is likely most Chinese students do not lack critical thinking, but simply engage in the process differently (Evers, 2007 ; Mason, 2013 ; Shaheen, 2016 ).

This leads some to argue that imposing a Western-centric theory of critical thinking in culturally diverse contexts could be construed as a form of ‘intellectual colonialism’ (Indelicato and Prazic, 2019 ; Moosavi, 2020 ). Indeed, as Hammersley–Fletcher and Hanley point out, critical thinking may become ironically uncritical if it finds itself as a mechanism for “reproducing the interests of particular groups and constraining thought within the boundaries of Western traditions” ( 2016 , p. 990). However, there is nothing ‘colonial’ about Western universities drawing on Western intellectual traditions and practices. Indeed, many international students may choose to study abroad precisely because they want exposure and experience with these traditions and practices. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise the teaching and practice of critical thinking without consideration of its conceptual heritage and underlying assumptions may simply fail to be as efficient or effective in cross-cultural contexts. What is at stake is not necessarily a matter of aims but of effectiveness. However, as I discuss in the conclusion of this paper, questions about the aims of students, educators, and institutions regarding they type of criticality each seeks are important and potentially problematic if inexplicit or unaligned.

Existing research on Chinese student engagement with critical thinking gives very little attention to how criticality manifests in Chinese philosophy. This is surprising given the degree to which Western philosophy is mined for resources (e.g., epistemological theory, logic, dialectic argumentation) for conceptualising and practicing critical thinking. If critical thinking is more than a ‘Western’ construct, it would seem relevant to explore the phenomenon in other traditions. Some scholars have been making headway in this area. For example, Tan articulates a ‘Confucian conception of criticality’ as a form of action oriented judgment (2017). Lam works to reconcile Confucianism and a generally Western-derived conception of critical rationalism ( 2017 ). Sigurosson, acknowledges Confucianism is rarely seen to promote criticality and typically regarded as conservative, reactionary, and ideological (2017). In aiming to rectify this, he argues that the “transformative self-critical attitude” of ancient Confucian philosophy exemplifies a form of deep criticality often neglected within Western conceptions (2017, p. 133). However, such work seems to be the exception, not the norm. Furthermore, while these more nuanced examinations of Confucian conceptions of criticality are valuable, it is less common to see consideration of Chinese philosophy beyond Confucianism within the Anglophone critical thinking literature. This paper builds on the work of those aiming to understand the value of Confucianism for critical thinking, while also expanding the project to consider other aspects of Chinese philosophy for the same purposes. The goal here is not to ‘explain’ culture or individual student behaviour, but to provide historical and philosophical resources for better understanding the concept and practice of critical thinking, which is not a description of something we are bound to by tradition, but an ideal of how we ought to think and act within and across traditions.

Confucian Criticality

This section explores manifestations of criticality within the Confucian tradition. The natural starting place is with Confucius (c. 551–479 BCE), whose project is undoubtedly conservative. Confucius aims to rectify an idealised past, not to create a new future. Along these lines he proclaims, “I transmit but do not innovate; I am truthful in what I say and devoted to antiquity” ( Analects , 7:1). However, transmission of the past into the present is an invariably interpretive, creative, and critical endeavour. Fung calls this a process of, “creation through transmission” (1937, p. 48), which begins to shed light on the subtle nature of criticality in the Confucian tradition. Here, it is important to note that many ancient Chinese texts derive from oral traditions and appear in multiple versions before reaching their current common forms (Fung, 1937 ). Furthermore, I am drawing on these texts in English translation, which introduces another layer of interpretation. The hermeneutic process of transmission, translation, and interpretation itself constitutes an important form of ‘creation through transmission’ in Chinese traditions (Ames and Hall, 2003 ). However, the creative and critical elements of Confucius’ transmission of antiquity reach beyond mere translation and interpretation. Fung claims, “Although Confucius was conservative as regards political change, he was in other respects revolutionary” (1937, p. 314). The primary thrust of this ‘revolution’ is the establishment of a scholarly class independent of ruling elites (Chan, 1963 ). The aspiration of a Confucian scholar is to become a junzi (gentleman). Footnote 2 The use of the term junzi embodies elements of radicality, as the word, literally meaning ‘son of a royal’, is stripped of its hereditary and elite connotations and opened for the aspirations of common people (Fung, 1937 ). The scholarly class originating with Confucius opens the door for social status and public service based on merit instead of birth, no small feat for a society of his (or any) time.

Confucius contends that achieving individual and social harmony requires following the dao (way) of the ancient Zhou Dynasty through the proper practice of li (ritual) and diligence in xue (study) to develop de (virtue), culminating in ren (benevolence/humanity) which facilitates action in accordance with yi (rightness) to become a junzi (gentleman) . This requires a bit of unpacking. Confucius conceives of dao as the ‘way’ of ideal human action, which is necessarily relational and ethical (Zhang, 1989 ). Acting in accordance with dao manifests as de (virtue). There are many ideal virtues, but the most important is ren , which can be seen as the virtue both containing and coordinating all others (Ames and Rosemont, 2011 ). Ren helps a person to discern yi (rightness), which is not fixed by rule but must be understood contextually (Slingerland, 2001 ) . A Junzi , then, is a benevolent person that does the right thing in any given situation. The two key tools in becoming a junzi are study and ritual propriety.

Confucius’ attention to xue (study) and li (ritual) can seem rather uncritical if taken as literal prescriptions of fixed rules . However, they are better understood as tools of (a type) of liberation than fixed rules guiding thought and action (Slingerland, 2001 ). This interpretation is not immediately evident as the Analects prescribes precise rituals and specific studies. However, Confucius is clearly concerned with active thinking, not passive knowledge acquisition. He refuses to teach anyone who, after being shown “one corner of a square”, cannot come back with the “other three corners” through their own reasoning ( Analects , 7:8). Furthermore, while Confucius is exacting in the conduct of rituals, there are also examples of critical alterations (e.g., Analects 3:15, 16:22, 9:3). Ultimately, there is no intention for study of tradition to comprise the totality of all knowledge, nor for rituals to prescribe ‘correct’ action for every person in every situation (Ivanhoe, 2000 ). Instead, study and ritual are tools for cultivating the virtues that sustain an adaptive moral intelligence . Slingerland notes,

… once a practice has been mastered, in the sense that the requisite virtues have been fully developed, this mastery brings with it a certain independence from the rules that constitute the practice: the master is able to reflect upon the rules and may even choose to transgress or revise them… Practice mastery thus brings with it a type of transcendence: freedom to evaluate, criticize and seek to reform practice tradition itself (2001, p. 102).

The practices under discussion include skilled activities like music, archery, and charioteering, along with the moral practices necessary to navigate the social world. Thus, the ‘rules’ of the Confucian tradition are not provided by fixed knowledge or rituals, but by self-cultivation of an adaptive moral intelligence, guided by ren , capable of changing learning and ritual. This is a debatable interpretation. Some agree with the intentions but argue such an approach is psychologically infeasible (Slote, 2016 ). Others interpret Confucius as aiming to identify universal principles to guide ethical duty with a more deontological tilt (Roetz, 1993 ). Despite these interpretive debates, I argue the Confucian focus on reflexive and adaptive moral intelligence is substantiated by the evolution of Confucianism after Confucius, particularly through the work of Mencius (372–289 BCE), who claims “a great man will not observe a rite that is contrary to the spirit of the rites, nor will he perform a duty that goes against the spirit of dutifulness” ( Mencius , 4B:6). Understanding this ‘spirit’ requires critical reflection on the practices intended to cultivate virtues, and the virtues themselves, which must guide adjustment of those practices. As others have argued, this is a necessarily critical process of reflexive self-cultivation (Sigurosson, 2017 ) and moral judgment (Tan, 2017 ). This reflexive process is essential to understanding, and facilitating, criticality within the Confucian tradition, as it creates the possibility for changes not only in practice, but for reinterpretation of how reasoning proceeds (rules of the game) from fundamental assumptions.

For example, Mencius employs ‘creation through transmission’ to reframe reasoning regarding obedience to social hierarchy. Some degree of allowance for disagreement and critique within hierarchy is necessary, as the idealised Zhou Dynasty from which Confucius draws his inspiration usurped power from a reigning emperor. This is a topic Confucius skirts around, but Mencius addresses at far more length, with powerful implications. In speaking with a local king Mencius asks, “If the Marshal of the Guards was unable to keep his guards in order, then what should be done about it?” The King naturally replies that he should be removed from office. Mencius then asks, “If the whole realm within the four borders was ill-governed, then what should be done about it?” At this, the king “turned to his attendants and changed the subject” ( Mencius , 1A:7). In the next passage, perhaps getting a bit worried, the King asks, “Is regicide permissible?” Mencius replies, “He who mutilates benevolence is a mutilator; he who cripples rightness is a crippler; and a man who is both a mutilator and a crippler is an ‘outcast’. I have indeed heard of the punishment of the ‘outcast [of the slain king Tchou]’, but I have not heard of any regicide” ( Mencius , A:8). Mencius is making the point that a ruler failing to rule with ren is not a legitimate ruler, thus their removal from power is in accordance with yi and does not amount to a disruption of the socio-political order. This bit of ‘creation through transmission’ demonstrates a critical change in the criteriological framework guiding reasoning (rules of the game) with meaningful implications for thought and action.

Mencius’ extends this critical development further while discussing the legitimacy of rulers and succession by arguing that while emperors must receive the ‘mandate of heaven’ (a traditional source of approval beyond human control), the disapproval of the people constitutes a sign that no such mandate has been given ( Mencius , 5A:5). In a subtle yet highly critical move, Mencius shifts the very foundations for political legitimacy. The plight of a ruler is not merely a matter of birth or heavenly fate, but of human action (Chan, 1963 ). The same sentiment is expressed more explicitly when Mencius says, “the people are of supreme importance; the altars to the gods of earth and grain come next; last comes the ruler” ( Mencius , 7B:14). These ideas diverge from the Analects, providing an example of ‘creation through transmission’ leading to criticality within the Confucian tradition. Fundamental assumptions regarding the necessity of an emperor and a hierarchical social order remain intact, but the reasoning drawn from these assumptions is transformed with meaningful implications for thought and action. The ‘game’ remains the same, but some of the ‘rules’ have been changed. The subtle nature of this approach aims, and typically succeeds, at maintaining stability while still facilitating criticality .

An example of more confrontational and explicit argumentation within the Confucian tradition is available through consideration of the most famous and perhaps more lasting of Mencius’ critical innovations, his conception of renxing (human nature) derived from the emotional experiences of familial relations and extension of empathy to provide a moral psychology capable of orienting and animating the pursuit of ren. Put more simply, Mencius solidifies the Confucian assumption, still dominant today, that human nature is good, or at least contains the ‘sprouts’ of potentiality for goodness (Fung, 1937 ). Instead of elaborating Mencius’ argument, made through a combination of thought experiment, anecdote, and analogy, it is more relevant to the purpose of this paper, aimed at shedding light on manifestations of criticality, to look at one of Mencius’ primary rivals, Xunzi (c. 310–235 BCE) who sharply critiques Mencius’ view on human nature.

Chan claims Xunzi is “the most critical of ancient Chinese philosophers” (1963, p. 124). Graham sees Xunzi’s work as marking an important step forward in systematic and critical philosophy, remarking that:

[Xunzi’s] attack on the Mencian theory of human nature illustrates the progress of argumentation in the Confucian school. Mencius’ case has to be re-assembled from scattered dialogues and discourses; [Xunzi] develops his in a consecutive essay… with Mencius as the named target, and a terminology clarified… by scrupulous definitions (2003, p. 244).

Xunzi’s critique of Mencius’ view of human nature is pointed. Book 23 of the Xunzi is titled “Human Nature is Bad” and sets out to make a reasoned argument for why this must be the case ( Xunzi ). One such argument is that if human nature were indeed good, and each individual capable of looking inward to cultivate ren, “then what use would there be for sage kings? What use for ritual and yi? ” ( Xunzi , 23:160). Ritual is necessary only because human nature must be shaped through conscious rational effort. In contrast to Mencius, Xunzi uses metaphors of craftmanship regarding the need to mould (or ‘mutilate’ as Mencius would say) human nature as a craftsman bends wood or tempers metal. Xunzi values rationality over sentimentality and sees the need for mind and will to check the dangers of emotion and desire (Fung, 1937 ). This demonstrates an example of confrontational argumentative criticality within the Confucian tradition.

Thus far, the focus has been on criticality within the Confucian tradition of the classical era. Moving beyond this period sheds light on critical integration of traditions. After a brief but severe stint of repression under the Qin Dynasty (221–206 BCE), Confucianism is codified and institutionalised during the Han Dynasty (202 BCE-220 CE) with the scholarly class of Confucians becoming an integral aspect of the aristocracy and government (Fung, 1953 ). The thrust of Confucianism shifts from a critical philosophy exploring how best to live, toward a scholarly bureaucracy of status, politics, and power (Bol, 2008 ). This coincides with the arrival of Buddhism from India, beginning in the fourth century CE. There is immense diversity within early Chinese Buddhist thought and the tradition transforms significantly over time, with Chan Buddhism (which becomes Zen Buddhism upon migrating to Japan) eventually becoming the most dominant (Chan, 1963 ; Fung, 1953 ). The fundamental Buddhist aims of transcending the illusory nature of the phenomenological world based on the assumed existence of a ‘truer’ underlying reality challenge prevailing Confucian assumptions about the nature of the world, its relation to the mind, and the appropriate grounding of knowledge and morality (Chan, 1963 ). This requires Confucianism to face, and attempt to answer, new questions in new ways. Consequently, beginning in the Tang (619–907) and culminating in the Song (960–1279) and Ming (1368–1644) a diverse range of thinkers with varying and often incompatible perspectives address the more ‘metaphysical’ questions raised through contact with Buddhism, marking the origins of what later becomes broadly categorised (despite great internal diversity of ideas) as Neo-Confucianism (Angle and Tiwald, 2017 ). This is an excellent example of criticality within the Confucian tradition through critical integration of concepts from another tradition.

In this process new concepts are integrated by reinterpreting existing ideas. One such old concept made new is that of li , typically translated as ‘Pattern’. This term appears very sparsely in the Confucian literature of the ancient period (Neo-Confucian li 理 is not to be confused with li 禮 as rite/ritual in ancient texts), and rarely warrants detailed commentary (Zhang, 1989 ). However, by the Song and Ming period, li (along with a constellation of other revitalised concepts and terms) is central to Confucian debate (Angle and Tiwald, 2017 ). Chan says of li, “all things exist because of it and can be understood through it. It is universal truth, universal order, universal law” (1963, p. 519). This conveys the ambitious aims of articulating a theory of li, which are nothing short of understanding the Pattern giving rise to and underlying every aspect of reality. It also indicates a substantial shift from intensive focus on ancient rituals, normative ethics, and political bureaucracy toward a new set of concerns and concepts conducive to empirical investigation of the natural world and new theories of how the mind relates to reality (Chan, 1963 ). This shift is the result of critical integration of questions and ideas encountered in a foreign tradition.

Thus far, it is evident Confucianism contains the capacity to question and ‘reinterpret’ fundamental assumptions in ways that change the ‘rules’ guiding reasoning and judgment. However, it remains difficult to gain a perspective from within the Confucian tradition capable of facilitating criticality of that tradition. Consequently, to understand criticality of tradition within Chinese philosophy it is helpful to look beyond Confucianism.

Beyond Confucianism

This section explores philosophies directing criticality at the fundamental aims and assumptions of the Confucian tradition. This is done by looking at two chronologically disparate, but circumstantially similar periods of history. The first is that of the Warring States Period (475–221 BCE), also known as the time of ‘100 schools of thought’, in which rival philosophies take direct aim at each other in confrontational critical debate. A similar such period occurs when the Qing Dynasty falls in 1911, beginning the Republican Era, during which China finds itself in a life-or-death struggle for modernisation, leading to eclectic and integrative philosophical thinking drawing on all types of criticality. Consequently, these are two exemplary periods for understanding criticality of tradition within Chinese philosophy.

Warring States Period (475 – 221 BCE)

The Han historian Sima Qian recognises six philosophical ‘schools’ as having strong influence through the Warring States Period (Fung, 1937 ). Along with Confucianism, these include the Yangists, perhaps best understood as anarchist individualistic naturalists advocating the renunciation of society and a return to simple, self-sufficient living (Graham, 2003 ). Simultaneously, the Logicians explore logical and metaphysical questions similar to those central in the Greek tradition (Chan, 1963 ). The Legalists integrate aspects of Xunzi’s Confucianism, with the argumentation of the Logicians to forge a highly pragmatic (and temporarily influential) political philosophy. The Mohists, espouse a kind of utilitarianism sharply attacking Confucian tradition at the most fundamental level, arguing against filial piety, and for elimination of unnecessary rites and rituals (Johnston, 2013 ). Mohism is of particular interest because it is equal to, if not dominant over, Confucianism until the Han Dynasty (Chan, 1963 ). It also offers one of the strongest examples of criticality of tradition . However, the starting point for understanding Chinese philosophy beyond Confucianism is with Daoism.

‘Daoism’ is not a school in any formal sense during the Warring States Period. Nonetheless, it exerts a powerful influence on philosophies of the time, and into the present (Zhang, 1998 ). The two most influential thinkers in early Daoist philosophy are Laozi, believed to have lived roughly contemporary to the time of Confucius in the sixth century BCE, and Zhuangzi, likely to have lived in the fourth century BCE (Chan, 1963 ). Laozi is traditionally credited with writing the Daodejing. However, like Confucius’ relationship to the Analects, it is unlikely he ever wrote anything (Fung, 1937 ). Instead, the text associated with his thought is compiled by subsequent followers in a variety of versions. The text bearing Zhuangzi’s name is also compiled, most likely over centuries, before reaching its current form. However, the first seven ‘Inner Chapters’ are generally agreed to have been written by one person (Graham, 2003 ).

The first lines of the Daodejing state, “ dao that can be put into words is not really dao, and naming that can assign fixed reference to things is not really naming” (p. 77) . This oft-cited passage can be translated and interpreted in several ways. I follow Ames and Hall in taking this to indicate that as a process of constant transformation, dao is neither fixed nor constant, thus no fixed or constant practices (or language) can consistently align with or describe the true Way (2003). Consequently, knowledge and rituals drawn from the past are not the best means for gaining knowledge in the present. For example, chapter 38 of the Daodejing calls ritual propriety “the thinnest veneer of doing one’s best and making good on one’s word,” while referring to the Confucian claims of knowledge as “tinsel decorating the Way” ( Daodejing , p. 136). While Confucianism and Daoism share concepts like dao and de, they are conceived of in meaningfully different ways. For example, the dao of Laozi is more naturalistic and cosmological, running contrary to what Tan calls, the ‘humanist’ Confucian conception of dao as ideal normative behaviour (2017). This can be seen as a form of ‘creation through transmission’ of shared concepts predating both Confucian and Daoist thought. However, Laozi also critiques Confucian methods for attaining dao , shifting focus from ritual and study toward intuition and experience. I argue these divergences constitute criticality of tradition.

Daoist criticality is perhaps best exemplified in the Zhuangzi, which is a unique text for its time, and remains unique to this day. It is poetic and lyrical, filled with fantastical stories of talking animals, magic, and mystical transformations. Confucius and his disciples appear as frequent characters (indicating Zhuangzi is well read in the classics), often to espouse views contradictory to their own philosophies. The Zhuangzi is also filled with uncertainty and contradiction, leading many to speculate an intentional avoidance of precise articulation meant to facilitate interpretation as opposed to providing explication (Kupperman, 1996 ). Watson suggests, if there is a central theme to the text, it is “freedom” ( 1968 , p. 3). But exactly what kind of freedom is Zhuangzi striving for? It appears to be different from Laozi’s more explicit call toward withdrawal from the world (Slingerland, 2003 ;  2014 ). Furthermore, unlike later Buddhism, Zhuangzi does not see the material world as illusory or something that must (or even ought) be transcended (Chan, 1963 ). Instead, it is the human world of constructed meanings and arbitrary divisions that Zhuangzi aims to free people from (if he aims at anything at all). This is freedom from the prescriptions and fixed perspectives that divide and dim the power of unmediated experience.

Zhuangzi is explicitly critical of Confucians and Mohists, the two most prominent philosophies of his time, stating, “what one calls right the other calls wrong; what one calls wrong the other calls right. But if we want to right their wrongs and wrong their rights, then the best thing to use is clarity ( Zhuangzi , p. 39).” The ‘clarity’ Zhuangzi advocates comes from unburdening the mind from the preconceptions and habituations imposed by traditions. Only once freed from the preconceptions and constructs (including language) dividing the genuine flow of experience can one develop de and naturally (spontaneously) react, act, and interact with dao . Zhuangzi’s intention is to cut beyond simple recognition of differing opinions and point out the ‘groundlessness’ of any fixed opinion or perspective. He is not suggesting changes to the ‘rules’ of an existing game but suggesting the need for a ‘new game’ altogether. In a frequently quoted and variously interpreted passage, Zhuangzi proclaims,

Everything has its ‘that’, everything has its ‘this’. From the point of view of ‘that’ you cannot see it, ‘that’ comes out of ‘this’ and ‘this’ depends on ‘that’ – which is to say that ‘this’ and ‘that’ give birth to each other. But where there is birth there must be death; where there is death there must be birth ( Zhuangzi , p. 39) .

Ziporyn argues this is Zhuangzi’s way of recognising the necessarily perspectival nature of indexical knowledge. That is, whether something is a ‘this’ or ‘that’ depends on the location of the perspective of reference (Ziporyn, 2009 ). While I am holding something, it is ‘this’, when I set that thing down and walk away, it becomes ‘that’. While there is obvious application of indexical perspectivism regarding perception and interaction with the physical world, Zhuangzi’s deeper point is moral (Slingerland,  2003 ; 2014 ). Whatever ‘this’ a Confucian holds as ‘good’ can only be so in reference to a ‘that’ which is ‘bad’. This is Zhuangzi’s way of recognising that not only are divergent perspectives relative, but any apparent contradiction or opposition is only superficial, because opposites form a necessary and indivisible unity. There can be no ‘this’ perspective without a ‘that’ perspective. Furthermore, drawing on observations from the natural world, in which opposites (e.g., night/day, summer/winter, birth/death) do not simply define each other in conceptual stasis, but through processual transformation, any effort to maintain a fixed perspective in an always changing world is to struggle against dao . It is common to interpret the Zhuangzi as a collection of various types and degrees of skepticism and/or relativism (Kjellberg and Ivanhoe, 1996 ). Given that criticality is necessarily a form of skepticism (to at least some degree) and the importance of contextualised perspective within many contemporary philosophies and practices, Zhuangzi should be recognised as one of the most critical and curious contributors to Chinese philosophy.

I shift now to the one of the most prominent and influential philosophies of the ancient period, that of Mohism. While Mozi (479–381 BCE) is the founding figure of Mohism, the school of thought develops continuously into the Han period, with substantial shifts from the earlier to later incarnations (Chan, 1963 ; Graham, 2003 ). Mohism applies a more logical (and methodological) approach to articulating a systematic philosophy in distinct contradiction to Confucian and Daoist norms (Fung, 1937 ). This includes explicit critique of fundamental assumptions and aims underlying Confucian philosophy. For example, Chapter 39 of the Mozi, entitled ‘Against the Confucians’ explicitly attacks the idea of “following but not creating” by recognising that someone had to create the rituals Confucians so revere, thus showing the very sources of their reverence is for people that ‘created but did not follow’ ( Mozi ). Here, the Mohist seems to identify a kind of logical infinite regress in the normative foundations of Confucian theory. If current practices are based on the past, what were past practices based upon?

This leads Mohists toward recognition of the need for a universal grounding for yi, conceived of as justice (Johnston, 2013 ). The central concept in this effort is the utilitarian idea of jian ai, often translated as ‘universal love’, though perhaps better understood as ‘equal concern for each person’ (Graham, 2003 ). The implications of this cosmopolitan consequentialism are profound. Mohists rail against the most fundamental assumptions of Confucianism, namely the priority of filial piety as a source for cultivating positive moral psychology and the importance of rites and rituals in cultivating virtues capable of guiding action in accordance with yi ( Mozi ). They see the privileged and special bonds of family as problematically impeding establishment of jian ai , the excess of rituals as unnecessarily wasteful, and the perspectivism of Daoism as unacceptably anarchic and morally relativistic (Chan, 1963 ). For the Mohist, society requires unity of purpose and values as the foundation for calculating and justly distributing benefit (Johnston, 2013 ). This is clear evidence of strong criticality of tradition. Importantly, Mohist critiques are addressed in the Mencius (e.g. 3B:9) and, at greater length throughout the Xunzi (e.g. Books 6 & 10) , showing active and explicit critical debate within and between these traditions.

Republican Era to the Present

We jump forward now to the waning years of the Qing Dynasty (1636–1911). As part of an effort to overcome the challenges of internal division and external threats, the education system is overhauled, including elimination of the Imperial civil service exams in 1905, marking the end of a practice over 1000 years old (Bol, 2008 ). Six years later, the Qing dynasty falls, and the Republic of China is formed, marking the end of dynastic rule. Chan claims, “not since the third century B.C. have there been ‘one hundred schools’ of thought contending in China as in the twentieth century. The combination of Western thought and revolt against traditional heritage caused many intellectual currents to run in all directions” (1963, p. 743). The Republican Era brings about radically divergent perspectives, but all are grounded in, and aim to resolve, the same problem: how to modernise China (Cua, 2003 ). This is a time rife with criticality of all forms. In keeping with the current project, I only highlight a few prominent thinkers or ideas, which exemplify the various ways in which criticality manifests during this period in Chinese philosophical history.

At this juncture, thinking critically about fundamental philosophical aims and assumptions becomes explicit. Some advocate total westernisation, others aim to integrate Chinese and Western ideas, while some argue for rectification and globalisation of Chinese traditions (Fung, 2010 ). Amidst these debates, Liang Qichao uses the term lixiang to represent “… the things that everybody imagines and are commonly taken as the most reasonable principles… inherited social customs of thousands of years (in Xiao, 2002 , p. 19). He goes on to argue for transforming, and perhaps discarding, aspects of lixiang as essential to the survival of Chinese civilisation. This demonstrates the degree to which criticality of the Republican Era is marked by intentional effort to restore, reshape, or sometimes discard the fundamental aims and assumptions of Chinese philosophy. In this effort, many philosophers see the way forward as requiring critical integration of Chinese and Western philosophical traditions. For example, Zhang Dongsun draws heavily on Kant to articulate a theory of culturally contextual epistemological pluralism intended to reconcile the seemingly incommensurate differences between Chinese and Western traditions (Jiang, 2002 ). Hu Shih, after studying at Columbia University with Dewey, is central to The New Culture Movement (Xinhe, 2002 ). It is difficult to find more explicit criticality of tradition than a movement founded on the aim of forging a ‘new culture’. Hu draws on Nietzsche’s notion of ‘transvaluation of all values’ to espouse the need for a ‘critical attitude’ toward institutions and traditions (Hu, 2013 ). He aims to put Confucian and non-Confucian philosophies on equal footing to be analysed through the lens of contemporary thought, claiming, “the future of Chinese philosophy would seem to depend much on the revival of those great philosophical schools that once flourished side by side with the school of Confucius in Ancient China” (Hu in Xinhe, 2002 , p. 92). In this process he warns against imported ‘isms’ as necessarily ideological and dogmatic, thus not contributing to critical philosophy or meeting the needs of the contemporary Chinese context (Xinhe, 2002 ).

Ultimately, however, it is an -ism, that of Marxism-Leninism, that prevails in reuniting the Middle Kingdom into the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The critically integrated philosophies guiding the Communist revolution eventually give way to uncritical dogmatism in the form of Maoism, which reaches its heights during the Cultural Revolution and essentially paralyzes philosophical development within Mainland China for several decades (Chan, 1963 ). Despite temporary devolution into uncritical dogmatism, there may be no better example of criticality than the creative integration of a foreign philosophical theory as the foundation for a new nation to preserve a culture facing the very real prospect of destruction. The deft manoeuvrings of Deng Xiaoping navigating the transition from Maoism to the ‘opening’ of China, is perhaps one of the best modern examples of highly practical criticality within and between multiple traditions simultaneously (Vogel, 2011 ). Finally, it is important to recognise that Chinese philosophy is a dynamic and continually developing field, with an invariably comparative and/or integrative aspect (Cheng, 2002 ). For example, Mou Zongsan integrates Kant and Heidegger with Buddhist and Daoist philosophy to ‘reconstruct’ Confucianism, while also making meaningful contributions to ‘Western’ theory (Lee, 2021 ). This might better be considered ‘world’ philosophy (Mou, 2009 ). The Western imperialist legacy creates an imbalance of power that requires China to engage with Western philosophy in a way the West has not been forced to reciprocate. Many Western scholars have taken great interest in Chinese philosophy, but not with a sense of cultural survival on the line, as was the case in 19th and early twentieth century China. This is an imbalance contemporary philosophers should be working to eliminate (Rošker, 2020 ). Thankfully, the increasing internationalisation of education provides just such an opportunity.

Implications for Practice

This broad overview cannot do justice to the depth of specific concepts, theories, and debates within Chinese philosophy. However, it shows criticality within traditions , of traditions , and critical integration of different traditions. This should caution researchers, practitioners, and students against making inferences about culture or students based on reductive essentialisations of ‘Confucianism’, which may fail to consider the complexity of actual Confucian philosophy . Importantly, this approach does not preclude the fact that some aspects of Confucian philosophy, particularly those ossified into socio-cultural traditions, may discourage development of critical capacities and the practice of criticality. My point is that this does not indict the entirety of Confucian philosophy as necessarily incompatible with critical thinking, nor does it obviate the potential of that philosophy for deeply meaningful criticality. Furthermore, Confucianism is not the only resource within Chinese philosophy with relevance to critical thinking. Consequently, the research and practice of critical thinking may benefit from more nuanced consideration of Chinese philosophy. In the realm of practice, this could include attention to ongoing professional development for staff teaching critical thinking, whether embedded within a subject or more explicitly, particularly in contexts with large numbers of Chinese international students. Similarly, this paper may inspire reconsideration of reading and course content aimed at exploring or demonstrating criticality. Exploration of philosophies less prominent or dominant in contemporary theory and practice may help realise the critical potential of Chinese philosophy. For example, Xunzi, Mozi, and Zhuangzi may not exert as ‘measurable’ of an influence on contemporary culture and education, but their philosophies could contribute to understanding and potentially reimagining criticality. It could be instructive to investigate Xunzi’s forms of argumentation, the implications of jian ai for critical thinking, or explore the interplay between embodied cognition, skeptical perspectivism, and criticality in the dao of Zhuangzi. I hope this paper inspires further inquiry into the broader critical resources within Chinese philosophy and their applications for theory and practice.

In this paper I have also drawn attention to ‘creation through transmission’ as a method of criticality. This process does not contain the explicit argumentative form typical of much Western philosophy, and common in the teaching and practice of critical thinking. Recognition of this method of criticality corroborates conclusions drawn from philosophically informed empirical work exploring Chinese student engagement with critical thinking. For example, Tan argues, “… the image of a critical thinker as an independent and truth-driven champion of propositional knowledge, syllogism and adversarial debates is foreign to the Confucian traditions” (2017, p. 337). This leads her to suggest dialogical instead of dialectic critical engagement. My analysis substantiates this suggestion. However, I argue that this important observation fails to provide a complete picture. There are ample instances of explicit argumentative criticality within the history of Chinese philosophy. For example, Xunzi’s criticality within the Confucian tradition and Mohist criticality of the Confucian tradition, along with Zhuangzi’s criticality of Confucianism, Mohism, and skeptical questioning of the foundations of morality. Furthermore, the past two centuries of Chinese philosophy have engaged in adversarial debate at a (literally) revolutionary scale, transforming both society and philosophy multiple times. What can be drawn from this is both a need to recognise the nuances of ‘creation through transmission’ as a dialogical form of criticality and the existence of resources within Chinese philosophy exemplifying explicit critical debate and action.

Finally, attention to the fundamental types of criticality identified in this paper may help educators and students better understand what is being asked within a particular context. If a tutor thinks they are engaging in criticality within tradition without recognising the requirement on students to grapple with criticality of their traditions, there is a risk of ‘speaking past’ each other instead of ‘speaking with’ each other. The same is true of students working diligently to filter learning into familiar traditions without confronting the possibility – perhaps the necessity – of questioning fundamental assumptions through criticality of those traditions. While this paper focuses on traditions of Chinese philosophy, understanding how aims and assumptions guide reasoning to form the boundaries of traditions more generally (e.g., social, political, academic, professional) reveals the broader applicability of the types of criticality discussed here. Of course, not everyone can be an expert on every tradition. Thus, the onus is on all participants to explore the limits of their own assumptions in service of helping others do the same. And because it can be difficult to gain a perspective from within a tradition to facilitate criticality of that tradition, diverse educational contexts offer opportunities for engagement with perspectives conducive to expanding critical possibilities (MacAllister, 2016 ). Such a process, however, requires explicit attention to differences between traditions to create meaningful critical dialogue.

This means universities must clarify the types of criticality they aim to teach and practice. Do universities aim for criticality within tradition, of tradition, and/or to facilitate critical integration between traditions? Given the increasingly diverse demographic of Western universities, it seems impossible to avoid criticality of traditions without severely limiting the scope of critical thinking. So, should Western universities engage with types of criticality not taught (or allowed) in Chinese higher education? After all, this may be one reason many Chinese international students choose to study abroad, and if not, it may be an opportunity worth contemplation. Conversely, perhaps universities should bend toward critical aims better aligned with the backgrounds and likely future contexts of application for Chinese (and other) international students? The type of critical thinking drawn on in this paper would require all students from every background to seize the opportunity provided by diversity of traditions and perspectives to identify and critically reflect on their own aims and assumptions in any context that calls itself ‘critical’. To contribute to such a process, this paper dispels reductive cultural generalisations and provides resources for understanding and expanding criticality through Chinese philosophy.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank James MacAllister, Gale Macleod, and Gert Biesta for their helpful feedback on prior drafts of this paper. I am also thankful for the insightful comments of those that peer reviewed this paper.

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Normile, I.H. Exploring Criticality in Chinese Philosophy: Refuting Generalisations and Supporting Critical Thinking. Stud Philos Educ 42 , 123–141 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-022-09855-3

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critical adjective ( NOT PLEASED )

• She is critical of the president's globalist foreign policy .
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• Many people were critical of the resurgent militarism in the country .
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critical adjective ( IMPORTANT )

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• Continual stirring is critical to a good custard .

critical adjective ( GIVING OPINIONS )

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• Despite his great commercial success he still yearns for critical approval .
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• He has written a long critical piece evaluating the exhibition .

critical adjective ( SERIOUS )

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