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Argumentative Essays on Freedom of Speech

Freedom of speech essay topic examples, argumentative essays.

Argumentative essays on freedom of speech require you to take a stance on a specific aspect of this topic and provide evidence to support your viewpoint. Consider these topic examples:

• 1. Argue for the importance of protecting hate speech as a form of free expression, emphasizing the principles of free speech and the potential consequences of limiting it.
• 2. Debate the ethical implications of social media platforms censoring or moderating content, exploring the balance between maintaining a safe online environment and upholding free speech rights.

Example Introduction Paragraph for an Argumentative Freedom of Speech Essay: Freedom of speech is a cornerstone of democratic societies, but it often challenges our notions of what should be protected. In this argumentative essay, we will examine the importance of safeguarding hate speech as a form of free expression, exploring the principles of free speech and the potential ramifications of its restriction.

Example Conclusion Paragraph for an Argumentative Freedom of Speech Essay: In conclusion, the argument for protecting hate speech within the bounds of free expression highlights the enduring principles of democracy and free speech. As we navigate these complex debates, we must remain committed to preserving the foundations of our democratic society.

Compare and Contrast Essays

Compare and contrast essays on freedom of speech involve analyzing the similarities and differences between various aspects of free speech laws, practices, or the historical development of free speech rights in different countries. Consider these topics:

• 1. Compare and contrast the approach to freedom of speech in the United States and European Union, examining the legal frameworks, historical context, and key differences in their protection of free expression.
• 2. Analyze the evolution of freedom of speech in the digital age, comparing the challenges and opportunities presented by online platforms and the traditional forms of free expression.

Example Introduction Paragraph for a Compare and Contrast Freedom of Speech Essay: Freedom of speech varies across different countries and contexts, raising questions about the boundaries of this fundamental right. In this compare and contrast essay, we will explore the approaches to freedom of speech in the United States and the European Union, shedding light on their legal frameworks, historical backgrounds, and notable distinctions.

Example Conclusion Paragraph for a Compare and Contrast Freedom of Speech Essay: In conclusion, the comparison and contrast of freedom of speech in the United States and the European Union reveal the multifaceted nature of this fundamental right. As we examine these diverse perspectives, we gain a deeper appreciation for the complexities surrounding free expression in our globalized world.

Descriptive Essays

Descriptive essays on freedom of speech allow you to provide detailed accounts and analysis of specific instances, historical events, or contemporary debates related to free speech. Here are some topic ideas:

• 1. Describe a landmark Supreme Court case related to freedom of speech, such as the "Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District" case, and its significance in shaping free speech rights for students.
• 2. Paint a vivid picture of a recent protest or demonstration where freedom of speech played a central role, discussing the motivations of the protesters, the public's response, and the outcomes of the event.

Example Introduction Paragraph for a Descriptive Freedom of Speech Essay: Freedom of speech is often tested and defined in the courtroom and in the streets. In this descriptive essay, we will delve into the landmark Supreme Court case "Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District" and its profound impact on the free speech rights of students within the educational system.

Example Conclusion Paragraph for a Descriptive Freedom of Speech Essay: In conclusion, the descriptive exploration of the "Tinker" case illustrates the enduring struggle to balance students' free speech rights with the need for a productive educational environment. As we reflect on this historical event, we are reminded of the ongoing challenges in preserving and defining freedom of speech in schools.

Persuasive Essays

Persuasive essays on freedom of speech involve advocating for specific actions, policies, or changes related to the protection or limitations of free speech rights. Consider these persuasive topics:

• 1. Persuade your audience of the importance of enacting legislation to combat "cancel culture" and protect individuals' right to express unpopular opinions without fear of social or professional consequences.
• 2. Advocate for greater transparency and accountability in social media content moderation practices, highlighting the potential impact on free speech and the public's right to access diverse information.

Example Introduction Paragraph for a Persuasive Freedom of Speech Essay: The boundaries of free speech are continually tested in our rapidly changing society. In this persuasive essay, I will make a compelling case for the necessity of legislation to combat "cancel culture" and preserve individuals' right to express dissenting views without facing severe social or professional repercussions.

Example Conclusion Paragraph for a Persuasive Freedom of Speech Essay: In conclusion, the persuasive argument for legislation against "cancel culture" underscores the importance of safeguarding free speech in the face of societal pressures. As we advocate for change, we contribute to the preservation of a diverse and inclusive marketplace of ideas.

Narrative Essays

Narrative essays on freedom of speech allow you to share personal stories, experiences, or observations related to free speech, your encounters with debates or controversies, or the impact of free expression on your life. Explore these narrative essay topics:

• 1. Narrate a personal experience where you exercised your right to free speech, detailing the circumstances, motivations, and reactions from others, and reflecting on the significance of your actions.
• 2. Share a story of your involvement in a community or online discussion where freedom of speech played a central role, emphasizing the challenges and rewards of engaging in open dialogue.

Example Introduction Paragraph for a Narrative Freedom of Speech Essay: Freedom of speech is not just an abstract concept; it is a lived experience. In this narrative essay, I will take you through a personal journey where I exercised my right to free speech, recounting the circumstances, motivations, and the impact of my actions on those around me.

Example Conclusion Paragraph for a Narrative Freedom of Speech Essay: In conclusion, the narrative of my personal experience with free speech highlights the transformative power of open dialogue and individual expression. As we share our stories, we contribute to the rich tapestry of voices that define our commitment to this essential democratic principle.

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Freedom of speech is a fundamental human right that encompasses the liberty to express thoughts, opinions, beliefs, and ideas without fear of censorship, reprisal, or governmental interference.

1. The right to seek information and ideas; 2. The right to receive information and ideas; 3. The right to impart information and ideas.

The concept of freedom of speech has deep historical roots, originating from ancient civilizations and evolving through various historical contexts. The ancient Greeks, particularly in Athens, valued free expression and public debate, considering it essential for democratic governance. Similarly, the Roman Republic allowed citizens the freedom to express their opinions in political matters. The modern understanding of freedom of speech emerged during the Age of Enlightenment in the 17th and 18th centuries. Prominent thinkers like John Locke and Voltaire advocated for the right to express ideas without censorship or persecution. Their ideas influenced the development of democratic societies and the recognition of freedom of speech as a fundamental human right. The historical context of freedom of speech also includes pivotal moments, such as the American Revolution and the French Revolution. These revolutions challenged the existing oppressive regimes and led to the inclusion of free speech protections in their respective declarations of rights. Since then, the concept of freedom of speech has been enshrined in numerous international human rights documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The freedom of speech is a fundamental right protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. It guarantees individuals the right to express their opinions, beliefs, and ideas without fear of government censorship or retaliation. The historical context of freedom of speech in the US can be traced back to the country's founding. The American Revolution and the subsequent establishment of the Constitution were driven by a desire for individual liberties, including the right to freely express oneself. Over the years, the interpretation and application of freedom of speech in the US have been shaped by landmark court cases. For instance, in the 1960s, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of protecting political and symbolic speech, even if it was controversial or dissenting. This period also saw the rise of the free speech movement, which advocated for greater rights on college campuses. However, the freedom of speech in the US is not absolute. Certain types of speech, such as obscenity, defamation, incitement to violence, and hate speech, are subject to limitations and can be legally restricted.

Thomas Jefferson: As one of the Founding Fathers of the United States, Jefferson was a staunch advocate for freedom of speech. He believed that a free exchange of ideas was vital for a democratic society and emphasized its protection in the First Amendment. Voltaire: A French philosopher and writer, Voltaire championed the principles of free expression and tolerance. His writings challenged oppressive regimes and promoted the idea that individuals should have the right to speak their minds without fear of persecution. Martin Luther King Jr.: Known for his leadership in the American civil rights movement, King passionately defended free speech as a means to advocate for social justice. His powerful speeches and peaceful protests were instrumental in promoting equality and challenging systemic racism. John Stuart Mill: An influential philosopher and political economist, Mill articulated the concept of the "marketplace of ideas" and argued for unrestricted freedom of speech. He believed that through open and robust debate, society could discover the truth and prevent the suppression of minority viewpoints.

Public opinion on the freedom of speech varies widely, reflecting the diversity of perspectives within societies around the world. While many individuals staunchly uphold the value and importance of free speech as a fundamental human right, others harbor concerns and reservations regarding its boundaries and potential consequences. Additionally, cultural and societal factors significantly shape public opinion on freedom of speech. Different countries and communities may have distinct historical experiences, cultural norms, and legal frameworks that influence their perspectives. The balance between individual freedoms and collective well-being may vary across societies, leading to differing opinions on where the boundaries of free speech should lie. Technological advancements and the rise of social media platforms have further complicated public opinion on freedom of speech. The digital age has enabled individuals to express their views on a global scale, amplifying the impact and reach of their words. However, it has also highlighted concerns about online harassment, the spread of misinformation, and the potential for manipulation and abuse of free speech rights. As a result, debates emerge around the role of platforms in regulating speech and ensuring the responsible use of online communication tools.

1. Protection of democratic principles 2. Advancement of knowledge and progress 3. Promotion of individual autonomy 4. Protection of minority rights 5. Defense against tyranny

1. Harmful and hateful speech 2. Protection of vulnerable groups 3. Misinformation and propaganda 4. Privacy and dignity 5. Societal stability and public safety

1. The recognition of speech protection can be traced back to the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215, marking an early milestone in safeguarding the freedom of expression. 2. In 399 BC, the renowned Greek philosopher Socrates faced persecution for his advocacy of unrestricted speech, showcasing the historical roots of the ongoing struggle for free speech rights. 3. A significant majority, approximately 70% of Americans, believe in the importance of granting individuals the right to free speech, even if their words are deemed highly offensive or controversial. 4. A pivotal moment for student rights came in 1969 with the Supreme Court case Tinker v. Des Moines, which affirmed that students maintain their right to free speech even within the confines of school hours.

The topic of freedom of speech is of immense importance for writing an essay due to its fundamental role in society. Freedom of speech is a cornerstone of democracy, enabling individuals to express their opinions, ideas, and beliefs openly without fear of censorship or retribution. It serves as a catalyst for societal progress, allowing for the exchange of diverse perspectives, critical thinking, and the challenging of established norms. Exploring the concept of freedom of speech in an essay provides an opportunity to delve into its historical significance and the ongoing struggles for its protection. It allows for an examination of the complex balance between free expression and the limitations necessary to prevent harm or hate speech. Additionally, discussing the importance of freedom of speech facilitates a deeper understanding of its role in fostering social justice, political discourse, and the protection of minority voices. Moreover, the topic invites exploration of contemporary issues such as online censorship, fake news, and the challenges posed by the digital age. By analyzing case studies, legal frameworks, and international perspectives, an essay on freedom of speech can shed light on the ongoing debates, dilemmas, and potential solutions to ensure its preservation in an ever-evolving society.

1. Sullivan, K. M. (2010). Two concepts of freedom of speech. Harvard Law Review, 124(1), 143-177. (https://www.jstor.org/stable/20788316) 2. Van Mill, D. (2002). Freedom of speech. (https://plato.stanford.edu/ENTRIES/freedom-speech/) 3. Bogen, D. (1983). The origins of freedom of speech and press. Md. L. Rev., 42, 429. (https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/mllr42&div=20&id=&page=) 4. Yong, C. (2011). Does freedom of speech include hate speech?. Res Publica, 17, 385-403. (https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11158-011-9158-y) 5. McHugh, M. R. (2004). Historiography and freedom of speech: the case of Cremutius Cordus. In Free Speech in Classical Antiquity (pp. 391-408). Brill. (https://brill.com/display/book/edcoll/9789047405689/B9789047405689-s018.xml) 6. Milo, D. (2008). Defamation and freedom of speech. (https://academic.oup.com/book/2591) 7. Helwig, C. C. (1998). Children's conceptions of fair government and freedom of speech. Child Development, 69(2), 518-531. (https://srcd.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1998.tb06205.x) 8. Cheung, A. S. (2011). Exercising freedom of speech behind the great firewall: A study of judges’ and lawyers’ blogs in China. Harvard International Law Journal Online. (https://harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2011/04/HILJ-Online_52_Cheung1.pdf) 9. Nieuwenhuis, A. (2000). Freedom of speech: USA vs Germany and Europe. Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 18(2), 195-214. (https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/092405190001800203)

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The good, the bad, and the ugly of free speech

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Freedom of Speech

By: History.com Editors

Updated: July 27, 2023 | Original: December 4, 2017

Freedom of speech—the right to express opinions without government restraint—is a democratic ideal that dates back to ancient Greece. In the United States, the First Amendment guarantees free speech, though the United States, like all modern democracies, places limits on this freedom. In a series of landmark cases, the U.S. Supreme Court over the years has helped to define what types of speech are—and aren’t—protected under U.S. law.

The ancient Greeks pioneered free speech as a democratic principle. The ancient Greek word “parrhesia” means “free speech,” or “to speak candidly.” The term first appeared in Greek literature around the end of the fifth century B.C.

During the classical period, parrhesia became a fundamental part of the democracy of Athens. Leaders, philosophers, playwrights and everyday Athenians were free to openly discuss politics and religion and to criticize the government in some settings.

First Amendment

In the United States, the First Amendment protects freedom of speech.

The First Amendment was adopted on December 15, 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights—the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution . The Bill of Rights provides constitutional protection for certain individual liberties, including freedoms of speech, assembly and worship.

The First Amendment doesn’t specify what exactly is meant by freedom of speech. Defining what types of speech should and shouldn’t be protected by law has fallen largely to the courts.

In general, the First Amendment guarantees the right to express ideas and information. On a basic level, it means that people can express an opinion (even an unpopular or unsavory one) without fear of government censorship.

It protects all forms of communication, from speeches to art and other media.

Flag Burning

While freedom of speech pertains mostly to the spoken or written word, it also protects some forms of symbolic speech. Symbolic speech is an action that expresses an idea.

Flag burning is an example of symbolic speech that is protected under the First Amendment. Gregory Lee Johnson, a youth communist, burned a flag during the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas to protest the Reagan administration.

The U.S. Supreme Court , in 1990, reversed a Texas court’s conviction that Johnson broke the law by desecrating the flag. Texas v. Johnson invalidated statutes in Texas and 47 other states prohibiting flag burning.

When Isn’t Speech Protected?

Not all speech is protected under the First Amendment.

Forms of speech that aren’t protected include:

• Obscene material such as child pornography
• Plagiarism of copyrighted material
• Defamation (libel and slander)
• True threats

Speech inciting illegal actions or soliciting others to commit crimes aren’t protected under the First Amendment, either.

The Supreme Court decided a series of cases in 1919 that helped to define the limitations of free speech. Congress passed the Espionage Act of 1917, shortly after the United States entered into World War I . The law prohibited interference in military operations or recruitment.

Socialist Party activist Charles Schenck was arrested under the Espionage Act after he distributed fliers urging young men to dodge the draft. The Supreme Court upheld his conviction by creating the “clear and present danger” standard, explaining when the government is allowed to limit free speech. In this case, they viewed draft resistant as dangerous to national security.

American labor leader and Socialist Party activist Eugene Debs also was arrested under the Espionage Act after giving a speech in 1918 encouraging others not to join the military. Debs argued that he was exercising his right to free speech and that the Espionage Act of 1917 was unconstitutional. In Debs v. United States the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Espionage Act.

Freedom of Expression

The Supreme Court has interpreted artistic freedom broadly as a form of free speech.

In most cases, freedom of expression may be restricted only if it will cause direct and imminent harm. Shouting “fire!” in a crowded theater and causing a stampede would be an example of direct and imminent harm.

In deciding cases involving artistic freedom of expression the Supreme Court leans on a principle called “content neutrality.” Content neutrality means the government can’t censor or restrict expression just because some segment of the population finds the content offensive.

Free Speech in Schools

In 1965, students at a public high school in Des Moines, Iowa , organized a silent protest against the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to protest the fighting. The students were suspended from school. The principal argued that the armbands were a distraction and could possibly lead to danger for the students.

The Supreme Court didn’t bite—they ruled in favor of the students’ right to wear the armbands as a form of free speech in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District . The case set the standard for free speech in schools. However, First Amendment rights typically don’t apply in private schools.

What does free speech mean?; United States Courts . Tinker v. Des Moines; United States Courts . Freedom of expression in the arts and entertainment; ACLU .

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Freedom of Speech

[ Editor’s Note: The following new entry by Jeffrey W. Howard replaces the former entry on this topic by the previous author. ]

Human beings have significant interests in communicating what they think to others, and in listening to what others have to say. These interests make it difficult to justify coercive restrictions on people’s communications, plausibly grounding a moral right to speak (and listen) to others that is properly protected by law. That there ought to be such legal protections for speech is uncontroversial among political and legal philosophers. But disagreement arises when we turn to the details. What are the interests or values that justify this presumption against restricting speech? And what, if anything, counts as an adequate justification for overcoming the presumption? This entry is chiefly concerned with exploring the philosophical literature on these questions.

The entry begins by distinguishing different ideas to which the term “freedom of speech” can refer. It then reviews the variety of concerns taken to justify freedom of speech. Next, the entry considers the proper limits of freedom of speech, cataloging different views on when and why restrictions on communication can be morally justified, and what considerations are relevant when evaluating restrictions. Finally, it considers the role of speech intermediaries in a philosophical analysis of freedom of speech, with special attention to internet platforms.

1. What is Freedom of Speech?

2.1 listener theories, 2.2 speaker theories, 2.3 democracy theories, 2.4 thinker theories, 2.5 toleration theories, 2.6 instrumental theories: political abuse and slippery slopes, 2.7 free speech skepticism, 3.1 absoluteness, coverage, and protection, 3.2 the limits of free speech: external constraints, 3.3 the limits of free speech: internal constraints, 3.4 proportionality: chilling effects and political abuse, 3.5 necessity: the counter-speech alternative, 4. the future of free speech theory: platform ethics, other internet resources, related entries.

In the philosophical literature, the terms “freedom of speech”, “free speech”, “freedom of expression”, and “freedom of communication” are mostly used equivalently. This entry will follow that convention, notwithstanding the fact that these formulations evoke subtly different phenomena. For example, it is widely understood that artistic expressions, such as dancing and painting, fall within the ambit of this freedom, even though they don’t straightforwardly seem to qualify as speech , which intuitively connotes some kind of linguistic utterance (see Tushnet, Chen, & Blocher 2017 for discussion). Still, they plainly qualify as communicative activity, conveying some kind of message, however vague or open to interpretation it may be.

Yet the extension of “free speech” is not fruitfully specified through conceptual analysis alone. The quest to distinguish speech from conduct, for the purpose of excluding the latter from protection, is notoriously thorny (Fish 1994: 106), despite some notable attempts (such as Greenawalt 1989: 58ff). As John Hart Ely writes concerning Vietnam War protesters who incinerated their draft cards, such activity is “100% action and 100% expression” (1975: 1495). It is only once we understand why we should care about free speech in the first place—the values it instantiates or serves—that we can evaluate whether a law banning the burning of draft cards (or whatever else) violates free speech. It is the task of a normative conception of free speech to offer an account of the values at stake, which in turn can illuminate the kinds of activities wherein those values are realized, and the kinds of restrictions that manifest hostility to those values. For example, if free speech is justified by the value of respecting citizens’ prerogative to hear many points of view and to make up their own minds, then banning the burning of draft cards to limit the views to which citizens will be exposed is manifestly incompatible with that purpose. If, in contrast, such activity is banned as part of a generally applied ordinance restricting fires in public, it would likely raise no free-speech concerns. (For a recent analysis of this issue, see Kramer 2021: 25ff).

Accordingly, the next section discusses different conceptions of free speech that arise in the philosophical literature, each oriented to some underlying moral or political value. Before turning to the discussion of those conceptions, some further preliminary distinctions will be useful.

First, we can distinguish between the morality of free speech and the law of free speech. In political philosophy, one standard approach is to theorize free speech as a requirement of morality, tracing the implications of such a theory for law and policy. Note that while this is the order of justification, it need not be the order of investigation; it is perfectly sensible to begin by studying an existing legal protection for speech (such as the First Amendment in the U.S.) and then asking what could justify such a protection (or something like it).

But of course morality and law can diverge. The most obvious way they can diverge is when the law is unjust. Existing legal protections for speech, embodied in the positive law of particular jurisdictions, may be misguided in various ways. In other words, a justified legal right to free speech, and the actual legal right to free speech in the positive law of a particular jurisdiction, can come apart. In some cases, positive legal rights might protect too little speech. For example, some jurisdictions’ speech laws make exceptions for blasphemy, such that criminalizing blasphemy does not breach the legal right to free speech within that legal system. But clearly one could argue that a justified legal right to free speech would not include any such exception. In other cases, positive legal rights might perhaps protect too much speech. Consider the fact that, as a matter of U.S. constitutional precedent, the First Amendment broadly protects speech that expresses or incites racial or religious hatred. Plainly we could agree that this is so as a matter of positive law while disagreeing about whether it ought to be so. (This is most straightforwardly true if we are legal positivists. These distinctions are muddied by moralistic theories of constitutional interpretation, which enjoin us to interpret positive legal rights in a constitutional text partly through the prism of our favorite normative political theory; see Dworkin 1996.)

Second, we can distinguish rights-based theories of free speech from non-rights-based theories. For many liberals, the legal right to free speech is justified by appealing to an underlying moral right to free speech, understood as a natural right held by all persons. (Some use the term human right equivalently—e.g., Alexander 2005—though the appropriate usage of that term is contested.) The operative notion of a moral right here is that of a claim-right (to invoke the influential analysis of Hohfeld 1917); it thereby correlates to moral duties held by others (paradigmatically, the state) to respect or protect the right. Such a right is natural in that it exerts normative force independently of whether anyone thinks it does, and regardless of whether it is codified into the law. A tyrannical state that imprisons dissidents acts unjustly, violating moral rights, even if there is no legal right to freedom of expression in its legal system.

For others, the underlying moral justification for free speech law need not come in the form of a natural moral right. For example, consequentialists might favor a legal right to free speech (on, e.g., welfare-maximizing grounds) without thinking that it tracks any underlying natural right. Or consider democratic theorists who have defended legal protections for free speech as central to democracy. Such theorists may think there is an underlying natural moral right to free speech, but they need not (especially if they hold an instrumental justification for democracy). Or consider deontologists who have argued that free speech functions as a kind of side-constraint on legitimate state action, requiring that the state always justify its decisions in a manner that respects citizens’ autonomy (Scanlon 1972). This theory does not cast free speech as a right, but rather as a principle that forbids the creation of laws that restrict speech on certain grounds. In the Hohfeldian analysis (Hohfeld 1917), such a principle may be understood as an immunity rather than a claim-right (Scanlon 2013: 402). Finally, some “minimalists” (to use a designation in Cohen 1993) favor legal protection for speech principally in response to government malice, corruption, and incompetence (see Schauer 1982; Epstein 1992; Leiter 2016). Such theorists need not recognize any fundamental moral right, either.

Third, among those who do ground free speech in a natural moral right, there is scope for disagreement about how tightly the law should mirror that right (as with any right; see Buchanan 2013). It is an open question what the precise legal codification of the moral right to free speech should involve. A justified legal right to freedom of speech may not mirror the precise contours of the natural moral right to freedom of speech. A raft of instrumental concerns enters the downstream analysis of what any justified legal right should look like; hence a defensible legal right to free speech may protect more speech (or indeed less speech) than the underlying moral right that justifies it. For example, even if the moral right to free speech does not protect so-called hate speech, such speech may still merit legal protection in the final analysis (say, because it would be too risky to entrust states with the power to limit those communications).

2. Justifying Free Speech

I will now examine several of the morally significant considerations taken to justify freedom of expression. Note that while many theorists have built whole conceptions of free speech out of a single interest or value alone, pluralism in this domain remains an option. It may well be that a plurality of interests serves to justify freedom of expression, properly understood (see, influentially, Emerson 1970 and Cohen 1993).

Suppose a state bans certain books on the grounds that it does not want us to hear the messages or arguments contained within them. Such censorship seems to involve some kind of insult or disrespect to citizens—treating us like children instead of adults who have a right to make up our own minds. This insight is fundamental in the free speech tradition. On this view, the state wrongs citizens by arrogating to itself the authority to decide what messages they ought to hear. That is so even if the state thinks that the speech will cause harm. As one author puts it,

the government may not suppress speech on the ground that the speech is likely to persuade people to do something that the government considers harmful. (Strauss 1991: 335)

Why are restrictions on persuasive speech objectionable? For some scholars, the relevant wrong here is a form of disrespect for citizens’ basic capacities (Dworkin 1996: 200; Nagel 2002: 44). For others, the wrong here inheres in a violation of the kind of relationship the state should have with its people: namely, that it should always act from a view of them as autonomous, and so entitled to make up their own minds (Scanlon 1972). It would simply be incompatible with a view of ourselves as autonomous—as authors of our own lives and choices—to grant the state the authority to pre-screen which opinions, arguments, and perspectives we should be allowed to think through, allowing us access only to those of which it approves.

This position is especially well-suited to justify some central doctrines of First Amendment jurisprudence. First, it justifies the claim that freedom of expression especially implicates the purposes with which the state acts. There are all sorts of legitimate reasons why the state might restrict speech (so-called “time, place, and manner” restrictions)—for example, noise curfews in residential neighborhoods, which do not raise serious free speech concerns. Yet when the state restricts speech with the purpose of manipulating the communicative environment and controlling the views to which citizens are exposed, free speech is directly affronted (Rubenfeld 2001; Alexander 2005; Kramer 2021). To be sure, purposes are not all that matter for free speech theory. For example, the chilling effects of otherwise justified speech regulations (discussed below) are seldom intended. But they undoubtedly matter.

Second, this view justifies the related doctrines of content neutrality and viewpoint neutrality (see G. Stone 1983 and 1987) . Content neutrality is violated when the state bans discussion of certain topics (“no discussion of abortion”), whereas viewpoint neutrality is violated when the state bans advocacy of certain views (“no pro-choice views may be expressed”). Both affront free speech, though viewpoint-discrimination is especially egregious and so even harder to justify. While listener autonomy theories are not the only theories that can ground these commitments, they are in a strong position to account for their plausibility. Note that while these doctrines are central to the American approach to free speech, they are less central to other states’ jurisprudence (see A. Stone 2017).

Third, this approach helps us see that free speech is potentially implicated whenever the state seeks to control our thoughts and the processes through which we form beliefs. Consider an attempt to ban Marx’s Capital . As Marx is deceased, he is probably not wronged through such censorship. But even if one held idiosyncratic views about posthumous rights, such that Marx were wronged, it would be curious to think this was the central objection to such censorship. Those with the gravest complaint would be the living adults who have the prerogative to read the book and make up their own minds about it. Indeed free speech may even be implicated if the state banned watching sunsets or playing video games on the grounds that is disapproved of the thoughts to which such experiences might give rise (Alexander 2005: 8–9; Kramer 2021: 22).

These arguments emphasize the noninstrumental imperative of respecting listener autonomy. But there is an instrumental version of the view. Our autonomy interests are not merely respected by free speech; they are promoted by an environment in which we learn what others have to say. Our interests in access to information is served by exposure to a wide range of viewpoints about both empirical and normative issues (Cohen 1993: 229), which help us reflect on what goals to choose and how best to pursue them. These informational interests are monumental. As Raz suggests, if we had to choose whether to express our own views on some question, or listen to the rest of humanity’s views on that question, we would choose the latter; it is our interest as listeners in the public good of a vibrant public discourse that, he thinks, centrally justifies free speech (1991).

Such an interest in acquiring justified beliefs, or in accessing truth, can be defended as part of a fully consequentialist political philosophy. J.S. Mill famously defends free speech instrumentally, appealing to its epistemic benefits in On Liberty . Mill believes that, given our fallibility, we should routinely keep an open mind as to whether a seemingly false view may actually be true, or at least contain some valuable grain of truth. And even where a proposition is manifestly false, there is value in allowing its expression so that we can better apprehend why we take it to be false (1859: chapter 2), enabled through discursive conflict (cf. Simpson 2021). Mill’s argument focuses especially on the benefits to audiences:

It is is not on the impassioned partisan, it is on the calmer and more disinterested bystander, that this collision of opinions works its salutary effect. (1859: chapter 2, p. 94)

These views are sometimes associated with the idea of a “marketplace of ideas”, whereby the open clash of views inevitably leads to the correct ones winning out in debate. Few in the contemporary literature holds such a strong teleological thesis about the consequences of unrestricted debate (e.g., see Brietzke 1997; cf. Volokh 2011). Much evidence from behavioral economics and social psychology, as well as insights about epistemic injustice from feminist epistemology, strongly suggest that human beings’ rational powers are seriously limited. Smug confidence in the marketplace of ideas belies this. Yet it is doubtful that Mill held such a strong teleological thesis (Gordon 1997). Mill’s point was not that unrestricted discussion necessarily leads people to acquire the truth. Rather, it is simply the best mechanism available for ascertaining the truth, relative to alternatives in which some arbiter declares what he sees as true and suppresses what he sees as false (see also Leiter 2016).

Note that Mill’s views on free speech in chapter 2 in On Liberty are not simply the application of the general liberty principle defended in chapter 1 of that work; his view is not that speech is anodyne and therefore seldom runs afoul of the harm principle. The reason a separate argument is necessary in chapter 2 is precisely that he is carving out a partial qualification of the harm principle for speech (on this issue see Jacobson 2000, Schauer 2011b, and Turner 2014). On Mill’s view, plenty of harmful speech should still be allowed. Imminently dangerous speech, where there is no time for discussion before harm eventuates, may be restricted; but where there is time for discussion, it must be allowed. Hence Mill’s famous example that vociferous criticism of corn dealers as

starvers of the poor…ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn dealer. (1859: chapter 3, p. 100)

The point is not that such speech is harmless; it’s that the instrumental benefits of permitting its expressions—and exposing its falsehood through public argument—justify the (remaining) costs.

Many authors have unsurprisingly argued that free speech is justified by our interests as speakers . This family of arguments emphasizes the role of speech in the development and exercise of our personal autonomy—our capacity to be the reflective authors of our own lives (Baker 1989; Redish 1982; Rawls 2005). Here an emphasis on freedom of expression is apt; we have an “expressive interest” (Cohen 1993: 224) in declaring our views—about the good life, about justice, about our identity, and about other aspects of the truth as we see it.

Our interests in self-expression may not always depend on the availability of a willing audience; we may have interests simply in shouting from the rooftops to declare who we are and what we believe, regardless of who else hears us. Hence communications to oneself—for example, in a diary or journal—are plausibly protected from interference (Redish 1992: 30–1; Shiffrin 2014: 83, 93; Kramer 2021: 23).

Yet we also have distinctive interests in sharing what we think with others. Part of how we develop our conceptions of the good life, forming judgments about how to live, is precisely through talking through the matter with others. This “deliberative interest” in directly served through opportunities to tell others what we think, so that we can learn from their feedback (Cohen 1993). Such encounters also offer opportunities to persuade others to adopt our views, and indeed to learn through such discussions who else already shares our views (Raz 1991).

Speech also seems like a central way in which we develop our capacities. This, too, is central to J.S. Mill’s defense of free speech, enabling people to explore different perspectives and points of view (1859). Hence it seems that when children engage in speech, to figure out what they think and to use their imagination to try out different ways of being in the world, they are directly engaging this interest. That explains the intuition that children, and not just adults, merit at least some protection under a principle of freedom of speech.

Note that while it is common to refer to speaker autonomy , we could simply refer to speakers’ capacities. Some political liberals hold that an emphasis on autonomy is objectionably Kantian or otherwise perfectionist, valorizing autonomy as a comprehensive moral ideal in a manner that is inappropriate for a liberal state (Cohen 1993: 229; Quong 2011). For such theorists, an undue emphasis on autonomy is incompatible with ideals of liberal neutrality toward different comprehensive conceptions of the good life (though cf. Shiffrin 2014: 81).

If free speech is justified by the importance of our interests in expressing ourselves, this justifies negative duties to refrain from interfering with speakers without adequate justification. Just as with listener theories, a strong presumption against content-based restrictions, and especially against viewpoint discrimination, is a clear requirement of the view. For the state to restrict citizens’ speech on the grounds that it disfavors what they have to say would affront the equal freedom of citizens. Imagine the state were to disallow the expression of Muslim or Jewish views, but allow the expression of Christian views. This would plainly transgress the right to freedom of expression, by valuing certain speakers’ interests in expressing themselves over others.

Many arguments for the right to free speech center on its special significance for democracy (Cohen 1993; Heinze 2016: Heyman 2009; Sunstein 1993; Weinstein 2011; Post 1991, 2009, 2011). It is possible to defend free speech on the noninstrumental ground that it is necessary to respect agents as democratic citizens. To restrict citizens’ speech is to disrespect their status as free and equal moral agents, who have a moral right to debate and decide the law for themselves (Rawls 2005).

Alternatively (or additionally), one can defend free speech on the instrumental ground that free speech promotes democracy, or whatever values democracy is meant to serve. So, for example, suppose the purpose of democracy is the republican one of establishing a state of non-domination between relationally egalitarian citizens; free speech can be defended as promoting that relation (Whitten 2022; Bonotti & Seglow 2022). Or suppose that democracy is valuable because of its role in promoting just outcomes (Arneson 2009) or tending to track those outcomes in a manner than is publicly justifiable (Estlund 2008) or is otherwise epistemically valuable (Landemore 2013).

Perhaps free speech doesn’t merely respect or promote democracy; another framing is that it is constitutive of it (Meiklejohn 1948, 1960; Heinze 2016). As Rawls says: “to restrict or suppress free political speech…always implies at least a partial suspension of democracy” (2005: 254). On this view, to be committed to democracy just is , in part, to be committed to free speech. Deliberative democrats famously contend that voting merely punctuates a larger process defined by a commitment to open deliberation among free and equal citizens (Gutmann & Thompson 2008). Such an unrestricted discussion is marked not by considerations of instrumental rationality and market forces, but rather, as Habermas puts it, “the unforced force of the better argument” (1992 [1996: 37]). One crucial way in which free speech might be constitutive of democracy is if it serves as a legitimation condition . On this view, without a process of open public discourse, the outcomes of the democratic decision-making process lack legitimacy (Dworkin 2009, Brettschneider 2012: 75–78, Cohen 1997, and Heinze 2016).

Those who justify free speech on democratic grounds may view this as a special application of a more general insight. For example, Scanlon’s listener theory (discussed above) contends that the state must always respect its citizens as capable of making up their own minds (1972)—a position with clear democratic implications. Likewise, Baker is adamant that both free speech and democracy are justified by the same underlying value of autonomy (2009). And while Rawls sees the democratic role of free speech as worthy of emphasis, he is clear that free speech is one of several basic liberties that enable the development and exercise of our moral powers: our capacities for a sense of justice and for the rational pursuit a lifeplan (2005). In this way, many theorists see the continuity between free speech and our broader interests as moral agents as a virtue, not a drawback (e.g., Kendrick 2017).

Even so, some democracy theorists hold that democracy has a special role in a theory of free speech, such that political speech in particular merits special protection (for an overview, see Barendt 2005: 154ff). One consequence of such views is that contributions to public discourse on political questions merit greater protection under the law (Sunstein 1993; cf. Cohen 1993: 227; Alexander 2005: 137–8). For some scholars, this may reflect instrumental anxieties about the special danger that the state will restrict the political speech of opponents and dissenters. But for others, an emphasis on political speech seems to reflect a normative claim that such speech is genuinely of greater significance, meriting greater protection, than other kinds of speech.

While conventional in the free speech literature, it is artificial to separate out our interests as speakers, listeners, and democratic citizens. Communication, and the thinking that feeds into it and that it enables, invariably engages our interests and activities across all these capacities. This insight is central to Seana Shiffrin’s groundbreaking thinker-based theory of freedom of speech, which seeks to unify the range of considerations that have informed the traditional theories (2014). Like other theories (e.g., Scanlon 1978, Cohen 1993), Shiffrin’s theory is pluralist in the range of interests it appeals to. But it offers a unifying framework that explains why this range of interests merits protection together.

On Shiffrin’s view, freedom of speech is best understood as encompassing both freedom of communication and freedom of thought, which while logically distinct are mutually reinforcing and interdependent (Shiffrin 2014: 79). Shiffrin’s account involves several profound claims about the relation between communication and thought. A central contention is that “free speech is essential to the development, functioning, and operation of thinkers” (2014: 91). This is, in part, because we must often externalize our ideas to articulate them precisely and hold them at a distance where we can evaluate them (p. 89). It is also because we work out what we think largely by talking it through with others. Such communicative processes may be monological, but they are typically dialogical; speaker and listener interests are thereby mutually engaged in an ongoing manner that cannot be neatly disentangled, as ideas are ping-ponged back and forth. Moreover, such discussions may concern democratic politics—engaging our interests as democratic citizens—but of course they need not. Aesthetics, music, local sports, the existence of God—these all are encompassed (2014: 92–93). Pace prevailing democratic theories,

One’s thoughts about political affairs are intrinsically and ex ante no more and no less central to the human self than thoughts about one’s mortality or one’s friends. (Shiffrin 2014: 93)

The other central aspect of Shiffrin’s view appeals to the necessity of communication for successfully exercising our moral agency. Sincere communication enables us

to share needs, emotions, intentions, convictions, ambitions, desires, fantasies, disappointments, and judgments. Thereby, we are enabled to form and execute complex cooperative plans, to understand one another, to appreciate and negotiate around our differences. (2014: 1)

Without clear and precise communication of the sort that only speech can provide, we cannot cooperate to discharge our collective obligations. Nor can we exercise our normative powers (such as consenting, waiving, or promising). Our moral agency thus depends upon protected channels through which we can relay our sincere thoughts to one another. The central role of free speech is to protect those channels, by ensuring agents are free to share what they are thinking without fear of sanction.

The thinker-based view has wide-ranging normative implications. For example, by emphasizing the continuity of speech and thought (a connection also noted in Macklem 2006 and Gilmore 2011), Shiffrin’s view powerfully explains the First Amendment doctrine that compelled speech also constitutes a violation of freedom of expression. Traditional listener- and speaker-focused theories seemingly cannot explain what is fundamentally objectionable with forcing someone to declare a commitment to something, as with children compelled to pledge allegiance to the American flag ( West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 1943). “What seems most troubling about the compelled pledge”, Shiffrin writes,

is that the motive behind the regulation, and its possible effect, is to interfere with the autonomous thought processes of the compelled speaker. (2014: 94)

Further, Shiffrin’s view explains why a concern for free speech does not merely correlate to negative duties not to interfere with expression; it also supports positive responsibilities on the part of the state to educate citizens, encouraging and supporting their development and exercise as thinking beings (2014: 107).

Consider briefly one final family of free speech theories, which appeal to the role of toleration or self-restraint. On one argument, freedom of speech is important because it develops our character as liberal citizens, helping us tame our illiberal impulses. The underlying idea of Lee Bollinger’s view is that liberalism is difficult; we recurrently face temptation to punish those who hold contrary views. Freedom of speech helps us to practice the general ethos of toleration in a manner than fortifies our liberal convictions (1986). Deeply offensive speech, like pro-Nazi speech, is protected precisely because toleration in these enormously difficult cases promotes “a general social ethic” of toleration more generally (1986: 248), thereby restraining unjust exercises of state power overall. This consequentialist argument treats the protection of offensive speech not as a tricky borderline case, but as “integral to the central functions of the principle of free speech” (1986: 133). It is precisely because tolerating evil speech involves “extraordinary self-restraint” (1986: 10) that it works its salutary effects on society generally.

The idea of self-restraint arises, too, in Matthew Kramer’s recent defense of free speech. Like listener theories, Kramer’s strongly deontological theory condemns censorship aimed at protecting audiences from exposure to misguided views. At the core of his theory is the thesis that the state’s paramount moral responsibility is to furnish the social conditions that serve the development and maintenance of citizens’ self-respect and respect for others. The achievement of such an ethically resilient citizenry, on Kramer’s view, has the effect of neutering the harmfulness of countless harmful communications. “Securely in a position of ethical strength”, the state “can treat the wares of pornographers and the maunderings of bigots as execrable chirps that are to be endured with contempt” (Kramer 2021: 147). In contrast, in a society where the state has failed to do its duty of inculcating a robust liberal-egalitarian ethos, the communication of illiberal creeds may well pose a substantial threat. Yet for the state then to react by banning such speech is

overweening because with them the system’s officials take control of communications that should have been defused (through the system’s fulfillment of its moral obligations) without prohibitory or preventative impositions. (2021: 147)

(One might agree with Kramer that this is so, but diverge by arguing that the state—having failed in its initial duty—ought to take measures to prevent the harms that flow from that failure.)

These theories are striking in that they assume that a chief task of free speech theory is to explain why harmful speech ought to be protected. This is in contrast to those who think that the chief task of free speech theory is to explain our interests in communicating with others, treating the further issue of whether (wrongfully) harmful communications should be protected as an open question, with different reasonable answers available (Kendrick 2017). In this way, toleration theories—alongside a lot of philosophical work on free speech—seem designed to vindicate the demanding American legal position on free speech, one unshared by virtually all other liberal democracies.

One final family of arguments for free speech appeals to the danger of granting the state powers it may abuse. On this view, we protect free speech chiefly because if we didn’t, it would be far easier for the state to silence its political opponents and enact unjust policies. On this view, a state with censorial powers is likely to abuse them. As Richard Epstein notes, focusing on the American case,

the entire structure of federalism, divided government, and the system of checks and balances at the federal level shows that the theme of distrust has worked itself into the warp and woof of our constitutional structure.

“The protection of speech”, he writes, “…should be read in light of these political concerns” (Epstein 1992: 49).

This view is not merely a restatement of the democracy theory; it does not affirm free speech as an element of valuable self-governance. Nor does it reduce to the uncontroversial thought that citizens need freedom of speech to check the behavior of fallible government agents (Blasi 1977). One need not imagine human beings to be particularly sinister to insist (as democracy theorists do) that the decisions of those entrusted with great power be subject to public discussion and scrutiny. The argument under consideration here is more pessimistic about human nature. It is an argument about the slippery slope that we create even when enacting (otherwise justified) speech restrictions; we set an unacceptable precedent for future conduct by the state (see Schauer 1985). While this argument is theoretical, there is clearly historical evidence for it, as in the manifold cases in which bans on dangerous sedition were used to suppress legitimate war protest. (For a sweeping canonical study of the uses and abuses of speech regulations during wartime, with a focus on U.S. history, see G. Stone 2004.)

These instrumental concerns could potentially justify the legal protection for free speech. But they do not to attempt to justify why we should care about free speech as a positive moral ideal (Shiffrin 2014: 83n); they are, in Cohen’s helpful terminology, “minimalist” rather than “maximalist” (Cohen 1993: 210). Accordingly, they cannot explain why free speech is something that even the most trustworthy, morally competent administrations, with little risk of corruption or degeneration, ought to respect. Of course, minimalists will deny that accounting for speech’s positive value is a requirement of a theory of free speech, and that critiquing them for this omission begs the question.

Pluralists may see instrumental concerns as valuably supplementing or qualifying noninstrumental views. For example, instrumental concerns may play a role in justifying deviations between the moral right to free communication, on the one hand, and a properly specified legal right to free communication, on the other. Suppose that there is no moral right to engage in certain forms of harmful expression (such as hate speech), and that there is in fact a moral duty to refrain from such expression. Even so, it does not follow automatically that such a right ought to be legally enforced. Concerns about the dangers of granting the state such power plausibly militate against the enforcement of at least some of our communicative duties—at least in those jurisdictions that lack robust and competently administered liberal-democratic safeguards.

This entry has canvassed a range of views about what justifies freedom of expression, with particular attention to theories that conceive free speech as a natural moral right. Clearly, the proponents of such views believe that they succeed in this justificatory effort. But others dissent, doubting that the case for a bona fide moral right to free speech comes through. Let us briefly note the nature of this challenge from free speech skeptics , exploring a prominent line of reply.

The challenge from skeptics is generally understood as that of showing that free speech is a special right . As Leslie Kendrick notes,

the term “special right” generally requires that a special right be entirely distinct from other rights and activities and that it receive a very high degree of protection. (2017: 90)

(Note that this usage is not to be confused from the alternative usage of “special right”, referring to conditional rights arising out of particular relationships; see Hart 1955.)

Take each aspect in turn. First, to vindicate free speech as a special right, it must serve some distinctive value or interest (Schauer 2015). Suppose free speech were just an implication of a general principle not to interfere in people’s liberty without justification. As Joel Feinberg puts it, “Liberty should be the norm; coercion always needs some special justification” (1984: 9). In such a case, then while there still might be contingent, historical reasons to single speech out in law as worthy of protection (Alexander 2005: 186), such reasons would not track anything especially distinctive about speech as an underlying moral matter. Second, to count as a special right, free speech must be robust in what it protects, such that only a compelling justification can override it (Dworkin 2013: 131). This captures the conviction, prominent among American constitutional theorists, that “any robust free speech principle must protect at least some harmful speech despite the harm it may cause” (Schauer 2011b: 81; see also Schauer 1982).

If the task of justifying a moral right to free speech requires surmounting both hurdles, it is a tall order. Skeptics about a special right to free speech doubt that the order can be met, and so deny that a natural moral right to freedom of expression can be justified (Schauer 2015; Alexander & Horton 1983; Alexander 2005; Husak 1985). But these theorists may be demanding too much (Kendrick 2017). Start with the claim that free speech must be distinctive. We can accept that free speech be more than simply one implication of a general presumption of liberty. But need it be wholly distinctive? Consider the thesis that free speech is justified by our autonomy interests—interests that justify other rights such as freedom of religion and association. Is it a problem if free speech is justified by interests that are continuous with, or overlap with, interests that justify other rights? Pace the free speech skeptics, maybe not. So long as such claims deserve special recognition, and are worth distinguishing by name, this may be enough (Kendrick 2017: 101). Many of the views canvassed above share normative bases with other important rights. For example, Rawls is clear that he thinks all the basic liberties constitute

essential social conditions for the adequate development and full exercise of the two powers of moral personality over a complete life. (Rawls 2005: 293)

The debate, then, is whether such a shared basis is a theoretical virtue (or at least theoretically unproblematic) or whether it is a theoretical vice, as the skeptics avow.

As for the claim that free speech must be robust, protecting harmful speech, “it is not necessary for a free speech right to protect harmful speech in order for it to be called a free speech right” (Kendrick 2017: 102). We do not tend to think that religious liberty must protect harmful religious activities for it to count as a special right. So it would be strange to insist that the right to free speech must meet this burden to count as a special right. Most of the theorists mentioned above take themselves to be offering views that protect quite a lot of harmful speech. Yet we can question whether this feature is a necessary component of their views, or whether we could imagine variations without this result.

3. Justifying Speech Restrictions

When, and why, can restrictions on speech be justified? It is common in public debate on free speech to hear the provocative claim that free speech is absolute . But the plausibility of such a claim depends on what is exactly meant by it. If understood to mean that no communications between humans can ever be restricted, such a view is held by no one in the philosophical debate. When I threaten to kill you unless you hand me your money; when I offer to bribe the security guard to let me access the bank vault; when I disclose insider information that the company in which you’re heavily invested is about to go bust; when I defame you by falsely posting online that you’re a child abuser; when I endanger you by labeling a drug as safe despite its potentially fatal side-effects; when I reveal your whereabouts to assist a murderer intent on killing you—across all these cases, communications may be uncontroversially restricted. But there are different views as to why.

To help organize such views, consider a set of distinctions influentially defended by Schauer (from 1982 onward). The first category involves uncovered speech : speech that does not even presumptively fall within the scope of a principle of free expression. Many of the speech-acts just canvassed, such as the speech involved in making a threat or insider training, plausibly count as uncovered speech. As the U.S. Supreme Court has said of fighting words (e.g., insults calculated to provoke a street fight),

such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. ( Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 1942)

The general idea here is that some speech simply has negligible—and often no —value as free speech, in light of its utter disconnection from the values that justify free speech in the first place. (For discussion of so-called “low-value speech” in the U.S. context, see Sunstein 1989 and Lakier 2015.) Accordingly, when such low-value speech is harmful, it is particularly easy to justify its curtailment. Hence the Court’s view that “the prevention and punishment of [this speech] have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem”. For legislation restricting such speech, the U.S. Supreme Court applies a “rational basis” test, which is very easy to meet, as it simply asks whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. (Note that it is widely held that it would still be impermissible to selectively ban low-value speech on a viewpoint-discriminatory basis—e.g., if a state only banned fighting words from left-wing activists while allowing them from right-wing activists.)

Schauer’s next category concerns speech that is covered but unprotected . This is speech that engages the values that underpin free speech; yet the countervailing harm of the speech justifies its restriction. In such cases, while there is real value in such expression as free speech, that value is outweighed by competing normative concerns (or even, as we will see below, on behalf of the very values that underpin free speech). In U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, this category encompasses those extremely rare cases in which restrictions on political speech pass the “strict scrutiny” test, whereby narrow restrictions on high-value speech can be justified due to the compelling state interests thereby served. Consider Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 2010, in which the Court held that an NGO’s legal advice to a terrorist organization on how to pursue peaceful legal channels were legitimately criminalized under a counter-terrorism statute. While such speech had value as free speech (at least on one interpretation of this contested ruling), the imperative of counter-terrorism justified its restriction. (Arguably, commercial speech, while sometimes called low-value speech by scholars, falls into the covered but unprotected category. Under U.S. law, legislation restricting it receives “intermediate scrutiny” by courts—requiring restrictions to be narrowly drawn to advance a substantial government interest. Such a test suggests that commercial speech has bona fide free-speech value, making it harder to justify regulations on it than regulations on genuinely low-value speech like fighting words. It simply doesn’t have as much free-speech value as categories like political speech, religious speech, or press speech, all of which trigger the strict scrutiny test when restricted.)

As a philosophical matter, we can reasonably disagree about what speech qualifies as covered but unprotected (and need not treat the verdicts of the U.S. Supreme Court as philosophically decisive). For example, consider politically-inflected hate speech, which advances repugnant ideas about the inferior status of certain groups. One could concur that there is substantial free-speech value in such expression, just because it involves the sincere expression of views about central questions of politics and justice (however misguided the views doubtlessly are). Yet one could nevertheless hold that such speech should not be protected in virtue of the substantial harms to which it can lead. In such cases, the free-speech value is outweighed. Many scholars who defend the permissibility of legal restrictions on hate speech hold such a view (e.g., Parekh 2012; Waldron 2012). (More radically, one could hold that such speech’s value is corrupted by its evil, such that it qualifies as genuinely low-value; Howard 2019a.)

The final category of speech encompasses expression that is covered and protected . To declare that speech is protected just is to conclude that it is immune from restriction. A preponderance of human communications fall into this category. This does not mean that such speech can never be regulated ; content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations (e.g., prohibiting loud nighttime protests) can certainly be justified (G. Stone 1987). But such regulations must not be viewpoint discriminatory; they must apply even-handedly across all forms of protected speech.

Schauer’s taxonomy offers a useful organizing framework for how we should think about different forms of speech. Where does it leave the claim that free speech is absolute? The possibility of speech that is covered but unprotected suggests that free speech should sometimes be restricted on account of rival normative concerns. Of course, one could contend that such a category, while logically possible, is substantively an empty set; such a position would involve some kind of absoluteness about free speech (holding that where free-speech values are engaged by expression, no countervailing values can ever be weighty enough to override them). Such a position would be absolutist in a certain sense while granting the permissibility of restrictions on speech that do not engage the free-speech values. (For a recent critique of Schauer’s framework, arguing that governmental designation of some speech as low-value is incompatible with the very ideal of free speech, see Kramer 2021: 31.)

In what follows, this entry will focus on Schauer’s second category: speech that is covered by a free speech principle, but is nevertheless unprotected because of the harms it causes. How do we determine what speech falls into this category? How, in other words, do we determine the limits of free speech? Unsurprisingly, this is where most of the controversy lies.

Most legal systems that protect free speech recognize that the right has limits. Consider, for example, international human rights law, which emphatically protects the freedom of speech as a fundamental human right while also affirming specific restrictions on certain seriously harmful speech. Article 19 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights declares that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds”—but then immediately notes that this right “carries with it special duties and responsibilities”. The subsequent ICCPR article proceeds to endorse legal restrictions on “advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”, as well as speech constituting “propaganda for war” (ICCPR). While such restrictions would plainly be struck down as unconstitutional affronts to free speech in the U.S., this more restrictive approach prevails in most liberal democracies’ treatment of harmful speech.

Set aside the legal issue for now. How should we think about how to determine the limits of the moral right free speech? Those seeking to justify limits on speech tend to appeal to one of two strategies (Howard and Simpson forthcoming). The first strategy appeals to the importance of balancing free speech against other moral values when they come into conflict. This strategy involves external limits on free speech. (The next strategy, discussed below, invokes free speech itself, or the values that justify it, as limit-setting rationales; it thus involves internal limits on free speech.)

A balancing approach recognizes a moral conflict between unfettered communication and external values. Consider again the case of hate speech, understood as expression that attacks members of socially vulnerable groups as inferior or dangerous. On all of the theories canvassed above, there are grounds for thinking that restrictions on hate speech are prima facie in violation of the moral right to free speech. Banning hate speech to prevent people from hearing ideas that might incline them to bigotry plainly seems to disrespect listener autonomy. Further, even when speakers are expressing prejudiced views, they are still engaging their autonomous faculties. Certainly, they are expressing views on questions of public political concern, even false ones. And as thinkers they are engaged in the communication of sincere testimony to others. On many of the leading theories, the values underpinning free speech seem to be militate against bans on hate speech.

Even so, other values matter. Consider, for example, the value of upholding the equal dignity of all citizens. A central insight of critical race theory is that public expressions of white supremacy, for example, attack and undermine that equal dignity (Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado, & Crenshaw 1993). On Jeremy Waldron’s view (2012), hate speech is best understood as a form of group defamation, launching spurious attacks on others’ reputations and thereby undermining their standing as respected equals in their own community (relatedly, see Beauharnais v. Illinois 1952).

Countries that ban hate speech, accordingly, are plausibly understood not as opposed to free speech, but as recognizing the importance that it be balanced when conflicting with other values. Such balancing can be understood in different ways. In European human rights law, for example, the relevant idea is that the right to free speech is balanced against other rights ; the relevant task, accordingly, is to specify what counts as a proportionate balance between these rights (see Alexy 2003; J. Greene 2021).

For others, the very idea of balancing rights undermines their deontic character. This alternative framing holds that the balancing occurs before we specify what rights are; on this view, we balance interests against each other, and only once we’ve undertaken that balancing do we proceed to define what our rights protect. As Scanlon puts it,

The only balancing is balancing of interests. Rights are not balanced, but are defined, or redefined, in the light of the balance of interests and of empirical facts about how these interests can best be protected. (2008: 78)

This balancing need not come in the form of some crude consequentialism; otherwise it would be acceptable to limit the rights of the few to secure trivial benefits for the many. On a contractualist moral theory such as Scanlon’s, the test is to assess the strength of any given individual’s reason to engage in (or access) the speech, against the strength of any given individual’s reason to oppose it.

Note that those who engage in balancing need not give up on the idea of viewpoint neutrality; they can accept that, as a general principle, the state should not restrict speech on the grounds that it disapproves of its message and dislikes that others will hear it. The point, instead, is that this commitment is defeasible; it is possible to be overridden.

One final comment is apt. Those who are keen to balance free speech against other values tend to be motivated by the concern that speech can cause harm, either directly or indirectly (on this distinction, see Schauer 1993). But to justify restrictions on speech, it is not sufficient (and perhaps not even necessary) to show that such speech imposes or risks imposing harm. The crucial point is that the speech is wrongful (or, perhaps, wrongfully harmful or risky) , breaching a moral duty that speakers owe to others. Yet very few in the free speech literature think that the mere offensiveness of speech is sufficient to justify restrictions on it. Even Joel Feinberg, who thinks offensiveness can sometimes be grounds for restricting conduct, makes a sweeping exception for

[e]xpressions of opinion, especially about matters of public policy, but also about matters of empirical fact, and about historical, scientific, theological, philosophical, political, and moral questions. (1985: 44)

And in many cases, offensive speech may be actively salutary, as when racists are offended by defenses of racial equality (Waldron 1987). Accordingly, despite how large it looms in public debate, discussion of offensive speech will not play a major role in the discussion here.

We saw that one way to justify limits on free speech is to balance it against other values. On that approach, free speech is externally constrained. A second approach, in contrast, is internally constrained. On this approach, the very values that justify free speech themselves determine its own limits. This is a revisionist approach to free speech since, unlike orthodox thinking, it contends that a commitment to free speech values can counterintuitively support the restriction of speech—a surprising inversion of traditional thinking on the topic (see Howard and Simpson forthcoming). This move—justifying restrictions on speech by appealing to the values that underpin free speech—is now prevalent in the philosophical literature (for an overview, see Barendt 2005: 1ff).

Consider, for example, the claim that free speech is justified by concerns of listener autonomy. On such a view, as we saw above, autonomous citizens have interests in exposure to a wide range of viewpoints, so that they can decide for themselves what to believe. But many have pointed out that this is not autonomous citizens’ only interest; they also have interests in not getting murdered by those incited by incendiary speakers (Amdur 1980). Likewise, insofar as being targeted by hate speech undermines the exercise of one’s autonomous capacities, appeal to the underlying value of autonomy could well support restrictions on such speech (Brison 1998; see also Brink 2001). What’s more, if our interests as listeners in acquiring accurate information is undermined by fraudulent information, then restrictions on such information could well be compatible with our status as autonomous; this was one of the insights that led Scanlon to complicate his theory of free speech (1978).

Or consider the theory that free speech is justified because of its role in enabling autonomous speakers to express themselves. But as Japa Pallikkathayil has argued, some speech can intimidate its audiences into staying silent (as with some hate speech), out of fear for what will happen if they speak up (Pallikkathayil 2020). In principle, then, restrictions on hate speech may serve to support the value of speaker expression, rather than undermine it (see also Langton 2018; Maitra 2009; Maitra & McGowan 2007; and Matsuda 1989: 2337). Indeed, among the most prominent claims in feminist critiques of pornography is precisely that it silences women—not merely through its (perlocutionary) effects in inspiring rape, but more insidiously through its (illocutionary) effects in altering the force of the word “no” (see MacKinnon 1984; Langton 1993; and West 204 [2022]; McGowan 2003 and 2019; cf. Kramer 2021, pp. 160ff).

Now consider democracy theories. On the one hand, democracy theorists are adamant that citizens should be free to discuss any proposals, even the destruction of democracy itself (e.g., Meiklejohn 1948: 65–66). On the other hand, it isn’t obvious why citizens’ duties as democratic citizens could not set a limit to their democratic speech rights (Howard 2019a). The Nazi propagandist Goebbels is said to have remarked:

This will always remain one of the best jokes of democracy, that it gave its deadly enemies the means by which it was destroyed. (as quoted in Fox & Nolte 1995: 1)

But it is not clear why this is necessarily so. Why should we insist on a conception of democracy that contains a self-destruct mechanism? Merely stipulating that democracy requires this is not enough (see A. Greene and Simpson 2017).

Finally, consider Shiffrin’s thinker-based theory. Shiffrin’s view is especially well-placed to explain why varieties of harmful communications are protected speech; what the theory values is the sincere transmission of veridical testimony, whereby speakers disclose what they genuinely believe to others, even if what they believe is wrongheaded and dangerous. Yet because the sincere testimony of thinkers is what qualifies some communication for protection, Shiffrin is adamant that lying falls outside the protective ambit of freedom of expression (2014) This, then, sets an internal limit on her own theory (even if she herself disfavors all lies’ outright prohibition for reasons of tolerance). The claim that lying falls outside the protective ambit of free speech is itself a recurrent suggestion in the literature (Strauss 1991: 355; Brown 2023). In an era of rampant disinformation, this internal limit is of substantial practical significance.

Suppose the moral right (or principle) of free speech is limited, as most think, such that not all communications fall within its protective ambit (either for external reasons, internal reasons, or both). Even so, it does not follow that laws banning such unprotected speech can be justified all-things-considered. Further moral tests must be passed before any particular policy restricting speech can be justified. This sub-section focuses on the requirement that speech restrictions be proportionate .

The idea that laws implicating fundamental rights must be proportionate is central in many jurisdictions’ constitutional law, as well as in the international law of human rights. As a representative example, consider the specification of proportionality offered by the Supreme Court of Canada:

First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair “as little as possible” the right or freedom in question[…] Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of “sufficient importance” ( R v. Oakes 1986).

It is this third element (often called “proportionality stricto sensu ”) on which we will concentrate here; this is the focused sense of proportionality that roughly tracks how the term is used in the philosophical literatures on defensive harm and war, as well as (with some relevant differences) criminal punishment. (The strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny tests of U.S. constitutional law are arguably variations of the proportionality test; but set aside this complication for now as it distracts from the core philosophical issues. For relevant legal discussion, see Tsesis 2020.)

Proportionality, in the strict sense, concerns the relation between the costs or harms imposed by some measure and the benefits that the measure is designed to secure. The organizing distinction in recent philosophical literature (albeit largely missing in the literature on free speech) is one between narrow proportionality and wide proportionality . While there are different ways to cut up the terrain between these terms, let us stipulatively define them as follows. An interference is narrowly proportionate just in case the intended target of the interference is liable to bear the costs of that interference. An interference is widely proportionate just in case the collateral costs that the interference unintentionally imposes on others can be justified. (This distinction largely follows the literature in just war theory and the ethics of defensive force; see McMahan 2009.) While the distinction is historically absent from free speech theory, it has powerful payoffs in helping to structure this chaotic debate (as argued in Howard 2019a).

So start with the idea that restrictions on communication must be narrowly proportionate . For a restriction to be narrowly proportionate, those whose communications are restricted must be liable to bear their costs, such that they are not wronged by their imposition. One standard way to be liable to bear certain costs is to have a moral duty to bear them (Tadros 2012). So, for example, if speakers have a moral duty to refrain from libel, hate speech, or some other form of harmful speech, they are liable to bear at least some costs involved in the enforcement of that duty. Those costs cannot be unlimited; a policy of executing hate speakers could not plausibly be justified. Typically, in both defensive and punitive contexts, wrongdoers’ liability is determined by their culpability, the severity of their wrong, or some combination of the two. While it is difficult to say in the abstract what the precise maximal cost ceiling is for any given restriction, as it depends hugely on the details, the point is simply that there is some ceiling above which a speech restriction (like any restriction) imposes unacceptably high costs, even on wrongdoers.

Second, for a speech restriction to be justified, we must also show that it would be widely proportionate . Suppose a speaker is liable to bear the costs of some policy restricting her communication, such that she is not wronged by its imposition. It may be that the collateral costs of such a policy would render it unacceptable. One set of costs is chilling effects , the “overdeterrence of benign conduct that occurs incidentally to a law’s legitimate purpose or scope” (Kendrick 2013: 1649). The core idea is that laws targeting unprotected, legitimately proscribed expression may nevertheless end up having a deleterious impact on protected expression. This is because laws are often vague, overbroad, and in any case are likely to be misapplied by fallible officials (Schauer 1978: 699).

Note that if a speech restriction produces chilling effects, it does not follow that the restriction should not exist at all. Rather, concern about chilling effects instead suggests that speech restrictions should be under-inclusive—restricting less speech than is actually harmful—in order to create “breathing space”, or “a buffer zone of strategic protection” (Schauer 1978: 710) for legitimate expression and so reduce unwanted self-censorship. For example, some have argued that even though speech can cause harm recklessly or negligently, we should insist on specific intent as the mens rea of speech crimes in order to reduce any chilling effects that could follow (Alexander 1995: 21–128; Schauer 1978: 707; cf. Kendrick 2013).

But chilling effects are not the only sort of collateral effects to which speech restrictions could lead. Earlier we noted the risk that states might abuse their censorial powers. This, too, could militate in favor of underinclusive speech restrictions. Or the implication could be more radical. Consider the problem that it is difficult to author restrictions on hate speech in a tightly specified way; the language involved is open-ended in a manner that enables states to exercise considerable judgment in deciding what speech-acts, in fact, count as violations (see Strossen 2018). Given the danger that the state will misuse or abuse these laws to punish legitimate speech, some might think this renders their enactment widely disproportionate. Indeed, even if the law were well-crafted and would be judiciously applied by current officials, the point is that those in the future may not be so trustworthy.

Those inclined to accept such a position might simply draw the conclusion that legislatures ought to refrain from enacting laws against hate speech. A more radical conclusion is that the legal right to free speech ought to be specified so that hate speech is constitutionally protected. In other words, we ought to give speakers a legal right to violate their moral duties, since enforcing those moral duties through law is simply too risky. By appealing to this logic, it is conceivable that the First Amendment position on hate speech could be justified all-things-considered—not because the underlying moral right to free speech protects hate speech, but because hate speech must be protected for instrumental reasons of preventing future abuses of power (Howard 2019a).

Suppose certain restrictions on harmful speech can be justified as proportionate, in both the narrow and wide senses. This is still not sufficient to justify them all-things-considered. Additionally, they must be justified as necessary . (Note that some conceptions of proportionality in human rights law encompass the necessity requirement, but this entry follows the prevailing philosophical convention by treating them as distinct.)

Why might restrictions on harmful speech be unnecessary? One of the standard claims in the free speech literature is that we should respond to harmful speech not by banning it, but by arguing back against it. Counter-speech—not censorship—is the appropriate solution. This line of reasoning is old. As John Milton put it in 1644: “Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?” The insistence on counter-speech as the remedy for harmful speech is similarly found, as noted above, throughout chapter 2 of Mill’s On Liberty .

For many scholars, this line of reply is justified by the fact that they think the harmful speech in question is protected by the moral right to free speech. For such scholars, counter-speech is the right response because censorship is morally off the table. For other scholars, the recourse to counter-speech has a plausible distinct rationale (although it is seldom articulated): its possibility renders legal restrictions unnecessary. And because it is objectionable to use gratuitous coercion, legal restrictions are therefore impermissible (Howard 2019a). Such a view could plausibly justify Mill’s aforementioned analysis in the corn dealer example, whereby censorship is permissible but only when there’s no time for counter-speech—a view that is also endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

Whether this argument succeeds depends upon a wide range of further assumptions—about the comparable effectiveness of counter-speech relative to law; about the burdens that counter-speech imposes on prospective counter-speakers. Supposing that the argument succeeds, it invites a range of further normative questions about the ethics of counter-speech. For example, it is important who has the duty to engage in counter-speech, who its intended audience is, and what specific forms the counter-speech ought to take—especially in order to maximize its persuasive effectiveness (Brettschneider 2012; Cepollaro, Lepoutre, & Simpson 2023; Howard 2021b; Lepoutre 2021; Badano & Nuti 2017). It is also important to ask questions about the moral limits of counter-speech. For example, insofar as publicly shaming wrongful speakers has become a prominent form of counter-speech, it is crucial to interrogate its permissibility (e.g., Billingham and Parr 2020).

This final section canvasses the young philosophical debate concerning freedom of speech on the internet. With some important exceptions (e.g., Barendt 2005: 451ff), this issue has only recently accelerated (for an excellent edited collection, see Brison & Gelber 2019). There are many normative questions to be asked about the moral rights and obligations of internet platforms. Here are three. First, do internet platforms have moral duties to respect the free speech of their users? Second, do internet platforms have moral duties to restrict (or at least refrain from amplifying) harmful speech posted by their users? And finally, if platforms do indeed have moral duties to restrict harmful speech, should those duties be legally enforced?

The reference to internet platforms , is a deliberate focus on large-scale social media platforms, through which people can discover and publicly share user-generated content. We set aside other entities such as search engines (Whitney & Simpson 2019), important though they are. That is simply because the central political controversies, on which philosophical input is most urgent, concern the large social-media platforms.

Consider the question of whether internet platforms have moral duties to respect the free speech of their users. One dominant view in the public discourse holds that the answer is no . On this view, platforms are private entities, and as such enjoy the prerogative to host whatever speech they like. This would arguably be a function of them having free speech rights themselves. Just as the free speech rights of the New York Times give it the authority to publish whatever op-eds it sees fit, the free speech rights of platforms give them the authority to exercise editorial or curatorial judgment about what speech to allow. On this view, if Facebook were to decide to become a Buddhist forum, amplifying the speech of Buddhist users and promoting Buddhist perspectives and ideas, and banning speech promoting other religions, it would be entirely within its moral (and thus proper legal) rights to do so. So, too, if it were to decide to become an atheist forum.

A radical alternative view holds that internet platforms constitute a public forum , a term of art from U.S. free speech jurisprudence used to designate spaces “designed for and dedicated to expressive activities” ( Southeastern Promotions Ltd., v. Conrad 1975). As Kramer has argued:

social-media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter and YouTube have become public fora. Although the companies that create and run those platforms are not morally obligated to sustain them in existence at all, the role of controlling a public forum morally obligates each such company to comply with the principle of freedom of expression while performing that role. No constraints that deviate from the kinds of neutrality required under that principle are morally legitimate. (Kramer 2021: 58–59)

On this demanding view, platforms’ duties to respect speech are (roughly) identical to the duties of states. Accordingly, if efforts by the state to restrict hate speech, pornography, and public health misinformation (for example) are objectionable affronts to free speech, so too are platforms’ content moderation rules for such content. A more moderate view does not hold that platforms are public forums as such, but holds that government channels or pages qualify as public forums (the claim at issue in Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump (2019).)

Even if we deny that platforms constitute public forums, it is plausible that they engage in a governance function of some kind (Klonick 2018). As Jack Balkin has argued, the traditional model of free speech, which sees it as a relation between speakers and the state, is today plausibly supplanted by a triadic model, involving a more complex relation between speakers, governments, and intermediaries (2004, 2009, 2018, 2021). If platforms do indeed have some kind of governance function, it may well trigger responsibilities for transparency and accountability (as with new legislation such as the EU’s Digital Services Act and the UK’s Online Safety Act).

Second, consider the question of whether platforms have a duty to remove harmful content posted by users. Even those who regard them as public forums could agree that platforms may have a moral responsibility to remove illegal unprotected speech. Yet a dominant view in the public debate has historically defended platforms’ place as mere conduits for others’ speech. This is the current position under U.S. law (as with 47 U.S. Code §230), which broadly exempts platforms from liability for much illegal speech, such as defamation. On this view, we should view platforms as akin to bulletin boards: blame whoever posts wrongful content, but don’t hold the owner of the board responsible.

This view is under strain. Even under current U.S. law, platforms are liable for removing some content, such as child sexual abuse material and copyright infringements, suggesting that it is appropriate to demand some accountability for the wrongful content posted by others. An increasing body of philosophical work explores the idea that platforms are indeed morally responsible for removing extreme content. For example, some have argued that platforms have a special responsibility to prevent the radicalization that occurs on their networks, given the ways in which extreme content is amplified to susceptible users (Barnes 2022). Without engaging in moderation (i.e., removal) of harmful content, platforms are plausibly complicit with the wrongful harms perpetrated by users (Howard forthcoming).

Yet it remains an open question what a responsible content moderation policy ought to involve. Many are tempted by a juridical model, whereby platforms remove speech in accordance with clearly announced rules, with user appeals mechanisms in place for individual speech decisions to ensure they are correctly made (critiqued in Douek 2022b). Yet platforms have billions of users and remove millions of pieces of content per week. Accordingly, perfection is not possible. Moving quickly to remove harmful content during a crisis—e.g., Covid misinformation—will inevitably increase the number of false positives (i.e., legitimate speech taken down as collateral damage). It is plausible that the individualistic model of speech decisions adopted by courts is decidedly implausible to help us govern online content moderation; as noted in Douek 2021 and 2022a, what is needed is analysis of how the overall system should operate at scale, with a focus on achieving proportionality between benefits and costs. Alternatively, one might double down and insist that the juridical model is appropriate, given the normative significance of speech. And if it is infeasible for social-media companies to meet its demands given their size, then all the worse for social-media companies. On this view, it is they who must bend to meet the moral demands of free speech theory, not the other way around.

Substantial philosophical work needs to be done to deliver on this goal. The work is complicated by the fact that artificial intelligence (AI) is central to the processes of content moderation; human moderators, themselves subjected to terrible working conditions at long hours, work in conjunction with machine learning tools to identify and remove content that platforms have restricted. Yet AI systems notoriously are as biased as their training data. Further, their “black box” decisions are cryptic and cannot be easily understood. Given that countless speech decisions will necessarily be made without human involvement, it is right to ask whether it is reasonable to expect users to accept the deliverances of machines (e.g., see Vredenburgh 2022; Lazar forthcoming a). Note that machine intelligence is used not merely for content moderation, narrowly understood as the enforcement of rules about what speech is allowed. It is also deployed for the broader practice of content curation, determining what speech gets amplified — raising the question of what normative principles should govern such amplification; see Lazar forthcoming b).

Finally, there is the question of legal enforcement. Showing that platforms have the moral responsibility to engage in content moderation is necessary to justifying its codification into a legal responsibility. Yet it is not sufficient; one could accept that platforms have moral duties to moderate (some) harmful speech while also denying that those moral duties ought to be legally enforced. A strong, noninstrumental version of such a view would hold that while speakers have moral duties to refrain from wrongful speech, and platforms have duties not to platform or amplify it, the coercive enforcement of such duties would violate the moral right to freedom of expression. A more contingent, instrumental version of the view would hold that legal enforcement is not in principle impermissible; but in practice, it is simply too risky to grant the state the authority to enforce platforms’ and speakers’ moral duties, given the potential for abuse and overreach.

Liberals who champion the orthodox interpretation of the First Amendment, yet insist on robust content moderation, likely hold one or both of these views. Yet globally such views seem to be in the minority. Serious legislation is imminent that will subject social-media companies to burdensome regulation, in the form of such laws as the Digital Services Act in the European Union and the Online Safety Bill in the UK. Normatively evaluating such legislation is a pressing task. So, too, is the task of designing normative theories to guide the design of content moderation systems, and the wider governance of the digital public sphere. On both fronts, political philosophers should get back to work.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) , adopted: 16 December 1966; Entry into force: 23 March 1976.
• Free Speech Debate
• Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University
• van Mill, David, “Freedom of Speech”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/freedom-speech/ >. [This was the previous entry on this topic in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – see the version history .]

ethics: search engines and | hate speech | legal rights | liberalism | Mill, John Stuart | Mill, John Stuart: moral and political philosophy | pornography: and censorship | rights | social networking and ethics | toleration

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to the editors and anonymous referees of this Encyclopedia for helpful feedback. I am greatly indebted to Robert Mark Simpson for many incisive suggestions, which substantially improved the entry. This entry was written while on a fellowship funded by UK Research & Innovation (grant reference MR/V025600/1); I am thankful to UKRI for the support.

Copyright © 2024 by Jeffrey W. Howard < jeffrey . howard @ ucl . ac . uk >

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Events, news & press, free speech.

While many Americans take free speech for granted, the tradition is far from universal. Many developed nations restrict speech that is deemed hurtful or offensive. And in the United States, there is increasing sentiment that some speech is not worth protecting. Is it time to reconsider the nation’s free-speech orthodoxy?

Nearly everyone has experiences that contradict the children’s rhyme “sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me.” Words can be painful. And that is particularly true in the age of social media, when a viral tweet or insensitive post can hurt feelings and damage reputations.

Despite this reality, the United States maintains a strong legal and cultural tradition of free speech. While many Americans take it for granted, the tradition is far from universal. Many developed nations restrict speech that is deemed hurtful or offensive. And in the United States, there is increasing sentiment that some speech is not worth protecting.

Is it time to reconsider the nation’s free-speech orthodoxy?

Part 1: What is freedom of speech?

The First Amendment of the Constitution says:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

At its core, the Constitution’s robust protections for speech are intended to preserve and protect liberty. Hoover Institution senior fellow Peter Berkowitz  highlights  how the First Amendment connects freedom of speech with liberty:

Its position in the text of the First Amendment symbolizes free speech’s indissoluble connection to religious and political liberty. One can neither worship (or decline to worship) God in accordance with one’s conscience, nor persuade and be persuaded by fellow citizens, if government dictates orthodox opinions and punishes the departure from them. Indeed, the more authorities—whether formally through the exercise of government power, or informally through social intolerance—prescribe a single correct view and demonize others, the more citizens lose the ability to form responsible judgments and defend the many other freedoms that undergird human dignity and self-government.

Freedom of speech protects your right to say things that are disagreeable. It gives you—and everyone else—the right to criticize government policies and actions.

Part 2: What isn’t protected?

It sounds straightforward, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” but the First Amendment isn’t absolute. Hoover Institution senior fellow Richard Epstein  offers a framework  for how to think about free speech and its limits:

The First Amendment clearly covers the spoken word, written pamphlets, and books. By analogy, it also reaches other expressive activities like drawing, dancing, and acting. But no one could claim that it also protects mayhem, murder, defamation, and deceit. The only way to draw the right line—that between expression and violence—is to recognize that the First Amendment is as much about  freedom  as it is about speech. The necessary theory of freedom applies equally to all forms of speech and action, and it draws the line at the threat or use of force, even if the former counts as speech and the latter does not.

As the video below explains, the general principle of the nation’s free-speech rules is that your speech is protected so long as it doesn’t harm others.

But this raises the question: what should count as a harm? In our legal system there are well-defined examples where speech is not protected, because it hurts someone. You can’t lie about someone to harm their reputation. That’s called defamation. You can’t misrepresent the truth to people for your own gains. That’s fraud. And the First Amendment doesn’t permit you to advocate for the immediate use of force against someone else.

But there are other times when speech is protected even when someone may claim to be harmed. Mean or hateful words that may be true or a matter of opinion are generally protected by the First Amendment, even if they offend someone. You may think that is wrong. And there are plenty of countries that agree with you. Many countries have enacted strong hate-speech laws that prohibit derogatory remarks about a person’s race or religion. Peter Berkowitz  summarizes  new restrictive speech laws recently enacted by other nations:

In 2017, Germany enacted a law that obliges social media networks to be more “diligent in policing ‘hate speech’ on their platforms.” The next year, France adopted a similar law. A substantial plurality of British voters in 2018 believed that people do not feel free to express their opinions on “important issues.”

But there is a danger to these rules. As the video below highlights, enacting laws that ban offensive speech mean that “the people who disagree with you the  most  would have the most control over what you’re allowed to say.”

In an interview with Tunku Varadarajan , Richard Epstein explains the consequences of laws that ban offensive speech: “Everybody offends everybody a large fraction of the time. So, if I am insulting to you because you’re a progressive and you’re insulting to me because I’m a conservative, and if we allow both people to sue, then neither can talk.” The end result is that debate and free expression are stifled.

Part 3:  What about private restrictions on speech?

The First Amendment constrains the federal government from infringing on most speech, and the Fourteenth Amendment extended these constraints to state and local governments. But the First Amendment’s protections don’t apply to the personal and private interactions of people or businesses. If people disagree with you, they are free to stop listening. And companies are generally free to stop doing business with people with whom they disagree. Nor is anyone obligated to provide a forum for anyone else’s speech. Richard Epstein  explains:

Freedom of speech means that you have the right to use your own resources to advance your own causes. But it doesn’t give you, in the name of free speech, the right to take somebody’s telephone, somebody’s house, or somebody’s anything in order to use it for your own purposes.

But while private actors are not bound by the First Amendment, many private institutions have thrived because they have embraced a culture of free speech. For example, private universities have historically maintained broad academic freedoms for its faculty and students that allow for robust dissent on campuses. Recently, however, some universities have adopted policies that take a narrower view of what is acceptable speech.  Here’s Peter Berkowitz :

At universities, America’s founding promise of individual freedom and equality under law is often treated as irredeemably tainted by racism and sexism, colonialism and imperialism. In some cases, free speech is placed on the list of “incorrect phrases” that ought not be uttered, because it belongs among the “impure thoughts” of which minds must be cleansed.

Berkowitz notes, “Ninety percent of American universities censor speech or maintain policies that could authorize administrators to engage in censorship.” These rules are well intentioned. They are intended to promote a safe and welcoming environment for students and faculty. But a rejection of free speech has significant costs.

Part 4:  What are the benefits of free speech?

Without protections for speech—particularly for disagreeable speech—our liberties are more easily threatened. But free speech is important even beyond its value to our liberty. The free exchange of ideas—even ones that are disagreeable—is key to future prosperity. Hoover Institution research fellow Ayaan Hirsi Ali  explains  why:

Societies since the Enlightenment have progressed because of their willingness to question sacred cows, to foster critical thinking and rational debate. Societies that blindly respect old hierarchies and established ways of thinking, that privilege traditional norms and cower from giving offense, have not produced the same intellectual dynamism as Western civilization. Innovation and progress happened precisely in those places where perceived “offense” and “hurt feelings” were not regarded as sufficient to stifle critical thinking.

Diversity of thought isn’t just a matter of freedom; it is also an important ingredient to progress. When society discourages dissent or governments dictate the bounds of acceptable opinions, there is less innovation, and incorrect yet popular ideas go unchallenged. Economist Milton Friedman explains how diversity and freedom of all types are integral to a thriving society in this video:

Part 5: How do we preserve freedom of speech?

Preserving our liberties and ensuring a vibrant, innovative society requires free speech. Well-intentioned efforts to protect people from speech that offends is thus a threat to our free and prosperous society. What steps can we take to ensure free speech remains a cherished value for future generations?

Hoover Institution research fellow David Davenport  makes a case  for reprioritizing civic education in US schools. Testing reveals that a shrinking number of students are knowledgeable about US history. Increased funding and improved curriculum for civic education will ensure that future generations understand and appreciate the nation’s tradition of free speech.

Higher education also has a role to play. Public universities are generally bound by the First Amendment, but all universities—public and private—should remember the value academic freedom brings to campuses and to all of society. As Richard Epstein  argues :

The First Amendment prohibition does not allow one person to commandeer the property of another for his own purposes. But in terms of their roles in society, there is a critical difference between a university and a private business: Universities have as their central mission the discovery and promotion of knowledge across all different areas of human life.

Part 6:  Conclusion

All too often, support for free speech depends on who is talking and what is being said. Partisanship too frequently shapes our view of just how expansive the First Amendment should be. But we should remember how the nation’s strong tradition of free speech has helped protect the freedoms of all Americans. It has empowered citizens to speak against and undo unjust laws. And it has helped create a vibrant, diverse economy with widespread prosperity.

Does this mean there is nothing we can do about speech we find disagreeable or offensive? Certainly not. As  the video above explains : “The way to respond to offensive speech isn’t to use force—it’s to counter with persuasive speech of your own.”

Citations and Further Reading

In his essay  Rewriting the First Amendment ,  Richard Epstein explains the dangers of a proposed constitutional amendment to restrict spending for political speech.

In  an interview on  Uncommon Knowledge ,  Ayaan Hirsi Ali emphasizes the importance of free speech in addressing the nation’s racial inequalities.

To view the original article, click here .

View the discussion thread.

Join the Hoover Institution’s community of supporters in ideas advancing freedom.

1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology

Philosophy, One Thousand Words at a Time

Free Speech

Author: Mark Satta Category:  Social and Political Philosophy , Philosophy of Law , Ethics Word Count: 989

Want to criticize your government? Burn a flag? Wear a t-shirt that says f**k the draft?

Thanks to freedom of speech , in many places you can. [1]

But what exactly is freedom of speech? And what does it permit us to say? This essay will review some influential answers to these questions.

1. Protection from Government, Not Private Actors

Freedom of speech, sometimes called freedom of expression , is a legal right to express many beliefs and ideas without government interference or punishment. This freedom does not typically prevent private entities (e.g., ordinary citizens or private organizations) from limiting speech. [2]

If freedom of speech prevented private entities from limiting speech, freedom of speech could not be applied consistently because the freedom of speech includes the ability not to speak. [3] So, e.g., if a newspaper was forced to publish every piece of writing submitted to it, then that newspaper would lose some ability to not speak. Freedom of speech also includes the right not to listen to or receive other people’s messages. [4]  

The fact that freedom of speech only prevents government interference doesn’t entail that freedom of speech is irrelevant to action by private entities. Some argue that certain private entities ought to voluntarily conform to legal standards for speech protection: e.g., that private universities should conform to the free speech standards legally required by public universities. [5]  Freedom of speech is also sometimes understood more broadly as a social value.

2. Limits on Free Speech

Freedom of speech is not an unlimited right. All governments impose some limits on what kinds of speech they will protect. This is because freedom of speech, like all rights, must be balanced against other rights and values.

Common types of speech not protected by freedom of speech include threats of violence, false advertising, and defamation (i.e., false statements that unjustly harm someone’s reputation). [6]

Many democratic nations do not protect hate speech (i.e., speech intended to threaten, degrade, or incite hatred against a group or group member based on group prejudice). But some other nations, including the United States, treat hate speech as protected speech. Whether hate speech should receive free speech protection has been much debated in recent years. [7]

  But even protected speech can be limited to an extent by the government: e.g., freedom of speech does not permit just anyone to enter a military base or a class at a public university and start talking. This is true because, even though military bases and public universities are government-run, these spaces seek to achieve other important goals that justify limiting free speech.

Freedom of speech gives you much greater latitude in a public park, a public sidewalk, or in your own home. But even in public places like parks and sidewalks, freedom of speech allows for content-neutral restrictions on speech: e.g., a town can have a noise ordinance banning playing loud music in parks near residential neighborhoods after midnight.

But it is important that these restrictions be content- and viewpoint-neutral . [8] Thus, a town could not pass an ordinance limiting speech only about certain topics or from certain perspectives in the park. Such a rule would discriminate based on the content or viewpoint of the speech. An important part of freedom of speech is that the government cannot restrict speech just because it doesn’t like the topics or agree with the speaker. Freedom of speech also doesn’t allow for the suppression of ideas simply because those ideas are unpopular.

3. Expressive Conduct

Freedom of speech protects more than just spoken and written expression. It also protects many other activities through which ideas can be expressed: [9] e.g., in the United States, abstract art, non-lyrical music, and marching in a parade are all activities protected under the freedom of speech. [10]

There are controversies concerning which activities ought to be considered expressive conduct: e.g., there is substantial disagreement about whether political spending by corporations ought to be protected as free speech. [11] There are also disagreements about if and when the creation of products like wedding cakes and photographs ought to be considered protected speech. [12]

4. Prior Restraint versus Subsequent Punishment

Freedom of speech protects people against two different types of government interference: prior restraint and subsequent punishment .

A prior restraint prevents you from speaking: it restrains your speech prior to it being made. At one point, many legal scholars thought that freedom of speech meant only freedom from prior restraint. [13] That is no longer true.

Today, most everyone believes that freedom of speech protects people not only from prior restraint, but also from subsequent punishment (i.e., from being legally sanctioned for protected speech). This makes freedom of speech more robust because it protects people not only from having their protected speech restrained, but also from having their protected speech punished by the government.

5. Why is Free Speech Important?

Philosophers and legal scholars have given many different explanations for why free speech is important. Many scholars think there are multiple good reasons why we protect free speech. [14]

Three common rationales for free speech protections are that they help us (1) discover truth, (2) respect human autonomy, and (3) preserve democracy by allowing criticism of government.

Influential advocates of the idea that free speech helps us discover truth include writer John Milton, philosopher John Stuart Mill, and U.S. Supreme Court Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis. [15]

One common form of the truth discovery argument is that the best way to overcome false speech is with more speech. [16] Given what we know about how viral misinformation works, such a claim can appear implausible. [17] But even if this version of the truth discovery argument is mistaken, there may be weaker forms of a truth-preservation principle that provide us with good reason to safeguard free speech: e.g., someone might argue that the fallibility of political leaders requires them to avoid suppressing others’ ideas.

6. Conclusion

Freedom of speech is valuable. Protecting it first requires understanding it.

[1] See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio , Texas v. Johnson , and Cohen v. California .

[2] See, e.g., U.S. Const. Amend I .

[3] Gaebler 1982 .

[4] Corbin 2009 .

[5] Chemerinsky and Gillman 2017 .

[6] Maras 2015 , Redish and Voils 2017 , and Post 1986 .

[7] See, e.g., Waldron 2012 and Strossen 2018 .

[8] Jacobs 2003 .

[9] Tushnet, Chen, and Blocher 2017 .

[10] See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston .

[11] Hasen 2011 .

[12] Liptak 2017 .

[13] Rabban 1981 , Healy 2013 .

[14] Greenawalt 1989 .

[15] Milton 1644 (reprinted 1918) , Mill 1859 , Abrams v. United States (Holmes, J. dissenting ), Whitney v. California (Brandeis, J. concurring) .

[16] See, e.g., Milton 1644 (reprinted 1918) , Whitney v. California (Brandeis, J. concurring) .

[17] Wu 2018 .

Abrams v. the United States , 250 U.S. 616 (1919).

Brandenburg v. Ohio , 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

Cohen v. California , 403 U.S. 15 (1971).

Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston , 515 U.S. 557 (1995).

Texas v. Johnson , 491 U.S. 397 (1989).

Whitney v. California , 274 U.S. 357 (1927).

Corbin, Caroline Mala. 2009. “The First Amendment right against compelled listening.” Boston University Law Review , 89 (3): 939-1016.

Chemerinsky, Erwin and Howard Gillman. 2017. Free Speech on Campus . Yale University Press.

Gaebler, David. 1982. “First Amendment Protection Against Government Compelled Expression and Association.” Boston College Law Review , 23 (4): 995-1023.

Greenawalt, Kent. 1989. “Free Speech Justifications.” Columbia Law Review 89 (1): 119-155.

Hasen, Richard L. 2011. “Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence.” Michigan Law Review , 109 (4): 581-623.

Healy, Thomas. 2013. The Great Dissent: How Oliver Wendell Holmes Changed His Mind—and Changed the History of Free Speech in America . Metropolitan Books.

Jacobs, Leslie Gielow. 2003. “Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and Content/Viewpoint Determinations.” McGeorge Law Review , 34 (3): 595-635 .

Liptak, Adam. 2017. “Where to Draw Line on Free Speech? Wedding Cake Case Vexes Lawyers.” New York Times .

Maras, Marie-Helen. 2015. “Unprotected Speech Communicated via Social Media: What Amounts to a True Threat?” Journal of Internet Law , 19 (3): 3-9.

Mill, John Stuart. 1859. On Liberty . John W. Parker & Son.

Milton, John. 1918. Areopagitica . Cambridge University Press.

Post, Robert C. 1986. “The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution” California Law Review , 74: 691-742.

Rabban, David M. 1981. “The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years.” Yale Law Journal , 90 (3): 514-595.

Redish, Martin H. and Kyle Voils. 2017. “False Commercial Speech and the First Amendment: Understanding the Implications of the Equivalency Principle.” William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal , 25: 765-799.

Strossen, Nadine. 2018. Hate: Why We Should Resist it With Free Speech, Not Censorship . Oxford University Press.

Tushnet, Mark V., Alan K. Chen, and Joseph Blocher. 2017. Free Speech Beyond Words: The Surprising Reach of the First Amendment . New York University Press.

Waldron, Jeremy. 2012. The Harm in Hate Speech . Harvard University Press.

Wu, Tim. 2018. “Is the First Amendment Obsolete?” Michigan Law Review , 117 (3): 547-581.

For Further Reading

“Freedom of Expression – Speech and Press.” Cornell Law School’s Legal Information Institute.

van Mill, David, “Freedom of Speech”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)  

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About the Author

Mark Satta is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan. He received his PhD in Philosophy from Purdue University and his JD from Harvard Law School. Some of his philosophical research interests include philosophy of law, epistemology, bioethics, and philosophy of language. MarkSatta.com

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Table of Contents

Arguments for freedom: the many reasons why free speech is essential.

• David Hudson

“The matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other freedom”— that’s how Justice Benjamin Cardozo referred to freedom of speech. 

This eminent Justice is far from alone in his assessment of the lofty perch that free speech holds in the United States of America. Others have called it our blueprint for personal liberty and the cornerstone of a free society. Without freedom of speech, individuals could not criticize government officials, test their theories against those of others, counter negative expression with a different viewpoint, or express their individuality and autonomy. 

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” This freedom represents the essence of personal freedom and individual liberty. It remains vitally important, because freedom of speech is inextricably intertwined with freedom of thought. 

Freedom of speech is closely connected to freedom of thought, an essential tool for democratic self-governance.

“First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible end,” warned Justice Anthony Kennedy in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002). “The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the beginning of thought.”

There are numerous reasons why the First Amendment has a preferred position in our pantheon of constitutional values.  Here are six.

Self-governance and a check against governmental abuse

Free speech theorists and scholars have advanced a number of reasons why freedom of speech is important. Philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn famously offered that freedom of speech is essential for individuals to freely engage in debate so that they can make informed choices about self-government. Justice Louis Brandeis expressed this sentiment in his concurring opinion in  Whitney v. California (1927): “[F]reedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.”

In other words, freedom of speech is important for the proper functioning of a constitutional democracy. Meiklejohn advocated these ideas in his seminal 1948 work, “ Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government .” Closely related to this is the idea that freedom of speech serves as a check against abuse by government officials. Professor Vincent Blasi referred to this as “the checking value” of free speech. 

Liberty and self-fulfillment

The self-governance rationale is only one of many reasons why freedom of speech is considered so important. Another reason is that freedom of speech is key to individual fulfillment. Some refer to this as the “liberty theory” of the First Amendment.

Free-speech theorist C. Edwin Baker writes that “speech or other self-expressive conduct is protected not as a means to achieve a collective good but because of its value to the individual.” Justice Thurgood Marshall eloquently advanced the individual fulfillment theory of freedom of speech in his concurring opinion in the prisoner rights case  Procunier v. Martinez (1974) when he wrote: “The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity, but also those of the human spirit—a spirit that demands self-expression. Such expression is an integral part of the development of ideas and a sense of identity. To suppress expression is to reject the basic human desire for recognition and affront the individual’s worth and dignity.”

The search for truth and the ‘marketplace of ideas’ metaphor

Still another reason for elevating freedom of speech to a prominent place in our constitutional values is that it ensures a search for truth. 

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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes expressed this idea in his “Great Dissent” in  Abrams v. United States (1919) when he wrote that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade of ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.” This language from Holmes led to one of the most pervasive metaphors in First Amendment jurisprudence—that of the “marketplace of ideas.” 

This concept did not originate with Holmes, as John Milton in the 17th century and John Stuart Mill in the 19th century advanced the idea that speech is essential in the search for truth in their respective works, “Areopagitica” (1644) and “On Liberty” (1859). Milton famously wrote: “Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple, whoever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?” For his part, Mill warned of the “peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion” explaining that “[i]f the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.” 

Informational theory

The marketplace metaphor is helpful but incomplete. Critics point out that over the course of history, truth may not always prevail over false ideas. For example, Mill warned that truth sometimes doesn’t triumph over “persecution.” Furthermore, more powerful individuals may have greater access to the marketplace and devalue the contributions of others. Another critique comes from those who advocate the informational theory of free speech. 

Coronavirus and the failure of the 'Marketplace of Ideas'

“If finding objective truth were the only value of freedom of expression, there would be little value to studying history,”  explains Greg Lukianoff of FIRE . “ Most of human thought in history has been mistaken about its assumptions and beliefs about the world and each other; nevertheless, understanding things like superstitions, folk medicine, and apocryphal family histories has significance and value.” 

Under this theory, there is great value in learning and appreciating what people believe and how they process information. Lukianoff calls the metaphor for the informational theory of free speech “the lab in the looking glass.” The ultimate goal is “to know as much about us and our world as we can,” because it is vitally “important to know what people really believe, especially when the belief is perplexing or troubling.”

Safety valve theory

Another reason why freedom of speech is important relates to what has been termed the “safety valve” theory. This perspective advances the idea that it is good to allow individuals to express themselves fully and blow off steam.

If individuals are deprived of the ability to express themselves, they may undertake violent means as a way to draw attention to their causes or protests. Justice Brandeis advanced the safety valve theory of free speech in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California (1927) when he wrote:

Those who won our independence believed . . . that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies.

Tolerance theory

Free speech has also been construed to promote the virtue of tolerance: If we tolerate a wide range of speech and ideas, this will promote greater acceptance, self-restraint, and a diversity of ideas. 

Lee Bollinger advanced this theory in his 1986 work “The Tolerant Society.” This theory helps explain why we should tolerate even extremist speech. As Justice Holmes wrote in his dissent in  United States v. Schwimmer (1929), freedom of speech means “freedom for the thought that we hate.” This means that we often must tolerate extremist speech. As Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote in  Snyder v. Phelps (2011), we don’t punish the extremist speaker; instead “we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.”

Freedom of speech holds a special place in American law and society for many good reasons.

As Rodney Smolla writes in “Free Speech in an Open Society,” “[t]here is no logical reason . . . why the preferred position of freedom of speech might not be buttressed by multiple rationales.” Freedom of speech is closely connected to freedom of thought, an essential tool for democratic self-governance; it leads to a search for truth; it helps people express their individuality; and it promotes a tolerant society open to different viewpoints. 

In sum, it captures the essence of a free and open society.

• Free Speech

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Why Free Speech Is An Important Freedom Argumentative Essay

Introduction.

Freedom of speech is synonymous with freedom of expression. These two terms do not only explain the ability to speak or voice opinions without limitation or interference, but also the use of other means in communicating or impacting information.

This includes the use of expressions, music and art like painting, photography, and performing. In many countries, this freedom is provided for in as a basic freedom. Under the Universal Declaration of human rights in the United Nations there is a provision for this freedom. There are many genuine reasons why free speech is an important freedom.

Expressing oneself is a basic and important aspect of life and is also part of the basis for communication; it is more instinctive than learned. Throughout childhood and life, freedom of speech supports the learning of an individual through the acquisition of new views, ideas, concepts and theories in scientific, social and other fields of education.

One is able to participate in healthy debates and discussions, learn how to win and persuade in arguments and tolerate or even accept other people’s perceptions and ways of thinking. When an individual is able to express their ideas and opinions, it enables them to relate with others, participate in and enjoy interaction and bonding with other members of a group, team and community.

The main importance of speech learning and development is to facilitate expression and help an individual to live in harmony with other people in society, making sure that there needs are met and their rights, values and principles are not violated. Limiting or interfering with the freedom to speak and express oneself is a big violation of the basic rights of an individual and it restrains an individual from living a normal, productive and independent life.

Freedom of speech is an important aspect of social life in a civilized and democratic society. It enables people to make decisions on their rulers, systems of development and administration and initiate debates and discussions on important issues that concern public policy and governance.

People can voice their concerns over any problems or issues on accountability, responsibility and transparency of leadership. Freedom of speech is essential in the maintaining of law and order and making sure that there are checks and balances on individuals or groups which violate the law.

Although there has been debate on the justification of freedom of speech, it is important to realize that society cannot develop or advance when imparting of and access to information is impeded. In some instances privacy, control and protection of information is required but this does not mean that information should be completely barred from the public.

Freedom of expression is also important where social and cultural issues are concerned. When people are at liberty to express their opinions on critical issues concerning social values, norms and standards, social harmony and order is achieved.

In order to facilitate effective change which is inevitable, sensitive Issues concerning social life, like abortion, aesthesia, divorce, parenting, marriage etc. should be open to debate whether there is consensus or not. It is obviously clear that not all forms and means of freedom of expression that supported and defended but in order to prevent social tension and chaos people should be free to speak.

There are many reasons why free speech is an important freedom. Most societies agree that there should be clearly set guarantees on protecting and defending of this freedom without very little limitation except when it is very necessary and there has been general consensus on taking action against disbursement of information.

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Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Why Free Speech Is An Important Freedom." November 25, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/why-free-speech-is-an-important-freedom/.

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Freedom of Speech in the United States

How it works

Freedom of speech has been protected in The United States by the First Amendment since 1791. For over 100 years, this right, though symbolically important, has sat dormant. However today, freedom of speech has been in the headlines due to its involvement in controversial topics surrounding the media, political correctness, and “hate speech”. Hateful beliefs and intolerance towards those with different characteristics exist throughout society and results in an environment of hate. Americans now have a hard choice to make of what freedom of speech means and where to draw the line on what it protects.

Freedom of speech is an essential right that grants all Americans the liberty to criticize the government and speak their minds without the fear of being censored. However, it is time to realize that speech directing hatred and vitriol at marginalized people does not advance freedom or liberty.

Allowing hate speech to be protected by the constitution leads to a hostile environment for those it is directed at, as well as it rallies harm and violence against innocent individuals of our society. This topic is often brought before our judicial branch of government, highlighting the relevance to society today. Other countries have worked hard to build an inclusive environment for their citizens and denounce hate speech. Understanding the importance of the US constitution is crucial, however there is room for growth and evolution with current societal beliefs.

Exploring the union of ideas and events that led to the declaration of “freedom of speech and of the press” are important influences in the development of the principle and where it stands today. Freedom of speech in America began off the basis of the English Bill of Rights enacted in 1689 from the English Parliament. According to David Bogen, the colonies attempted to follow the Parliament and secure freedom of speech in legislative debate (1). This is emphasized by the Articles of Confederation directing that “Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Congress….” (2). Declaring these principles allowed politicians to gain independence and protection against punishment for criticizing a legislator and avoid censorship by the government. Moving this privilege forward began with the inclusion of common individuals. It is this cross over that has led to a more controversial discussion. When dealing with free speech in the legislature, it was confined to an environment where it was powerless to cause any other harm. However, with the expansion of freedom of speech to society generally, the potential of speech to cause harm increased greatly. The final form of the first amendment states, “Congress shall make no law… abridging the freedom of speech or of the press” (3). This brings up a contradictory element of freedom of speech. In the federal system, only Congress can set national limits on speech; for example, making laws regulating commercial speech and copyright laws. However, the language of the first amendment clearly restricts Congress from interfering with freedom of speech. Bogen sheds some light on this paradox stating, “Under the Constitution only the whole body of the people acting through Congress even arguably has the power to restrict speech” (1). In conclusion, the fight for freedom of speech dates back to the regulations imposed on speech in England and Americans need for protection against prior restraints.

The progressive era brought around a time of change for the political status of expression rights. During this time legislatures began to discuss proposals limiting the scope of expression rights, however measures like this were rarely passed. This era also showed a transition in how individuals were using the constitution as a defense for free speech. According to Mark Graber, “Leading progressive thinkers insisted the public policy should promote the social interests of the community and that these interests could best be determined by elected officials and social science experts” (4). This highlights the discontent for the judiciary system having control over the fundamental principles of American government. Instead the policies should be flexible for revision when noticing consequences, they entail when acted upon. Grab states, “This interpretation of the nature of truth has been called ‘instrumentalism’ because the validity of concepts is measured by their observable consequences, rather than logical structure” (4). This means that the new intellectuals believe the laws should be ever changing in relation to the effect and consequences seen by the civilian population.

The argument of censorship in America has been apart the first amendments history since its institution. This debate is relevant to all citizens of The United States, especially minorities or other parties facing discrimination. Regulating “hate speech” eliminates both the direct and indirect harm that comes to the recipients. For some individuals, verbal abuse can render the workplace and educational environments unbearable. This utilitarianism value rests on the fact that the positive feelings invoked by hate speech is greatly outweighed by the disgust and fear that minorities feel by falling victim. In addition, constitutionalists, extremist and internet users find themselves on the same side of the argument, protecting speech and their ability to preach content without repercussions. They believe that freedom of speech is operating as a democratic principle and a democracy cannot legitimately restrict speech within public discourse, solely on grounds of the undesirable worldviews expressed.

Allowing hate speech to fall under the guise of freedom of speech fosters a hostile environment for minorities, allowing their human dignity to be vandalized. In recent years, this controversy has been played out on college campuses. College campuses provide an environment where individuals can be fluid with their social markers, such as lifestyle preferences and cultural habits. According to Peter Scott, “The increased diversity on campuses has had important implications for debates about ‘free speech’ and ‘political correctness’. The exercise of free speech that appears to threaten their identity or culture and even their still precarious foothold in higher education can easily be interpreted as intolerable” (5). Scott recognizes that no speech is absolute and college campuses do not follow the “anything goes” model. There are sensitives and vulnerabilities that should be respected. This is seen by students campaigning for campus buildings to be renamed, protesting controversial speakers on campus, and mutual respect within the academic community. It is also important that these core components of the university experience not be invoked too often to protect the progressive science and enlightenment occurring within students. A strong balance must be reached to have the best environment to foster the learning experience, which is based on the ability to have free thoughts.

One way to ensure a respectable balance is to have improved responses from people in positions of power when the controversial topic arises. There has been a rise in frequency of hateful incidents on college campuses over the past two years. According to Cynthia Miller-Idriss, “There has been a 77% increase in White supremacist propaganda during the 2017-18 school year, including nooses hung on trees to swastikas painted on Jewish professor’s office walls” (6). These actions are terrorizing and detrimental to students and professors who are trying to increase the wealth of the country they live in. Even in wake of these unsetting action, campus leaders are still stumbling in their responses, not fully condemning the hateful content of the messages. This leaves room for these ideas to be seeding in other vulnerable people’s heads and grow in to a much bigger problem. Individuals involved are not seeing any consequences for their actions which encourages them to continue at even larger extremes. Such neutral statements may be a way to combat the concerns regarding navigating free speech. However, free speech should not be positioned against hate speech, as if protecting free speech means there are constraints on denouncing hate. Strong responses are becoming more apparent, such as the vice president at Cornell for student life Ryan Lombardi expressing his “revulsion” (6) at a swastika being marked in the snow, and how denouncing hate is a “shared responsibility” (6). This answer helps assert core community values that knit the campus closer together rather than increase the divide. In addition to campus leaders speaking out, there needs to be more training for residential assistants and resources available for students to report or seek counseling for such events. Every person, no matter their race, religion, or gender deserve a supportive, all-inclusive learning environment to better themselves and in turn the world around them.

Groups that are targeted for hateful expressions due to race, religion, or ethnicity usually develop into victims of hate-related incidents. Hate speech threatens unlawful harm and incites violence towards members of these targeted groups. According to the 2017 FBI report ove hate crimes, “There were 7,106 single-bias incidents involving 8,493 victims. A percent distribution of victims by bias type shows that 59.6 percent of victims were targeted because of the offenders’ race/ethnicity/ancestry bias; 20.6 percent were targeted because of the offenders’ religious bias; 15.8 percent were victimized because of the offenders’ sexual-orientation bias” (7). It would be naive to deny the relationship between hate speech and the hate crimes that follow. Governments functions are to protect individuals threatened with immediate violence and preserve social conditions that foster individual autonomy. Implementing stronger restrictions on these kinds of expression can save targeted individuals from immediate physical harm as well has serious psychological consequences. Eric Rosenberg highlights the detrimental effects hate speech and racism have on not only the individual but more importantly society. Egalitarianism is a doctrine that all people are equal and deserve equal rights and opportunities (8). It is a compelling ideal that emphasizes the rights that all people deserve and should not be sacrificed for the small gain of others. Rosenberg states, “The failure of the legal system to redress the harms of racism, and of racial insults, conveys to all the lesson that egalitarianism is not a fundamental principle; the law, through inaction, implicitly teaches that respect for individuals is of little importance” (8). This is confirmed in the increase of white supremist groups and religious bases being vandalized or destroyed. One of the most prominent cases of society being directed to ignore egalitarianism was made by President Trump concerning the Charlottesville rally in 2018. President Trump refused to outright condemn the white nationalists and even stated, “You also had people that were very fine people, on both sides” (9). This type of apathetic response only encourages extremists that there will be consequences for their actions and they can go about striping other people’s human dignities. The common saying, “Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me”, minimizes the value that words have. However, one cannot protect free speech and demise hate speech by denying the power of speech.

One driving force behind the support for restricting hate speech is the success other countries have found and their avoidance to becoming an oppressive society. The fear Americans have is that they will be silenced, and the government will have complete censorship over all speech outlets.

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Freedom of Speech Essay

Free speech is a massive step in human civilization. The ability to say something without fear of persecution and/or death is a big step in human society and is something that only around fifty countries have. My essay is about free speech in US colleges and how it is rapidly declining at a frightening rate.

In the case of Sweezy vs. New Hampshire in 1957 the Supreme Court said, “Teachers and students must always remain free to enquire, otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.” Many would agree with that statement and consider it true, but in modern US colleges there is a massive restriction on free speech to the point where the comment made by the Supreme Court no longer applies in some places in the US. The US colleges are literally removing free speech from our futures by stamping it out in through what they teach younger people.

In 2010, there was a study by the Association of American colleges and universities. They found that over 70% of college students found it unsafe to hold unpopular positions on campus. This means they may have had opinions and thoughts about issues, but they did not feel safe expressing their thoughts in college.

Another troubling element of the 2010 is that the longer the student spends in the college, the less safe he or she feels about holding and expressing unpopular opinions. If we were to blame outside influences, then students would enter and leave college either as safe or unsafe as they like. However, it is clear that the longer a student spends in college, then the more restricted and repressed his or her freedom of speech is. The freshmen students feel safer using their freedom of speech, but they begin to feel less safe as they move through college.

To clarify, the feeling of safety is safety from repercussions and not from physical harm. The students feel safe from harm in college, but they do not feel safe from the penalization from professors. They feel uneasy about expressing their unpopular positions or opinions within their work and dissertations, and they do not feel as if they are free to speak their true feelings and opinions because they fear they will be marked down and/or looked upon unfavorably by the people that control their grades and ability to get their qualifications.

What is more worrying is the fact that colleges and universities in the US are blatantly restricting student’s freedom of speech. They claim they do it to help avoid people getting offended, which further proves the point that freedom of speech is less important to these colleges that the fear of people being offended. To cast freedom of speech aside for any reason, noble or not, is to shatter its very foundation and urinate in the faces of the people that died for it.

Speech codes are a common and blatant sign that students are having their freedom of speech restricted. The colleges and universities are not even hiding the fact that their speech codes are regulations that limit or bans expression. It literally says that in their regulations.

The first amendment in the US constitution states implicitly that people are allowed to speak and write what they wish, and yet colleges and universities are disregarding it when they set use speech codes. Yet, what is it that colleges are protecting students from? If it were from people writing instructions on how to build a bomb, then one could argue that the protection of life is more important than freedom of speech.

Yet, all of the speech codes in US colleges and universities are there to stop people writing or saying things that the college/university in question feels are offensive. They usually revolve around religion or political views. Colleges and universities in the US are banning students from speaking, writing and even holding opinions that contradict what the college likes, and that is a blatant middle finger to a US citizen’s freedom of speech.

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Those Who Preach Free Speech Need to Practice It

Too many leaders, on campus and in government, are failing to uphold the First Amendment rights they claim to champion.

Updated at 9:35 a.m. ET on April 30, 2024

Say you’re a college senior, just a few weeks from graduation. For as long as you can remember—even back in high school, before you set foot on campus—older people have talked about free speech. More specifically, older people have talked about free speech and you : whether your generation understands it, whether you believe in it, whether you can handle it.

After watching some of those same people order crackdowns on campus protests over the past few days, you might have a few questions for them.

Last week, from New York to Texas, cops stormed college campuses clad in riot gear. They weren’t there to confront active shooters, thank goodness, or answer bomb threats. Instead, they were there to conduct mass arrests of students protesting the war in Gaza.

As the legal director of a First Amendment advocacy nonprofit, I teach students across the country that the government can’t silence speakers because of their beliefs, even—and perhaps especially—if those beliefs are unpopular or cause offense. That’s a foundational principle of free-speech law. But many of the crackdowns appear to be a direct reaction to the protesters’ views about Israel.

After sending a phalanx of state law-enforcement officers into the University of Texas at Austin campus, for example, Governor Greg Abbott announced on X that students “joining in hate-filled, antisemitic protests at any public college or university in Texas should be expelled.”

Erwin Chemerinsky: No one has a right to protest in my home

But no First Amendment exception exists for “hate-filled” speech. And for good reason: In our pluralistic democracy, everyone has their own subjective idea of what, if any, speech is too “hateful” to hear, making an objective definition impossible. And empowering the government to draw that line will inevitably silence dissent.

At UT, the officers arrested scores of protesters for “ trespassing .” But the students don’t appear to have violated school rules. And you can’t trespass on a place where you have the right to be, as students at the public universities they attend clearly do. Even a cameraman for a local news station was tackled and arrested . The next day, the Travis County attorney’s office dropped all of the trespassing charges for lack of probable cause—a telling indicator of the disturbingly authoritarian response. (Shockingly, the cameraman does face a felony charge , for allegedly assaulting a police officer—an allegation difficult to square with video of his arrest.) The government can’t throw Americans in jail for exercising their First Amendment right to peaceful protest.

Governor Abbott’s illiberal show of force has no place in a free country. It’s especially galling given the governor’s previous posture as a stalwart defender of campus free speech: In June 2019, he signed a law prohibiting Texas’s public colleges and universities from shutting down campus speakers because of their ideology. So much for that.

Governor Abbott isn’t alone. During her congressional testimony earlier this month, Columbia University President Minouche Shafik pledged investigations of students and faculty who voiced allegedly anti-Semitic criticism of Israel and Zionism, and agreed—on the fly—to remove a professor from his position as a committee chair because of his speech.

Michael Powell: The unreality of Columbia’s ‘liberated zone’

Columbia is a private institution, so it isn’t bound by the First Amendment. But the university promises freedom of expression to its students and faculty—and Shafik’s willingness to sacrifice faculty and student rights to appease hostile members of Congress betrays those promises.

If such things had happened only at UT and Columbia, that would be bad enough—but the problem is spreading. At Emory University, in Atlanta, police officers reportedly used tear gas and Tasers against protesters. State troopers with rifles directed toward protesters stood watch on a rooftop at Ohio State University. At Indiana University, administrators rushed out a last-minute, overnight policy change to justify a similar show of force from law enforcement, resulting in 34 arrests. It’s hard to keep up.

Students nationwide are watching how the adults who professed to care about free speech are responding under pressure. And they are learning that those adults don’t really mean what they say about the First Amendment. That’s a dangerous lesson. Our schools and universities could still teach the country a better one.

“Free Speech 101” starts here: The First Amendment protects an enormous amount of speech, including speech that some, many, perhaps most Americans would find deeply offensive. You may not like pro-Palestine speech; you may not like pro-Israel speech. You may think some of it veers into bigotry. The answer is to ignore it, mock it, debate it, even counterprotest it. But don’t call in the SWAT team.

George Packer: The campus-left occupation that broke higher education

Granted, free speech is not without carefully designated exceptions, and these exceptions are important but narrow. True threats and intimidation, properly defined, are not protected by the First Amendment. Neither is discriminatory harassment. Violence is never protected.

And public universities can maintain reasonable “time, place, and manner” restrictions on speech. That means, for example, that for the authorities to place a ban on playing heavily amplified sound right outside the dorms at 2 a.m. likely does not violate the First Amendment. A prohibition on camping overnight in the quad probably doesn’t either. And taking over a campus building, as Columbia students did early this morning , is not protected.

But the enforcement of these rules must be evenhanded and proportionate. The use of force should be a last resort. Students must be given clear notice about what conduct crosses a line. And any student facing punishment for an alleged infringement should receive a fair hearing. Consistency counts. Our leaders—in government, in university administration—must demonstrate their commitment to free expression in both word and deed.

Students are protesting on campuses nationwide, and they’re watching the reaction of university presidents and elected officials closely. The current moment presents a generational challenge: Do older people and people in authority really mean what they say about the First Amendment? Do they believe in free speech—and can they handle it? Right now, too many leaders are failing the test.

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• Essay on Freedom of Speech in English Free PDF download

Download Important English Essay on the Topic - Freedom of Speech Free PDF from Vedantu

One of the fundamental rights of the citizens of India is ‘Freedom of Speech’. This is allowed to the citizens by a lot of countries to empower the citizens to share their own thoughts and views. This freedom of speech essay is for students of class 5 and above. The language used in this essay is plain and simple for a better understanding of the students. This freedom of speech essay example will help the students write a paragraph on freedom of speech in their own words easily.

Long Essay on Freedom of Speech

The phrase “Freedom of Speech” has been misinterpreted by some individuals who either do not actually understand the meaning of the phrase completely or have a totally different agenda in mind altogether. Every democratic country gives its citizens this freedom. The same is guaranteed by the Constitution of India too. Irrespective of your gender, religion, caste, or creed, you are guaranteed that freedom as an Indian. The values of democracy in a country are defined by this guaranteed fundamental freedom. The freedom to practice any religion, the freedom to express opinions and disagreeing viewpoints without hurting the sentiments or causing violence is what India is essentially made up of.

Indians stand out for their secularism and for spreading democratic values across the world. Thus, to save and celebrate democracy, enforcing freedom of speech in India becomes a necessity. Freedom of speech is not only about the fundamental rights, it’s also a fundamental duty to be done by every citizen rightfully so as to save the essence of democracy.

In developed democracies like the US, UK, Germany or France, we see a “freedom of speech” that is different from what we see in authoritarian countries like China, Malaysia or Syria and failed democratic countries like Pakistan or Rwanda. These governance systems failed because they lacked freedom of speech. Freedom of press gives us a yardstick to gauge the freedom of speech in a country. A healthy, liberal and strong democracy is reflected by a strong media presence in a country, since they are supposed to be the voice of the common people. A democracy that has a stomach for criticisms and disagreements is taken in a positive way. 

Some governments get very hostile when faced with any form of criticism and so they try to oppress any voices that might stand against them. This becomes a dangerous model of governance for any country. For example, India has more than hundred and thirty crores of population now and we can be sure that every individual will not have the same thought process and same views and opinions about one thing. A true democracy is made by the difference of opinions and the respect people have for each other in the team that is responsible for making the policies.

Before making a choice, all aspects and angles of the topic should be taken into consideration. A good democracy will involve all the people - supporters and critics alike, before formulating a policy, but a bad one will sideline its critics, and force authoritarian and unilateral policies upon all of the citizens.

Sedition law, a British-era law, was a weapon that was used in India to stifle criticism and curb freedom of speech during the pre-independence era. Through section 124A of Indian Penal Code, the law states that if a person with his words, written or spoken, brings hatred, contempt or excites tension towards a government or an individual can be fined or jailed or fined and jailed both. This law was used by the Britishers to stifle the freedom fighters. Today it is being used by the political parties to silence criticism and as a result is harming the democratic values of the nation. 

Many laws in India also protect the people in rightfully exercising their freedom of expression but the implementation of these laws is proving to be a challenge. Freedom of speech cannot be absolute. In the name of freedom of speech, hatred, tensions, bigotry and violence too cannot be caused in the society. It will then become ironically wrong to allow freedom of speech in the first place. Freedom of speech and expression should not become the reason for chaos and anarchy in a nation. Freedom of speech was stifled when article 370 got revoked in Kashmir. Not that the government was trying to go against the democratic values, but they had to prevent the spread of fake news, terrorism or any type of communal tensions in those areas.

Short Essay on Freedom of Speech

Freedom of speech allows the people of our country to express themselves, and share their ideas, views and opinions openly. As a result, the public and the media can comment on any political activity and also express their dissent towards anything they think is not appropriate.

Various other countries too provide freedom of speech to their citizens but they have certain limitations. Different countries have different restrictions on their freedom of speech. Some countries also do not allow this fundamental right at all and the best example being North Korea. There, the media or the public are not allowed to speak against the government. It becomes a punishable offence to criticize the government or the ministers or the political parties.

Key Highlights of the Essay - Freedom of Speech

Every democratic country gives its citizens the Freedom of Speech so as to enable the citizens to freely express their individual views, ideas and concerns. The freedom to be able to practice any religion, to be able to express individual secularism and for spreading democratic values across the world. In order to be able to save and to celebrate democracy, enforcing freedom of speech in India Is essential. Freedom of speech  about fundamental rights is also a fundamental duty of citizens in order to save the essence of democracy.  In a country, a healthy, liberal and strong democracy is always  reflected and can be seen through a strong media presence, as the media are the voice of the common people.  When faced with any form of criticism, we see some governments get very hostile,  and they  try to oppress  and stop any kind of  voices that might go against them. This is not favorable for any country. 

A good democracy involves all the people - all their various  supporters and critics alike, before they begin formulating any policies. India had the Sedition law, a British-era law that is used to stifle criticism and curb freedom of speech during the pre-independence era. The section 124A of Indian Penal Code, this law of sedition stated that if a person with his words, written or spoken, brings hatred, contempt or excites tension towards a government or an individual, then he can be fined or jailed or both. Using  freedom of speech, people spread hatred, unnecessary tensions, bigotry and some amount of violence too in the society. Ironically  in such cases, it will be wrong to allow freedom of speech. The reasons for chaos and anarchy in a nation should not be due to  Freedom of speech and expression. This law was stifled when article 370 got revoked in Kashmir, in order to prevent the spread of fake news, terrorism or any type of communal tensions in those areas.

Freedom of speech gives people of our country, the freedom to express themselves, to be able to share their ideas, views and opinions openly, where the public and the media can express and comment on any political activities and can also be able to express their dissent towards anything they think is not appropriate. Different countries have different restrictions on their freedom of speech. And it is not proper to comment on that .In Fact, there are some countries which does not allow this fundamental right , for example, North Korea where neither the media nor the public have any right to speak against or even for the government and it is a punishable offense to openly criticize the government or the or anyone in particular.

While freedom of speech lets the society grow it could have certain negative outcomes. It should not be used to disrespect or instigate others. The media too should not misuse it. We, the people of this nation, should act responsibly towards utilizing its freedom of speech and expression. Lucky we are to be citizens of India. It’s a nation that respects all its citizens and gives them the rights needed for their development and growth.

A fundamental right of every citizen of India, the  ‘Freedom of Speech’ allows citizens to share their individual thoughts and views.

FAQs on Essay on Freedom of Speech in English Free PDF download

1. Mention five lines for Freedom of Speech Essay?

i) A fundamental right that is guaranteed to citizens of a country to be able to express their opinions and points of view without any kind of censorship.

ii) A democracy’s health depends on the extent of freedom of expression of all its citizens.

iii) Freedom of speech is never absolute in nature.

iv) New Zealand, USA or UK rank  high in terms of freedom of speech by its citizens.

v) A fundamental right in the Indian constitution is the Freedom of Speech and Expression.

2. Explain Freedom of Speech?

A fundamental right of every citizen of India, Freedom Of Speech allows every citizen the freedom and the right to express all their views, concerns, ideas and issues relating to anything about their country. Freedom of Speech is never actual in nature  and has its limits too. It cannot be used for any kind of illegal purposes.The health of a democracy depends on the extent of freedom of expression of its citizens.

3. What happens when there is no Freedom of Speech?

A country will become a police and military state with no democratic and humanitarian values in it if there is no freedom of speech. Freedom of Speech is a fundamental right for all citizens, and a failure to not being able to express one’s ideas, beliefs, and thoughts will result in a non authoritarian and non democratic country.  Failure to have freedom of speech in a country would mean that the rulers or the governments of those countries have no respect for its citizens.

4. Where can we get study material related to essay writing ?

It is important to practice some of the important questions in order to do well. Vedantu.com offers these important questions along with answers that have been formulated in a well structured, well researched, and easy to understand manner. Various essay writing topics, letter writing samples, comprehension passages are all available at the online portals today. Practicing and studying with the help of these enable the students to measure their level of proficiency, and also allows them to understand the difficult questions with ease. 

You can avail all the well-researched and good quality chapters, sample papers, syllabus on various topics from the website of Vedantu and its mobile application available on the play store. 

5. Why should students choose Vedantu for an essay on the topic 'Freedom of Speech’?

Essay writing is important for students   as it helps them increase their brain and vocabulary power. Today it is important to be able to practice some important topics, samples and questions to be able to score well in the exams. Vedantu.com offers these important questions along with answers that have been formulated in a well structured, well researched, and easy to understand manner. The NCERT and other study material along with their explanations are very easily accessible from Vedantu.com and can be downloaded too. Practicing with the help of these questions along with the solutions enables the students to measure their level of proficiency, and also allows them to understand the difficult questions with ease. 

6. What is Freedom of Speech?

Freedom of speech is the ability to express our opinions without any fear.

7. Which country allows the highest level of Freedom of Speech to its citizens?

The USA is at the highest with a score of 5.73.

8. Is Freedom of Speech absolute?

No, freedom of speech cannot be absolute. It has limitations.

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A panel including Nadine Strossen, the John Marshall Harlan II Professor of Law Emerita at New York Law School, Cornell Provost Michael I. Kotlikoff and a group of undergraduate students discuss free speech on campuses.

Expert defends free speech rights, ‘content neutral’ policies

By james dean, cornell chronicle.

Universities may legally apply “content neutral” time, place and manner policies to campus protests, a First Amendment expert and former American Civil Liberties Union president said April 29 at a Freedom of Expression theme year event taking place in Willard Straight Hall, not far from a multiday encampment on the Arts Quad.

“The fact that something is speech doesn’t mean that it is immune from restrictions,” said Nadine Strossen , the John Marshall Harlan II Professor of Law Emerita at New York Law School, who led the ACLU from 1991 to 2008. “There are permissible limits on expressive conduct as well as more literal speech.”

Strossen, a senior fellow with the Foundation for Individual Rights and Education (FIRE) and author of the 2023 book “ Free Speech: What Everyone Needs to Know ,” joined Provost Michael I. Kotlikoff and a panel of undergraduate leaders in Cornell Cinema for a livestreamed conversation titled “ Current Free Speech Controversies .” Student panelists were Talia Dror ’25, Patrick Kuehl ’24, Rodge Reschini ’24 and J.P. Swenson ’25.

Engaging with the student panelists, Strossen said she worries about young people suppressing themselves around each other to avoid conflict.

“[Students] are afraid of discussing some of the most important issues,” she said. “Not only in classrooms, but in dormitories and student cafeterias, other places where students would informally have conversations.”

Kotlikoff opened by noting that Strossen recommended that he invite conservative media personality Ann Coulter ’84 back to campus this semester, more than a year after hecklers prevented her from delivering a 2022 talk.

“I so strongly defend freedom of speech and viewpoint diversity, and especially on university campuses, particularly such a major university as Cornell, which from its founding has proclaimed and demonstrated commitment to diversity in all respects – in terms of identity but also in terms of ideas,” Strossen said. “You are endorsing the neutral values of the importance of a diversity of perspectives and engagement across difference.”

Kuehl, a senior in the College of Agriculture and Life Sciences and president of the Student Assembly, asked about distinctions between freedom of speech and freedom of expression, specifically concerning encampments that have been erected on campuses across the country by pro-Palestinian activists. Strossen said the Supreme Court has extended First Amendment protections to nonverbal conduct, but cited a 1982 case in which the court upheld restrictions on a National Mall encampment (defended by the ACLU) due to concerns about public health, public safety, and the diversion of law enforcement and other resources from other pressing needs.

Swenson, a junior in the ILR School, asked about free speech rights protecting calls for genocide, which Cornell has said would violate university policy. Strossen said that just because a university does not censor a message doesn’t mean it should do nothing, citing Louis Brandeis’ 1927 Supreme Court decision arguing that “the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.”

Strossen said she worries about young people suppressing themselves around each other to avoid conflict.

“A university that does not censor a particular message could certainly censure it, criticize it, say it is inconsistent with university values,” she said. Alternatively, she said, universities must weigh whether to maintain neutrality on pressing public policy issues, so community members aren’t afraid to speak out against perceived institutional orthodoxy.

Dror, an ILR School junior and member of Cornellians for Israel, asked if the university had an obligation to punish people who create an intimidating environment for Jewish students. Strossen said only if the speech poses an emergency by causing or threatening imminent, specific harm – stressing that violence is not protected speech.

“Government, or in this case, the university, may never punish speech, restrict it, regulate it, so forth, solely because of disagreement with, disapproval of, even loathing of the idea,” Strossen said. “Try to divorce the legal principle from the particular odious expression that’s involved in any particular case and understand that giving license to that kind of advocacy is really important for anti-racist, anti-war advocacy as well.”

Reschini, a senior in the College of Arts and Sciences and president of Cornell Republicans, said universities, including Cornell, haven’t done enough to create an environment in which conservative students can express their views without fear. Strossen said it’s a concern she has shared and that should be addressed – maybe even before students apply to universities like Cornell, in materials making clear that they will be exposed to diverse ideas, some of which they might find offensive, as a core part of their experience.

“That is not a bug, that is a feature,” Strossen said. “If you’re coming here looking to be coddled and comforted and have your own ideas parroted back at you … this is not the place for you.”

Strossen cited concerns about a FIRE survey that found self-censorship among students prevalent on college campuses across the nation. Kotlikoff added that he’d seen similar data in which first-year students at a different university said they feared intimidation from peers more than from instructors, suggesting universities must think more about how to ensure that incoming students understand the democratic principles needed to foster open discussions.

Kotlikoff closed by thanking the students for their critical and thoughtful questions, and Strossen for her strong defense of viewpoint diversity and “for coming back to Cornell and engaging in this conversation with us at a critical time.”

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Jane Coaston

Getting Back to Basics on Free Speech

By Jane Coaston

Ms. Coaston is a contributing writer to Opinion.

At colleges and universities across the country, from Cal Poly, Humboldt, to Columbia, students have been protesting the war in Gaza. Some of those protesters have demanded that their universities divest from companies that may directly or indirectly support Israeli military operations; others have called for a cease-fire, while others have far wider demands.

The protests have generated another round of discussion (and endless takes on the internet) about free speech on college campuses. Which forms of speech are permissible (and legal)? What about universities that purportedly champion free speech suddenly deciding that maybe there’s such a thing as too much freedom of speech? And, personally, I want to know why we pay so much attention to Ivy League schools most of us didn’t go to.

I spoke with Greg Lukianoff, the president and C.E.O. of the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE), a nonpartisan group that champions and defends free speech. His most recent book , written with Rikki Schlott, is “The Canceling of the American Mind: Cancel Culture Undermines Trust and Threatens Us All — But There Is a Solution.” We discussed what free speech is and isn’t, what conservatives are getting wrong about college campuses and how Oct. 7 changed how he views free speech.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity and is part of an Opinion Q. and A. series exploring modern conservatism today, its influence in society and politics and how and why it differs (and doesn’t) from the conservative movement that most Americans thought they knew. And, for disclosure, I spoke to FIRE’s Student Network Conference in 2021.

Jane Coaston: What do college campuses mean to you?

Greg Lukianoff: Done right, their single most important contribution is edging toward truth not by getting there directly but by chipping away at falsity. Professors getting in trouble for their opinions is much more dangerous than people understand. Because when people see that, it rightfully undermines their belief that experts are actually being objective. Even if there’s just social pressure to come to certain conclusions, that’s bad enough for the search for truth. Nearly one-third of professors report that administrators are telling them to steer clear of controversial research.

[ Mr. Lukianoff was citing FIRE’s own research .]

Coaston: Why do you think we fixate on very specific types of college campuses? Your book features lengthy discussions of both Harvard and Yale. Most people don’t go to the Ivies; most people don’t go to college, period. What is the impact of activities at Ivy League campuses on people who went to Auburn or Michigan, or Eastern Michigan or Northern Michigan?

Lukianoff: Yeah, I would love it if Harvard and Yale and Princeton and Stanford didn’t matter as much to the country as they do, but they do, unfortunately. When you look at the fact that nearly every single member of our Supreme Court at one point attended either Harvard or Yale, it’s pretty galling. When you look at a lot of the leadership of both parties, a lot of them are Yale and Harvard people.

If our society didn’t so handsomely reward the small number of schools and if those schools were not the gateway to things like Goldman Sachs and in some cases to the White House, then we’d be a healthier country. But we’re kidding ourselves if we pretend as currently structured that we don’t wildly overfavor people who attended the sample of schools.

Coaston: Why do you think that student protests that limit the speech of others get more attention than universities that limit speech? Which concerns you more?

Lukianoff: They both concern me. Last year was the worst year for deplatforming that we’ve seen, and we include in that shout-downs and physically blocking people from getting through a speech, chasing someone off campus like they did actually at Berkeley this year. Those are deplatformings. This year is set to blow that out of the water. What universities need to own is that if they have students who think it’s not just OK but it’s actually profoundly moral to chase off speakers they don’t like, rather than protest outside or ask tough questions, for example, that they’ve done a real disservice to those students. They failed to explain what higher education is supposed to be.

[ Mr. Lukianoff’s organization considers efforts, for example, to get speakers disinvited from campus or cancel screenings of films as deplatforming. ]

To be fair, some administrators are very good on free speech and academic freedom, but a lot of the administrators we battle in some cases are ideologues, and they believe that this speech needs to be shut down because it’s somehow toxic or whatever. In other cases, they’re doing what Dean Wormer would’ve done, which is simply shutting down speech because they don’t like it or because it’s inconvenient or because they want peace and quiet on their watch.

[ Dean Wormer is the administrator in the film “National Lampoon’s Animal House.” ]

Coaston: How did Oct. 7 and Israel’s war in Gaza and the activism that followed changed people’s views on the First Amendment and how people think about it?

Lukianoff: Last fall was a time where — I don’t want to say just conservatives, because I think there were a lot of people from different points in the spectrum who were kind of horrified in some cases, for example, by the students who I believe, actually, on Oct. 7, or at least on Oct. 8, were holding Israel entirely responsible for these attacks. That was something that people who would think of themselves even on the left found pretty galling, but it did lead to a lot of cancel culture. It did lead to a lot of attempts to get people out of jobs. And it led to people who normally were very critical of cancel culture in some cases, to sort of make an exception for people who were very pro-Palestine.

Cancel culture comes from both the right and the left. For some people, post-Oct. 7 made them fans of cancel culture when it worked to their advantage. It was a sort of clarifying moment for the people who support free speech even in the situations where in some cases you might consider the speech highly unsympathetic.

Coaston: How should we be thinking about offensive speech? In your book, you discussed the difference between free-speech laws and free-speech culture, and that ties into the idea of hate speech or offensive speech because you can say that there’s no rule against hate speech in the Constitution, but if you are a college administrator, someone screaming, “Kill all the Jews,” it’s probably something that you are going to want to curtail, even though it is technically legal. So how do you think about the difference between what is legal and what should be culturally permissible?

Lukianoff: That there’s a value to know what people really think not even if it’s horrifying or ugly or gross but especially if it is. One way of looking at it is: When there’s an environment where people are not being authentic because they’re afraid of being offensive, it can actually sometimes give greater suspicion among people.

But there’s value to knowing what people really think even when it’s wrong. I always give the example of: Lizard people who live under the Denver airport do not actually, in fact, control the world, but knowing that your girlfriend or your uncle or someone in your family or your teacher, for that matter, believes that they do is really important information to know.

An awful lot of the value of information is not knowing the objective nature of reality but rather knowing what people really think. When it comes to things like “Zionists must die,” depending on the circumstances, that absolutely can be potentially a threat, that can be intimidation, and if it’s part of a pattern of behavior, it can potentially be discriminatory harassment on campus. But when figuring out whether or not speech is or is not protected, context really does matter.

Coaston: What do you think conservatives get wrong about campuses right now?

Lukianoff: Conservatives focus a lot on the professoriate. Even though we are happy to defend their student chapters when they get in trouble for their speech, I take great issue with Charlie Kirk and Turning Point USA and their professor watch list, which is something that I very much object to, particularly when they add, “Here is how you can contact this administration.” We count that as a cancellation attempt.

Now, Turning Point USA thankfully has not actually been successful in getting professors canceled, but they certainly do report that they got a lot of hate mail and nasty calls.

Coaston: What do you think conservatives get right about campuses right now?

Lukianoff: I came to FIRE in 2001, somewhat hard to convince that the problem of viewpoint diversity was all that big of a deal. Like, “So what? Professors lean somewhat more to the left.” I thought the numbers were something like two to one or maybe even three to one in terms of left-leaning professors versus conservative. As I started to learn more about the actual data, I got a lot more concerned about it because when you have an environment that doesn’t have people who really fundamentally disagree with each other and you have an environment that practically excludes from certain departments people who represent maybe half of the voting population of the United States, you shouldn’t be surprised that group polarization effects take over.

If you were to take your 12 best friends and then go off, split them in half according to politics and then go off with your six most right- or left-leaning to talk about hot-button issues, you’re probably going to come back more radicalized in the direction of the group. That’s what group polarization means. I think that I underestimated how much the lack of viewpoint diversity creates an environment that tends to go further and further to the left. I don’t know a really easy way to fix that problem. One solution — and it’s something that Dartmouth has talked about — is to have a lot more classes that are co-taught by people who actually disagree with each other. People have mentioned the model of Robert P. George and Cornel West at Princeton.

But if you have an environment with too low of viewpoint diversity, it becomes a lot easier to think in terms of there’s an us — the clever, moral, smart people — and then there’s the they, the stupid and evil. That is a problem that I underappreciated earlier in my career, and I now take a lot more seriously.

Coaston: In the book you write about the perils of common-good conservatism. What worried you about that movement on the right?

Lukianoff: Where to begin with that? In a lot of ways, it seems to be an idea based on a kind of universal understanding of morality — which right there, that kind of scares me because I’ve been an atheist since seventh grade and I’ve always sort of balked at the idea of there being any idea of universal morality. That’s one of the things that we First Amendment people always love. We love the weirdos. We love the odd ones. We love the people who are out of step and don’t fit in within their same neighborhood or group. It sounds very much like a formula for authoritarianism.

Coaston: You’ve been doing this for a while. I want to ask you how you think a few major events or inventions have changed First Amendment concerns and how people perceive the First Amendment. How do you think the Trump presidency changed First Amendment concerns and how people perceive the First Amendment?

Lukianoff: Well, Trump sped up a lot of pre-existing trends, just like social media did, that essentially a lot of the concerns on the left about the right went into overdrive. Trump has a tendency to not really care about bringing people together. He’s perfectly fine having enemies that he targets. It led to a sort of even nastier form of the already fairly nasty politics that we’ve had, and 2017 through 2021 through the end of the Trump presidency was a pretty crazy time. And I think that, partially because there are some on the right who aren’t consistent about free speech and wrap themselves in the idea of being free-speech defenders, it makes it very easy for people who want to be cynical about those of us who do it for a living to sort of throw us in with people like that.

Coaston: How did the events of Jan. 6 change First Amendment concerns and how people think about it?

Lukianoff: I would say the biggest debate over Jan. 6 was whether or not it constituted Brandenburg incitement . That may sound kind of unsexy, but it matters because Brandenburg was kind of the resolution of cases that came out of World War I that originally fell upon the idea that speech can be stopped only if it’s a clear and present danger. Brandenburg got you to a stage where it has to be imminent lawless action that is also likely to happen, that you help happen — essentially standing in front of the mayor’s office saying, “Let’s go burn down the mayor’s office,” when a lot of people have torches in their hands, that would be incitement.

When it comes to what happened on Jan. 6 in First Amendment circles, there’s a lot of disagreement about whether that’s actually counted as incitement. I definitely understand people like my friend David French, who make the argument that if this doesn’t count as incitement, then maybe our definition of incitement is wrong. I have some sympathy for that point of view, even though I am with the majority of First Amendment people who still think the Brandenburg standard is overall the right standard.

[ Mr. French said that he still agrees the Brandenburg standard is the right one but believes that Mr. Trump’s actions meet that standard .]

Coaston: And then this past year, we talked a bit about this already, but you had a book about free speech come out 10 days after Oct. 7. How did the aftermath of Oct. 7 change how people view the First Amendment? Did it change your views?

Lukianoff: I think it was a reminder to get back to basics and explain more. Because most people, when they hear certain lines, they’re like, “So you’re telling me that sincerely trying to kill an entire group of people is protected?” Usually when people say that, they add “sincerely and seriously,” then you have to take a step back and explain, “Listen, the two things at issue here more than anything else are ‘From the river to the sea, Palestine should be free,’ and ‘intifada.’” Once you get people back there, you can be like, “And don’t you think those phrases by themselves are protected?” And generally you can get people, if they’re being reasonable to any degree, to go, “Well, yeah. Well, those are protected.” Now, if you’re saying that in certain contexts, again, it can be intimidation, it can be threats, it can potentially be discriminatory harassment, but there’s got to be more than just the phrases themselves.

So it was a good reminder sometimes to get back to some of the first principles of it and to remind people of simple ideas like what we call the bedrock principles. In our society, under the First Amendment, one of our bedrock principles, according to Texas v. Johnson, a 1989 case, is that you can’t ban speech simply because it’s offensive. That is a wonderful, sensible rule for a genuinely multicultural and diverse society, because people in different economic classes, people from different regions, people from different groups, people from different states, people from different countries, all have very different ideas of what is offensive. You would necessarily have to privilege what is deemed offensive by some group or some person or some group of people or some individuals of what is offensive. And that cuts against the kind of pluralism that you’re trying to protect.

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Jane Coaston was the host of Opinion’s podcast “ The Argument .” Previously, she reported on conservative politics, the G.O.P. and the rise of the right. She also co-hosted the podcast “The Weeds.” @ janecoaston

Democratic convention organizers work to balance free speech with safety amid tensions over protests

CHICAGO — The U.S. Secret Service has led security planning for nearly a year. Chicago police have spent hundreds of hours training officers to responsibly handle protesters. Public officials are vowing to strike a balance between keeping order and allowing free speech.

Yet tensions remain high over the prospect of a Democratic National Convention in Chicago this August.

The rash of protests at college campuses across the nation over the Israel-Hamas war, including violent clashes at UCLA and most notably a building takeover by protesters at Columbia University in New York City, has added a new urgency over security and whether protests could spiral out of control this summer. The focus comes as the city expects more than 5,000 delegates to descend on the DNC, with tens of thousands of additional visitors, including from the highest levels of government, from the president on down.

Groups vary in their expectations for how many activists will travel to the city, with the ACLU putting it in the thousands and one pro-Palestianian group putting it at the tens of thousands.

Those involved with security and logistics planning — including the Secret Service, the Chicago Police Department and those directly involved with the convention arena itself — insist there will be a balance between allowing freedom of speech and keeping order. They also say they’re ready for what’s to come, and while they’re paying close attention to the kinds of protests that have broken out on college campuses, they are not scrambling security plans because of them.

“Individuals can expect to see a very heavy presence of uniformed officers to ensure the highest level of safety for residents, business owners and attendees,” said U.S. Secret Service spokesman Anthony Guglielmi.

Illinois Gov. J.B. Pritzker said he felt confident about the city and state’s ability to hold a peaceful convention.

“There are always protests at conventions. I have been to almost every convention since I was able to vote. I have seen protests at every single one of them on a variety of issues,” Pritzker said in an interview. “I don’t think any better or worse this coming summer. I do think, though, that even though there will be protests, the security plan for Chicago, and the experience that people who are coming here for the convention will have, will be an outstanding one just like it was in 1996.”

Meantime, a slew of activist groups are challenging security plans in court, saying the location where they are now allowed to march — more than 3 miles away from the convention facility — violates their First Amendment rights, and they should be within “sight and sound” of the United Center.

“This is politics at play. I think there’s a lot of pressure from the DNC not to put President Biden in a position to be within sight and sound of protesters,” said Christopher Williams, an attorney representing a coalition of groups whose protest permits have so far been denied and are asking the city to move protests closer to the United Center. “You see that in the way that his campaign is handling events now, that they don’t want to see any protests in the backdrop of President Biden.”

Guglielmi, who himself spent years working with the Chicago Police Department, noted that federal authorities have offered more than 400 hours of training to Chicago officers on a combination of handling civil disturbances and protecting free-expression rights.

National political conventions are designated as National Special Security Events, which require the highest levels of security and allow officials to extend their reach, if necessary, into other federal agencies. Dozens of other agencies are already involved in security planning: the Cook County Sheriff’s Police, the Illinois National Guard and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency are a few examples.

“This is not just on the city of Chicago’s shoulders,” Guglielmi said. “You’ve got immense help from every federal agency that you can think of that we would want to engage.”

“I’m uniquely positioned here just because I was the chief spokesman [for the Chicago Police Department],” he added. “They are incredible partners. I know they’re very prepared, and they already even have plans should there be a dispersal during a demonstration.”

That includes training officers to protect the media’s role and “safeguard the freedom of the press during these things,” he said.

Activists and free speech advocates, though, have a decidedly different view. Deep concerns still exist over exactly what the security perimeter — the fenced-off area where only those with credentials can enter — will ultimately look like and whether protesters will be allowed to get close enough to the event. And they’ve vowed that if they are not given a permit, they will march anyway.

“We clearly do not have a plan in Chicago for accommodating free expression during the course of the DNC,” Ed Yohnka, director of public policy and communications at ACLU Illinois, said in an interview. “It raises a number of troubling factors in terms of how ultimately people will respond.”

Faayani Aboma Mijana, whose Chicago Alliance Against Racist and Political Repression is among the 70 organizations that are part of the Coalition to March on the DNC, said they are expecting tens of thousands of protesters in the city. Even if there is a cease-fire by August, the protests will not stop until there is a free state of Palestine, he said, and the United States stops funding Israel. But they said they have every intention for their activism to be peaceful.

“My fear is around whether or not the police officers and federal agents don’t infringe on our right to assemble and protest,” they said. “We’re aiming to have a family-friendly protest that families can come to.”

The Secret Service said the exact perimeter has not yet been set. It is still being worked out and a door-to-door canvass of residents in and around the United Center is underway to make sure security checkpoints are the least disruptive possible.

Williams, the attorney representing the coalition, acknowledged that city officials reached out to him after he filed a motion for an injunction this week, asking to discuss alternative routes for marches.

Williams said he also has some trust in Chicago Mayor Brandon Johnson, a longtime progressive organizer who broke a tie vote in the Chicago City Council to pass a resolution calling for a cease-fire in Gaza: “I’m inclined to give this mayor the benefit of the doubt.”

Johnson has repeatedly said he would work to strike a balance between the rights of protesters and not allowing events to devolve into chaos.

A Democratic National Convention official close to logistics planning told NBC News in an interview that they felt “absolutely” assured about the safety and security of the convention and delegations.

“I feel comfortable and I’m confident that we’re going to have a great convention,” the person said.

The logistics planner described intricate, long-term planning over how to safely move delegates from hotels and events to the convention center.

One Democratic strategist familiar with the planning described concerns tied to recent protests as “overblown.”

“Staff is making necessary plans and going through every scenario to make sure they’re prepared. There is no question there are a lot of protests at the president’s events, so they are concerned and want to make sure they’ve got mitigation tactics in place,” the person said. “The concern over the protests is not driving the daily process.”

That person did say there has been talk of convening a team to “remove protests at the private events the president is doing,” and noted that this is an existing protocol.

Reasons for a deeper distrust between activists and authorities are as complicated as Chicago itself, including decades of fraught relations between police and the community, layered over by present-day crime challenges in a city that’s still struggling to shed the stain left by a violent Vietnam War-era Democratic National Convention in 1968.

But one doesn’t have to look back that far for comparisons. During the George Floyd protests , the city struggled with its response to ward off crowds and took the controversial move of raising the bridges in Chicago’s Loop to keep people away.

Less often noted, however, is Chicago’s peaceful convention of 1996, where the most memorable moments were not around police pelting protesters but cringey “Macarena” dancing . A 2012 NATO summit saw large-scale demonstrations and days of protests. While there were some clashes with law enforcement, police largely showed restraint .

While the specter of the 1968 convention still hovers over Chicago, planners call it alarmist thinking.

One historian who was present at the 1968 convention in Chicago called it a “lazy” comparison. Sean Wilentz, a historian and professor at Princeton University, said — while not minimizing today’s conflict — the political climate in the Vietnam War era was incomparable. Thousands of Americans were drafted to fight in the war and were dying. Martin Luther King Jr. had been assassinated that year, as well as Bobby Kennedy.

“The divisions inside the Democratic Party were so profound, much more profound than they are today. … It’s in a wholly different political historical context,” Wilentz said. “I mean, Dan Rather was getting the death kicked out of them by some detective. There were journalists being assaulted on the floor, OK?”

But there’s also a deep-seated distrust between the community and the Chicago police that the department has been trying to shed for decades. Beyond the 1968 convention, where police officers openly clubbed protesters, former police commander Jon Burge strained race relations for a generation after he and his so called “midnight crew” routinely tortured Black suspects into confessing to crimes. It wasn’t until 2008 that Burge was charged in federal court. In 2014, the killing of LaQuan McDonald was another inflection point. A white police officer fired 16 shots at McDonald, who was holding a knife.

Chicago Police Superintendent Larry Snelling this week noted that the college protests in Chicago have so far been peaceful.

“If people are just trying to have their voices heard, hey, this is America, it’s their choice. And it’s our responsibility to protect them while they do it,” he said at a recent forum.

Snelling addressed preparations for the DNC this summer, saying that Chicago police officers are getting multiple hours of training on the First and Fourth amendments. “It’s embedded in every aspect of their training,” he said. “Crime is something we’re not going to tolerate. Because the minute we start tolerating that everything else breaks down and then it’s no longer peaceful protesting, it turns into a riot.”

Activists, however, remain skeptical.

“We don’t see the superintendent as a friend of ours,” said Aboma Mijana, who also does work involving police crimes. “He’s opposed to what we do.”

Natasha Korecki is a senior national political reporter for NBC News.

Kristen Welker is the moderator of "Meet the Press."